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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

FROM HOBBES TO HABERMAS:
THE ANTI-CULTURAL TURN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

The theme of this dissertation is the anti-cultural turn of Western Political Thought
that has emerged out of Enlightenment thinking and was first turned into a comprehensive
political idea by Thomas Hobbes. The Hobbesian worldview makes the case that human
sociability and ultimately culture are the main drivers of conflict, and that the prescriptions
of any political philosophy should aim to replace sociability with individuality.
Beginning with an overview of psychological research into the phenomenon of
culture I put forward the argument that human beings are by nature social and
individualistic, but that they oscillate between their ability to put group-interests before
individual interests and vice versa. Culture is the main mechanism that influences which
interest we give priority. This mechanism work through emotional attachments that create
intuitions about what is morally right and wrong, thereby influencing final behavioral
outcomes.
The Enlightenment and Thomas Hobbes viewed these emotional attachments as an
insufficient or dangerous fundament for social action, leading to a philosophical approach
that put rational individualism at the center of its moral matrix, diminishing the importance
of the emotional attachments created by culture. These attachments are crucial for the
emergence of communities and the ability to engage in collective action. Contrary to the
idea of a community formation driven purely by rationality, I propose that it is the
emotional part of the human psyche that enables us to create family like bonds based onb
culture.

In my dissertation I investigate the consequences of this reductionist view on
culture, and what it can mean for societies and institutions.
KEYWORDS: Modern Political Thought, Social Psychology, Moral Psychology,
Culture, Multiculturalism, New Institutionalism
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
1.1

The Death and Rebirth of Culture

The concept of culture in the discipline of political science has been a particular
knotty category for political scientists and even political theorists. This knottiness stems
not only from its real or seeming contestability, but also because of its relationships with
other disciplines and because of its conceptualization within the political science
community itself. This dissertation seeks to grapple with the notion of culture as an
interdisciplinary term and its relationships with psychology, political theory, and
institutionalism. In order to accomplish this task, I will explore a number of sub-literatures,
some of which are familiar to comparativists and international relations scholars, while
others remain unfamiliar or opaque to writing and research by mainstream political
scientists and are drawn from other disciplines amounting to a fugitive literature within the
political science community.

The hope is that drawing upon these unexplored or

marginalized bodies of works, this dissertation will contribute to a richer and more nuanced
understanding of culture and its place within a more interdisciplinary and global
appreciation of its multi-layered character.
We will begin with the psychology, political theory, and the evolutionary history
of culture. Every type of political theory starts with an assumption about the character of
human nature to explain why human beings behave in a certain way and which political
institutions should be built in order to incentivize behavior that is beneficial for natural
ourselves and the requirements of civil or political society. Building on a theory of human
nature, political theories attempt to create a blueprint for institution building, thereby
bridging the theoretical and the applied aspects of political science.
1

Regardless of whether one considers oneself religious or secular, liberal or
conservative, right-wing or left-wing, each is built upon underlying theory about what the
ideal institutional setup is supposed to look like. What many of these theories share is their
supposed universal assumption that human beings do not differ significantly in the way
they view the world and what they value. This means that once the right theory has been
discovered it should be applicable to all humankind. Of course, even the staunchest
ideologues have been befuddled by the stubbornness with which human beings have been
refused to accept universal designs. The Enlightenment has provided us with a possible
answer for this dilemma, pointing to the self-imposed intellectual immaturity of preenlightened times and the reliance on tradition and convention, which was just another way
of having somebody else do the thinking for us (as argued by Kant 1784). Once we all
started to use our capacity for reason, it was assumed, views of the world and people’s
values would inevitably converge.
The disappearance of fundamental differences would over time allow for a world
governed by a single set of principles. And true enough, we are indeed able to identify
certain human goals and aspirations that seem to be universal in general, but then begin to
differ widely in the particular. For example, to know that all human beings have a desire
for recognition does not mean that all forms of recognition have the same source. 1 In a
warrior culture there are different means to acquire recognition compared with a society
made up of Quakers. Unfortunately, it seems as if the universal is contained in the

1

This has been the most enduring problem for theories like Francis Fukuyama’s End of History
thesis (Fukuyama 2006) that have been largely accurate in their analysis of universals (e.g. the desire for
recognition) but neglected the possible variation in the particulars (the different ways in which the desire for
recognition can be satisfied). In defense of Fukuyama, he has conceded this pointed and tried to address this
shortcoming in later publications (Fukuyama 2012a, 2018).

2

particular: while there are only small differences in the general physiological setup of
human beings, there is room for variation in other aspects. This applies particularly to the
realm of psychology, where we are equipped with the necessary parts of the brain and
hormonal glands to experience feelings and emotions. Still, psychological studies suggest
that variation exists in the specific triggers that activate areas of the brain and influence the
release of certain hormones. Killing many enemies in battle will cause a sense of
exhilaration and pride in the member of a warrior culture but lead to shock and horror for
the previously mentioned member of the Quakers. Despite their similarity as member of
the species, homo sapiens, their bodies react differently to the same external stimulus. This
difference derives from the ability of culture to shape a new combination of stimulus and
physiological reactions.
The human psyche has been uniquely designed to enable social behavior and
cooperation in a variety of ways, involving the whole range of cognitive and emotional
abilities to create complex ways of arranging social structures. 2 In the modern world we
take many of these structures for granted, for example the existence of communities that
go beyond the level of kin and tribe, and thereby underestimate the many processes that
allow large societies to emerge and sustain themselves. Human societies throughout history
have experimented widely with ideas and visions of how to best organize their
communities, sometimes with great success and other times leading to disaster. A crucial
part of these different ideas was that they created different worldviews and values that were
fiercely defended and believed in by their communities. These worldviews and values had

2

To avoid any confusion – the distinction between cognitive and emotional is based on the
assumption that the emotional is intuitive and the cognitive is the conscious and reflexive.
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a crucial impact on the organization of interpersonal relations, defining who belongs to a
certain group and what kind of commitments are expected from members of society. From
different forms of prayer to different gods through dress codes and dietary restrictions,
societies have developed symbols and traditions that were invested with distinctive values
and served as pointers for collective and individual morality.
Without regard at the moment to its origins, morality should be seen as lying at the
heart of every discussion about culture, since it is the realm of morals that deals with the
question of what constitutes good and bad behavior and tries to provide us with an answer
to what behavior or actions are right and wrong. Morality emerges around culture as an
element to enable and organize communal living. In many instances, different cultures
developed similar answers to moral questions; sometimes, however, they led to quite
different ones. Once again, we are faced with a universal human quality that nonetheless
does not allow us to precisely determine the particular. We find moral ideas in all known
societies, but apart from similarities at the meta-level (i.e., the overall question of good vs.
bad that is at the core of moral thinking), actual moral practices can differ widely among
societies.
Therefore, we must start with a deeper investigation of human psychology in order
to identify what causes the variation of worldviews and values among societies, and what
the existence of such a variation means. Growing evidence strongly suggests that
fundamental differences exist in the way people experience the world and social
relationships, some even valuing and treasuring materials and practices that for others
might be regarded as completely worthless or abhorrent. Cultural psychologists, like
Richard Shweder, have demonstrated in cross-cultural studies that people can inhabit
4

different moral worlds consisting of unique value structures that inform human behavior
(Shweder 1990). Being the consequence of social and historical evolution, these different
moral worlds are not just steppingstones towards one future set of shared global values, but
are deeply-held beliefs that inform the daily lives of those who hold them.
There has been a trend in the social sciences over the last couple of decades to
extrapolate and generalize behavior based on a specific subset of the global population.
Searching for participants in psychological studies, researchers often have relied on the
student population at their research institutions, making the psychology of American
undergraduate students a deeply researched area. But is it really the case that the behavior
of this unique group can be applied to all other societies? Or is it more likely that these
studies tell a story about the behavior of an educated age group imbedded in a particular
cultural background? The latter seems significantly more likely and explains why the
replication of psychological experiments often leads to different outcomes when non-US
subjects are chosen (Collaboration 2015).
The fitting acronym for this subset is WEIRD – meaning those from “Western,
educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic” backgrounds. Relying on studies conducted
with participants from this cultural background unintentionally tended to valorize and
generalize a standard of behavior that supposedly was rational and “essential” human
behavior, even though it only applied to the kind of people that actually participated in
those studies. The problem remains that many people around the world have different
backgrounds and therefore show different behavioral patterns; and this makes the reliability
of many behavioral studies highly questionable (Arnett 2008; Henrich, Heine, and
Norenzayan 2010a, 2010b). The emergence of the “WEIRD” standard is another
5

demonstration of how the neglect of cultural differences can create blind spots in our
understanding of human behavior.
For the purpose of my research, the most important variation is in the area of moral
values, and this is where I will anchor my discussion of culture. One of the reasons why
the emergence of a single moral standard seems currently impossible is the emotional
attachment human beings develop towards different rules and practices. I will argue that in
its most basic form these attachments constitute what I mean by the concept of culture: a
set of values that are strongly- and emotionally-held by groups and individuals.
I am especially interested in the moral content of these values, since the moral
values we hold will have a profound impact on the way we treat ourselves and others. These
differences make objective judgments often difficult, but without an attempt at objectivity
one can easily fall into the trap of cultural and moral relativism. Is the practice of female
circumcision, for example, a means of suppressing women or an integral part of being a
member of one’s society and therefore perceived as something positive not just by
supposed male oppressors but by women themselves? (That is the argument of Shweder
2000.) It is without a doubt an interference with the bodily autonomy of the female body,
causing suspicion among the members of a culture whose morality is strongly centered
around the value of individualism. But is sacrificing part of the autonomy over one’s body
to strengthen one’s group membership really morally worse than not doing so? A similar
dilemma, by the way, informs a large part of the discussion regarding abortion in the United
States. There, both sides of the argument have competing moral values: one valuing the
autonomy of the potential mother over her body, while the other side holding fast to its

6

embrace of the responsibility of the community to protect what is viewed as an independent
life.
Moral disagreements are part of the realm of culture, and taking culture seriously
must include taking moral differences seriously. To avoid the trap of relativism or nihilism
from the outset, I will take the position that some things can be objectively the same in one
respect and objectively differ in another. For example, let us assume that there are two
different cultures, with one culture valuing celibacy over everything else and the other
culture having a strong procreation stance. If the members of both cultures emotionally and
voluntarily hold these opposing positions, it is impossible to claim objectively that one
culture is morally superior to the other. We can, however, assume that after a few
generations the culture celebrating celibacy will have significantly lower numbers than
their sexually active competitors. In other words, we can objectively look at the
consequences of culturally created values without doubting the sincerity of those who hold
these values. As I mentioned before, human societies have been experimenting with
different values and there is no guarantee that all of them will lead to the best possible
outcome.
This discussion is of crucial importance to the central arguments in this dissertation,
since contrary to the idea that morality is some form of learned behavior that serves the
purpose of enabling collective action, recent research evidences--and I hold--that basic
moral thinking is most likely innate to human beings (Tooby, Cosmides, and Barrett 2005)
and not acquired exclusively via experience or the consequence of rational calculations.
This innate predisposition to morality is physiologically connected to our emotional
centers, which means that moral behavior always comes with an emotional component that
7

creates the known feelings we experience in connection with morality, like shame for
breaking moral rules or pride in upholding them. But this innate inclination to think in
moral terms does not include a precise prescription of the substance of morals. For
example, as a species, we care among other things about justice and fairness, but we do not
all agree on the same definition of constitutes just and fair dealings. If we assume that
morality is a key factor in creating social order but works not solely through our rational
faculties but has a considerable emotional component, this could mean that any vision of a
purely rational society is an illusion or pipedream. It further means if culture is defined by
the emotional attachment to moral values and moral values are a key ingredient for social
stability, we probably cannot have any theory of social order that excludes culture.
As we will see, thinking in moral terms is a complex process that includes our
cognitive as well as our emotional and intuitive abilities, enabling us not only to define
behavior as either good or bad, but also to physiologically experience emotions such as
shame, pride, disgust, or elevation when confronted with particular triggers that can consist
of objects like food but also and more importantly the observed behavior of others’
behaviors. What these definitions are and what emotions they are triggering are deeply
influenced by cultural learning and the cultural surroundings in which individuals interact.
It is around this connection of the cognitive and the emotional that we must approach the
concept of culture. In the past, the term has been so ubiquitous that it now includes
everything from favorite foods to the ways people dress, thereby diluting the deeper
meaning of culture. To be clear, as anthropologists have shown (e.g., Claude Levi-Strauss),
both food and dress codes can be part of culture, but they do not have to be. For example,
if I should be forbidden to wear baseball caps, my emotional reaction would hardly be
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detectable, while banning headscarves for Muslims or yarmulkes for Jews wiould most
likely cause more of an emotional issue for these groups.
But not only religious communities show these kinds of emotional attachments:
Despite the claims in many Western societies that politics should be conducted objectively
and technocratically, public discourse is full of emotional content. Positions on abortion,
migration, the environment, or economic policies are not so often contentious because one
side has knowledge the other does not, but because the issues create different emotional
reactions (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt and Hersh 2001). Cultural similarities
and cultural differences do not follow national borders, and cultural gaps can easily open
up within a country just as they can become narrower between the populations of different
countries. To use but one example, a devout German and Chinese Catholic will probably
find more familiarity with each other than a German atheist and a German convert to Islam.
National cultures are cultures as long as national identity is also an emotional experience;
thus, if the emotional attachment breaks away, it will become more difficult to keep the
community together. None of this, by the way, trades away the human ability for
rationality. It is a mistake to constantly see the emotional and the rational as stark opposites.
They can pull in different directions, but also support each other. The abolition of slavery,
for example, was grounded in sound and rational arguments, but no one should doubt the
emotional commitment coming from the abolitionists.
Both the cognitive and the emotional quality of human beings need to be taken
seriously as equally important elements of enabling social life. While the rediscovered
scrutiny regarding the cognitive-rationalist model is welcome, we should not make the
mistake to move so far in the other direction that every action is now viewed as the result
9

of underlying emotional commitments and every claim to rationality is a mere illusion of
the mind. David Hume’s statement that “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume
2011, 174) has become a popular one-liner among the critics of rationalism (e.g. Haidt
2013, 29, 79, 381; Simler and Hanson 2018, 91); and for some, it purportedly demonstrates
how we are in the end all servants of our sub- and unconsciousness. Interestingly enough,
however, Hume himself does not come to this conclusion. For him, passion and reason can
sometimes stand in contradiction with one other, but it does not have to be so in every case
(Hume 2011, 175) – which is the same argument I am making. The important question
David Hume and later Adam Smith are asking is not whether passions are more important
than reason, but what causes passion for one thing but not another. Far from exchanging
one for the other, Hume and others have sought to identify the best possible means of
cooperation between passion and reason, captured explicitly in Adam Smith’s dictum that
“the great secret of education is to direct vanity to proper objects” (Smith 1982, 259).
Even if we were to accept it as factual that passion comes first and reason second,
the question of what we are passionate about still remains unanswered. Culture can provide
an answer here, because creating triggers for specific passions is exactly what culture does.
And it is the variation in these triggers that we mean when we talk about cultural, moral,
or psychological pluralism. The universal capacity for experiencing emotions but the
potential differences in what triggers them is at the heart of the previously mentioned
experiments in society building. Aristotle pointed to the importance of this when and
explained that the right triggers for emotions are key to a virtuous society: “to feel them at
the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right
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motive, and in the right way” (Aristotle 2009, 30). Not coincidentally, Aristotle and Smith
sound very similar, for both realized that the idea of a dispassionate society is impossible,
and that what is needed is not abandoning passion, but directing it towards proper objects.
If the guidance of human passions is so important and culture plays such a key role
in its stwardship, why does it seem that the question of culture has fallen out of fashion in
most of the social sciences. I argue that there has been a continuing thread throughout
modern and post-modern Western philosophy that has created the impression that a
universalist political theory is possible under the exclusion of culture. The reason for this,
however, was not that culture was seen as unimportant – on the contrary, it was seen as a
major threat to a stable political order due to its emphasis and an appeal to human emotions.
Hobbes and others correctly pointed out that if we did not care so much for the actions of
others, the world would be a much more peaceful place. But what if the lives of others in
both positive and negative ways mean so much to us because it is hardwired into our
psyche? The aforementioned innate quality of moral thinking is strong evidence that we
are by design made to care about the actions of others. This is further supported by the
research into our closest animal relatives, namely chimpanzees and other primates, that
have a less developed but nonetheless existing moral sense that in turn allows them to build
social structures (F. B. M. de Waal 2007; Frans B. M. de Waal 1997). Looking at human
evolution, society seems to be much more natural to us than modern theories of
individualism would allow us to suspect. Which brings us to another key question: What
comes first, community (and later society) or the individual?
This is the question we have to ask, because from Hobbes to the key thinkers of the
Enlightenment society and community were no longer seen as ends in themselves, but were
11

reduced to a functionalist purpose in order to ensure the survival and well-being of the
individual. 3 This was a cultural shift that occurred as a consequence of the Enlightenment
and left Western society with a definition of morality that almost exclusively rested on the
relationship between individuals, pushing the autonomous value of community out of the
picture (Graham et al. 2013, 6; Shweder 1990; Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller 1987). The
view of community that derived from a functionalist and utilitarian perspective marks the
anti-cultural turn of Western political thinking. It is anti-cultural in the sense that the idea
of commonly-held values was replaced by the value of individual liberation under the sole
condition that the liberty of one must not infringe on the liberty of another. This in itself is
more a change than an abandonment of culture, but I prefer the term anti-cultural because
it captures better how the Western tradition perceived this shift. It was not viewed as
cultural change, but as its replacement with reason and rationality. The turn towards reason
explicitly rejected the idea of emotional attachments to group values.
Before I continue, it is important to mention that the aim of my argument is not to
reject this new culture of individualism and individualistic reason, but to realize that it is a
culture in its own right with its own moral core. Contrary to some of the most vocal critics
of modern liberalism (e.g. Deneen 2018), the point is not to re-erect the specter of some
imaginary pre-Enlightenment period, but to build a solid defense of liberal society through
the recognition of its cultural character. Once it becomes clear that Western liberalism
inhabits its own moral and therefore cultural world, it should help us to better understand
the relationship between Western and non-Western cultures. In fact, the anti-cultural turn

3

That is the truly revolutionary content of social contract theory: Community becomes fully justified
by its utility for individual members, but community as such ceases to be an end in itself.
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in the West is strong evidence for the role of culture in influencing the relationship between
the cognitive and the emotional. The ability to use our natural inclination towards
community and build a society based on an emotional commitment to the principle of
individualism and individual autonomy is truly astounding. I will return to this topic later
when we discuss how culture not only creates communities, but also breaks them –
especially the more instinct-based bonds between family members.
The rejection of culture that was built into the thinking of Hobbes and others (e.g.,
Bernard Mandeville) was also a linked to the increasingly important role of commerce,
since the benefits of trade and economic prosperity were supposed to replace the downsides
of culture. Economics was imagined as the means through which individualism and
materialism would become our primary concern, thereby breaking the bonds of culture and
the emotional baggage it makes us carry. 4 If we focus most of our energy on our
endowment with material goods, peace will become more beneficial than war, and
cooperation will be more valuable than old antagonisms. We will also see, however, that
this idea caused discernable unease for figures like Adam Smith and David Hume, who
realized that the emphasis on materialism leaves out important aspects of what it means to
be human. Smith especially would be surprised that the average undergraduate student at
a Western university is more likely to know his Wealth of Nations (Smith 2005) than The
Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 1982), which he continued to revise and update until
his death and which puts so much emphasis on the importance of human beings as social

4

It is no coincidence that historical materialists and Marxists always had an uneasy relationship
with culture and viewed it is part of the superstructure, since they fall squarely on the anti-cultural side of
Western political thought.
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creatures (Macfie 1959, 223–24). 5 While Smith hints at the potential cultural emptiness of
a purely materialistic world created by capitalism, Joseph Schumpeter fully expanded on
the idea in a way that is helpful for our discussion of culture. The capitalist system enables
tremendous economic growth through the liberation of the individual and the permission
to own and sell labor as well as private property. Yet despite this economic expansion and
its benefits, social relationships start to change with growing inequality and the different
abilities that people can sell at different prices in the marketplace. If we were be truly selfcentered individuals, the poverty or wealth of others would not bother us, but since we are
psychologically hard-wired to care about others, the rising inequality emerging from the
overall success of the capitalist system causes us unease. Schumpeter fears that this unease
will make people turn against capitalism and usher in some form of socialism (Schumpeter
1994).
I would argue though that Schumpeter only got it half-right: It is less the
economic system that causes the psychological unease than the individualism that underlies
it. This is, however, mostly a cultural and not an economic problem. To return to Adam
Smith, the reason why he separated his work into a volume on economics and a volume on
sentiments was that he explicitly distinguished between the benefits of individualism in the
market and its downsides in other areas of life. The success of the capitalist system has
motivated social theorists to apply its underlying principles to the entirety of human
experiences, hoping to be able to explain all human behavior based on the desire for
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Smith is not the only economist whose writings against the utility-maximizing approach have been
largely ignored in modern times despite being popular names in economic departments. Joseph Schumpeter
and Alfred Marshall among others are also read mostly in a selective fashion these days, ignoring the
significant attention they paid to the non-rational side of human beings.
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material gain we see in the marketplace. 6 The concept of individualism has become so
persuasive that most of capitalism’s sharpest critics cannot detach themselves from it. The
argument that modern capitalism has been destroying authentic communal life assumes
that this authentic community was the consequence of individual choice, and it was only
the capitalist mode of production that deprived people of autonomous decision making and
forced them into a life of anonymous wage labor. This argument, however, puts reality
upside down: the reason why communal life seemed more authentic in pre-capitalist times
is because without it, people would have had a hard time surviving.
The often-floated idea that capitalism creates greed or egoism seems doubtful and
it is more likely that the productive success of the capitalist system made egoism an option
that was not available before. Even the biggest egocentric individual needed community to
survive, so he or she did not really have a choice in the matter.
This is why it is so important for this dissertation to include a discussion of the
social evolution of humankind, in order to show that in the beginning community was not
a choice, but a necessity for survival. In other words, the idea that individualism is at the
core of human behavior and all other behaviors can be reduced to it stands in stark contrast
to what was necessary for our species to survive. To a certain degree, most theories of the
contemporary social sciences resemble a materialist interpretation of history based on
utility maximization (Ziliak and McCloskey 2008). Culture remains a contested issue in
the discipline of political science because it clashes with some of its core assumptions—
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This is not only true for the social sciences. As I will explain in a later chapter, the criticism of
group-selection in evolutionary theory or the reduction of behavior to the actions of “selfish genes” (e.g.
Dawkins 2016) is often nothing more than the application of the neoclassical economic approach in the
natural sciences.
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primarily, the concepts of utility and rationality. The scientific revolution and its methods
that drove and were driven by the Enlightenment undercut and contradicted the concept of
culture, since a part of cultural behavior is the acceptance and emulation of behavior for
reasons that cannot be explained by individual utility or rationality (or at least not without
turning them into tautological concepts). Pure methodological individualism could
theoretically do without culture, for culture is facilitating and depending on community. In
a society of completely autonomous individuals, there would be no need for culture. In the
worst case, culture with its moral codes and ideas can be an obstacle for the good of society,
since it blinds us to the best possible options due to our emotional commitment to culture.
The completely autonomous individual, however, should increasingly be understood as the
consequence and not the starting point of culture. It was due to changes in institutions and
the economic modes of production that individualism became an option and an actual
culture of individualism could emerge.
The mistaken assumption that individualism is our true nature caused Western
thinkers from Hobbes to Freud to the contemporary social sciences, to argue that there is a
“struggle between nature and culture” (Kaye 1991, 90). These critics of culture claim that
our true instincts, which are supposedly individualistic and materialistic, clash with the
requirements of community thereby creating a constant state of anxiousness and even
neurosis for human beings. One way to resolve this anxiety would be for us to get rid of
culture altogether and remain solitary, coming together only under the umbrella of a social
contract and only when it is necessary to further individual wealth and well-being.
The idea that community as such provides pleasure or could be seen as an end in
itself regardless of its materialistic consequences is today a minority view in the social
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sciences. Modern Western institutions have been so successful in liberating the
autonomous individual that philosophers like Hobbes and Rousseau took a cultural
achievement – the concept of individualism – and conceived it as the natural state of affairs
(Fukuyama 2012a, 29; Greif 2006, 26). Considering the dark and violent times the early
Enlightenment thinkers had to endure while formulating their theories, their suspicion of
human passions beyond the desire for material possession can be well understood. 7
The final part of the dissertation will engage the question of institutions and
institution building. There are growing concerns from multiple scholars that the political
and social institutions in the West are fracturing and decaying (Ferguson 2013; Fukuyama
2000, 2013, 2014, 2016; Haidt 2013; Murray 2012; Putnam 1995, 2016; Skocpol 2004;
Wolfe 1999). I believe that culture could help provide us with part of the answer to what
is going on. To be clear once again, those who expect an argument lamenting the loss of
culture and how modernity has turned us into philistines who are staggering towards a
societal abyss will be disappointed. There is no lack of culture in the West, but there is a
lack of understanding what our culture is. The struggle between individualism and
collectivism has been dealt with in the realms of theory since the days of the Enlightenment,
and the gradual triumph of individualism had many positive consequences, reaching from
equality before the law, equal participation in politics, and the right to private property to
the right for individual recognition in ever more areas of life, including religious, ethnic,
and sexual orientation. Yet none of this would have been possible without the emotional
and therefore cultural attachment to the value of individualism. In the final part of the
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Both Hobbes and Locke, for example, lived during the Thirty Years War and the English Civil

War.
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dissertation, I will continue to argue that modern individualism is a cultural phenomenon,
and not simply the consequence of the overcoming of culture through reason and
rationality. However, both reason and rationality provide us with the tools necessary to
understand their cultural underpinning.
Institutions represent formalized rules and practices of a society, but the legitimacy
of these institutions and the will of people to follow the rules and practices depends strongly
on the emotional attitude people hold towards them. Aoki (Aoki 2001) and Boettke et al.
(Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson 2008, 334) emphasize “the importance of informal
complementary institutions that allow formal institutions to function in the desired
manner.” Francis Fukuyama makes a similar point, arguing for the necessary distinction
between formal institutions like constitutions and legal systems, and “informal norms that
fall into the realm of culture” (Fukuyama 2012b, 531). Niall Ferguson, who champions the
institutional approach as a historian and regularly issues “health warnings” (Ferguson
2013, 27) with regard to cultural interpretations, admits that “institutions are, of course, in
some sense the products of culture” (Ferguson 2011, 10). Institutions and culture, therefore,
are corresponding concepts. Institutions are created in order to constrain and shape
individual behavior via mechanics of reward and punishment, but also by creating social
norms that define actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden (Crawford and
Ostrom 1995). The content of these norms, however, varies from culture to culture (Ostrom
2000, 144).
The neoinstitutional economist Avner Greif argues that Western institutions “may
have undermined themselves in the long run by creating excessive individualism and
materialism” (Greif 2006, 26). Maybe, but I believe that the bigger problem is that
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individualism is still perceived as an objective norm, and people who are trying to act
rationally might feel a temptation to act individualistically, if not egoistically. The
realization that the sustainability of existing political institutions rests on our collective
emotional attachment to certain values could be an important step to maintain the
achievements of individualism and prepare it for future challenges.
In short, this dissertation will tell three stories: The first story is about how nature
has designed us not only social but cultural beings; the second story is about how a large
part of Western political philosophy has tried to overcome our culturability (to coin a
neologism); and the third story is about how the interaction of the first two is influencing
contemporary political and social institutions.
To tell these stories in an historical-theoretical and interdisciplinary mode, I will
explore what I term the “psychology, biology, anthropology, and history of culture.”
Culture has been treated as a subject in many disciplines, and my attempt is to sew some
of these threads together to form a non-contradictory whole. The first step in this endeavor
is to take a close examine on what biological and psychological basis culture can emerge
at all, and how these fundamentals have evolved and played out through the known history
of our species. The methodological approach of this dissertation is largely theoretical, so it
is a justified question what new kinds of knowledge or insights will be produced by it. The
ultimate attempt is to demonstrate two things: First, that emotions as the main element of
culture are a necessary element of political life and social order, but that at the same time
this element does not always cause outcomes that we would evaluate as good in a moral
sense. My argument is that emotional ties to a community are a necessity to enable social
life and that these ties can be sources of strength as well as sources weakness, but that
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without them we would hardly observe any social life at all. Secondly, I put forward an
argument that this has been realized by numerous thinkers up to modernity, but that authors
like Hobbes and Locke viewed the ability to culture as a mostly destructive force, which is
why they proposed to replace emotional ties to society with commercial interests. It was
only later with the rise of economics that what they proposed as a prescriptive idea turned
into a descriptive conceptualization of human nature. In other words, homo economicus
was the goal of Hobbes and Locke, but not the starting point as in many of today’s social
sciences.
My argument, however, is novel in the sense that I am looking for evidence in the
natural sciences before I engage with the points made by political theory. It is only through
the establishment of some basic facts of human existence as a biological reality that I move
to the idea of social life as a cultural reality.
1.2

Method and Chapter Outline

The attempt to find a common methodological approach for history and political
theory is a challenging undertaking. Historians like J.G.A. Pocock reason that philosophers
and historians “fancy that they wisely kept out of each other’s way” (Pocock 2009, 124),
including the often mentioned fact that Socrates and Thucydides lived at the same time,
yet there is no proof that they ever interacted with one another. In my dissertation, I try to
bridge this divide because theory can only be politically relevant if it interprets existing
facts without an overreliance on potentially unrealistic assumptions. Political theorists have
often been “silent on the question of method and approach” (Leopold and Stears 2008,
Kindle Location 68). While there are some exceptions (for an example, see: Skinner 2002),
methods remain a contested concept in political theory. The approach of my dissertation
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seeks to emulate elements of Charles Taylor’s and Jürgen Habermas’ way of reasoning as
a productive dialectic between history and political theory and between the real and the
ideal. A work in political theory and philosophy can hardly be without a normative
component, for the normative element is the standard against which the theorizing of reality
takes place.

Combining theory and historical analysis, I attempt to formulate a genealogy of the
relationship between political science and culture since Thomas Hobbes. At the center of
my genealogy is the attempt to isolate the way in which the perception of culture for
political theorists has changed over time.
In addition to thus genealogical approach, I attempt to contrast political theories
and their treatment of culture with the approaches taken by psychology. The guiding idea
here is to find a means of conceptual and vertical integration, striving to achieve some
consistency between psychology and political theory. The walls between the natural and
the social sciences seem often impenetrable due to the “inglorious isolation” that persists
between the fields of behavioral and social sciences as well as the natural sciences
themselves (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1995, KL 77). From an epistemological
viewpoint such isolation is a substantial hindrance to coming close to identifying the true
causes of political phenomena. The inclusion of psychology in any theory of human
interaction is necessary, since “a social science theory that is incompatible with known
psychology is as dubious as a neurophysiological theory that requires an impossible
biochemistry” (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1995, KL 83). The understanding of certain
psychological processes creates opportunities to understand and evaluate not only the basic
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assumptions but also the more normative quality of political theories. The findings in the
field of social psychology, for example, have provided new insights into the dichotomy of
human beings as both social and individualistic beings and how these different traits can
be activated (Kluver, Frazier, and Haidt 2014). Therefore, any social theory that, for
example, defines the true self of an individual solely as being part of a socioeconomic class
(a Marxian fallacy) or being almost exclusively individualistic (a libertarian fallacy) falls
short of the actual reality of human behavior. This observation bears good news, for it is a
rejection of any form of monocausal determinism. Different factors are mutually interplay
and influence each other, some of them of a biological and genetic nature, others of a social
nature. Human behavior cannot be reduced to social or biological factors but should be
viewed through a lens of neuroplasticity, the idea that brain structure influences our ability
for social interaction, but this interaction also influences the brain structure. This is an
especially helpful approach, I believe, for it cautions us against one-directional or
monocausal reasoning. It is the interplay of social and biological factors that lead to
different outcomes (Cacioppo and Berntson 2004; Holmes 2013).
One can only agree with the conclusion that “the whole incoherent opposition
between socially determined (or culturally determined) phenomena and biologically
determined (or genetically determined) phenomena should be consigned to the dustbin of
history, along with the search for a biology-free social science” (Barkow, Cosmides, and
Tooby 1995, KL 781-782). The most fruitful engagement with culture is to assume “a
universal human nature, but that this universality exists primarily at the level of evolved
psychological mechanisms, not of expressed cultural behaviors” (Barkow, Cosmides, and
Tooby 1995, KL 87).
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In the first two chapters and their subchapters I will establish the connection
between culture and psychology, successfully demonstrating (I hope) that culture is not
simply an acquired or learned behavior, but based on an innate drive to cultural activity
based on biological factors. I try to further highlight this innate character of culture by a
close look at the anthropological record, showing that while culture is universal, cultural
uniformity does not exist. Culture can be an important element in supporting the adaption
of groups and their social behavior to a changing environment, but it can also lead to
maladaptation, where social practices counteract the sustainability of communities.
In chapter three I begin to engage with the ways in which culture tends to be
misinterpreted in the contemporary social sciences. All too often, I argue, cultures gets
equated with ethnicity or other physiological factors that can overlap with culture, but does
not constitute a cultural phenomenon in itself. Following a clarification of how this
dissertation defines culture, I turn towards the school of thought that probably had the
largest influence in the sidelining of culture, namely rational choice theory and the science
of economics.
Chapter four will attempt to demonstrate that economic and rational-choice
thinking are themselves the product of a cultural evolution, and that we have to pay
particular attention to the writings of Thomas Hobbes, who was the first thinker in the
Western philosophical canon to turn against culture. Hobbes did not do so, because he
viewed culture as unimportant, but because he saw it as a main source of conflict and
consequently violence. It is with Hobbes that homo economicus emerges as a normative
proposal that later becomes the supposedly objective fundament of modern economic and
rational thinking.
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Chapter five engages with some of the most influential thinkers of modernity and
culture, particularly Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor, and the critical analysis of their
respective theories serve as a backdrop for my argument that even those who try taking
culture seriously often get stuck in a Hobbesian mode of thinking where culture ultimately
is more of an option than a necessity.
The dissertation closes with a final chapter offering an outlook and an argument
that seeks to demonstrate that we cannot fully understand the functioning of institutions
without taking culture into account, since the belief systems and emotional commitments
people are holding influence not only their behavior, but the very legitimacy of existing
institutions in the first place.
CHAPTER II: THE PSYCHOLOGY, BIOLOGY, AND ANTHROPOLOGY OF CULTURE
2.1

The Culture-Psychology Connection

According to Raymond Williams, “Culture is one of the two or three most
complicated words in the English language” and by definition an essentially contested
concept, and the question of what actually constitutes “culture” can neither be settled
conclusively by empirical methods nor is there some form of general agreement in
theoretical terms (Clegg and Haugaard 2009, 3). Similarly to the concept of art, it is hard
to argue about the essence of culture because the term invites endless disputes about their
proper uses on the part of their users” (Gallie 1955, 167, 169). Culture, of course is not the
only essentially contested concept in political science, and some even argue that politics
itself is an essentially contested concept (Connolly 1974). It is for this reason, that I need
to provide a clear understanding as to how the term culture is used in the context of this
dissertation.
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The description of culture as referring to “the overall way of life of a people,”
(Huntington 2002, KL 648) is too universal a formulation to allow for the effective
operationalization of the term. The confusion is so widespread that Clifford Geertz
provides us with 11 definitions of culture, while an interdisciplinary survey produces no
less than 160 definitions of culture across the fields of anthropology, sociology, and
psychology among others (Fukuyama 1996, 33; Geertz 1993, 4–5). So one of the
difficulties with defining culture is that we are having a hard time recognizing it when we
see it. While it is true that there are all kinds of definitions, they do share one thing: They
all deal with the relationship between the individual and community.
In order to fully develop a theory of culture in political science, the first step is to
realize that culture operates on a cognitive as well as an emotional level. It is important to
remember that the separation of the spheres of the natural and social world was an
intellectual decision, but in reality these two things do not exist independently from each
other. In the following chapters, we will explore this complex relationship. In his work on
the structure of behavior, Merleau-Ponty points out that we have to understand the human
body as a whole that integrates mind and matter (Merleau-Ponty 1967). This duality is
important because my discussion of the role of emotions and culture is a critique of “the
prevalent scientific reduction of human behavior to material conditions alone” (Low 2004,
412). My approach, however, it does not attempt to claim that material considerations are
irrelevant. My criticism instead aims at a more nuanced appreciation and understanding of
human nature and the individual, claiming that we can identify different behavioral patterns
based on the cultural surroundings. The ability to reason and the ability to express passion
are two integral aspects of what it means to be human, and both fulfill evolutionary
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purposes. For good reason culture has fallen into disrepute in the West since, beginning
with Hobbes, the passions have been under suspicion as the cause of violent conflict. While
Hobbes and others offer a strong case that we will explore in more detail in part two of this
dissertation, we have to ask whether a world without passions is even possible.
In the beginning, we will take a close look at the biological underpinnings that make
culture possible in the first place, then turn to the history of why Western political theory
has turned its back on culture. Without giving too much away, let it be said that the rejection
of culture as a fundamental part of the political is in itself a cultural phenomenon. Driven
by their historical experiences, some of the early key figures of modern political thought
deliberately attempted to purge culture from politics. They, of course, did not call it culture
then but referred to the problem of the human passions. In the 17th century Hugo Grotius
identified in his attempt to formulate a legal and moral framework for war and peace that
the human desire for both individualism and community is responsible for the impossibility
of erecting a truly peaceful and harmonious society (Hunter and Nedelisky 2018, 38). Just
as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke realized after him that the emotional bonds of loyalty
that tie us to communities and their members, as well as the symbols, institutions, values,
and traditions that characterize the community, are in the way for a society based solely on
individualistic reason. They proposed different remedies for this problem: Hobbes
suggested what amounts to a form radical individualism that is maintained by the allpowerful Leviathan while Locke planned to redirect and transform the desire for
community into a desire for economic success. The Enlightenment in both its Anglo-Saxon
and continental variations continued and refined this approach, arguing that these
emotional bonds can be made superfluous and replaced with the growing access of
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individuals to the faculties of reason. Loyalty was supposed to be no longer based on
emotions, but had to be justifiable in the name of reason, which was soon interpreted to
mean that the most reasonable community is the one that best serves the materialistic and
utilitarian needs of the individual. It did not take long for this view to encounter its backlash
in form of the Counter-Enlightenment and German idealism. A lot of ink has been spilled
describing the differences between the Scottish and the French Enlightenment, whether
Rousseau was more a figure of the Enlightenment or of the Counter-Enlightenment, and if
German idealism in its most pessimistic form was the first step on the road to Auschwitz
(S. B. Smith 2016; Sternhell, Sznajder, and Ašerî 1994; Strong 2012). These debates all
have value on their own, but I believe that there is an underlying meta-theme that informs
both the Enlightenment and its enemies, and that is the uneasy tension between community
and modernity. The Enlightenment correctly anticipated the unprecedented possibilities for
human individualism that would result from the shedding of traditions. Still, it
underestimated that communities and their traditions were not just a necessary evil but
were fulfilling an important role in human life. The Counter-Enlightenment, on the other
hand, was terrified by this individualism and tried to rescue an idea of community that most
likely never fully existed and even if were possible, would have had a hard time
withstanding modernity.
Not surprisingly, both sides of the debate have not yet delivered on their core
promise. Neither the Enlightenment has not succeeded in freeing us from our passions and
deliver us to the guidance of reason, and the Counter-Enlightenment has failed in its
attempts to save authentic communities from the onslaught of modernity and the
rationalization of everyday life. The question of how society emerges and how individuals
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become part of it has been core questions of philosophy and the social sciences since Plato,
but it is a characteristic of modernity to try to answer this question without referring to
culture. The idea that society emerges as the result of a voluntary social contract or is the
consequence of enlightened individuals realizing that they will be better off if they work
together gives too much credit to our ability for rational thought while ignoring other
elements that contribute to being human. As we will see later in this chapter, it is impossible
to understand the phenomenon of culture without reference to emotions, and in the course
of this discussion it will become clear why culture is so problematic for the modern,
enlightened mind that wishes to base all decision making on rationality. The truly rational
mind has no need for emotions which ultimately also means that there is no need for
culture. Even postmodernity, which takes a more critical stance towards Enlightenment
rationality ultimately comes down on the anti-cultural side.
In one of the defining works of postmodernism by Francois Lyotard it is explained
that postmodernity is built on the assumption of the “obsolescence of the metanarratives
apparatus of legitimation,” the “incredulity towards metanarratives” and the “narrative
function losing its functor, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal”
(Lyotard 1984, xxiv). These metanarratives – whether in form of traditions, religions, or
ideologies – are of course a central part of culture. Discarding them ultimately means to
impoverish the idea of culture as a crucial element of the human condition.
The better we understand our species, however, the more unlikely it seems that this
vision of a society comprised solely of individuals and without a shared culture will find
fulfillment. As the 20th century has shown, we are nowhere near to becoming the
dispassionate, calculating individuals that out of pure rationality can and will create a state
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of perpetual peace. But we are also not in a position to turn back the clock to the imagined
world of authentic communities that the Counter-Enlightenment so desired. Since neither
of those two will be achievable in their purest form, we need to ask the question: what at
best is possible? Despite the singular and distinctive claims of each side, both the
Enlightenment’s individualism and the Counter-Enlightenment’s emphasis on community
appeal to our human nature. In other words, we are uniquely capable of simultaneously
desiring individual freedom and autonomy and desiring community and recognition by
others. Culture is a mediator between those two poles, creating the environment and the
psychological triggers that activate either our individualistic or our communitarian side.
The main mechanism for this is the human ability to feel emotions that influence our
behavior. Therefore, it is the emotions to which we must turn first when we discuss the
phenomenon of culture.

2.1.1

Culture as an Emotional Phenomenon

There is a scene in the black comedy film, “American Psycho,” that seems to
capture an essential part of how culture works. In one scene in this film, various characters
compare their business cards. With the exception of the name, each business card contains
identical information since everyone works at the same Wall Street company as a vice
president without any specified portfolio. The information is what one would expect to
find: the name and position of the employee, the company’s name, and some contact
information. There is nothing particularly special about any of them; the simple utility of
business cards is intended to facilitate the exchange of contact information. Yet the main
character almost experiences a nervous breakdown when he glimpses the business cards of
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his co-workers. He believes that their cards have more exquisite coloring, lettering, and
paper, causing him to start perspiring uncontrollably. As it turns out, business cards are the
main indicator of status in this company, so even though there is no difference in the
material utility between a cheap and an expensive card, there is an additional psychological
cost for being seen with a cheaper card than others. The physiological reaction of our
character, his uncontrolled sweating and shaking, is an emotional reaction triggered by an
environment that was created through culture. There is nothing innate about the character’s
reaction to being exposed to his partners’ business cards, but his body is instinctively
exhibiting a physiological reaction beyond his control. The movie was of course creating
an exaggerated caricature of the 90s’ Wall Street investment banker, but the audience
immediately gets the pun--that even though the main character has a life free of material
worries, a small thing like a business card triggers a profound emotional reaction that seems
entirely disproportionate.
What we see in this movie occurs on an almost daily basis in real life as well; people
tend to react emotionally to things that have no direct influence on their material well-being
or physical security but impinge on what is perceived as culturally relevant. The emotions
we observe in everyday life are not separate from the dominant cultural frame in which
specific social situations are constructed and, therefore, cannot be separated from culturespecific patterns of thinking, acting, and interacting (Kitayama and Markus 1994, 4).
Culture not only creates the connection between what kind of physiological reaction
occurs, but also influences whether a reaction occurs at all. If I am not aware of the cultural
importance of business cards in the film’s fictional company, I would not feel any shame
in having a cheap card or pride for having an expensive one or envy towards someone who
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has the most exquisite business card. It simply would not matter. Yet once we have
internalized the cultural framework that organizes our emotional triggers, it can be difficult
to turn them off.or hold them at bay.
Jonathan Haidt describes a related phenomenon in his research about moral
dumbfounding. Moral dumbfounding describes the strong moral intuition that makes us
perceive something as wrongin the absence of having reasons to support that intuition
(Haidt 2003, 280). In Haidt’s experimental setup to study moral dumbfounding, the
researcher confronts his subjects with stories about incest (is it ok to have sex with a
sibling?), food (is it ok to eat your dog?), and other provocative scenarios (e.g., having
intercourse with a ready-to-cook chicken?). All these stories make clear that no one is
harmed by the actions described, all actions are consensual, and there are no negative longterm consequences (Haidt 2001; Haidt and Hersh 2001; Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993).
Nonetheless, many sujects condemned these actions and tried to justify their judgment by
presenting illogical reasons like the idea that fully-cooked dog meat will make a person
sick (Haidt 2003, 280). Many of the participants in Haidt’s et al. studies were judging the
actions based on their moral intuition, that upon hearing one of the stories caused them to
have an emotional reaction like a feeling of disgust, without having a rational explanation
for it. Only after they experienced these emotions did test participants try to justify them
on rational grounds. Haidt’s work demonstrated that the long held assumption that moral
judgments are the result of rational learning and evaluation is at least partially wrong.
In the early stages of moral psychology a popular idea was that as we grow up, we
learn and refine our autonomous understanding of moral behavior with limited or no
influence from society (see, for example: Kohlberg 1969; Piaget and Inhelder 1969). This
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view was based on the observation that children change their moral reasoning as they grow
up, which was interpreted as the maturation of their brains, the approach towards questions
of morality becomes also increasingly the subject of reasoned evaluation. To put it
differently, small children might be annoyed when you try to cheat at a game of marbles,
but it will not be until a later stage of their development that they will be capable explaining
to another person why it is morally wrong (for an excellent overview and critique of
Kohlberg and Piaget see: Haidt 2013, chap. 1). As humans grow up, however, they come
to inhabit the moral domain and increasingly are able to rationally grasp why there is a
moral dimension to appropriate and inappropriate behaviour.
The problem with this assumption is that the subject-children grew up in the same
cultural environment as their observers, so there is the risk that what was perceived as
growing rationality was in fact just the subject-children increasingly adopting to their
cultural environment. It is important to add that Kohlberg nowhere claims that there is one
objective morality based on pure reason; his argument is limited to the development of
moral reasoning independent of its content. As Reid and Yanarella point out,
two subjects may reach diametrically opposed conclusions
concerning a particular moral dilemma and yet be situated in the same stage
of moral development by virtue of the parallel modes of reasoning
employed” (Reid and Yanarella 1977, 507).

The issue with Kohlberg’s approach is that it places all the emphasis of moral
development on the human faculty for reason neglecting the role of emotions. The theories
of Piaget, Kohlberg and other psychological rationalists, on my view, underestimate or
downplay the role of moral intuition and how we physiologically react to moral phenomena
without knowing exactly why. Haidt’s approach of moral dumbfounding has demonstrated
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not just the important role of intuition, but also that there is no universality to moral
intuition across different societies.
These studies revealed an important insight that is highly relevant for the question
of culture: Not all people reacted the same way, and there were differences between
Westerners and non-Westerners but also among Westerners who identify as either
conservative, liberal, or libertarian. It turned out that in these studies liberals and
libertarians exhibit a higher tolerance towards the actions described above, but the reason
is not that they are quicker in coming up with a rational answer. As Haidt points out, for
these groups individual autonomy is of high emotional value; therefore, the approval to do
what some others see as a taboo violation comes easier (Haidt 2013, 110). The fact that the
same action can lead to different emotional reactions that we nonetheless try to justify
rationally, tells us a lot about the role of culture. People learn through culture how to
interact emotionally with their environment. While the used intuitive systems (i.e. the
variety of emotions that exist) are universal, cultures build upon them differently, creating
frames of meaning that connect emotions to actions in ways other cultures do not (J.
Graham et al. 2013).
It turns out that homo sapiens is not only a thinking species but also a feeling
species, and the relationship between those two is not always clear. Culture plays an
important role in linking them, and we will see that the artificial dichotomy between
rational and emotional behavior no longer captures enough of the complexity of human
beings’ actions. One of the most puzzling aspects is that the human species, on the one
hand, has evolved too far in its cognitive abilities to be purely instinct driven, but, on the
other hand, is still such an emotional creature that we occasionally lose the ability to use
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our cognitive abilities. There is a tendency to value one faculty more than the other, but
both aspects serve evolutionary purposes, and the human species would have been at a
disadvantage if it would have had to rely exclusively on one. None other than Charles
Darwin made the point that intellect and social instincts condition one another, and that
cognitive acts can lead to the creation of emotionally-binding institutions (Thompson 1995,
7). Culture can serve as a bridging device between the cognitive and the emotional through
the formation of group and individual identities. The reason, for example, why people join
a community can be purely cognitive and driven by rational self-interest. The decision to
stay with a community when it comes under stress, however, can be based on the loyalty
and obligation one feels towards it, making it an emotional decision. As Richard Sosis and
others have demonstrated, one of the reasons why religious institutions show more
longevity than comparable secular institutions is because the former fosters emotional ties
between the community and the individual that go beyond mere self-interest (Sosis and
Alcorta 2003; Sosis and Bressler 2003). Such institutions have demonstrated a strong
ability to infuse its symbols and social codes with intrinsic value and provide a framework
of meaning for the individual. Membership ceases to be a purely cognitive desire based on
some cost-benefit analysis, but turns into an emotional bond between group and individual.
This means that individuals want to be part of the community, even if it comes at economic
costs or potential psychological distress. 8 Culture in its most basic interpretation then is the
creation of such frameworks of meaning and their infusion with intrinsic value and

8

This last point is especially important: The utilitarian argument would claim that it makes no
difference if we join a community for psychological or economic benefit. If that would be so, than why do
people often experience significant psychological suffering and trauma and not just leave the community if
it no longer satisfies utility (On collective trauma see: J. Alexander 2012; Jeffrey C. Alexander et al. 2004).

34

emotional commitment, which then supports the creation of the kind of moral intuition we
have discussed.
To fully grasp the significance of culture we need to distinguish between knowing
cultural cues and symbols and experiencing them. Knowledge of culture does not require
any use of our emotional abilities; experiencing culture does. We might know that Judaism
has specific dietary restrictions, but this is not the same as experiencing the emotional
distress members of this faith feel if they should violate these restrictions. The very
introduction of limitations or outright bans on the consumption of pork in Islam and
Judaism was most likely based on quite rational grounds (Redding 2015), but what made
the ban effective was its connection to religion, which automatically created an emotional
bond to the new rule. This is also the reason why such practices are difficult to give up
once the rational reason for their implementation has disappeared and people follow them
out of moral intuition.
This is not a trivial point and is politically highly relevant: when Germany tries to
integrate migrants through teaching German laws and customs, newcomers will know the
important elements of German culture, but experiencing them would mean to have the
same emotional reaction to the violation of said laws and customs. By the same token I
might know that visual depictions of the prophet Muhammed anger a devout Muslim but
experiencing it would mean to actually feel a flash of anger as an emotional reaction. The
assumption that knowing and understanding expected behavior is the same as experiencing
it and making it part of one’s identity is optimistic at best and dangerously wrong at worst.
If I don’t feel any emotional attachment to a particular culture, my willingness to violate
its customs if it benefits me will be much higher compared to a situation where such a
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violation will elicit a psychological toll on me in the form of emotions like shame or
embarrassment.
The Kantian researcher’s dream basing social relationships on the categorical
imperative assumes that emotional ties (or a moral intuition) will become unnecessary once
we are able to discern the benefits of a rational order through reason. Why, for example,
do I need to attach an emotional reaction to determine that murder is bad, something that
should be understandable even without emotions? The answer is: because knowing that
murder is bad does unfortunately not mean that every culture has an equal definition of
what constitutes murder. From honor killings and apostasy laws to the debate about
abortion, the death penalty, and euthanasia, there is cultural variance regarding what kind
of violent act that results in another person’s death is interpreted as murder (Eisner and
Ghuneim 2013; Lowe et al. 2018). 9 The anthropologist Edward Westermarck has spent
most of his rprofessional life engaging in research seeking to demonstrate how seemingly
universal emotions can lead to particularistic behavior in different communities in order to
support the hypothesis that there is a difference between universal principles and the way
in which they are applied. As it turns out, “the same universal human moral emotions could
lead to widely diverse behaviors” (Hunter and Nedelisky 2018, 68). In one of his
observations, Westermarck describes how one expression of filial affection among the
native Fijians is to put an aged parent to death. What might be considered murder elsewhere
is regarded as affection in this context due to the strong belief among the observed Fijians
that “persons enter upon the delights of the future life with the same faculties, mental and

9

For poll data on whether the death penalty is appropriate for leaving Islam see:
https://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-beliefs-about-sharia/
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physical, as they possess at the hour of death, and that the spiritual life thus commences
where the corporeal existence terminates” (Westermarck 2017, KL 8928). So while it is a
moral universal to view murder as something negative, what actually constitutes murder is
culturally variable.
That different cultures create different reactions to similar events was not a novel
observation by Western anthropologists. Around 440 BC, the ancient Greek historian
Herodotus describes the following scene, which supposedly took place at the court of the
Persian king Darius a hundred years earlier:
Take, for example, this story from the reign of Darius. He called
together some Greeks who were present and asked them how much money
they would wish to be paid to devour the corpses of their fathers – to which
the Greeks replied that no amount of money would suffice for that. Next,
Darius summoned some Indians called Callantians, who do eat their parents,
and asked them in the presence of the Greeks (who were able to follow what
was being said by means of an interpreter) how much money it would take
to buy their consent to the cremation of their dead fathers – at which the
Callantians cried out in horror and told him that his words were a
desecration of silence. Such, then, is how custom operates; and how right
Pindar is, it seems to me, when he declares in his poetry that ‘Custom is the
King of all’ (Herodotus 2015, 207).

Custom might not be king of all, but it has a stronger impact on our actions then we
often care to admit. Both the Greeks and the Callantians share the universal value among
human societies to honor their dead, but how they do it differs not only in practice but is
diametrically opposed emotionally. What is perceived as honoring by one is perceived as
desecration by the other and vice-versa, and the story gives us a glimpse into a world that
already two-and-a-half millennia ago was wrestling with the question of multiculturalism.
As I will discuss in more detail in a later chapter, this is the essence of true
multiculturalism and why it is such a challenge: When people feel strongly yet differently
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about the same objective facts, how can one reconcile these opposing attitudes within the
same society? Discussions about diversity and multiculturalism in the past have taken the
easy way out by declaring these differences to be part of one’s private life and irrelevant
for the public sphere (see, for example: Kymlicka 1996), or attempted to pick and choose
aspects from certain cultures and ignoring others (see, for example: Habermas 2005).
While these discussions are worthwhile and well-intended, they more or less openly
assume that in the end there is an underlying cultural uniformity that gives the highest value
to tolerance and individual autonomy and thereby makes a multicultural society possible.
In other words, what we have here is a monocultural answer to the problem of
multiculturalism.
The hope, of course, to resolve this conundrum brings us back to the question of
rationality and the possible abandonment of culture (at least as an emotional factor).
Emotionless rationality would align subjective and objective reality and elicit the
“appropriate” feelings and reactions that would lead to the most beneficial outcome for
those involved. Unfortunately, from what we have learned so far from evolutionary and
social psychology the likelihood of such a universal rationality to emerge seems rather low
at the moment, and it is doubtful whether it would suffice to hold communities together.
Richard Shweder and others have pointed out that there is something like
psychological pluralism, meaning that the same objective reality can be met by different
psychological (i.e. emotional) reactions. These can be triggered so automatically and unself-consciously that they are hard to distinguish from raw experiences like fear when
encountering a bear (Shweder et al. 2010, 409–10). A more colloquial way to describe such
reactions would be as a “gut-feeling” that leads us to immediately judge something as good
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or bad and that elicits an emotional reaction even before we are able to reflect upon it. 10
Culture plays a key role in what kind of emotions are activated when we encounter social
or environmental triggers. Culture in this context can be defined as
the subset of humanly possible or available meanings that, by virtue
of enculturation (informal or formal, implicit or explicit, unintended or
intended), has become valued and active in giving shape to the
psychological processes of the individuals in a particular norm-sensitive
group (Shweder et al. 2010, 409).
As these authors point out, culture is symbolic and behavioral at the same time:
culture is a way a society expresses its definition of what is:
true, good, beautiful, and efficient” through symbolic acts like
speech, laws, and customary practices. It is, however, also behavioral since
the meaning attached to these symbols creates emotional ties that
incentivize us to behave in a certain way in order to avoid psychological
punishment or achieve psychological rewards in the form of positive or
negative emotions like shame or pride (Shweder 1999, 67).

In order to avoid any confusion from the outset, we must not confuse this
psychological reward with the concept of pleasure: doing something that elicits a feeling
of pride does not necessarily correspond with the more hedonistic feeling of pleasure. The
attempt to equate the two is one of the biggest weaknesses of Benthamite Utilitarianism, a
problem with which we will engage in more detail a little later. The reduction of the variety
of existing human emotions to the simple dichotomy of pain and pleasure remains one of
the least helpful concepts that originated with the Utilitarian thinkers and that keeps
befuddling theories of society ever since.

10

New forms of interaction through social media demonstrate this on an almost daily basis. The
routine of an emotional tweet to be followed by a retraction or deletion shows how quick we can be to judge
a situation without conscious reflection.
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This, in essence, is what Sigmund Freud outlines in his Civilization and its
Discontents, describing how the demands of communal life can be in contradiction with
the demands of individual pleasure (Freud 1961) and thereby throwing us into a quasineurotic state of being. Supposedly, this would mean that it is only through our rationality
that we can resist the temptations to give in to seeking out whatever individual pleasure is
available, putting rationality and emotions into constant conflict. Yet such a view is based
on a very limited understanding of human emotions. Certainly, if positive emotions would
only arise from individual pleasures, sacrificing them for the good of the community would
be a difficult step, and having to repeat it continuously could indeed mean that the basis
for civilization is a voluntarily chosen neurosis. Luckily, however, this is most likely not
the case since positive emotions are not only elicited by purely hedonistic pleasures but
can be founded on various triggers.
Even the field in which rationality supposedly holds strongest sway cannot be fully
understood without taking into account the connection of culture and emotions. Economic
progress as the result of competition is not just the result of systemic rationality, but in
large part also driven by the desire of entrepreneurs to build their own economic empires
and dynasties. The economist Joseph Schumpeter points out that the entrepreneur in his or
her quest for economic success is not driven by a hedonistic desire to consume goods,
which makes them appear “irrational” under a purely materialistic viewpoint (Schumpeter
2017, 92). It is the emotional side of human nature that drives entrepreneurs, and even
though they might seemingly employ full rationality in the running of their company, the
initial motivation comes from somewhere else. These ideas have been picked up again by
economists and psychologists, who discuss them in terms of extrinsic and intrinsic
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motivation (Benabou and Tirole 2003; Vallerand 1997). Extrinsic motivation is motivation
by monetary and materialist incentives, while intrinsic motivation is motivation by way of
appeals to one’s identity and values. In reality, both forms overlap, since even the most
intrinsically motivated individual still needs materials in order to survive. Nonetheless, one
of the main reasons why the entrepreneurial revolution of the 18th century could take place,
was a significant change in the way entrepreneurial activity was perceived. The shift from
political empires and dynasties to Schumpeter’s economic dynasties was possible because
being an entrepreneur became a source of recognized pride and virtue, and thereby made
economic success not just materialistically but intrinsically valuable, (For a detailed
overview how the attitude towards economic activity changed, see: McCloskey 2007,
2010, 2017.) 11 Underlying this shift was a cultural change that altered the emotions that
were connected with various aspects of economic activity. It is worth remembering that the
pillars of a modern economy--including private property and financing via interestcarrying loans--were not always viewed approvingly and the subject of fierce debates
among religious scholars of all backgrounds for many centuries. What holds true in the
economic sphere also applies to other areas including politics, and a growing understanding
of how cultural change influenced the evolution of social structures through the rewiring
and redefining of emotional triggers should help us to better understand how past and
contemporary societies are organized.
As we will see, there is a complex interplay between the cognitive and emotional
faculties possessed by humans and how this effects actual behavior. The goal of this chapter

11

Schumpeter goes on to argue that ultimately this shift will be reversed and capitalist societies will
start to reject the entrepreneur, leading to the replacement of capitalism with socialism (Schumpeter 1994).
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is to demonstrate that this interplay is a key factor in the human ability to create social
structures, and that our cognitive abilities, on the one hand, and our emotional abilities, on
the other, are not contradictory, but complement each other.

2.1.1.1

Different Types of Emotions

One of the reasons why the study of emotions has been underappreciated can be
found in the way it has been treated in its original field, psychology. For the most part, the
study of emotions has been focused on negative emotions like fear, anger, sadness, shame,
and disgust, while positive emotions like joy, contentment, interest, and love have only
played a marginal role (Fredrickson and Branigan 2001, 123). This is partially
understandable, since negative emotions like depression, phobia, and anxiety disorders can
cause a wide array of grave problems for individuals and society, therefore justifying a
stronger focus. The downside of this, however, was that positive emotional experiences
became increasingly reduced to simple sensual and material pleasures. Even fundamental
inter-personal emotions such as love became just an evolutionary tool to facilitate
reproduction, ignoring the additional effects the experience of such emotions can have.
Fredrickson and Branigan point to numerous studies that have demonstrated that positive
emotions widen the array of thoughts and actions that come to people’s minds, makes them
more approachable and willing to approach others (e.g. the desire one has to share positive
news with others), and has overall positive effects on social cohesion and cooperation,
making them most likely “evolutionary adaptive for the individual, its species, or both”
(Fredrickson and Branigan 2001, 133).
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It turns out that the more we know of human beings, the less realistic the idea of
the rational, utility-maximizing individual that joins communities for their own benefit
becomes. On the contrary, it is increasingly observable that the human emotional
framework was not just built for the “fight and flight” reflex when encountering the
proverbial bear but evolved as a key component to enable complex social living. It is not
cool rationality that makes us into members of a community, but the positive emotions and
the increase of dopamine and serotonin in the human brain that can be caused through the
recognition by others. The success of social media networks and their effects is a much
smaller surprise when we take the intersubjectivity of human beings into account. In fact,
one could make the argument that social media networks have enabled something akin to
“overdosing” on social interaction and thereby causing withdrawal symptoms, if one is cut
off from it for too long (Twenge 2017).
While some emotions can be felt instinctively and are hard wired into the human
psyche (like the fight or flight instinct), others depend on social constructs that tie certain
behavior to specific emotions. Which behavior is supposed to be met with shame compared
to joy is not a natural instinct but often the consequence of behavioral patterns that have
been repeated and reinforced over longer periods of time.
Jonathan Haidt and others address this question and distinguish between primordial
and elaborated emotions (Keltner and Haidt 2001). Primordial emotions play a key role in
solving the problem of physical survival and support our ability to avoid death by
predation, violence, and disease. Keltner and Haidt describe how primordial emotions like
fear and disgust influence our “fight-flight” or “food-selection” system. Evolved over a
long period of time, the human brain scans incoming information for patterns associated
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with danger, triggering the release of stress hormones into the bloodstream. Similarly,
potential food sources elicit the emotion of disgust if they resemble powerful elicitors of
disgust, such as feces and decaying animal bodies (Keltner and Haidt 2001, 196). While
primordial emotions play a key role in the survival mechanisms of individuals, elaborated
emotions have developed to support our functioning as groups. Keltner and Haidt draw on
existing literature to provide us with a summary that explains how emotions and culture
interact:
Impressed by how culture and language give humans flexibility and
creativity in designing their lives and societies, social constructivists
concern themselves with the total package of meanings, social practices,
norms, and institutions that are built up around emotions in human societies
[…]. We refer to these complex meanings as elaborated emotions.
Elaborated emotions are shaped by social discourse and interaction, and by
concepts of the self, morality, and social order […]. Elaborated emotions
vary across cultures, they cannot be experienced by infants, and they can
last for years or centuries. For example, the hatred felt towards an historical
enemy, although at any one moment in time comprised of brief emotional
experiences, is made up of values, beliefs, images, action tendencies, and
affective dispositions or sentiments that can pass from one generation to the
next and last for extended periods of time” (Keltner and Haidt 2001, 199).

The distinction between primordial and elaborated emotions allows us to
distinguish between the physiological setup of human beings that hardwires us for the
experience of emotions (the former) and our ability to alter the triggers for emotional
processes through culture (the latter). The connection between actions and the emotional
reaction it causes for those who execute them, those who observe them, and those who are
affected by it can differ based on the cultural environment. Depending on the cultural
environment, different actions will elicit different emotional reactions. To reiterate the
example of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur: the entrepreneur in her emotional desire is not
unlike a medieval warrior who seeks status and recognition through prowess in battle. The
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difference is that a modern society bestows higher recognition on someone who runs a
successful business than on someone who slaughters others on the field of battle. The
constantly present ability to experience emotions is not the same as the actual emotions,
since we need to recognize what actually triggers them. Contrary to the assumption that
human beings are born with either a “blank slate” or have most behavioral patterns preuploaded via genetics, the human brain comes with an array of building blocks that
combine the cognitive and the physiological:
Rather the components may be combined and afforded their
divergent functions and forms through social and cultural process ….
Through [the] pursuit of adaptation and adjustment to one’s cultural and
social environment, the [physiological] component processes are organized
and enabled to become emotions” (Kitayama and Markus 1994, 1–2).

This makes clear that there actually is something like cross-cultural emotional
diversity that brings us back to something we discussed earlier in this chapter: There is a
difference between knowing and experiencing culture, with the latter including emotions
while the former does not. This gets us closer to what is meant by culture, since it allows
us to distinguish between the “active” parts (i.e. those to which we feel an emotional
attachment) and the “inactive” parts (something that might be part of a tradition, but no
longer elicits emotional reactions) of a society’s culture. The reason why a caricature of
the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper offends more people in the Muslim world
than similar drawings of Jesus or Christians do in Western Europe is because Europe’s
emotional ties to Christianity are not as strong as the emotional ties between Islam and the
Muslim world.
Emotions, however, are not just a means; they can also be an end in themselves.
Sometimes our emotions drive us to do something, but sometimes we also do something in
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order to elicit an emotional reaction. For example, if we recoil due to the smell of something
decaying, our emotion of disgust will make us turn away or pinch our nose. But if we fast
during Lent, we accept physiological discomfort in anticipation of the emotional reward of
having endured something difficult. Culture operates on both these levels, building
connections that allow for immediate emotional responses as well as creating the
environment in which people are willing to endure hardships in the hope for an emotional
reward. In other words, we are not just passive emotional responders but also have a
tendency to engage in activities that intensify or weaken emotional experiences – whether
it is the adrenalin rush sought through skydiving or learning relaxation techniques to avoid
the emotions associated with stress (Tracy Mayne 2001, 366–67). Culture not only creates
the psychological tendencies to experience certain emotions, but emotions follow that
reinforce and promoted culturally important concerns (Mesquita 2001, 240).
There is yet another crucial factor that distinguishes primordial from elaborated
emotions. The latter creates moral imagination and the foundation for morality as such,
which of course is quite different from emotional reactions that serve immediate protection
from physical harm. While both operate within the same “machine,” morality plays the
additional role of supporting the creation and maintenance of communities. Morality
expresses itself in the emotional attachment to actions we perceive as right or wrong, and
is once again involves the interplay of cognitive and physiological abilities that shapes
behavior. Even if a society agrees on certain moral rules, a strong emotional attachment to
them will ensure that people obey them even if they are not under constant supervision.
That these moral rules are often additionally underpinned with a supernatural or
metaphysical component (i.e. behaving according to these rules serves God, the nation,
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etc.) helps to elicit an even stronger commitment from the members of the community,
since there is now a higher purpose that justifies one’s moral values.
2.1.2

Culture and Morality

The question of morality is a particularly tricky one, because it is very closely
related to the concept of culture. The Enlightenment strove to base morality on a universal
set of moral principles, primarily the rights of individuals as part of the natural law
tradition. This tradition was explicitly based on the idea that there are universal moral
guidelines independent of culture and tradition. (For a book length discussion of this issue,
see: Hunter and Nedelisky 2018.) The problem, however, is that the very idea of individual
rights has a cultural core. As Clifford Geertz points out:
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more
or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of
awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive
whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its
social and natural background, is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a
rather peculiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures (Geertz 1974,
31).

What Geertz describes are the basic ingredients for a society based on the value of
individualism, but it might not be the right starting point for a universal morality, since
many societies do not share these basics.
Following the studies of Shweder and Bourne, the fundamental moral dilemma
societies have to solve is the organization of the relationship between group and individual
(Shweder and Bourne 1984). According to them, most societies have opted for a
sociocentric answer to this question, while societies that went through the Enlightenment
have a much stronger tendency towards egocentric or individualistic societal models (Haidt
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2013, 14; Shweder and Bourne 1984). The dichotomous distinction between collective and
individualistic cultures is not necessarily new (Greif 1994), but once again we have to drill
down to the details.
I think the best way to understand the complex interplay of culture and morality is
Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory MFT, since this theory was explicitly
developed to describe moral differences across cultures (Haidt and Joseph 2004). Their
main argument is that “cultures build incommensurable moralities on top of a foundation
of shared intuitions” (Haidt and Joseph 2004, 56). These intuitions are defined as “feelings
of approval or disapproval [that] pop into awareness as we see or hear about something
someone did, or as we consider choices for ourselves” (Haidt and Joseph 2004, 56). Before
looking at what triggers these feelings, let us look at three of the cornerstones of Moral
Foundations Theory, some of which we have already touched upon previously in this
chapter. (Unless mentioned otherwise, this summary is based on: Graham et al. 2013.)

2.1.2.1

The Nativism of Morality

In his book Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil, Paul Bloom (2013) uses
experiments that seem to demonstrate that we are actually born with a sense of morality.
Observing the behavior of infants between the age of six and ten months, it turned out that
when shown a puppet that tries to climb a hill, where in one case second puppet tries to
stop it and a third puppet seeks to help, the babies afterwards almost uniformly picked the
nice puppet. In a similar experiment where twenty-month-old toddlers could reward the
nice puppet with candy and punish the bad puppet with taking candy away, most of them
rewarded the former (P. Bloom 2013, 23–29).
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These toddlers all have the genetic blueprint to experience morality, yet their moral
sense does not remain unmalleable as they grow up. The toddlers show an emotional
reaction to perceived unfair behavior, but as we get older and develop a refined sense of
abstraction and are exposed increasingly to the shaping effect of our cultural environment,
the trigger-reaction relationship also starts to change. The existence of a basic moral sense
is evolutionary advantageous, since it supports group cooperation through the desire to
punish rule breakers and the triggering feelings of guilt for those who break rules. In its
simplest form, morality is a problem-solving mechanism for groups. With the social
evolution of societal structures and the emergence of more complex types of social
organization, this mechanism also adapted, and its main way of doing so is culture:
in humans, culture loosens the linkages between emotions and
problems so that cultures find new ways to solve the problems for which
emotions evolved, and cultures find new ways of using emotions (Keltner
and Haidt 2001, 192).

For example, loyalty to one’s family is natural for both humans and chimpanzees,
while loyalty to one’s ideology (religious or secular) is specifically human even though it
is built on the existing emotional capability of being loyal to a group. The previously
mentioned toddlers did most likely not reason their way towards their reactions but acted
on emotions that arose as a consequence of what they perceived as rule or norm breaking.
While there is no genetic basis for the content of the rules, we are genetically hardwired to
follow norms, especially if they are invested with transcendental and intrinsic values like
religious norms. In other words, moral thinking is innate and organized in advance of
experience. Our neural tissue includes a first draft of morality, which is then revised
through cultural learning and experience.
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MFT is thus an active attempt to integrate evolutionary and cultural explanations
of human behavior, which makes it such an interesting candidate for the conceptual
integration between the social and the natural sciences. Drawing on studies conducted with
primates has revealed that young rhesus monkeys, without any prior fear of snakes—
including plastic snakes—watched a video of an adult monkey reacting fearfully (or not)
to a plastic snake (or to plastic flowers). The monkeys learned from a single exposure to
snake-fearing monkey to be afraid of the plastic snake, but a single exposure to a flowerfearing monkey did nothing (Seligman 1971).
This lends 50redence to the idea that evolution has made it easier for us to learn
fear of snakes compared to fear of flowers, a good case of an innate case of a primordial
emotion. Haidt and his co-authors then apply this observation on the moral realm and more
elaborated emotions, describing how
It’s probably quite easy to teach kids to want revenge just by
exposing them to role models who become angry and vengeful when treated
unfairly, but it is probably much more difficult to teach children to love their
enemies just by exposing them, every Sunday for 20 years, to stories about
a role model who loved his enemies. We are prepared to learn vengefulness,
in a way that we are not prepared to learn to offer our left cheek to those
who smite us on our right cheek” (J. Graham et al. 2013, 63).

Following Haidt’s reasoning here furthers the argument we made before that culture
helps to bridge the cognitive and the emotional—i.e., it takes a cognitive effort supported
by a cultural belief system to suppress the more intuitive desire for vengeance. The
existence of innate moral thinking is a hotly-contested topic among evolutionary
psychologists, and a very fruitful answer seems to come from the concept of gene-culture
co-evolution. It seems logical that our species has faced recurrent problems for a long
period of time that generate support for the creation of domain- specific cognitive
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adaptations in order to respond rapidly and effectively (Pinker 2009; Tooby and Cosmides
1995). A proposed and valuable comparison is made with the human sense for taste: we
are born with an innate preference for sweetness against bitterness, and just as the interplay
of tongue and brain can elicit a feeling of pleasure when exposed to the right taste, it is
possible that the brain reacts similarly when just interactions occur, and irritation when one
detects cheaters (Tooby, Cosmides, and Barrett 2005).
The growing evidence that morality is based on an innate blueprint deals a huge
blow to any theory that starts from the heuristic assumption that we are born exclusively
as self-centered autonomous individuals. We are genetically hard-wired to care about the
behavior of others, but this does not mean that we are hard-wired to either like or dislike
others. It does mean however that we are not indifferent to the actions of those around us,
even if they should not directly affect us personally. The social evolution of human beings
must increasingly be understood as a way of coping with external challenges through
combinations of both our individualism and our sociability. Just as in the realm of biology,
there has been a lot of tinkering regarding possible social structures and some of them
solved social problems (like the sharing of resources) better than others. The human mind
has not as elegantly evolved as one would hope, and the contention by Cosmides and Tooby
that “evolutionary biology suggests that there is no principled reason for parsimony to be
a design criterion for the mind” (Cosmides and Tooby 1994, 91) should not be seen as a
weakness, but as an evolutionary advantage. Despite the ongoing evolution of the human
mind it always builds on the preexisting blueprints that make it more complex and does not
provide a mono-linear functionality for which there is one solution for every challenge
(Marcus 2009). Culture is a direct result of this tinkering with possible solutions, creating
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its own path dependencies that in turn influence the continued social evolution of human
beings.

2.1.2.2

Culture, Psyche, and Morality make
each other up

In the words of Richard Shweder, “Culture and psyche make each other up”
(Shweder 1990b, 24). The innateness of morality is also setting certain limits to what is
feasible when it comes to the creation of moral values. Just as we cannot make broccoli
taste sweet through education, it is not possible to just learn any kind of moral idea equally.
On the other hand, if cultural learning was to play no role at all, we would not be
able to see variation across different cultures. Haidt and his collaborators suggest that there
are five moral foundations on which cultures build their morality. They compare these
foundations to the taste buds that exist on everyone’s tongue, and although they cannot be
changed, different cultures can create cuisines that appeal differently to individual taste
buds. Some cultures might value sweet more than spicy or tart over bland; this variation
demonstrates that despite the equal biological make up of our tongues, we can have
different tastes.
The argument regarding the “moral taste buds” is that there are emotional triggers
that have evolved as answers to environmental and social challenges, and these triggers act
on our moral senses in the way sugar or salt would on our tongue. MFT proponents are
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open to evidence and arguments that there are more than five, but as a starting point their
ideas are very helpful independently of how many moral foundations exist. What interests
us is that if different building blocks of morality exist and if they can be put together to
build unique moral imaginations that vary across cultures, moral pluralism as a result of
culture exists. The moral foundations describe the meta-answers to what seems to be the
most common challenges to social living. Although often expressed and combined
differently across cultures, they are a first step to define the fundament on which all cultures
are built upon.
The basic five for now are (quoted from Haidt 2013, 153–54):
• The Care/harm foundation evolved in response to the
adaptive challenge of caring for vulnerable children. It makes us
sensitive to signs of suffering and need; it makes us despise cruelty and
want to care for those who are suffering.
• The Fairness/cheating foundation evolved in response to the
adaptive challenge of reaping the rewards of cooperation without
getting exploited. It makes us sensitive to indications that another
person is likely to be a good (or bad) partner for collaboration and
reciprocal altruism. It makes us want to shun or punish cheaters.
• The Loyalty/betrayal foundation evolved in response to the
adaptive challenge of forming and maintaining coalitions. It makes us
sensitive to signs that another person is (or is not) a team player. It
makes us trust and reward such people, and it makes us want to hurt,
ostracize, or even kill those who betray us or our group.
• The Authority/subversion foundation evolved in response to
the adaptive challenge of forging relationships that will benefit us within
social hierarchies. It makes us sensitive to signs of rank or status, and to
signs that other people are (or are not) behaving properly, given their
position.
• The Sanctity/degradation foundation evolved initially in
response to the adaptive challenge of the omnivore’s dilemma, and then
to the broader challenge of living in a world of pathogens and parasites.
It includes the behavioral immune system, which can make us wary of
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a diverse array of symbolic objects and threats. It makes it possible for
people to invest objects with irrational and extreme values—both
positive and negative—which are important for binding groups
together.
These five foundations are in themselves not the same as morality, but they are
foundations that can be found in different compositions in all known cultures. What makes
them very helpful is that they allow us to approach the topic of culture on more of a metalevel and identify the cultural content of supposedly anti-cultural ideas and ideologues. For
example, from a moral foundations viewpoint it makes no differences if I accept the
authority of a king or the authority of a pope – the underlying moral mechanisms that enable
my following are the same.
Another important point is that not all cultures draw from these five foundations to
the same extent, meaning that in some cultures the harm/care foundation might be more
important than the sanctity/degradation foundation or the other way round (J. Graham,
Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt and Hersh 2001). A good example here is Western
individualism compared to Islam or Judaism. While the latter two have extensive rules
regarding bodily hygiene and dietary restrictions, the Western approach is mostly based on
the question of whether my regard to hygiene and food has a harmful impact on others. If
it does not, restrictions are usually lifted or are non-existent. To be clear once again: there
is no perfect combination of the moral foundations that in turn allows a perfect morality to
emerge. From an evolutionary viewpoint, these building blocks are combined in order to
enable collective action and strengthen social cohesion.
The five foundations lay the groundwork for the relationship between triggers and
emotional reactions and, depending on the weight that a foundation carries, the stronger
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the reaction will be if it appears to be violated. As Haidt has pointed out, the differences
between liberals and conservatives in the United States can be explained by looking at
these different moral building blocks. Both conservatives and liberals inhabit a moral
matrix, but while for liberal morality harm and fairness are the most important criteria of
morality, conservatives tend to attach more importance to the aspects of authority and
sanctity (J. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt 2013, pt. 2).
.
If members of these groups see their dominant moral foundations violated, they
have an intuitive negative reaction, and it is only after this intuition that moral reasoning
(meaning the rationalization of the initial intuition begins). What moral foundations matter
to what degree is not predetermined, but depends on the cultural framework that arranges
them. A deeply religious-collectivist society will most likely value authority and loyalty
more than a secular-individualistic society. The key point to take away from Haidt’s
approach is that while morality is universal, it is not uniform. And I think the same
argument applies to culture as well. We find culture among any community of people, but
cultural universalism is not the same as cultural uniformity.

2.1.2.3

Moral Intuitions Come First –

Strategic Reasoning Second
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One of the most important paradigmatic shifts in social psychology was the socalled “automatic revolution” of the 1990s:
most of a person's everyday life is determined not by their conscious
intentions and deliberate choices but by mental processes that are put into
motion by features of the environment that operate outside of conscious
awareness and guidance” (Bargh and Chartrand 1999, 462).

Especially when exposed to new things, it might be that what we think we are doing
while consciously deliberating in actuality has no effect on the outcome of the judgment,
as it has already been made through relatively immediate, automatic means” (Bargh and
Chartrand 1999, 475).
Drawing on a wide body of experimental literature, Haidt formulated the
Social Intuitionist Model (SIM), which he defined as “the sudden
appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an
evaluative feeling (like—dislike, good—bad) about the character or actions
of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps
of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt and
Bjorklund 2008, 188).

This does not mean, however, that the human psyche can be reduced to our
intuitions. This kind of effortless, associative, and heuristic processing is referred to as
System 1 thinking, more an aesthetic reaction coming from the gut than the consequence
of significant deliberation (Kahneman 2013). This does not mean, however, that
deliberative reasoning – also known as System 2 thinking – does not take place. On the
contrary, we are often forced to justify our initial feelings and judgments, especially when
called upon by others, so that we actually see cognitive and automated processes working
together.
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According to Graham, the automated processes “were shaped by development
within a cultural context, and their output can be edited or channeled by subsequent
reasoning and self-presentational concerns” (J. Graham et al. 2013, 65). In other words,
they can be changed over time or adapt to new kinds of triggers. Given the complex
interplay of cognitive and automated processes we should not be surprised that there is a
broad variety when it comes to cultures and their moral imaginations.
The combination of moral foundations creates a core of sacred values, defined as
the core issues around which debate and negotiation becomes very difficult. As we have
pointed out before, although our intuitions do not prevent System 2 thinking, it most likely
does bias it and motivates us to find arguments in support of our initial feelings (Ditto,
Pizarro, and Tannenbaum 2009; Epley and Gilovich 2016; Gino, Norton, and Weber 2016).
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2.1.2.4

The Sacred and How it Binds and
Blinds Us

These biases do not necessarily prevent discourse over sacred issues, though
finding common ground will become more difficult. A convinced atheist and a strong
believer might have different moral matrices built around different sacred cores, still, if
there is sufficient overlap they do not have to be mortal enemies. 12 This, by the way, is
probably the most important legacy of the Enlightenment to which we will return 1 several
times: at the core of the Enlightenment movement was its tremendous dedication to open
and unbounded debate, something that manifested itself in the “Republic of Letters”
(Fumaroli 2018; Goodman 1996), the Federalist Papers (Kramnick 1987), and the overall
Enlightenment movement itself (Gay 1966, 1969, 1973; McMahon 2002). Contrary to what
is often claimed, the Enlightenment was not so much the triumph of rationality as the
creation of a cultural core around the value of open debate and persuasion, with all its
positive consequences for progress and innovation. To put it simply, if the cultural core
that influences my intuitions such that I prefer to debate rather than kill my opponent, it is
not rationality alone that causes me to abstain from violence. So even the Enlightenment
with its rejection of religion ended up creating a sacred core around which a very specific
morality was created.
The reason why I am using the term sacred is because it underscores the act of
valuing of something for its own sake, regardless of its utility – not because it involves a

12

A great example for this are the debates between Richard Dawkins (an atheist) and John Lennox
(a Christian apologist), one of them can be found under https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zF5bPI92-5o, or
Cornel West (an African-American Progressive) and Robert P. George (a white conservative)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n5dVnAIcYrU
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supernatural element. The human ability to organize around ideas and symbols that have
been invested with intrinsic value and led to the emergence of moral matrices around them,
regardless of their materialistic utility, is not an evolutionary relic of prehistoric times.
Rather, it plays a central role in the structuring of social institutions. Additionally, it is not
only the ideas and symbols alone that we value, but the fact that we do it together with
others and that they often provide us with a map of how to behave to be accepted in society.
Culture does not create a social glue that ties the individual to the community on a rational,
but instead on an emotional, level. A convinced nationalist loves his country not only for
his own psychological benefit, but at the same time strives to demonstrate his membership
in the national community through investing the idea of the nation and those who belong
to it with intrinsic value. The same mechanisms are at work in any ideological or religious
community, which explains why all communities have a difficult time finding flaws among
their members or the community as such. Unfortunately, it goes beyond the scope of this
dissertation to argue whether or not there is a single and objective moral truth. I can only
offer my definition of a subjective moral truth that emerges at the intersection of culture
and emotions. If I judge something as morally wrong because it elicits a strong emotional
and thereby, a physiological reaction, I am experiencing my own intuitive moral truth. I
might be able to change it over time, but at the moment I experience it, it is a subjective
reality.
So in order to clarify the discussion about moral matrices at this point is not guided
by the desire to find an objective moral standard. What we are interested in is the role and
emergence of morality independent of its content. We will engage in this discussion later,
but for now it is important to understand how morality and culture interact and how they
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influence the creation of communities. Morality has a large effect on the creation of social
cohesion, because people who share moral values can rely on the assumption that others
feel about the world as they do, so they can assume that certain actions will elicit the same
emotional reaction with every member of the community. This shared feeling in turn makes
it easier to build trust with low costs of enforcement. To return to a much-used example,
the shared observance of dietary restrictions or dress codes has less to do with the substance
of these rules than the positive experience of behaving morally together.
Religion, as Jonathan Haidt reminds us, is essentially a “team sport” (See: Haidt
2013, chap. 11). But what applies to religion is also true for culture in a broader sense. The
entire concept of culture, consisting of shared habits, symbols, and rituals, is built on the
assumption of human beings as social and political animals. Over time a habit has
developed intended to dilute the concept of culture by its mixing with religion. Religion is
in itself a cultural phenomenon, but it is not culture per se. A society held together by a
shared belief in the nation or socialism or any other sacred value is fulfilling the conditions
of culture. 13 The human ability to create culture is an expression of our sociability; and,
although historically the most common form of this expression was of a religious nature,
we should not view it as an exclusive expression. Not only religion, but culture itself is a
“team sport” and cannot exist in isolation. Cultures form around sacred cores that are given
significance through the development of rituals and symbols and the respect that members
of a community lend to them.

13

One reason for this dilution is the use of religious terms like “sacred” when discussing culture, a
habit I continue here as well.
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Such cores can be of a secular as well as a religious nature, and human beings can
be members of multiple communities with different sacred cores simultaneously.
Differences in sacred cores need not always lead to unavoidable conflict, but there is a
strong likelihood that people join groups with whom they share more of their central values.
A simple example would be the membership in the fan club for a specific sports team. We
can assume that the members of the club share an emotional commitment to their team,
feeling pain with every lost game and joy with every victory. A New York Yankees fan
might have a hard time in a Boston Red Sox club trying to convince the other members
that they should actually cheer for New York. At the same time, however, both types of
fans can be equally committed to worshipping the American flag and conceive of
themselves as members of the same community of US citizens. We encounter cultural
differences on a daily basis, but the reason why they do not always result in conflict is
because there are degrees of commitment and dedication people hold to the sacred cores of
their communities. It is unlikely, for example, that a sports team can draft its fans into a
war the same way a state or religious community can – although we have seen occasional
violent outbreaks at sports events that can put that distinction in doubt. In general, however,
my neighbor’s following of a rival sports team might foster a field of tension, but if I see
more that connects us, like our shared passion for team sports and what it symbolizes as
part of an even larger cultural context where sport symbolizes national pride, the value
differences that can generatee tensions will start to become less salient. This also
demonstrates that once we find commonalities in our differences, cultural conflict can
become less likely.
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Once again, such differences are not defined or limited by geographical borders
that define a country. As several studies have shown, different combinations of the moral
foundations can run through subcultures within nations as well as between nations. This is
something that has befuddled cross-cultural studies in the past, because there is the strong
assumption that people with different passports also hold different values. Studies
examining moral foundations have discovered, however, that groups within countries can
hold widely different values. Regarding the authority/subversion foundation we see, for
example, that while social conservatives see obedience as a virtue, social liberals tend to
see it as either neutral or as a vice in others (Frimer et al. 2013; J. Graham, Haidt, and
Nosek 2009).
There are other complex issues as well: whether a society holds freedom of speech
sacred, regardless of the content of speech (or with only minor limitations like incitement)
or believes that not being exposed to potentially emotional harmful speech is the true value,
can have a huge impact on the inner workings of a society. As MFT demonstrates, cultures
can attach different weight to the value of individual foundations, which can cause different
reactions among groups who see them violated. If my values are primarily based on the
harm/care foundation, I will react more sensitively to hurtful speech compared to someone
who views the sanctity of the principle of free speech as more important, because her
cultural values in this case are more strongly grounded in the sanctity/degradation
foundation. But even cultures that build on the same foundations trigger them differently.
This is what we see, for example, in the abortion debate, where for both sides the harm/care
foundation plays an important role, but one side applies it more to the potential mother and
the other to the potential newborn. To come to an objective truth in moral questions is
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difficult, so without being relativistic we should open our mind to the possibility that moral
pluralism also encompasses the topics we within our own cultural horizon care about most.

2.1.2.5

Moral Intuitions and Moral

Reasoning Affect Us All
It is crucial, I believe, to emphasize the difficulty created by the concept of moral
pluralism and to point out that even the author of this dissertation does not escape it. Moral
pluralism is not the same as moral nihilism, because it increasingly looks as if the latter is
biologically impossible. Our genetic setup is designed for the experience of morality, so
even the supposed moral nihilist will have some moral matrix that triggers his or her
emotional centers. It is equally important to emphasize that acceptance of moral pluralism
does not mean one simply shrugs her shoulders and tolerates whatever moral imagination
happens to come along. The story of human social evolution has been one of cultural/moral
competition as much as economic and military competition and its continuation is a
precondition for further evolution. Therefore, it is worth repeating that we are truly faced
with an emotional and cognitive phenomenon that creates a space in which debates about
morality can take place and even lead to change through persuasion. I want to use this
section to highlight something that should not escape our attention. Culture also permeates
the activity of the social scientist and that I believe it is helpful to reflect on our own
culturally created moral matrices before we move forward.
The Enlightenment ideal, which we will discuss in more detail in the second part
of this dissertation, put a huge emphasis on education and the ability to overcome the
emotional with the rational. What happened, however, was that the field of education
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became its own moral world, where the claim of rationality is often used to justify positions
that are at least equally lodged in the moral and emotional. None of this is per-se bad, but
the lack of self-awareness of our own emotional commitments exacerbates what we see in
others, creating the temptation to ascribe purely emotional motives to their positions. I
think this point is particularly important because there is now compelling evidence that
higher levels of education also lead to a higher “moral binding and blinding” within the
community of the higher educated that tends to isolate them from the rest of the country
(Murray 2012; Putnam 2016). This group of people is overrepresented in opinion-shaping
institutions like media and politics, so this group’s moral universe matters also for those
who do not share it. Thus, we should be curious what some of elements of this moral
universe are. As it turns out, this group of people is more partisan in political and cultural
issues than other members of society (Ripley, Tenjarla, and He 2019), and their view on
opposing positions is not one of debate and persuasion but spills over into outright hatred.
In political terms, 15 percent of Republicans and 20 percent of Democrats share the view
that the United States would be “better off if large numbers of opposing partisans in the
public today ‘just died’” (Kalmoe and Mason 2018, 22) – and a majority of these 15 and
20 percent factions have been through higher education.
What exacerbates this problematic is that we often tend to attribute the worst
motives to those who do not share our moral consciousness: The “More in Common”
initiative takes a regular look at how Americans view each other and their differences, and
it turns out that each side sees the other one as much more radical and morally malignant
than each actually is (The Perception Gap 2019). What makes the study even more salient
is the following finding: “the most partisan, politically-active Americans – a group we call
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the ‘Wings’ – have deeply distorted perceptions of the other side.” while “politically
disengaged” Americans were “fully three times more accurate in their estimates of political
opponents” than those on the right and left edges of American politics. Other studies come
to similar conclusions (e.g. Ahler and Sood 2018).
What came as a surprise to the study’s authors should not surprise those of us who
cognizant of the interplay of culture and morality. If somebody creates his or her sacred
core around specific political views and a political community, the kind of emotional bonds
that we have discussed will emerge, with all the consequences for our intuitions and moral
reasoning. Our political beliefs in such a scenario become more akin to religious believers,
and any transgression against them is perceived as a transgression against ourselves and
the values that make up our identity. The moral certainty of the political ideologue is
emotionally not much different from the moral certainty of the religious fundamentalist –
and even though they might be miles apart regarding the substance of their beliefs, the
psychological processes are very much alike.
Jonathan Haidt describes this very aptly as the phenomenon of morality “binding
and blinding” members of a community (Haidt 2013, pt. III). Our shared values bind us
together, but they also blind us to the possibility that there are either weaknesses within our
own values or to accept that there are people out there that hold their own values just as
strongly as we do. Culture is a double-edged sword, and the more we believe in the values
of our own culture and thereby become cohesive as a group the more difficult it becomes
to see that the members of other cultures hold their beliefs with equal commitment.
This does not mean that change is not possible, but it is important to realize the
strong emotional and intuitive ties we can establish with certain ideas. Finding and trying
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to understand the sacred cores of others’ ideas is an important element in bridging cultural
divides and build spaces of mutual understanding. It is important to keep in mind the point
we made earlier about the human species being both an emotional as well as a cognitive
being, and members of the scientific community are as affected by the emotional triggers
they have culturally acquired like anyone else. We can grasp these issues scientifically –
which is demonstrated by the existence of the multiple studies that have investigated them
– but I doubt that we can easily or fully emancipate ourselves from them.
Understanding that we are also part of the phenomenon we are inquiring is crucial,
because it shields us from the mistaken belief that those with different moral values are just
servants of their emotions while we have found true and detached objectivity. And to a
certain extent we might be in favor of having morals operate on the emotional level. The
effect of System 1 thinking (immediate intuitive judgement) is to ground communities in
some basic attitudes towards social phenomena. As noted earlier, we are still capable of
reflecting on these attitudes (this is where system 2 thinking comes into play), but shared
intuitions are an effective way to bind individuals together.
Once again, it is crucial to maintain the distinction that knowing is not the same as
feeling, and to create a cultural space in which there is more that ties us morally together
than drives us apart is a difficult process for every society. Despite its interesting
philosophical and theoretical implications, social contract theory and similar rational
choice approaches have almost completely submerged or discounted the emotional
element. According to these approaches, communities exist solely as an expression of
individualized self-interest, and the realization of individual benefits from being a member
of a group is creating enough social cohesion to maintain it. Such an argument rests at least
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implicitly on the assumption that our moral sense is something like the appendix, it has
once been useful, but evolution made it redundant. Similarly, the discovery of reason and
rationality supposedly provides more stable ground for community building than emotional
and moral ties.
For a mind trained in Western rationalism, any emphasis on sentimentalism might
be irritating, but ignoring it is tantamount to neglecting a fundamental quality of what it
means to be human. Additionally, the unease created by highlighting the role of emotions
is in itself a culturally-acquired intuition along the lines we have discussed—that is, even
the scientific community operates around a core of sacred values, particularly the idea of
objectivity, a facts-based approach, and the goal of discovering truth. Unfortunately, even
those exposed most regularly to these values unable to escape their “binding and blinding”
powers. That universities create their own moral universe is by now a well-established
observation (Campbell and Manning 2014, 2016), and while this in itself is not a bad thing,
we need to look at possible consequences.
The Perception Gap Study has revealed that partisan affiliation and high levels of
education make one understand the other side on political and cultural issues even less.
That higher levels of education can increase partisanship is not a new finding (Lukianoff
and Haidt 2018), and it can be argued that those who understand the world better thanks to
their education hold their beliefs more passionately because they are based in fact and
reason. The picture that emerges now, however, is that the more time one spends at an
institution of higher learning, the less one understands people on the other side of the
political divide. To avoid confusion, my point here is not that they do not share the views
of others, but that those with higher degrees attribute wrong and often more sinister motives
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to those on the other side. This strengthens one’s own moral community, but
simultaneously decreases bonds to the other side.
In other words, education is potentially becoming a factor that deepens, instead of
bridges cultural gaps within society. The Enlightenment ideal that education will replace
passion with reason and knowledge is very hard to fulfill, since unsurprisingly universities
themselves developed their own unique cultures with their own moral matrices and moral
intuitions. Just like the fictional company of our investment banker, universities consist of
communities tied together by moral imaginations. The emotional power that culture can
command is an underappreciated phenomenon, especially since it is often difficult for us
to distinguish between emotionally and cognitively held positions. What further
complicates things is that neither of the two options has a higher claim to truth and that
they are not mutually exclusive. For example, two people can be equally convinced of
climate change but for one of them it is also an emotional issue while the other person takes
it seriously but without significant emotional attachment. Both people hold the same
position, and objective evidence might support their stance, but most likely they will react
quite differently if they encounter someone who holds a contrarian position on the issue.
Because it is not only a disagreement about the interpretation of facts, but seen as an act of
transgression against a sacred value.
This makes communication and understanding much more difficult, because now
there is room for feeling emotionally repelled by the other person. The realization and
reflection that we hold positions not only because we think they are true but also because
they mean something to us emotionally is not always easily accomplished, although it
happens regularly. With the exception of people suffering from specific medical conditions
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that affect their brain function, we rely heavily on our emotional intuitions since they help
us to navigate our physical and social environment.

2.1.3

Shared Mental Models

For (Haidt 2013, 314), “moral thinking is for social doing,” but depending on the
content of the prevailing morals, such thinking can either be a source of conflict or of
cooperation and a basis for mutual trust that enables collective action (Fukuyama 1996).
The establishment of moral relations play a key role in the formation of organizations like
large-scale companies or state-like structures. The discussion about cultural differences
often circulates around the symbols of culture like foods and dress codes. This tends to
make us overlook what the underlying cause of these symbols is and how strong individuals
are morally tied to it. For example, the fact that most Western countries celebrate Christmas
is not a reliable indicator for the degree to which these societies maintain what one might
call traditional Christian values. Cultural symbols can have different degrees of meaning
to people, which is why culture tends to remain such an ambiguous concept. In dealing
earlier with the importance of emotional ties, we were anticipating Haidt’s adage about
moral thinking and social doing just cited above.
The argument put forward by Freud and others that our moral side creates a form
of anxiety is not wrong – violating moral rules or even having the temptation to do so can
cause negative emotions like shame or the fear of being ostracized by the group. By the
same token, however, pride in following rules and being valued by one’s group can cause
positive emotions like a feeling of elevation and pride. Emotions that emerge in our relation
with others therefore have an effect on our behavior, and depending on the moral rules of
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a culture there are different triggers for different emotions (Haidt 2001; Keltner and Haidt
2001; Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead 2004). Complex systems of moral rules like
religions or ideologies create a sophisticated web of emotional triggers that incentivize
behavior that ideally leads to more cooperation and collective action. 14
Many of the things we associate with civilization would have been impossible
without an improved capability to engage in collective action based on shared intuitions.
This view continues to have a difficult stance in the social sciences, since it directly
contradicts the concept and assumptions of methodological individualism. It still maintains
the idea that any kind of behavior should be reducible to the interests of individual agents
and that authentic group agency is impossible. Further, it claims that all phenomena we
perceive as alleged group agency is merely an expression of individual interests within a
group.
The problem with this view, however, is that it is not borne out by social reality
(List and Pettit 2013; Searle 1995; Tuomela 2016). It is not only the emotions that get
triggered within an individual, but also what one expects somebody else to feel if they are
exposed to certain triggers. Anticipating the emotional reaction of others is another way of
influencing our own behavior. Emotional ties to otherwise non-human institutions has an
impact, because we know that the way we talk or act regarding an institution influences
those who have invested it with intrinsic value. A company or a state are ideational or
inanimate objects, but through the actions of those who ascribe higher meaning to it,
individualism is being reduced and replaced with agency on behalf of the institution.

14

As I will demonstrate with a few examples later in this chapter, these webs can also have the
opposite effect and thereby cause a reduction in cooperation and collective action.
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Working on behalf of a group and the desire to further its interests and sustainability can
come at the expense of individual interests, but there are situations when individuals see
the well-being of the community as equal or more important than their own individual
situation. The question we are interested in is: how can situations be created where
community takes such a prominent position?
Historically, we can observe three basic kinds of incentives for cooperation with
varying degrees of complexity. They are not mutually exclusive, but it is important to take
note that there is a basic human inclination towards cooperation and how this inclination
can be culturally adapted:
1.) Cooperation among close kin and family members, something that most
likely also has a genetic component to it (Hamilton 1964). Even here, however, we
need to carefully distinguish between consanguine (directly related by blood, i.e.
genetically) and affinal (related by marriage, adoption, or similar arrangements)
relationships, since the latter already has a cultural component to it. There is an
ongoing discussion as to whether acting cooperatively or even altruistically towards
affinal family members is a conscious cultural or subconscious genetic
phenomenon. 15
2.) Forms of reciprocal altruism and tit-for-tat behavior, where cooperation
is continued based on previously observed cooperative behavior (Axelrod 2006;
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995; Trivers 1971). This would be the kind of
cooperation at the core of rational choice theories and the dominant interaction as
it appears market relationships.
3.) Cooperation that is driven by a shared belief system or shared mental
models (SMM) that creates a common goal and a collectively held identity for the
group. This form of cooperation is the one most closely connected with culture,
since it combines the cognitive (the creation of a belief system) and intuitive
(emotional ties to this belief system) elements of human nature.

That being said, in all three forms of cooperation, there can be an incentive for
individuals to free-ride at the expense of other members of the group. Neither culture nor

15

Haidt and others outright dispute the clear connection between gene-affinity and cooperation
(Haidt 2013, 197 footnote 27; Hill et al. 2011)

71

genes have been able to turn human beings into completely non-selfish individuals. Types
1 and 2 work among smaller communities, but become more difficult as soon as the level
of kin becomes more removed or if behavior can no longer be as easily observed in order
to establish a tit-for-tat strategy. A community that inhabits a small territory will have
significantly more personal interaction and thereby better means to establish direct and
social control. Political entities that stretch over wider terrains and try to exert control over
a diverse group of people cannot not rely on kin and reciprocal altruism alone. The growing
anonymity between group members needs to be bridged. Theoretically, the ability of
collective action tends to break down once the group size no longer allows direct and
personal relationships between its members and thereby creates the possibility for freeriding and other opportunistic behavior (Olson 2003). One way to solve this collective
action problem is to create shared mental models, describing the process of people viewing
the world in similar ways and thereby creating bonds among them. Cultures are built upon
such cognitive models, and they expand on them with emotional components like
surrounding rituals and codes of behavior.
The term “shared mental models” was coined by the economists Denzau and North
(Denzau and North 1994) but in many ways they fail to acknowledge the culture
connection, because it would open the door to the emotional component that ultimately
conflicts with some of the basic assumptions of their economic model. The authors do
distinguish between ideologies and traditional cultures, which is why they developed the
concept of shared mental models. This distinction, however, is not so much driven by a
clearly delimited definition than by the assumption that ideologies are more rational than
religions and other traditional cultures, therefore necessitating such a distinction. Whether
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this is truly helpful remains an open question, because it creates the impression that
believing in an ideology is a separate phenomenon compared to religious belief. But before
we look at the content of any belief system, we need to come to terms with the facts that
are “built” for believing.
Shared mental models involve creating a subjective reality that organizes
experiences with the world around us into a processable causal model. It helps us
understand what is going on around us; unfortunately. It offers no guarantee that our way
of understanding is the correct one. An ideal mental model would approach reality as much
as possible, for the closer the subjectively defined cause-effect relations are to the objective
cause-effect relations, the more capable the model will be to adapt to the environment. This
is one of the reasons why science and culture are not opposites.
Not everyone in a Western secular society is a trained scientist, but Western-shared
mental models put a premium on explanations that are grounded in science and not religion
or ideology. Such a mental model is closer to objective reality, but it is still a mental model.
Even the science-based model is not without its emotional component – most Westerners
will intuitively lend greater credibility to an argument based on an article published in an
academic journal compared to a passage from scripture. This is not necessarily a bad thing,
since one of the purposes of shared mental models is the ability to navigate through the
world by intuition and therefore save cognitive resources for other activities.
We even know cases where mental models created incorrect cause-and-effect
relationships, but the intuition they incentivized still led to positive outcomes. To give an
example, in medieval times Jews and Muslims had lower disease and death rates due to the
strict teachings their respective religions had regarding bodily hygiene (Landes 1998, KL
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219). In their subjective interpretations, taking care of one’s body pleased god and led to
the reward of a longer, healthier life. While god might indeed be pleased, the objective
causal relationship is that hygiene reduces the risk of contracting infectious diseases. 16
Another example is the previously mentioned shift in attitude towards wealth advanced,
according to Weber, by Calvin’s theology (the idea of a calling and the doctrine of
predestination and their impact on wealth and work) during the Protestant Reformation.
Religion has provided many societies throughout history with many shared mental models,
but once again we need to realize that religion was only building on the existing
psychological preconditions shared by almost all human beings.
Human beings are thus hard-wired not simply for religion per-se, but for holding
religious-like beliefs--meaning that a theological underpinning of an idea is not required to
create a shared mental model, although historically models that have included an element
of the supernatural have shown significant endurance. It is probably no coincidence that
currently the Catholic church is the longest continuously existing institution. Critics of
religion like to argue that without the belief in god human affairs would be more peaceful
and rational, two claims that do not withstand close scrutiny. There can be no doubt that
religious beliefs have been responsible for a great deal of violence and human suffering,
but the dichotomy claiming that religion is inherently violent and secularism is inherently
peaceful is most likely wrong (Armstrong 2014; Cavanaugh 2009). If religion were the
main source of violence, we should have seen an increase in violent behavior as a
consequence of religion proliferating and becoming more complex and organized. In fact,

Unfortunately, another widespread shared mental model was that Jews lived longer because
they had poisoned Christian wells, becoming one of the continuous elements of past and in mutated form
also contemporary antisemitism.
16
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the opposite is true and with higher levels of organization, religion became one of the most
successful tools not only to enable cooperation, but also to rein in violent behavior (Pinker
2011), at least within, if not so much between, societies. My second argument is that
cooperation would be better and more widespread if the delusions of religion had not
prevented us from identifying and acting according to the principles of reason and
rationality (See, for example: Dawkins 2006; Harris 2006; Hitchens 2008). Since the
substantive content of religions has an impact on actual social outcomes, it should always
be the subject of intense scrutiny and evaluation. It is, however, something completely
different to argue that the religious impulse as such can be replaced with pure rational
sober-mindedness.
Even North concedes that the level of cooperation and social behavior observed
throughout the world would be impossible without our ability to create religious-like
institutions that incentivize trust and cooperation (Douglass Cecil North 1981, 45–58). We
most likely will also have to re-evaluate the claim that with modernization religion
becomes less important. It is true that the belief in god is declining as economic and
political development are progressing, but the religious impulse is finding other ways to
express itself, only this time in the form of ideologies (Hoffer 1951; Lindholm and Zuquete
2010; Zuquete 2007). From an evolutionary psychological viewpoint this should not come
as a surprise, since even the religious sense does serve an evolutionary function. The
creation of social cohesion and the increased survival chances for the members of a tightknit community (Pinker 2009, 554–58).
Shared mental models are not a collective agreement on the most rational way to
cooperate; rather, they are collectively-held beliefs about how to behave towards others
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and the environment. That is, such models generate an emotional bond that allow
cooperation through emotions like shame if one violates moral codes, anger if someone
else violates them, or pride if our commitment to these values is recognized. Moral codes
cause more than the anxiety that Freud was concerned about, instead,
people gain pleasure from or feel morally obliged to cooperate with
like-minded people. People also enjoy punishing those who exploit the
cooperation of others, or fell morally obligated to do so (Bowles and Gintis
2013, 3).

Shared mental models serve the purpose to create “like-minded” people and thereby
trigger the emotional-moral switch that improves the capacity for cooperation.
This propensity to follow norms is not only a way to reduce the free-rider problem;
it also enables a more efficient pursuit of the common good. Douglas North posed that
question and wondered why
we observe people disobeying the rules of a society when the
benefits exceed the costs, we also observe them obeying the rules when an
individualistic calculus would have them do otherwise […] Without an
explicit theory of ideology or, more generally, of the sociology of
knowledge there are immense gaps in our ability to account for either
current allocation of resources or historical change. In addition to being
unable to resolve the fundamental dilemma of the free rider problem we
cannot explain the enormous investment that every society makes in
legitimacy” (Douglass Cecil North 1981, 46–47).
The emotional investment of norms also grants them legitimacy because they start
to “feel right.” One answer to North’s puzzle would be to accept that it is not only material
gain that triggers positive feelings. In dealing with human psychology research Fredrickson
and Branigan have spent a lot of time with negative emotions like hate and anger, compared
to more positive emotions like joy, love, and contentment (Fredrickson and Branigan
2001). The dominant materialist framework has blinded us to the possibility that delayed
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or foregone material gratification can be more than compensated with psychological
gratification.
Think about the alcoholic who remains abstinent, the devout religious follower who
commits to fasting or the pennypincher who decides to give to charity. We might decide
on occasion not take advantage of others or freeride at the expense of our community
because not doing so makes us feel better than complying. Equally important, our emotions
affect others around us – behaving according to moral norms (i.e. “doing good”) not only
causes the individual who does so to feel better, but it incentivizes those who observe such
behavior approvingly to do the same (Haidt 2000; Schnall, Roper, and Fessler 2010).
Nature has equipped human beings with a complex and malleable cause-trigger system for
emotional reactions precisely to ensure that decisions are not solely based on a rational
cost-benefit calculation. The emotional investment of behavior is a key element when we
try to understand why communities can be sustainable.
Human beings are capable of redirecting instinctive emotions for the purpose of
creating artificial, family-like groups. It is not our ability to reflect and rationalize ourselves
into embracing a larger society, since our tribal instincts would immediately lead us to
attempt to take advantage of the other members for the benefit of our own kin. If, however,
my emotional bond to my family is no stronger than my emotional bond to the other
members of society, cooperation for the common good becomes possible. One of the
purposes of complex cultures was to create an artificial counterweight to our natural
preference for close kinship relations. Again, the word “natural” should not be
misunderstood here; what it means is that cooperation among family members happens
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automatically and instinctively, while cooperation beyond the family needs a cultural
supports system that reinforces the emotional bond with shared mental models.
Shared interpretations of the world help solve the collective action problem
especially in cases where the mental model was especially built to counter selfish behavior
by presenting rewards and punishments that greatly reinforce the
gains from cooperation in the here and now. If I believe that my tribe’s chief
is just another fellow like me following his own self-interests, I may or may
not decide to obey his authority. But if I believe that the chief can command
the spirits of dead ancestors to reward or punish me, I will be much more
likely to respect his word. My sense of shame is potentially much greater if
I believe I am being observed by a dead ancestor who might see into my
real motives better than a live kinsman. Contrary to the views of both
religious believers and secularists, it is extremely difficult to prove or falsify
any given religious belief. Even if I am skeptical that the chief is really in
touch with dead ancestors, I may not want to take the risk that he really is”
(Fukuyama 2012, 37).

That the religious impulse is a human universal does not absolve us from
acknowledging the differences between religious creeds and how they developed.
Obviously, a society that believes in irrigation for a better harvest is preferable to one that
tries to accomplish the same goal through human sacrifice. But it would be a mistake to
automatically assume that the psychology of the latter is fundamentally different from the
former – what differs is their mental model. One tried to solve the problem through the
prescriptions of science, the other via religion. Yet both most likely are not dispassionate
about their beliefs, but see one as inherent superior to the other.
Evidence for the psychological underpinning of trust in science is provided by the
fact that even in modern and secular societies, science loses its appeal when it runs up
against people’s more important beliefs. This holds true for all political attitudes, too.
Indeed, it is almost comical to observe how the left and right list examples of how the other
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side is ignoring science (for criticism of the left, see: Berezow and Campbell 2014; for
criticism of the right, see: Mooney 2012), when it conflicts with other emotionally invested
convictions. The big problem in this debate is that neither side is willing to admit that they
have an emotional reason for why they prefer certain scientific findings to others. The claim
to be emotion-free has an eroding effect on our ability to self-reflect, because if I am
convinced that my views are grounded in objective rationality my openness to persuasion
will be lower compared to a person admitting that there is an emotional component to their
positions making them more aware of their own potential biases.
Family-like bonds, tit-for-tat, and reciprocal altruism are not replaced by religion
or secular ideologies, but they amplify the scope of these biologically-grounded social
behaviors and add additional components in the form of collective rules to it. These rules
of social behavior (regardless of their content, e.g. not to eat certain kinds of food) within
collectively held belief systems are not grounded solely in a cost-benefit analysis (e.g. if I
wash my hands I will live longer) but are becoming a part of an individual’s identity and
image of him- or herself (e.g. as a good Muslim or Jew, I have to regularly wash my hands),
which creates another incentive for collective action. One wants to demonstrate loyalty and
commitment to the group by actively following its rules and working for its goals. This is
exactly the phenomenon we can see on a large scale among the main world religions, but
it also works on smaller scales like towns or neighborhood communities where people take
pleasure in working together without either being directly related or expecting an
immediate individual benefit from their commitment.
Since the first two kinds of social behavior need the least amount of “cultural
support,” they also posit something like our natural fallback position if shared mental
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models should lose their credibility and legitimacy. If a society’s mental model is religionbased and people lose faith, appeals to their religiosity will become less effective in
enabling effective collective action and there will be new incentive structures to benefit the
families and friends. The creation of a society around a collectively-held belief is not an
easy undertaking, especially if the expectation is that it can override our more primal
instincts that make us favor family or tit-for-tat behavior (which can be just another word
for corruption). We will discuss this in more detail once we turn to institutions, but political
development can hardly be understood without taking large-scale, shared mental models
into account. A comparison of Japanese and Chinese institutional development, for
example. demonstrates that the Japanese ability to put government before family gave them
a significant advantage in organizing governance, at least for a time (Huntington 1965,
417–18).
SMMs serve as maps through our social, economic, and political life and enable us
to follow historically developed paths. There is, however, always the possibility that the
map itself is wrong and our emotional investment in the charted course makes it hard for
us to update it. A known consequence of following a flawed SMM is the phenomenon of
cognitive dissonance, where societies try to confront a new challenge based on their SMM,
but the model is inadequate for the problem at hand. Since the mental model is invested
with emotional value, its believers try to fit reality into our model instead of the other way
round (Festinger 2001; Tavris and Aronson 2016). Francis Fukuyama gives a good
example, where he describes how
societies from Rome to China attributed military setbacks to
inadequate observance of religious obligations; instead of spending time
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reorganizing and reequipping the army, they devoted resources to increased
rites and sacrifices” (Fukuyama 2012, 453).

Culture and shared mental models remain double-edged swords. On the one hand,
they can provide strong incentives for collective action and social cohesion, and as long as
they don’t encounter a serious contradiction in the realm of objective reality, they can
deliver positive results for a prolonged period of time. On the other, if such contradictions
occur, communities may face severe problems, since their emotional attachments create a
barrier for necessary change.

2.2

The Culture-Biology Connection
The establishment of a connection between culture and emotions carries with it a

connection between culture and biology. So far we have dealt with the physiological
reactions triggered by experienced and observed behavior by ourselves or others, but is the
experiencing of emotions the only biological element we can connect to culture. We will
have to take a look at some additional factors of human biology, especially the human
brain, which has been evolved in many respects to enable social life. This is important
because it addresses a key question: Are we by nature more individualistic or more social?
Part of the answer has to do with the design and biochemistry of our brain and whether we
will find more evolution in the areas responsible for social behavior or for those pertaining
to our individualistic side. Once more, we follow our approach of interdisciplinarity and
see what other fields can contribute to our definition of culture.
One starting point stems from the observation that our position in relation to others
as well as our recognition of social status by others directly affects human brain chemistry.
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For example, serotonin levels tend to be elevated with higher social status and serve as a
safeguard against depression (R. H. Frank 1986, 21–25; Fukuyama 2012c, 41), indicating
that our physiological well-being is connected to our social needs. Our sense for
community is hardwired into our behavior to such a degree that as soon as we have the
smallest communality around which to form a group, we will begin to behave differently
towards in-group members and out-group members. Known in psychology as the “minimal
group paradigm,” a number of experiments conducted by Henri Tajfel demonstrated that
regardless of the criteria by which people are separated into two or more groups, when it
comes to the distribution of resources individuals will tend to distribute a larger share to
their group. Examples for the criteria used to divide people into a group included flipping
a coin or having individuals guess the number of dots on a page. Regardless of their actual
estimations, 50% were told that they had overestimated the number of dots and were put
into a group of “overestimators,” while others were grouped as “underestimators.” After
the investigator assigned groups, the test subjects were asked to distribute money to all
subjects whose only known characteristic was the group they belonged to. The almost
uniform tendency of people was to distribute in favor of their group (Tajfel 1970). This
finding supports the notion that our brain automatically operates as if we are members of
group, regardless of how that group came into existence and without clear evidence that
preferring my own group will lead to any form of individualized benefit.
More recent studies have used functional magnetic resonance imaging monitoring
the brain activity of individuals watching videos of other people’s hands being pricked by
a needle or touched by a Q-Tip that revealed that being part of the same community
influences our experience of pain. The hands were labeled with the person’s religion, and
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if it was a match with the religion of the viewer of the video, a larger spike occurred in the
area of the brain that handles pain than when the hand in the video was labeled with another
religion. This was repeated with similarly arbitrary group definitions as in Tajfel’s
experiments with the same results, showing that our brain empathizes more strongly with
those whom we see as part of our group (Vaughn et al. 2018). These experiments all
demonstrate that the human mind has a repertoire of ways to support group cohesion.
Outside of the laboratory things are more complex and there are different levels of
affection and connection we feel with others. As we have discussed, the first community
we are part of without our own choosing is our family, and we tend to remain more loyal
to them then to other groups. Additionally, none of these experiments advance the claim
that we are incapable of reflected decision making and that we can never leave groups or
communities once we joined them. We can, and we join and leave different communities
throughout our lives. It does demonstrate, however, that there is a natural inclination
towards community, which does make sense since we are instinctively aware of our
limitations to survive as a solitary animal.
But communities are not just the byproduct of rational individualistic human beings
forced by nature to work together, but they can be a desirable end on their own. The
evolutionary advantage that stems from effective cooperation in groups is also maintained
by a subconscious and physiological need for community and the emotional elevation it
makes us feel. Even small communal activities that are done together like synchronous
signing or dancing not only affects us psychologically, but physiologically, too. After such
synchronous activities, participants exhibit higher levels of physical resilience and
experience a higher pain threshold (Cohen et al. 2010). It looks as if community does not
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just make us feel stronger, but actually makes us stronger by allowing us to more fully
access the potential of our bodies. In this respect, consider the so-called homefield
advantage of a sports team where the cheering for the team seems to give them an
advantage due to the emotional elevation the players feel.
Further evidence of the need for community comes from the field of
psychopathology, where evidence mounts that an unsatisfied sense of belonging and lack
of community can cause serious mental illnesses like depression, causing lower life
expectancy and even suicide (Chandler and Lalonde 1998; Cole et al. 2015; Hari 2018). 17
Sean Twenge and others have observed that the increase of time US adolescents spent in
front of screens correlates strongly with symptoms of depression and suicide-related
outcomes, while in-person social interaction, sports/exercise, homework, the consumption
of print media, and attending religious services had the opposite effect (Twenge et al.
2018). One of the biggest surprises of the twenty-first century is the social media revolution
in the most demonstrative way show the extent to which we care about others (in positive
and negative ways), how greatly we desire to communicate with others, and how much we
are affected by what others think of us. Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter are socialattention machines that feed directly into one part of our community-seeking brain,
especially for the generation born shortly just before or just after 2000 when social media
became a central pillar of their community life. And just as with other forms of community,
the online world is heavily influencing our emotional interaction or the lack thereof.
Positive or negative comments, likes and other ways of interaction produce a measurable

17

It is no coincidence that in January 2018 the British Government made the tackling of loneliness
a key issue for its “Minister for Sport and Civil Society.”
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impact on the psychological and social well-being of users (Burke, Marlow, and Lento
2010; Burrow and Rainone 2017; Kross et al. 2013; Sung et al. 2016; Valkenburg, Peter,
and Schouten 2006). Interaction with others can be an attributing cause to psychological
and physiological health or sickness, but the human need for it is becoming more and more
evident. There is growing empirical evidence that the quality of our social relations has a
direct impact on life expectancy, something that would support the previously made claim
that common activities make us more resilient.
So it is not simply a choice between individualism and sociability that has to be
made by a rational, individual utility-maximizing person, but the question is how to balance
individualism with the biological need for community. One of the growing problems is that
is has become easier to be exposed to the pathologies of communities than to their benefits,
and the growing role of social media is part of this problem.
Looking at those who are most likely to shift their community needs to online
platforms we see concerning trends: depression and suicide attempts among adolescents
have skyrocketed since the 2000. Among girls, twice as many teenage girls now end their
own lives compared to the early 2000s (Lukianoff and Haidt 2018, 150; for a more in-depth
analysis see: Twenge 2017). Social isolation and reduced in-person social interaction
literally can make us sick, so based on all the available evidence the idea that our communal
sense and sociability are results of our rationality no longer holds up. Twenge and her coauthors point towards the growing evidence that the neural network of the brain needs
social interaction to develop. When they say “it is worth remembering that humans’ neural
architecture evolved under conditions of close, mostly continuous face-to-face contact with
others (including non-visual and non-auditory contact; i.e., touch, olfaction), and that a
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decrease in or removal of a system’s key inputs may risk destabilization of the system”
(Twenge et al. 2018, 4).
Jonathan Haidt and Greg Lukianoff demonstrate that among the generation born
after 1994 the trend in shifting in-person social relationships to online relationships has
triggered a mental health crisis among adolescents with growing rates of self-inflicted
harm, depression, and suicide (Lukianoff and Haidt 2018, 152). If sociability were only a
choice but not a necessity, we should not observe these kinds of phenomena.
As previously described, it is safe to say that a first blueprint that nudges us towards
sociability (including both cooperation and competition) has been psychologically
hardwired into the human brain. This hardwiring, however, is only a first draft that requires
revision based on experience. For example, the human brain is built to learn a language,
but its needs communication to fully develop the actual ability to speak. Luckily enough
by default we enjoy communicating with others, thereby providing the necessary stimulus
for the brain to acquire full linguistic capacity (Johnson and Newport 1989). It is not only
the human body that is born prematurely, but also the human brain continues to mature and
change at least until the age of 15, if not longer (Epstein 1986; Hudspeth and Pribram
1990), exposing it to neuroplasticity, or the ability to develop according to external stimuli
(Wexler 2010), that cannot have been preprogrammed before birth.
Just as with language, we are a species that enjoys engaging in play to learn social
skills and support the development of our brain structure, but this is also absolutely crucial
in understanding the development of culture. The existing predisposition for language and
play are all designed to allow us to work in groups, but our environment has not
predetermined the particular content and shape of language and social behavior. To a
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certain extent, the role of instinct ends here – we are not like termites who would behave
the same way wherever we encounter them. We use our basic building blocks of language
and social behavior but create significantly different cultures. And these cultures then
create the environment that contributes to the determinants of what, for example, causes
anxiety or joy. Max Weber makes a strong case that the birth of capitalism was exactly
such a reshaping of the “webs of emotions” that redirected human behavior, since alternate
sources of positive and negative emotions were created. The Protestant Reformation turned
the traditional idea of vanity on its head by
liberating the acquisition of wealth from the inhibitions of
traditionalist ethics; it breaks the fetters on the striving for gain not only by
legalizing it, but [...] by seeing it as directly willed by God (M. Weber 2012,
119).

Max Weber’s famous description in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, is a concise historical hermeneutic of how wealth acquisition became a source
of positive emotions, through triggering approval in the eyes of god and then in the eyes of
others. Before Calvin’s time, the connection between wealth and shame was a strong
inhibition to economic development, since every economic success in this life moved one
closer to eternal damnation in the afterlife. Assuming that religious sentiments at that time
were genuine and controlling, this attitude was a real cultural obstacle to improving the
material conditions in the Christian world. Up until the first half of the 20th century, those
regions that embraced Protestantism over Catholicism had significantly higher economic
growth that cannot be explained by non-cultural factors alone (Barro and McCleary 2003;
Ferguson 2011a).
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A changing cultural environment, however, does not necessarily only have positive
consequences. Clifford Geertz writes that “man is an animal suspended in webs of
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs” (Geertz 1993, 5). We can
imagine the strings of these webs to consist of the emotions that tie us to our cultural group.
Or to phrase it more in biological terms, culture has an influence on which kind of events
cause the release of which specific hormone, so a change in the cultural environment can
have a direct impact on the processes of the brain and endocrine system.
If these webs start to change, it is not just a social phenomenon but also a
psychological one. Investigating the cultural change in Europe in the 19th century, Emile
Durkheim formulated his study about suicide rates in European countries and concluded
that it “varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups of which the
individual forms a part” (Durkheim 2006, 208), meaning that those in stable “webs of
significance” dealt with fewer incidents of suicide than those whose webs were altering.
Durkheim was among the first to give a social dimension to individual psychological states,
arguing that people who experience social isolation and crumbling group identities can be
driven into such a mental state that they view suicide as the only possible way out.
Durkheim wrote in the late 1800s, but his theory still commands validity today (see, for
example Eckersley and Dear 2002).
The sudden change of a cultural environment is not only an aesthetic challenge; it
can also have severe effects on human psychology. Evaluating the literature on migrantpsychology and the challenges of integration, Bruce Wexler comes to the conclusion that
because of the neurobiological importance of the homology between
internal structures and the external environment, people do not like living
inside someone else’s symbol system […] Happiness, peace and satisfaction
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in realizing childhood goals, contributing to and receiving the approval of a
vital community to which they belong, and assuming the roles of the parents
and other community elders they had admired are not available to them
(Wexler 2010, 19).

The contemporary trend toward equating culture with religion or ethnicity has at
least partially distorted our understanding of the psychological function of culture. What
Durkheim describes are the consequences of an emergent multicultural society, even
though there has been no change in the dominant form of religious belief or the ethnic
composition of the countries he was investigating. What did change, however, was that
people were forced to move from a primarily rural culture into a growingly urban culture.
This is just as much a change of the symbolic environment as it is for a Somali Muslim
moving to liberal Minnesota. And as Wexler has described, it is these changes of the
symbolic environment that can have severe psychological consequences.

2.2.1

Culture and Evolution

If we want to better understand the biological underpinnings, it is helpful to
examine our closest non-human relatives. The basic behavioral patterns that are relevant
for human culture can also be observed in chimpanzees (F. B. M. de Waal 2007), and they
allow us to glimpse into the early days of humanity about five million years ago. Although
humans branched off from its common ancestor, the similarity of human and chimpanzee
genomes is still characterized by genome overlap of 99% and thereby the two species
match each other far more closely than any other pair of primates. As a result, this makes
comparing the social behavior of the two a useful first step in tracing the evolution of social
behavior (Fukuyama 2012c, 31; Wade 2014, 7, 13–21).
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Before the emergence of societies based on complex cultures, human communities
strongly resembled a chimpanzee-colony regarding its social environment, with a
prevalence of tribal warfare for territory, resources, and females. Among chimpanzees we
see significant instances of social behavior including violent raids against outgroups and
the integration of females from outside chimpanzee colonies (LeBlanc and Register 2003),
the acquisition of social status (alpha male) that must be earned, and the ability to make
and break coalitions to reach a higher status (F. B. M. de Waal 2007, chap. 2). This status
is also recognized by the members of the colony and consequently they turn to the alpha
male or female to settle conflicts (Fukuyama 2012, 32). They are also capable of reciprocity
and returning favors, even if it comes at a personal cost (Schmelz et al. 2017). Chimps
however are also capable of deceiving others, which can lead to being ostracized by other
chimpanzees (Fukuyama 2012, 33).
Our closest primate relative moreover shows clear instances of social behavior,
both in its positive and negative expressions. In its early stages, human existence most
likely was not much different, and the basic forms of social behavior paralleled each other
in many respects (F. B. M. de Waal 2007). Raids on other groups for resources and women
continually took place, and even within tribes violence was not exceptional. As LeBlanc
and Register observe, “much of noncomplex society human warfare is similar to
chimpanzee attacks […]. The chimp and human behaviors are almost completely parallel”
(LeBlanc and Register 2003, 83). Since chimpanzees also live in groups, they are
confronted with the same problems of group governance as other species, including
humans. And as with humans, emotions play a key role in ensuring the social functioning
of groups.
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The difference, however, is that human beings can influence what triggers an
emotional reaction; a chimpanzee will never display an emotional reaction because another
chimpanzee has violated a sacred rule or desecrated a holy site. Other species have
something like instinctive emotional reactions that allows the emergence of social
hierarchies, but complex moral imaginations that spring from shared mental models are
most likely exclusive to humans. Chimpanzees have the emotional building blocks (the
ability to feel sympathy, fear, anger, affection, envy) that play a key role in the creation of
shared mental models, but they lack the ability to put together a full-fledged model of the
world and then invest it with intrinsic value. (On the existence of emotional building blocks
in chimpaszees but their lack of an ability to put them together, see: Frans B. M. de Waal
1997). Thus, will our closet ancestors are social creatures, but they cannot develop ideas
of morality that would allow them to cooperate as closely as human individuals can.
For all the social behavior we see in chimpanzees, their actual ability for collective
action is also quite limited. Michael Tomasello conducted several experiments trying to
evaluate the cooperative capacities of chimpanzees and other primates. Based on the results
of these studies, he concluded that their ability of chimps and other primates to cooperate
is limited at best. In one key publication, he states that “it is inconceivable that you would
ever see two chimpanzees carrying a log together” (quoted in: Haidt 2013, 204). What they
are missing is shared intentionality (Tomasello et al. 2005)--or what we described as the
formulation of common goals based on a shared mental model. Once you agree on how the
world supposedly works, it is much easier to intentionally grasp the meaning of somebody
else’s actions. Like actions, language too rests on shared intentionality, since words are an
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agreement among people as to what a sound describes (Haidt 2013, 206; Tomasello et al.
2005, 683).
Most animals react to the environment based on a stimulus-instinct basis, meaning
that their ability for reflection and abstraction is limited compared to human beings. Even
with an almost 99% genome overlap, the chimpanzee has no comparable ability for abstract
thought that accounts for, among other things, language and religion (Fukuyama 2012, 31).
Consequently, animal behavior is significantly easier to predict, since the likelihood of the
same non-human species to come to different interpretations of their environment is
practically non-existent. This does not mean that chimpanzees and other animals are
incapable of feelings or cannot develop loyalties and emotional attachments (F. B. M. de
Waal 2007, 42), but they never reach the level of complexity that prevails among homo
sapiens. It is, for example, unlikely that chimpanzees will turn vegetarian for moral
reasons. They understand and are capable of following a set of social rules that enable
hierarchies within chimpanzee colonies, but unable to reflect on the moral order or some
transcendent purpose of the community.
Numerous researchers have also provided strong evidence that human beings are
also hardwired to create and understand hierarchies and social rules causes us uneasiness
if we see these concepts and practices violated (Greene 2014; Haidt 2013; C. Smith 2009;
and Wright 1994), but different human communities came up with different ideas of what
actually constitute legitimate rules. These questions do not arise for chimpanzees – they
follow their natural instincts but lack the capacity to rearrange or suppress what triggers
these instincts. Human beings on the other hand developed societal constructs that were
driven by shared mental models and began to refine the triggers for emotions and the urge
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to act upon them. We know of no human society that does not build some forms of cultural
structures around symbols like body paintings, ornaments, or certain social rituals. While
it is true that we for example see elaborate mating rituals among animals, these rituals are
of significantly less complexity and design as human rituals. The peacock follows a ritual
in order to attract a mate, but they do so out of instinct and not because there is an oral
tradition or another similar way of cultural transmission of certain behavior.
Another main difference between primates and humans is the capacity to reason.
Contrary to animals, homo sapiens is not only driven by instinct and emotion but has the
capacity to reason and reflect critically before taking an action. Throughout Western
philosophy the idea has been that emotions and reason are two competing forces within the
human psyche. Plato, David Hume, Thomas Jefferson and others proposed different
interpretations of the conflict between the passions (i.e. emotions) and reason. Ideally,
although difficult, reason should have command over the passions. More than in other
philosophical traditions, Western philosophy put a premium on reason while distrusting
the passions (Solomon 1993).
Advances in neuroscience, however, strongly suggest that passion and reason are
not opposed to each other, but are supporting parts of the human psyche that make social
life possible. The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio worked with numerous patients whose
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the emotional center of the brain, had been damaged. These
patients were entirely free from emotional reactions but maintained their full memory of
right and wrong and suffered no loss in IQ (A. R. Damasio 2006). Yet, instead of living a
life uninhibited by emotions, their lives fell apart – i.e., their decision making was reduced
to a constant and conscious cost-benefit analysis where any option felt as good as every
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other. This disability however did not turn these subjects into cold, calculating
psychopaths, who were able to take advantage of their fellow human beings at every turn,
since they could still reason their way towards moral behavior. They knew what was right
and wrong, but that knowledge no longer came to them emotionally; instead, they had to
make a conscious effort to morally inform their actions based on information without any
recourse to what their feelings would tell them to do. Although this might be the
rationalist’s dream, for those afflicted with this condition it meant the loss of connection
with family and employers (Haidt 2013, 33).
Instead of making us physically ally more resilient towards the environment and
potential predators, evolution reinforced our ability to cooperate and organize into groups
and communities. The human brain is larger especially in the area of the neocortex than
other species, which is critical for abstraction, a basic condition necessary for the creation
of social life beyond the tribal level that dominates among other social species (Pugh 1977).
For example, before someone can build a society around the belief that after death our
ancestors can still communicate with us through priests, it is necessary to grasp the idea of
life after death as such.
The human brain evolved toward an ever-increasing capacity for social interaction,
but with significant differences vis-à-vis what other species can do. The focus of studies
on the human brain have long centered on its ability to enhance individual survival chances;
but it seems that the more we know about our brain, the more it becomes clear to what
extend it has evolved to enable more and more complex social interaction. The tendency
of the brain to look for patterns in the physical and social environment turned out to be the
basis for “language, imagination, invention, and the belief in imaginary entities such as
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ghosts and gods” (Mattson 2014). In addition to memorizing food sources and the being
able to reproduce perceived patterns in maps or drawings, the human brain comes equipped
with an additional feature. As Tattersall notes,
The human brain has a superior ability to mentally manipulate
animate and inanimate patterns into a myriad of intangible symbols that can
then be recombined to produce new images of the world; we therefore live
partly in worlds of our own mental creation, superimposed upon or distinct
from the natural world” (Tattersall 2010, 193).

Even the human capacity for art and creativity is most likely just another part of the
evolutionary toolbox for social behavior, since
art is a symbolic communicative system practiced only by humans,
and argued to have become a fully practiced behavior at a time when early
human social groups grew in size and complexity, and communication
through language and art promoted cohesion and survival (Zaidel 2014).

Contrary to some theories that claim that human sociability is learned behavior, the
physiological development of homo sapiens made social behavior a necessary condition
for survival. The tripling of the size of the human brain and the accompanying increase in
head size lead to human beings being born prematurely for the newborn to fit through the
birth canal. From the beginning, human beings were dependent on at least one other person
for physical survival, most commonly the mother. Yet without a surrounding community
both the mother as well as the baby would have very little chance of survival. Sometimes
it seems as if studies about human development completely ignore the first stages of our
existence. We are incapable of living independently for quite a while after being born, so
any theory that proposes social behavior is exclusively learned behavior must also assume
that newborns could somehow survive on their own. We are an altricial species, meaning
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that human newborns need to be taken care of for a long period of time until they are
capable to provide for themselves. Nature has placed a huge and disproportionate burden
on women in order to allow the development of humanities most advanced feature: the
brain.
Competing theories have been presented as to why human babies are born
prematurely, but all of them point towards the extraordinary physical burden child bearing
and child rearing puts on the mother (Dunsworth et al. 2012; Wittman and Wall 2007). As
we have already discussed, child mortality and the risk for women to die as a consequence
of giving birth was extraordinary high in pre-modern societies. Creating an environment
that increased the chances of survival for both mothers and their offspring was one of the
first challenges for human communities, something that could simply not be accomplished
by an individual, especially if that individual should happen to be a female that just went
through the exhausting process of giving birth. Without repeating too much of a point
already made, cultural progress increased the survival chances for children and women,
despite the biological burden nature has put upon them.
The heuristic trick used by philosophers like Hobbes and Rousseau was to start
their philosophy with the assumption that we are first solitary and then evolve into
community and society. The problem is, we never had this option in the first place. The
path of human evolution seemingly made a tradeoff between physical and social
development, with the social component becoming increasingly more important. We
cannot survive on our own, but we are able to create social structures of such complexity
that we outperform any other competing species. Close emotional ties with mates, children,
parents, and friends can have a positive impact on the chances for survival and reproductive
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success (A. Damasio and Carvalho 2013). Contrary to what Rousseau, Marx, and Engels
(Engels 2010) might claim, it did not need a sinister cabal to drag us into a community.
The idea that society is by default a ruse created by the powerful who tricked others into
submission and blinded them to being exploited is a retelling of human history that the
evolutionary record does not bear out. Hierarchies and loyalties to a community are part of
our instinctive social side, and not a cabal by the powerful.
Communities were necessary for survival, and the better organized a community
was, the better were its chances for survival. It seems increasingly likely that the human
brain was not growing to make us more adaptive as individuals, but to allow new and more
complex forms of human interaction and the creation of ever more complex social
organizations (Humphrey 1976, 310).
Our ability to create a world of our own mental creation and to fill it with
emotionally triggering symbols and artificially created patterns that then are sustained by
different forms of communication has of course not only been a blessing. This increase in
brain size and the growing faculties for social intelligence is not a guarantor that social
organizations are always functioning or organize human societies for the betterment of its
members. Human intelligence allowed the development of
weapons, culture, and population sizes to levels that essentially
erased the significance of predators of other species, he simultaneously
created a new predator: groups and coalitions within his own species (R. D.
Alexander 1974, 335).

2.2.1.1 The Return of Group Selection
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As Alexander alludes, the further we evolved socially the more dangerous we
became to ourselves, and with the exception of pandemic events like the Spanish flu, the
deadliest competitor to human beings have been other human beings. But this danger was
less one-on-one fighting, but competition among groups and the better organized groups
tending to outperform less well- organized ones. Evolution of the means of cooperation
based on shared mental models enabled the human dominance over the planet, not some
sober cost-benefit calculation by sober individualists. Not surprisingly, a major field of
evolutionary competition involved the design of the mental models or the culture on which
a community based its cohesion.
If culture is the glue that keeps groups and coalitions together, those with the
stronger glue might have an advantage. Social organization and culture are also shaped by
an element of competition and those groups that find the best social organization to access
resources, protect their offspring, and increase group size will have a decided advantage
over other groups. That social evolution should not be discarded because of biological
evolution was also observed by Charles Darwin, who wrote that
when two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came
into competition, if (other circumstances being equal) the one tribe included
a great number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful members, who were
always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other,
this tribe would succeed better and conquer the other.… The advantage
which disciplined soldiers have over undisciplined hordes follows chiefly
from the confidence which each man feels in his comrades.… Selfish and
contentious people will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can be
effected. A tribe rich in the above qualities would spread and be victorious
over other tribes (Quoted in Haidt 2013, KL 3186).

Darwin realized that the ability for efficient collective action is an advantage, but it
puzzled him how such courageous, sympathetic, and faithful members” may emerge:
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But it may be asked, how within the limits of the same tribe did a
large number of members first become endowed with these social and moral
qualities, and how was the standard of excellence raised? It is extremely
doubtful whether the offspring of the more sympathetic and benevolent
parents, or of those who were the most faithful to their comrades, would be
reared in greater numbers than the children of selfish and treacherous
parents belonging to the same tribe. He who was ready to sacrifice his life,
as many a savage has been, rather than betray his comrades, would often
leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature (Quoted in Haidt 2013, KL
3198-3201)."

Like others before and after him, Darwin did not allow any significant role for
culture. Wedded to the principle of biological dominance, he remained a nativist – meaning
that in his view the moral qualities that make one tribe superior to another have to be innate,
and one has to be born with them, without any means of acquiring them otherwise (Haidt
2013, KL 637). If Darwin were right, any character trait that supported self-sacrifice or
selfless behavior would die out, because those holding these qualities would lead to having
significantly fewer offspring. Yet Darwin provides us with an emergency exit – for
procreation, we seek out partners that display sentiments like honor, respect, and affection
and thereby natural selection would ensure that these noble qualities would be passed down
through the generations and enable a functioning society (Haidt 2013, 225).
In Darwin’s approach, culture is not necessary at all, because the driving factor
remains exclusively with the individual , and evolutionary adaptation ultimately serves the
“interests” of an individual’s genes. Although he does not use the term, genetics takes care
of creating sufficient incentives for social behavior. Through the process of natural
selection, those who behave less socially have a competitive disadvantage, and the
subconscious desire to pass on one’s genes should lead to cooperation and functional social
cohesion.
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By the same token, however, any kind of observed social behavior that looks like
altruism or puts the community before one’s individual self-interest is only a thin veneer
that conceals the true trigger of such behavior, which is to have an advantage when it comes
to the selection of potential mates. Or in the words of Richard Dawkins, “DNA neither
cares nor knows. DNA just is. And we dance to its music” (Dawkins 2004, 133). Dawkins
may be correct that we dance to the music of our DNA, but it is possible that he is hearing
the wrong tune. From what we have seen so far, the human brain is a powerful engine
dedicated to the creation and maintenance of social relations. Human procreation would
easily be possible without language and religion or a predisposition to take pleasure in
having company or caring what people think of us, and neither music nor poetry would be
necessary to ensure our ability to pass on our genes.
But this is not how we function, and whatever our subconscious according to
Dawkins tells us to do, it doesn’t speak as clearly as he claims. If the seeking of approval
is only a function of an elaborate mating ritual, why do we also seek the approval of
strangers, something that has been demonstrated so strongly by the social media revolution.
It stretches the borders of logic to assume that evolution has equipped us with all these
tools for social behavior when passing on our individual genes is the primary goal.
It most certainly is a goal, but most likely not the only one, and the desire for a
parsimonious theory of human development does not automatically mean that evolution
also operates according to the rules of parsimony. Especially in the case of human beings,
we are confronted with a puzzling duality that enables us to act altruistically as well as
selfishly based on culturally-transmitted triggers. This is possible because our brains have
evolved to allow a swift adaptation not of our physiological qualities, but of group
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characteristics. Changing modes of cooperation can be accomplished much swifter than
waiting for natural selection to adapt to changing environmental conditions. So, contrary
to the claim that the individual should be the focus of inquiry, the acceptance of human
beings as social animals forces us to look at the interplay of communities and evolution as
well.
There is an ongoing debate about whether natural selection works only on the level
of the individual or if there is something like group selection, where evolutionary pressure
is not applied on the individual member of a species, but on groups. This concept of group
selection fell out of favor in the 1970s but is now returning from its banishment. Jonathan
Haidt, David S. Wilson, Edward O. Wilson, and Herbert Gintis have made convincing
arguments that natural selection can work on multiple levels simultaneously (Bowles and
Gintis 2013; Haidt 2013; D. S. Wilson 2015; D. S. Wilson and Wilson 2007; E. O. Wilson
2013).
Their critics argue that group selection or multilevel selection does not exist.
Biological nature, they say, has made us selfish and only fear for reputation and cultural
convention makes us sometimes appear as group-oriented (See, for example: Dawkins
2016). For me, this argument is not convincing: it is driven by a genetic determinism that
almost tautologically argues that every kind of behavior we observe can be reduced to the
underlying desire of our genes to be passed them on. We might think we protect our family
out of love, but in fact it is only our subconscious fear that our genetic line might end.
According to this theory, “true” human nature is inherently selfish and individualistic.
Everything that appears as altruism or individual sacrifices for one’s community
must be reducible to some selfish motivation (Haidt 2013, 197). As I will show in my
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chapter on maladaptation, such a theory lacks any explanation of why communities like
the Shakers have created a culture that severely impedes the chances for passing on the
genes of its individual members. It also does not account for pathological altruism, where
people care about others or their group to the point that they inflict psychological harm on
themselves (Oakley et al. 2011). These phenomena become easier to explain and
understand if we take the concept of multi-level selection seriously. Balancing the
competing evolutionary pressures on the individual and group level is something
specifically cultural, because it is the cultural environment that encourages and discourages
individual or social behavior based on the emotional triggers we discussed in the previous
chapters.
The idea that every human act is in the end driven by a single factor, be it genes,
materialism or utility maximization sounds a lot like Marxism and neoclassical economics
with their tendency towards single-factor or monocausal explanations. For Dawkins and
others these concepts are replaced with a “selfish gene” as the sole factor of true relevance.
Religion, ideologies or any other emotionally- invested shared mental model is just a
deception or superstructure when in fact there is a single explaining factor, the
subconscious desire to pass on our individual genes. What Marx called the “Überbau”
(superstructure) of culture that served the purpose of maintaining the ruling class’ grip on
power, is now put in service of our true master, the selfishness of our genes. One reason
why group selection fell out of favor was its lack of theoretical parsimony, but not a solid
empirical refutation (D. S. Wilson and Wilson 2007, 333). Individual selection theories
might be more elegant, but to put the elegance of a theory above its explanatory value is
not sufficient grounds to throw out competing approaches.
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It is important to keep in mind that group selection theory does not refute individual
selection but sees it instead as an additional component. I think Jonathan Haidt gets closest
to the truth when he claims that we can be both selfish or “groupish.” He developed the
concept of the Hive Switch, a hypothesis that states that we are conditional hive creatures
(Haidt 2013, chap. 10). What thie term means is that given the right conditions, we have
the ability to “transcend self-interest and lose ourselves (temporarily and ecstatically) in
something larger than ourselves” (Haidt 2013, 223). Drawing on Emile Durkheim, Haidt
argues that homo sapiens is also homo duplex, a being that exists at the individual and the
societal level (Haidt 2013, 225; Kluver, Frazier, and Haidt 2014). On the individual level,
we have one set of “social sentiments” that we feel individually towards each other and
that can be fitted into the concept of natural selection on the individual level. There is
another level already described by Emile Durkheim and that deals with the emotional
elevation we feel as part of a group. As Haidt argues,
The second [sentiments] are those which bind me to the social entity
as a whole; these manifest themselves primarily in the relationships of the
society with other societies, and could be called “inter-social.” The first [set
of emotions] leave[s] my autonomy and personality almost intact. No doubt
they tie me to others, but without taking much of my independence from
me. When I act under the influence of the second, by contrast, I am simply
a part of a whole, whose actions I follow, and whose influence I am subject
to (quoted in: Haidt 2013, 226).

Groups, according to Durkheim and Haidt, are actually real phenomena and not just
a “veneer” for our selfish genes. Haidt points towards an important element that helps to
activate the hive switch and reminds us of the role of the sacred that we discussed:
Durkheim believed that these collective emotions pull humans fully
but temporarily into the higher of our two realms, the realm of the sacred,
where the self disappears, and collective interests predominate. The realm
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of the profane, in contrast, is the ordinary day-to-day world where we live
most of our lives, concerned about wealth, health, and reputation, but
nagged by the sense that there is, somewhere, something higher and nobler
(Haidt 2013, 226).

This is why people continue to revere the flag to demonstrate their belonging to the
nation or refuse to eat pork to demonstrate their dedication to their faith or to refuse sex
and other activities that are fundamental for evolution to work on the individual level. The
intrinsic value that is invested in symbols and shared with others serve as a powerful glue
for social cohesion, and these symbols can create incentive structures where it becomes
more important for the individual to ensure the survival of this imagined and symbolic
world than his or her own existence.
The assumption that nature has programmed organisms mainly to survive as
individuals is not universally applicable. Bees, ants, and termites exist as parts of hives
where the structure does not allow for any individualism, but this turned out to be an
evolutionary advantage, not a disadvantage. As Edward O. Wilson points out, in many
respects it is them who rule the world (E. O. Wilson 1987). Would it really be such a
surprise to assume that some of these evolutionary advantages have also been incorporated
in human evolution? The search for parsimony in the history of human evolution seems to
have blinded us to the fact that we are the only species that operates on multiple levels
simultaneously. That is, we can be both individualistic and collectivistic depending on our
hive switch. Once again, we have to view them as two sides of a coin and resist the urge to
value one more than the other.
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In the next chapter we will see that they indeed cannot be separated and influence
each other on the cultural as well as the biological level. For this reason, we turn next to
the phenomenon of Gene-Culture Coevolution.

2.2.1.2 Gene-Culture Coevolution
Wilson and Lumsden define the concept of gene-culture coevolution as the
interaction in which culture is generated and shaped by biological
imperatives while biological traits are simultaneously altered by genetic
evolution in response to cultural innovation (Lumsden and Wilson 2005, 1).

In other words, genes compel us to create culture; culture helps us to change the
environment; and a changed environment causes alterations in our genes. Herbert Gintis
argues that
population biology traditionally takes the environment as
exogenous. However, we know that life-forms affect their own environment
and the environments they produce change the pattern of genetic evolution
they undergo (Gintis 2003, 418).

Human beings are not the only species that alter their environment. The same holds
true for different kinds of animals from beavers to termites. But human beings differ
because their alteration of the environment does not follow predictable lines: The building
of mounds is genetically blueprinted onto the termites and they will behave the same way
regardless of the environment. If the encountered conditions do not allow them to do so,
there is the chance of evolutionary adaptation or extinction in that specific area. They are
not built to brainstorm and reflect on their environment in order to reason towards a
possible solution. Their behavior is almost entirely genetically predetermined.
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Human beings are different as Bruce Wexler (2010, 11) points out:
Humans alone shape and reshape the environments that shape their
brains. This cultural evolution differs from Darwinian biological evolution
in important ways. Firstly, it creates more rapid, incremental, and
widespread population variability. Second, it uses different processes to
store the information that influences the development of brain structure and
function. In biological evolution, information is stored in the largely stable
base sequence of DNA molecules. In cultural evolution, the information is
stored in all aspect of cultural artifacts and practice” (Wexler, 2010, 11).

Apart from the fact that culture itself influences the biological evolution of human
beings, Wexler gives us an even more important aspect: in a certain way, culture is an
evolutionary booster, because it allows the storage and transmission of information and
behavior outside of DNA sequences.
At the same time, if genes a “competing” in an evolutionary sense, so does culture.
The physiological traits of individuals are the key to understand evolution as competition
on the genetic level, but we should keep in mind that DNA is ultimately a form of
information storage. If there are alternative forms of maintaining and disseminating
information, they might complement the functioning of DNA. Cultural products--like
stories, paintings, rituals, songs, dances, etc.--are all part of a cultural maintenance system
designed to pass behavioral patterns from one generation to the next, even if the genome
between people is not as similar as it would be among close relatives. These patterns can
become so ingrained in a society that they almost act as second nature, a commonly
accepted and instinctive way to interpret and interact with one’s environment. Religions
especially have proven to be very efficient cultural storage and distribution systems,
demonstrated by their extreme longevity as a form of collective organization.
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The competition between cultural and genetic explanations for human behavior has
led to discussions whether our life is predetermined by the sequences in our DNA. (For
both sides of the discussion see, for example: Heine 2017; Plomin 2019.) But once again
nature has created something so complex that monocausal explanations only reveal part of
the picture. Even if we assume that DNA is destiny, the question remains what causes the
activation or inactivity of genes? Contrary to the idea that research in genetics is making
culture obsolete, the field of epigenetics increasingly illustrates how genes and culture
interact. 18 Human DNA is not just a blueprint that gets executed by the body, but is an
encoded number of possibilities with – depending on the environment – different
probabilities of manifesting themselves. To put it differently, someone might have a more
addictive personality than others, but this alone is no guarantee that this person will end up
as a chain-smoking, gambling alcoholic. We still have a limited understanding of the
precise mechanisms regarding epigenetics, but there is growing evidence that there m be
something like an environment-dependent form of gene activation. This could potentially
mean that the different environments human societies create can have a lasting impact on
the activity of their genes.
If we assume that sociability based on culture has a genetic subtext, it is not a far
stretch to come up with an epigenetic answer as to why complex cultures have developed
at such a late point in human development. An epigenetic explanation would be that with
the need for more complex societies due to agriculture the parts of the genome that play a
role in social behavior have been increasingly activated, enabling a more social

18

Epigenetics is the study of heritable changes in gene expression (active versus inactive genes) that
do not involve changes to the underlying DNA sequence.
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environment than in the previous hunter gatherer societies. We have been carrying the
potential for complex cultures with us probably from the start as homo sapiens 250,000
years ago, but it took the right environmental factors to activate it. Edward Q. Wilson
(2013, 195) gives us numerous examples that demonstrate that culture and genes can
indeed influence each other. From the Westermarck effect (which states that people who
live in close domestic proximity are less likely to develop sexual attraction towards each
other), to his prime example, the tolerance for lactose:
The textbook example of gene-culture coevolution occurring in
recent millennia is the development of lactose tolerance in adults. In all
previous human generations, the production of lactase, the enzyme that
converts the sugar lactose into digestible sugars, was present only in infants.
When children were weaned off their mother's milk, their bodies
automatically shut down further production of lactase. When herding was
developed 9,000 to 3,000 years ago, variously and independently in
northern Europe and East Africa, mutations spread culturally that sustained
lactase production into adult life, allowing the continued consumption of
milk” (E. O. Wilson 2013, 198). The point here is that culture is not so much
changing our genome, put it influences the so-called gene expression, the
process by which the genotype gives rise to the phenotype or what we
usually call observable traits in behavior and physiological appearance. It
would go beyond the scope of this dissertation to detail the numerous ways
of how these influences could manifest themselves, but science is getting
closer to bridging the gap between social processes and biological processes
(Watters 2006).

Evolutionary changes on the individual-biological level are moving at a slower pace
than changes on the social level, but they are influencing each other. The changes in lifeexpectancy, body-height, and other biological traits was not driven by a social-Darwinist
survival of the fittest, but by changes to the social system that enabled the improvement of
diet and health-conditions, reduced child mortality and supported the creation of an
environment that allowed the human body to make increased use of its potential. It is
doubtful that a species driven by nothing but selfish motives would have been able to make
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such progress on the social level. Again, this does not mean that selfish motives do not
exist, but that one of the core roles of culture is the creation of social controls and selfcontrol for our selfish impulses. The concept of culture and the selfish inclinations of
human beings should not be seen as competing, but as complementary aspects of human
existence.

2.2.1.3 A Quick Remark on Meme Theory
The idea of cultural transmission of information has become more popular with the
spreading of meme theory—i.e., the passing on of ideas via non-biological means. Just as
individual traits can be passed on genetically, so too can ideas also be transmitted
culturally. The subconscious desire to pass on one’s genes can coexist and be supported by
the conscious desire to pass on one’s values and ideas. Meme theory is supposed to allow
for a squeezing of culture into the box of individual level evolution, whereby individuals
imitate behavior that seems to be beneficial in order to increase their chances for survival.
This does not explain, however, why in some cases, the desire to pass on ideas can
outperform the desire to pass on an individual’s DNA. When we think about religions that
demand celibacy or other ways of banning the production of offspring, there must be
another explanation for the resilience of belief systems that deliberately restrict the ability
to pass on one’s genetic code.
With the advances in information technology it has indeed become much easier to
disseminate ideas and symbols, and it also reflects the apparent human desire to share these
with others. This points out once again the fundamental sociability of our species. Although
there is still some disagreement regarding the significance of memes (S. Blackmore 2000;
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Boyd and Richerson 2000; N. Rose 1998), they nonetheless fit a pattern of human
behavior—namely, the ongoing attempt to pass on experiences and emotional states.
Whether it is cave paintings depicting a hunting scene or oral histories passed down
through generations, they all contribute to the creation of emotional bonds through the
elicitation of a shared emotional experiences.
Unfortunately, even modern meme-theory attempts to operate without the inclusion
of emotions, and is often presented as a shortcut where individual learning via trial-anderror is replaced by imitation of others. This falls under the generic term of social learning,
where “observers” imitate a “model” (K. Aoki 2001, 253). Outcome-oriented social
learning, like using a stone to crack a nut, has been observed in human as well as nonhuman animals. This example demonstrates how behavior can be adopted and imitated by
others, regardless of any close genetic connection (Heyes 1993; Whiten et al. 2009). Yet
once again human beings, and especially cognitively fully-developed human beings, are
different from children and primates. One of the most popular examples of meme
transmission are surnames, since they are “well-defined units that in many societies are
transmitted from father to son, just like a gene on the Y chromosome” (K. Aoki 2001, 254).
While this description is correct, it leaves out the deep cultural underpinnings that allow
this transmission of information that include an emotional attachment to a given name by
those who hold it.
A lot of meme theory tries to fit culture into the same biological box as genes,
thereby ignoring the potentially important role of emotions. The reason for this is that
modern meme theory views it as part of an explanation for evolution that works on an
individual level (Dawkins 2016, 352), thereby reducing cultural phenomena to people
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imitating what they think works for others. So, for example if we see a group of people
working together more effectively because they are a religious community, we also adopt
religion to match their effectiveness. Unfortunately, this is another simplification of human
behavior that ignores that even social learning is tied to the cultural surroundings. Whom
and what I imitate is not simply defined by whether I see someone’s actions leading to a
useful result. There is an entire cultural background that influences an individual’s
readiness to support or deny the spreading of a meme. To use but one example, researchers
investigated 180 cases of “genital shrinking” in eleven Sub-Saharan African countries (deGraft Aikins, Dzokoto, and Yevak 2015) between 1992 and 2014. “Genital Shrinking”
most often refers to the perceived loss or shrinking of male genitalia (although there are a
few cases that include women) as the consequence of a curse, sorcery or shaking hands
with a stranger. Although there is no scientific evidence that any person was actually
affected by any changes to their genitalia, newspapers and public officials investigated and,
in some cases, investigated the supposed culprits and their sorcery. This is a classic
example of how a meme spreads, but the only reason why it could do so was because the
cultural environment provided the conditions for it to do so. Beliefs in sorcery, old
traditions, widespread mistrust towards strangers are all ingredients that made the stories
of strangers causing one’s genitalia to disappear not only credible, but worthy of being
disseminated.
Neither gene nor meme theory can convincingly demonstrate the obsolescence of
culture and replace it with a simple evolutionary model. Culture has a much more complex
history, and, as we will see, is much younger than we sometimes realize.
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2.3

The Culture-Anthropology Connection
2.3.1

Culture and Complex Culture

Probably the most neglected fact about sophisticated cultural behavior is its
inherent modernity. The species of homo sapiens emerged around some 250,000 years ago,
but complex cultural behavior, like religious beliefs, centered around temple-like structures
that were only manifested 10,000 years ago. For most of human existence, social life was
centered around the extended family, which was able to provide the basic advantages of
collective action and could be held together by instinctive family bonds and small cultural
support systems that allowed the creation of hierarchies and social organization.
In order to entangle the confusion around the concept of culture, I want to propose
a conceptual separation between culture and complex culture. Indeed, I wish to deliberately
distinguish between culture and complex culture. Culture as a means to tie groups together
through marital or martial paintings on one’s body, coming of age rituals, circumcisions or
other traditions has been part of the earliest societies we know of. In these instances,
however, culture must be understood as a support system for family and kin ties. The
cultural activity in such cases involvee enhancing and supporting affinal and consanguine
relationships, but they were designed to support the family as the main unit and strengthen
instinctively existing bonds between members of a family. The claim here is not that hunter
gatherer societies had no culture at all, since there is substantial archeological evidence that
these societies did create cultural artefacts like drawings or even early forms jewelry made
out of bones. These small artefacts indicate that even before the emergence of complex
societies there were attempts to signify hierarchies and social structures with the creation
of paintings or ornaments for the body.
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Complex culture, on the other hand, describes the emergence of a complex SMM
that extends rules and moral obligations beyond one’s kin or tribe where culture even
supersedes the relation based on family ties. The distinction between prehistorical and
complex cultures is difficult, since we have limited ways to investigate the former for the
lack of archeological findings. Pre-complex cultures did not keep records, so
anthropologists and archeologists have had to piece together a picture of what human life
was like at the time using evidence that does support the dominant role of the family. To
be clear, culture and complex culture spring from the same psychological faculties all
human beings possess, so one is not more natural or authentic than the other. The difference
is that complex cultures expand beyond kin and tie people together by way of shared
beliefs. This in turn made more sophisticated symbols and rituals necessary, because the
loyalty to one’s family is part of our initial psychological blueprint, while loyalty to an idea
or a religion needs stronger cultural support systems. As I mentioned earlier, these support
systems do also exist in non-complex cultures, but their role is significantly smaller.
We see this in still existing tribal societies that have developed non kin-based
structures in order to further collective action and social cohesion. For example, the socalled “Big Men” among the societies of Melanesia and Polynesia are revered and high in
status because they are trusted by their community in the distribution of resources. One
becomes a Big Man not by birth, but by demonstrating a sense of selflessness and fairness
in the handling of resources. Yet despite the existence of these structures, relationships
within these societies are still primarily defined by tribe and family (Fukuyama 2012, KL
199). It is nonetheless revealing that in communities inhabitants have developed structures
that permit feelings of trust towards individuals to which they are not related. So culture is
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not some deus ex machina, but an expansion of existing human inclinations for community
from family based to non-family (or not exclusively family) based relationships.
For smaller hunter-gatherer societies the need for complex culture in order to
organize social life was limited; but with the emergence of settled agricultural societies the
demand for efficient cooperation also increased and could no longer be provided by purely
kinship-based cooperation. The defining point of a complex culture is its ability to create
emotional bonds between larger and genetically less-related individuals and to integrate
strangers into a network of trust.
Many of the consequences of complex culture come to us naturally, so we forget
the long evolutionary history that stands behind it. The degree to which modern societies
are characterized by interactions of non-related individuals is astounding, and we tend to
forget the important role of culture in it. Culture is sometimes described as preventing these
interactions and one can immediately think of situations where Catholic parents would
have reacted with shock if their offspring would wanted to marry a Protestant or perhaps
even someone from a completely different faith. But such a view is shortsighted:
historically, social approval was given to marriage within the tribe and not to outsiders.
The advancement of religion artificially created a wider pool of socially-accepted
relationships: For Greif and Tabellini,
Tribal tendencies were gradually undone by the Church which, in
addition to generalized morality, advanced a marriage dogma that
undermined large kinship organizations. The Church discouraged practices
that sustain kinship groups, such as adoption, polygamy, concubinage,
marriages among distant kin, and marriages without the woman’s consent”
(Greif and Tabellini 2010, 3).
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A consequence of all of this was that “it also curtailed parents’ abilities to retain
kinship ties through arranged marriages by prohibiting unions that the bride didn’t
explicitly consent to” (Greif 2006a, 309). Far from limiting options of partnerships, the
early Catholic Church actually expanded them. In similar fashion, Islam allowed new
connections between people to be established, since religion was supposed to be more
important than kin.
Greif and others view the reasons for the emergence of such systems as firmly
lodged in the economic interests of the major agents, but such a materialistic explanation
leaves a great deal to be explored and answered. Without at least a significant number of
people being true believers, it is doubtful that they would have given up the practice of
favoring kin over strangers--something that has dominated human social interactions for
thousands of years before complex cultures emerged. The argument that economic
necessity drove social evolution is a popular one, but there are at least some indicators that
show that social necessity drove economic evolution, and that it was desire for stable
communities that stood at the center of the agricultural revolution.
The oldest known temple structure in the world, Gobleki Tepe in contemporary
Turkey dates back 11,000 years Its history potentially indicates that the evolution of settled
cultures may have preceded the agricultural revolution. In other words, there is a chance
that we started to build temples before plowshares and didn’t need the former to maintain
the latter, but that it was the other way around. Archeologists like Klaus Schmidt, Ian
Hodder, and Jacques Cauvin even go so far to claim that
it was the urge to worship that brought mankind together in the very
first urban conglomerations. The need to build and maintain this temple
[Gobleki Tepe], he [Schmidt] says, drove the builders to seek stable food
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sources, like grains and animals that could be domesticated, and then to
settle down to guard their new way of life” (Symmes 2010).

Cauvin (Cauvin 2000) makes a strong argument for the hypothesis that the more
sophisticated our ways of worship became, the more sophisticated our economies became.
In his words, “The beginning of gods was the beginning of agriculture” (quoted in Symmes
2010). The social psychologist Nicolas Humphrey suggests that technological progress did
not so much stem from a process of problem-identification and problem solving but instead
that
many of mankind's most prized technological discoveries, from
agriculture to chemistry, may have had their origin not in the deliberate
application of practical intelligence but in the fortunate misapplication of
social intelligence. Once Nature had set up men's minds the way she has,
certain 'unintended' consequences followed - and we are in several ways the
beneficiaries (Humphrey 1976, 312)

Although I will not be able to solve this chicken-and-egg problem, there can be no
doubt that the complexity of culture increased at least simultaneously with the complexity
of economic life. It seems likely that cultural and economic life have been intertwined from
the beginning, and that there is no clear causal hierarchy that puts one before the other. As
the economic historian Gregory Clark points out, “the average person in the world of 1800
was no better off than the average person of 100,000 BC” (G. Clark 2009, 1). 19 Even
Francis Fukuyama in his first volume of The Origins of Political Order does not come to
a satisfactory answer as to what triggered the emergence of more complex societies. As he
points out, societies that had the technological ability to produce food surpluses and thereby
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I do think that Clark is engaging in some hyperbole here and Fukuyama also doubts this claim:
“The assertion of Gregory Clark that there were no increases in productivity from hunter-gatherer times to
1800 is highly implausible” (Fukuyama 2012, 532). Nonetheless, the average living standard does not start
to improve significantly before 1800.
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maintain higher population densities sometimes simply didn’t do it, like the New Guinea
highlanders and the Amazonian Indians (Fukuyama 2012, 84). The question Fukuyama
tries to answer is what triggered state formation, and, for him, economic factors seem
insufficient to answer this question.
I would propose that in addition to the already discussed concept of gene-culture
coevolution there was also something like economic-culture coevolution. Even if culture
was the driving force behind economic progress, such progress in turn allowed much more
powerful displays of culture. That is, the more productive our species became, the easier
it was to sustain parts of society exclusively dedicated to maintaining rituals and traditions.
At this point, religious classes emerged that took a share of the limited resources without
contributing to its production. From an economic viewpoint, such a class does not make a
lot of sense, unless it provided and maintained a form of social cohesion through cultural
activity (i.e. formulating sacred laws, displaying rituals, create written records,…) that
allowed collective action to take place with lower transaction costs and higher efficiency.
While Clark is right that the average person lived on the same economic level for most of
human history, we must not forget that the absolute number of people was constantly
increasing. Available estimates put the global population in 10,000 BC at roughly two to
three million. In 1800, it is close to its first billion (around 900 million). Even though
individual living standards only improved at a slow pace, better modes of production were
still needed to maintain the same living standard for ever more individuals. This means that
forms of cooperation needed to be developed that enabled increased productivity, despite
the average living standard remaining mostly unaffected.
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We must assume that all of this contributed to the emergence of the first
civilizations rooted in complex cultures that appeared in Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Indus
Valley around 3000 BC, which is at least 245,000 years after homo sapiens emerges as a
distinct species. This means that by archeological-historical standards complex cultures
that enabled the kind of collective action necessary to build the first civilizations were a
rather modern phenomenon. If we were to reduce human history to one hour, complex
culture would not be even a minute old. Yet within this minute humanity changed more
than it did in the previous 59 minutes. What makes this even more astounding is that this
change was almost exclusively a form of social evolution, compared to a much less
significant biological evolution. The human ability for organizing large-scale collective
action increased significantly within the last 10,000 years. An important element in these
new forms organization was the growing complexity of shared mental models and belief
systems, with religion as one of the first among them.
While some forms of religious belief seem to be universal even in pre-historic times
and, among proto-human groups like the Neanderthals (Wade 2009, 18–37), it was not
until 3000 BC that they reached a complexity involving written rules, organized
hierarchies, and entire religious classes holding ritual and social power. The expansion of
cultural complexity also allowed wider and more secure cooperation than within a tribe.
Culture turned out to be a way of redirecting our tribal instincts and create bonds replacing
family relations with cultural ones. The problem with pre-historic societies wasn’t that
there was no community, but there were significant limits on its possible scope. Around
3000 BC these limitations were broken as human beings found ways to expand tribal
loyalties beyond kin relations. Increasingly sophisticated ideological constructs about the
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nature of good and evil allowed people to share a common identity around rituals of
worship, something that was intensified by the spreading use of common activities like
song and dance that also became more complex as culture progressed, including the first
writing systems in Egypt and Mesopotamia – again around 3500 BC.
As noted earlier, what makes humans different from other species is the ability to
create shared mental models that allow an expansion of instinctive social behavior to
conscious social behavior. Shared mental models do not have to be religions and be tied to
some supernatural belief, but they tend to be religious in nature, meaning people believe
in a model of the world they did not themselves originate and elaborate, but that was
transmitted to them culturally. (What I mean by “religious in nature” is that these models
are based on emotional ties and not a scientific-rational evaluation or a cost benefit
analysis.)
Culture is a human universal, driven by what Clifford Geertz calls an inherent
human need to make sense of the world around us: “The drive to make sense out of
experience, to give it form and order, is evidently as real and as pressing as the more
familiar biological needs” (Geertz 1993, 140). While looking at the evolutionary
underpinnings of culture is helpful, we should not make the mistake of interpreting culture
solely as a means to an end, but as a psychological end in itself. Culture with its quality as
a shared system of believing can be a source of meaning. Geertz makes his argument for
the need of meaning from an anthropological viewpoint, but he gets support from
psychology as well. In a comprehensive review of the literature investigating the
relationship between happiness and religious belief, Rizvi and Hossain found that the vast
majority of studies confirms that religion is an efficient technique “to attain purpose in life,
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mental health, physical well-being and internal peace, which ultimately leads to happiness
in life.” What is even more fascinating is that “that the claim has proven to be true by a
vast majority of the surveys irrespective of religion, gender, nationality or race” (Rizvi and
Hossain 2017, 1561). So, it matters not so much what one’s belief is, but simply the fact
that one has something to believe in. This adds further evidence to the assumption that
culture is not merely a mechanism to deal with the challenges of the environment and social
life, but a psychological need.
Our ability for abstract thought is continually on the lookout to give meaning to the
world around us and fit it into familiar shapes. Just as we tend to see faces in clouds or rock
formations, we also have a tendency to try to understand social phenomena as part of a
larger whole. With supposed understanding, we also develop a desire to influence, which
is why sacrificing to the gods is common in so many ancient religions, since the existence
of gods should allow us to influence them. These basic behavioral traits are recognizable
across all human societies; indeed, some form of religion and communal worship with an
attached moral code has emerged in all known societies. Even in its earliest stages, human
tribes have had some intuitive ordering principles that were shared universally across
peoples known to ethnography and history, like dichotomous thinking, empathy, social
groups, ethnocentrism, play, exchange, cooperation and reciprocity, aggression and
violence (D. E. Brown 2004, 47). Yet despite these universals, societies have been arranged
in many different ways around them.
My argument is that human societies have been engaged in a trial-and-error process
throughout history that have tried different ways of community organization. Unlike other
species, universally observed behavior among humans can be the subject to culturally120

grounded exceptions. For example, exceptions to the incest taboo exists among high-status
groups among the Incas and ancient Egyptians (E. O. Wilson 2013, 199). The cultural
factor makes human behavior especially difficult to predict, given that it is driven by more
than just a will to survive, includes a search for meaning, and attempts to understand and
explain the world. Adding to further complexity, once groups of people agree on a model
of the world, they do not just believe in it in a purely utilitarian way, ready to discard it if
a better model comes along. Instead, they invest these models with intrinsic value, and
holding them becomes part of their identity and emotional structure, meaning that the
treatment of their model of the world by others triggers emotional reactions. This is
reflected in the earliest artistic human activities that depict the symbolic representations of
how people viewed the world.
And this is exactly what the anthropological record shows. Societies differ along
dimensions that are exceptional, given that it is the same species that constitutes these
societies. Despite different forms of marriage (polyandry, polygyny, polygamy), different
class structures (in some cultures the “warrior class” dominates, in other the “theological
class,” i.e. the priests), different claims to the metaphysical (the worshipping of god or gods
compared to forms of ancestor worship), there are multiple dimensions of social
organization where human societies show something approaching universals. But while the
dimensions (marriage, religion, etc.) might be universal, the way societies construct rules
around them are not. Complex cultures emerged independently from Asia to South
America as a reaction to the difficulties of organizing the social life of growing societies,
demonstrating that the ability for complex culture is a human universal, but the actual shape
and form is not.
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No other species engages in contemplation about the environment and then tries to
organize accordingly to its specific challenges. What makes matters even more
complicated is that societies have tried different ways of organization, not all of them
successful. So far, every study that has endeavored to explain the emergence of
civilizations out of tribal structures has revealed fascinating insights as to the role of
geography, climate, religion, available food sources and the like, but has discovered that
“complex societies are simply not amenable to the simple kinds of structural, functional,
or ‘culturological’ analysis” (Flannery 1972, 399). The attempts by historians, sociologists,
economists, and political scientists have delivered a much better understanding about how
complex societies function after they emerge, but studies in these disciplines still lack an
compelling account of how they came into existence in the first place. (Good examples are:
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Ferguson 2011; Fukuyama 2012b; Mann 1986, 1993;
Morris 2011). Indeed, the only thing we have no evidence for in the archeological and
anthropological record is the autonomous, utility-maximizing individual or the equalitarian
harmonious tribesmen.

2.3.2

Social Evolution or Social Decay?

Not everyone agrees that the growing complexity of human relationships has been
beneficial for humanity. As we will explore in the next part, the increasing complexity of
culture with its different layers of loyalty from which one can choose, was interpreted by
its critics as throwing us off our more natural way of interacting with each other. The desire
to identify the “natural” state of human affairs is a problematic one, especially regarding
culture, because it creates exogenous factors out of endogenous ones. As I have tried to
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demonstrate in the previous chapters, culture is part of the human condition and there are
numerous arguments from a variety of fields that indicate our inclination towards cultural
activity. As I have also tried to show, culture springs from biological faculties shared by
all human beings that leads to different outcomes in the design of the shared mental models
of a society. In other words, there is no guarantee that culture will always lead to the best
possible outcome, since a large part of it experiments with different forms of social
organizations. Thus, even though complex cultures only emerged in the more recently in
human history, we should be careful not to view everything before as “natural” and
everything after as “artificial.”
This is an important element in the intellectual hostility towards the concept of
culture from various sides. Some outright condemn modernity and materialist progress as
being inauthentic and thereby an atypical way of life and argue that pre-modern humanity
actually got it right. Another group of critics embraces material progress and sees the
persistence of culture as a threat to the ability of the market as the place and human
rationality as the means to a peaceful and prosperous future. So complex culture is under
attack from at least two sides – those who claim it has alienated us from our true authentic
selves and those who claim it is the biggest obstacle to a truly enlightened and rational
society.
Western philosophy and political thought since the Enlightenment have not only
created modernity, but also developed the arguments to attack the modern world that
emerged after the Neolithic revolution. Not everyone viewed the emergence of more
complex cultures as a positive development, and the idea that the hunter-gatherer society
is more akin to true human nature still has some appeal in academic circles. (For an
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overview, see: Lanchester 2017). We have to engage these views because they are part of
the reason why there is an inherent hostility towards complex culture in modern Western
thought. One of the lasting consequences of the Enlightenment is the search for the
supposedly lost authenticity of life. The striving for material well-being and the nonmetaphysical explanation of natural phenomena caused a widespread anxiety that life was
losing all meaning. German Romanticism took a leading role in giving a voice to this
anxiety, and the writings of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Marx and later Heidegger and
Schmitt offer a blistering attack on the materialist life in the age of modernity. Even
differences between left and right begin to become opaque regarding the issue of modernity
vs authenticity. It is no coincidence that Martin Heidegger writes about the “homelessness”
of modern man and invokes Marx in his support, saying: "Because Marx by experiencing
estrangement attains an essential dimension of history, the Marxist view of history is
superior to that of other historical accounts" (Heidegger 2008, 243).
The most influential and destructive ideologies of the 20th century were partly a
consequence of the romantic longing for pre-modern and supposedly natural times (Stern
1974), which is why we have to take these viewpoints extremely seriously. Meanwhile,
although ultramodern in its use of modern technologies, fascism in both German and Italian
variants were marked by a constant revolt against modernity (see, for example: Evola
1995). The same holds true for Marxism in all its forms, an ideology that promised a merger
of to the utopian times of pre-modern ways of living with the technological advantages of
modernity. The supposedly secular ideologies on the left and right of the 20th century all
claimed to have left religion behind, just to create their own gods, prophets, and
eschatologies.
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For all his supposed focus on economic matters, Karl Marx was recycling all
manner of Christian teachings and values and combining them with German Romanticism
(Löwy 1987; Muller 2003, 167)--something that his modern followers could not escape
either. (For a history, see: Crossman 2001.) The right does not fare much better: both
German and Italian fascism was driven by what Leo Strauss called “German Nihilism,” the
idea of a heroic fight against the decadence of modernity, most strongly embodied by the
philosophies of Martin Heidegger (S. B. Smith 2007, 108–30) and Carl Schmitt (Schmitt
1976). Roger Scruton makes a strong case that the postmodern writers of the Frankfurt
School after the Second World War continued the quasi-religious critique of modernity
(Scruton 2016). Even modern ideologies as different as Islamism and environmentalism
share this trait of German Romanticism that prefers an idealized past over a complex
present.
The romantic view of a peaceful and satisfying state of nature as formulated by
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and a still existing anxiety with modernity allows a widespread
belief that life before complex culture was more authentic and harmonious to live on. The
idea that culturally complex societies as a consequence of agriculture were the harbinger
of all that ails mankind even compelled a mind as sharp as Jared Diamond’s to write that
forced to choose between limiting population or trying to increase
food production, we chose the latter and ended up with starvation, warfare,
and tyranny. Hunter-gatherers practiced the most successful and longestlasting lifestyle in human history (Diamond 1987).

Diamond’s view, I would argue, reflects the idea that culture is somehow an
alienation of our true selves that we fully possessed in pre-modern times. Diamond presents
us with his own version of the anti-modern branch of 19th century European Romanticism.
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(See Yack 1992, for an overview of this anti-modernity impulse). In this respect,he does
not sound much different from Rousseau who wrote in 1755 that:
so many writers have hastily concluded that man is naturally cruel,
and requires civil institutions to make him more mild; whereas nothing is
more gentle than man in his primitive state, as he is placed by nature at an
equal distance from the stupidity of brutes, and the fatal ingenuity of
civilized man. (Rousseau 1997, 166)

Although not wishing to return to pre-modern times, philosophers like Philip
Selznick also share this discomfort with modernity when he writes that "the fundamental
truth is that modernity weakens culture and fragments experience" (Selznick 1992, 8).
Similarly, Robert Bellah and his co-authors write that “modernity has had […] destructive
consequences for social ecology [and] the destruction of the subtle ties that bind human
beings to one another, leaving them frightened and alone” (Bellah et al. 2008, 284).
Modern life is thus portrayed as a corrupting influence that breaks harmonious
bonds among egalitarian societies and replaces them with imprisoning authority structures
and other modes of oppression. The natural goodness of mankind, these critics argue, was
diluted by incentives that made us greedy for individual property and cruel towards others.
Underlying these arguments is the assumption that there is a “natural” culture represented
by pre-modern societies and an “artificial” culture that is lived by settled societies and
causes all kinds of anxieties among its members. Although Rousseau accepted that
modernity can no longer be reversed and a return to the state of nature is impossible, he
stands at the beginning of a debate that runs like a common thread through Western theories
of society and human behavior since the Enlightenment. On the one hand, the
Enlightenment searched for universal laws of human behavior and development, thereby
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opening up the door for the scientific study of man as such. At the same time, however,
this approach demystified the meaning of life.
There no longer was a struggle for the salvation of an eternal soul, but only this
world and the universal laws by which it is governed. Humankind turned from the subject
to the object of history. 20 Among these supposedly universal laws was the application of
Darwin’s concept of the survival of the fittest on human societies. In a world governed by
such laws a clear hierarchy of perceived human races was propagated, and those on top
were seen as the natural rulers of those below. In other words, human society became not
only disenchanted, to use Max Weber’s phrase, it became instrumentalized by the iron laws
of nature. Free will and a sense of moral responsibility became irrelevant in a world where
human beings were only the object of external laws (Jeffrey C. Alexander 1995, 2013, 2).
From there it was only a small step towards “scientifically” justified racism.
Rousseau’s defense of the natural state found renewed energy during the 1920s as
part of a backlash against this scientism of social Darwinists and their claims about the
racial superiority of Europeans. Pioneers of anthropology like Franz Boas, Margaret Mead,
Alfred Kroeber, and Ruth Benedict tried to counter such views by developing theories that
denied any biological component to human behavior. In a foreword to Margaret Mead’s
Coming of Age in Samoa, Franz Boas declared that “much of what we ascribe to human
nature is no more than a reaction to the restraints put upon us by our civilization” (quoted
in: Wrangham and Peterson 1996, 102). Although these anthropologists viewed natural
culture as crucially important, they also argued that modern society is characterized by a

20

We will discuss this and the backlash in form of German Romanticism in a later chapter.
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lack of harmony that existed or persisted in pre-modern societies. Therefore, they virtually
excluded biological-evolutionary factors regarding human behavior, turning the human
mind into a blank slate on which anything could be written (Fukuyama 2012, 50).
While I am sympathetic with the significant role these early anthropologists gave
to culture and social constructivism as a critical factor in organizing society and by the fact
that they eschewed any kind of biological determinism, I see in this research and popular
writings a tendency to place complex culture almost entirely outside of human nature and
to describe it more as a historical accident from which we still suffer (hence Diamond’s
claim that settled societies were the “worst mistake in human history”). This view, I
believe, is mostly due to the politicized understanding they have of the emergence of
culture and a certain uneasiness with it. The scholarly malaise comes from the problem that
if we allow for an evolutionary approach towards culture, we could talk about more or less
developed cultures--something that would go against “the enduring legacy of political
correctness in the field of comparative anthropology” (Fukuyama 2012, 51). This political
correctness was initially well-intended in order to avoid claims of racial or cultural
superiority, but it eventually caused a trained incapacity to objectively compare and
evaluate different cultures and their characteristics.
Even Clifford Geertz sees anthropological studies as more a taxonomy of how
different societies have tried to answer fundamental questions about life and human
relationships without attaching a normative value to those answers (Geertz 1993, 30). The
psychological anthropologist Richard Shweder struggles between cultural universals and
cultural relativism (Shweder 1991) but in the end comes close to endorsing cultural
relativism (Shweder 1990a). Again, much of this is well intended, but the desire to be
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entirely non-normative caused the unintended consequence of a romanticized version of
pre-modern and non-Western cultures.
Steven Pinker describes such a romanticized view of the pre-historic past as “the
belief that humans in their natural state are selfless, peaceable, and untroubled, and that
blights such as greed, anxiety, and violence are the products of civilization” (Pinker 2002,
6). In other words, the relativists are only so in defense of pre-modern cultures but make
significant normative claims when it comes to criticizing complex cultures. Some aspects
of life might have indeed been better in pre-historic times, like the fact that archeological
findings indicate that human beings shrank by six inches after the adoption of agriculture,
which could be an indicator for a better diet. But can one really claim that hunter-gatherer
life was affluent and egalitarian (James C. Scott 2017; Suzman 2017) to the point that one
should make a “case against civilization” (Lanchester 2017)?
Despite being taller, the life expectancy in hunter-gatherer societies reached a
maximum of 40 (Gurven and Kaplan 2007), and although that was not easily surpassed by
agricultural societies until later, those who settled were soon able to reduce infant mortality
below 20%, which was common among hunter-gatherers (Howell 2007). 21 As Konner and
Shostak point out, “data on morbidity and mortality, though not necessarily relevant to the
question of abundance, certainly made use of the term ‘affluent’ seem inappropriate”
(Konner and Shostak 1986, 73).

This indicates that weak children died very early, leading to a selection process which can explain
why those who survived turned out to be taller than their agricultural relatives who might have been on
average physically weaker but had higher numbers.
21
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Another significant element in the prevalence of low life expectancy was violence.
Archeology, as well as more recent anthropological studies, give us solid cause to believe
that the likelihood of violent death for an individual was significantly higher in pre-historic
times than Diamond and others would allow us to suspect. The archeological record has
excavated prehistoric skeletons that show a high rate of axe marks and embedded
arrowheads, strongly suggesting that violent death was a far more regular occurrence than
it is in culturally complex societies. Similar observations were made in contemporary
isolated societies. The anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon, who studied the Yanomamö
indigenous people in the Amazon rainforest, concludes that about 44 percent of men older
than 25 actively participated in killing someone, that one-third of deaths were the result of
violence, and that more than two-thirds of men over 40 had lost at least one close relative
to violence (Chagnon 1988). As Steven Pinker has pointed out, if we apply the level of
violence of a prehistoric tribal society onto the wars of the 20th century, the death toll would
have been two billion, not 100 million (Pinker 2007). For the larger part of its history,
human existence was dominated by continued prevalence of violence. Margaret Mead
herself wrote that “most primitive tribes feel that if you run across one of these subhumans
from a rival group in the forest, the most appropriate thing to do is bludgeon him to death”
(quoted in: H. Bloom 1997, 74). Even the Jared Diamond concedes that “to venture out of
one’s territory to meet [other] humans, even if they only lived a few miles away, was
equivalent to suicide” (Diamond 2007, 229).
In addition to violence, the often-assumed egalitarianism in hunter-gatherer
societies does not holding up to the findings of more recent studies. Good hunters kept
more of the acquired food for themselves and their families instead of sharing it with others
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(Gurven 2004). Also, good hunters received higher social status that increased their
chances of reproduction (E. A. Smith 2004), causing an actual level of inequality that,
although moderate, was far from nonexistent (E. A. Smith et al. 2010).
Even the claim that in hunter-gatherer societies women were supposedly better off
is only defensible if one ignores that women were one of the resources over which the male
members of tribes were fighting. From Friedrich Engels (Engels 2010) to more
contemporary contributions (see, for example: Ryan and Jethá 2010), modernity has been
accused of breaking up the more harmonious relationships between the genders--an
argument that became an important aspect of postmodern thought at least since the critical
treatment of it by Michel Foucault (Foucault 1990). The interesting thing is that complex
cultures indeed transformed the relationship between women and men, but I would argue
in the opposite direction from what the critics of modernity presume. Even if Engels and
others are right and the concept of the monogamous lifelong marriage is just another
invention of modernity that causes us anxiety, we should look at the available alternatives.
According to the anthropological record, 85% of known societies allowed men to have at
least occasionally more than one wife, while only 15% practiced monogamy and less than
one percent practicing polyandry. Yet somehow monogamous societies outperformed the
alternatives due to the evolutionary advantages that monogamy brings for both sexes.
Normative monogamy is actually more of an equalizing force between men and women
than the competing models:
The unusual package of norms and institutions that constitute
modern monogamous marriage systems spread across Europe, and then the
globe, because of the package's impact on the competitive success of the
polities, nations and religions that adopted this cultural package. Reducing
the pool of unmarried men and levelling the reproductive playing field
would have decreased crime, which would have spurred commerce, travel
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and the free flow of ideas and innovations” (Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson
2012, 657).

Before the spread of monogamy, women had been the spoils of war in tribal
societies (Wade 2014, 149) and the first modern societies, like ancient China and ancient
Greece (Gottschall 2004). 22 Rape and other forms of violence always went hand-in-hand,
and were considered a particular degrading forms of inflicting pain on one’s adversaries.
We see similar behavior in chimpanzees that integrate captured females into their group
after raids against other groups of chimpanzees (Fukuyama 2012, 31). The biological
anthropologist Richard Wrangham took a close look at the literature about supposedly
equalitarian and rape-free societies and concluded that the evidence actually pointed in the
other direction—i.e. male sexual violence against women occured more regularly in premodern societies and was most definitely not an invention of settled agricultural societies
(Wrangham and Peterson 1996). On the contrary, while we are still far from true genderequality in most societies, it is doubtful whether the dissolution of monogamy will be the
way to get us there. If the past truly is any indicator, the “natural” state of society would
be one where powerful men have access to multiple women, who then themselves have to
compete among each other. Once marital fidelity was incorporated into the value-core of
complex cultures, however,this became one more element to improve their evolutionary
fitness. To reiterate that point: this cultural development weakened the ability of the
individually strongest males to pass on their DNA by producing offspring with multiple
women. But monogamy reduced the intra-group competition for partners and therefore
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Consider this line from Homer’s Iliad “So don’t anyone hurry to return homeward until after he
has lain down alongside a wife of some Trojan” (Homer, 1999, Book 2, 354-55). In fact, the entire story of
Homer is full of stories brutalizing women (see: B. S. Strauss 2007).
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freed resources for other things, while also strengthening the care for one’s offspring, since
both males and females had increased certainty about fatherhood. These stronger family
bonds and higher survival rates contributed to the prevalence of more close-knit societies
compared to those based on looser relationships, even though their members might have
possessed stronger physical characteristics on the individual level.
Modernity most certainly has not ushered in the kind of Utopia some of its
proponents hoped for, but to claim that pre-modern times were better for human flourishing
than modern times is increasingly indefensible. Human beings did not suddenly leave the
path of some“natural” progression when they settled down in more permanent societal
structures; but they were acting on something that is just as much part of our human nature
as the behavior of the hunter gatherer – the creation and maintenance of communities.
Unfortunately, there are instances where culture can indeed diminish the sustainability of
a community, and it is these cases to which we will turn next.

2.3.3

Culture and Maladaptation

How communities organize themselves can follow widely different paths. An
Amish society has a different conception of the sacred compared to a gang like MS-13. So
too, a commercial-capitalist society has a different imagination of what is valuable than an
aristocratic warrior-society. We know that there are societies that put the individual above
the community and there are societies that do the opposite (Greif 1994; Greif and Tabellini
2010). This is what so fundamentally differentiates human beings from other animals. If
you expose termites to an uninhabited island, they will do what termites do--build a hive
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and multiply. Like any other non-human animal, they will follow their instincts, which
makes their behavior largely predictable.
Human cpacities, however, go beyond instincts and include the use of abstract
thought and the creation of ideas about how the world is causally connected. Out of this
perceived causality came the desire to influence or control natural phenomena. Satisfying
a deity to ensure a rich harvest is a completely different act from genetically engineering a
more resilient type of grain. Nonetheless, both behaviors spring from an instinctive human
desire to understand and possibly influence the world. This example demonstrates how the
desire to explain often overlapped with the desire for community. Praying to the gods might
have a limited effect on the harvest, but it does bind the people together through rituals like
engage in prayer. The bonds that are being created in turn facilitate cooperation and at some
point possibly have a positive effect on agriculture due to more efficient use of labor. The
geneticist in his laboratory has a much more direct influence on the potential agricultural
output, but she no longer enjoys the communal aspect of collective worshipping. She might
satisfy this need by attending Sunday church or joining a bowling league, but being part of
a community in the modern era involves much more of a conscious act than it did in the
past.
I think we have to reject the idea that community in pre-modern times was more
“authentic,” since community was baked into the very fabric of every aspect of social and
economic life. The possibility of living as a recluse previously was not readily available to
the extent it is today. Theoretically, through a combination of delivery services and homeoffice opportunities a person can lead a life without physical interaction with others.
Community in the past was not just authentic, but a fixture and necessity of life, and its
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romanticizing does not help in finding ways to reconcile modernity and the desire for
community.
The underlying culture to which people are loyal and that serve as a basis for their
community has a huge impact on the development of their societies and can cause empires
or extinction (Diamond 2011). Culture is crucial in the formation of communities, but it
does not make communities immune or perfectly adaptable to external change. As Robert
Edgerton’s concept of maladaptation has demonstrated, culture can build communities, but
it can also be the cause of their demise (Edgerton 1999).
Sam Harris gives us an interesting example based on a field study conducted by the
anthropologist Ruth Benedict, who was describing the life and culture of the Dobu
Islanders. For these islanders the most important idea was that ultimately life is governed
by magic spells that are cast upon one by other members of the tribe. Whenever something
bad befell a Dobuan, it was believed tathe or she had fallen prey to a spell, while every
positive event like a good harvest could only be the result of a successful spell that took
away from other members of the tribe and added to the resources of the spell casting
Dobuan. As Harris points out, a good harvest was seen as “a confession of theft” (Harris
2011, 61). Benedict herself writes that all “existence is cut-throat competition, and every
advantage is gained at the expense of a defeated rival” (Benedict 2005, 141). Life among
the Dobuans was a zero-sum game where even cooperation among family members within
the tribe was viewed with suspicion for “the power of sorcery was believed to grow in
proportion to one’s intimacy with the intended victim. This belief gave every Dobuan an
incandescent mistrust of all others, which burnt brightest on those closest” (Harris 2011,
61). The belief system of the Dobuans was so persuasive that it was even capable of
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overriding the assumed natural instinct of loyalty and trust to one’s closest kin. If we
perceive culture as the ability to extend trust beyond immediate kin, this case study
demonstrates that culture might as well have the opposite effect.
A similar case relates to the community of the Shakers in 19th century North
America, a Christian community that viewed celibacy and the foregoing of procreation as
a central tenet of their faith. Here culture did not extend ties of trust beyond the family, it
tried to replace the (biological) family altogether. Although economically highly
successful—at least until after the Civil War-- and outright progressive (women and men
were equals in many respects), the emphasis on celibacy lead to the end of the Shaker
community. By 2017, there are only two members left (Sharp 2017). From an evolutionary
perspective, both the Dobuan and the Shaker culture created strong belief systems that
made community life and the community itself increasingly unsustainable.
Jared Diamond also provides an example of a case where cultural beliefs
counteracted the sustainability of a community. Dealing with the disappearance of the
Norwegian Norse from Greenland in the 15th century, a peculiar finding from archeological
research revealed a very limited consumption of fish by the Norse, despite the abundance
of this food source and the lack of alternatives. Diamond developed a theory how the main
figure of the Norse settlement, Erik the Red, may have contracted food poisoning from
eating fish and upon his recovery started to tell everybody “how bad fish is for you, and
how we Greenlanders are a clean, proud people who would never stoop to the unhealthy
habits of those desperate grubby ichthyophagous Icelanders and Norwegians” (Diamond
2011, 230). Assuming that Diamond’s theory is correct, the deciding factors leading to the
disappearance of the Norsemen was almost entirely due to cultural maladaptation.
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Although hardly the first person to suffer from food poisoning, having the group leader
suffer from it turned a problem of individual health into an issue for the entire community.
Any other Norseman might have refused the consumption of fish after such an experience.
Only Erik the Red however had the authority to transcend his individual experience and
transform it into a group experience and taboo. The nature of this group experience,
however, was quite coincidental. Erik could also have interpreted his poisoning as a
punishment by the gods and turned his people into a more devout people – albeit one that
was still permitted to eat fish and thereby survive on Greenland. Or his people could have
refused his interpretation. Erik however played to his people’s identity by claiming that
eating fish was primarily a question of who the Greenlandic Norse were, which is better
than those fish eating “grubby ichthyophagous Icelanders and Norwegians.”
It is the cultural factor that allowed Erik the Red to discard a crucial food source
during the little ice age when fertile land became less accessible. What additionally
highlighted the role of culture was the fact that the Norsemen were not the only people on
Greenland at the time. The Inuit shared the same environment, but since their leaders
seemed to have avoided food poisoning by bad fish, they had no artificial restrictions when
ecological changes forced them to switch their diet. Not surprisingly, the Inuit are still the
demographically dominant group on Greenland.
These examples demonstrate that shared mental models can be “invested with
considerable emotional meaning and therefore are believed for intrinsic reasons and not
simply because they are accurate or useful” (Fukuyama 2012, 443). To elaborate on an
earlier point, anthropologist Robert B. Edgerton, in coining the term “maladaptation,” used
it to describe the phenomenon of cultural rituals being adopted and maintained despite
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being “inefficient at coping with environmental demands or harmful to people’s health or
well-being (Edgerton 1992, 15). Going strongly against the concept of cultural relativism,
Edgerton makes a convincing argument that not every aspect of culture is a perfect form
of adaptation that can only be understood through the lenses of those who hold it, but that
there are ways to evaluate the actual level of adaptability or maladaptability of certain
cultures. (For an overview see: Edgerton 1999.) The best way to describe this view is
probably as a cultural consequentialist, which tries to isolate the ability of cultures to adapt
to a changing environment. Cultural relativism remains an issue regarding the moral
qualities of cultural values, but in the case of cultural consequentialism there is no need for
relativism, only for precision. It is no moral judgment to point out that the culture of the
Shakers lost the adaptive advantage it might have once had, just as it is fair to say that
effective collective action will be hard to achieve by the Dobuans. In many cases, the
cultural influence on a society’s development is more difficult to isolate than in these
examples, so we have to be careful about using culture as “one-size-fits all” explanation
for social change, regardless of its adaptive qualities.
While there can be no doubt that Western culture has proven to be very adaptive
over the last five centuries, there is no guarantee that this will be an eternal condition of
the world. What was once adaptive might at some point turn maladaptive:
As Robert Bellah and his colleagues have shown in their book
Habits of the Heart, our cultural commitment to individualism rather than
collective achievement has enhanced our self-reliance, a virtue that was
probably adaptive earlier in American History but that has also brought
about such a loss of community that the consequences now threaten our
common well-being” (Edgerton 1992, 65).
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Bellah, of course, is not the only observer who laments the overarching role of
individualism that some authors view no longer as a safeguard ,but a major threat to a
liberal society. (See, for example: Deneen 2018.) Deneen and others argue that modern
individualism has actually decreased and not increased self-reliance.
The existence and changing nature of culture makes human behavior particularly
difficult to predict, and while culture as such is a universal characteristic of all societies,
its peculiarities can differ significantly regarding culture-specific taboos, symbols, and
figures of authority. These in turn influence the scope of a cultural community – for
example, is it small and tribal or designed to potentially encompass the entire human race?
These peculiarities matter, because they influence the ability of humans to work in teams
and facilitate cooperation between and among groups.
It is not the sociability alone that distinguishes human beings from other animals;
rather that the scope of that sociability is not predetermined. It depends on a complex
interplay of the environment, ecological factors, and often sheer accident that gives rise to
cultural creations that in turn enable increased levels of collective action. This complexity
is absent in the organization of social life among non-human species.
Diamond’s example about Greenland makes the case in point about how animals
and humans react engage differently with their environment. The Norwegians were fully
aware of the nutritious benefits of fish, and there is no evidence that the Norwegian settlers
had “forgotten” how to fish, but the mental model provided by Erik the Red prevented them
from making use of a readily available food source. A Norwegian animal species would
have searched for the area that most resembles its original homeland, and if such an area
could be found it would follow its instincts in the same fashion as it would do in its previous
139

habitat. In fact, such an animal does exist: The reindeer. And it exists in Greenland and
Norway with no significant differences in behavior.
Could we make the same claim about human beings? Imagine that we exposed
groups of people on each island. Immediately we would have to gather significantly more
information about each member of that group when trying to predict the possible social
structure. 23 Are the people religious? And if yes, what creed are they holding? Are they
educated? What was their upbringing before being exposed on the island? Even if these
factors and many others were the same, there is still a significant chance that human life
on each of these islands would develop quite differently. Over time, we would see certain
universal traits developing among our island societies – hierarchies, symbolic structures,
forms of social order would all emerge. This is something that can be predicted with some
certainty, but it is the details of these universals that are also crucial. How effective is the
cultural system to enable large scale collective action? Will the societies remain tribal in
nature or become more complex and structured over time?
The emergence of large-scale societies made it necessary to find ways to apply our
pre-installed social software to be updated beyond the level of smaller groups. Culture, I
argue, fulfills precisely this role. Culture enables societies to apply cooperative social
behavior beyond kin and tribe. It is an artificial amplifier of our existing social capabilities.
We feel natural affection towards our children, parents, and close family members, but in
order to extend this affection to people who are initially strangers to us , it needs the help
of artificial creations. These creations are the core of what I define as culture: a shared
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Here an important caveat for my thought experiment is warranted: Under the condition of having
all the information about each individual including biological factors like brain types as well as the full array
of social and psychological factors a reliable prediction might be possible.
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belief system that rests on rules, symbols, rituals, and traditions that define a group as a
community even though its members might be barely blood-related.
If culture is as central to community as I claim, and community a basic
psychological need of the individual, the vision of a purely individualistic and rational
society is entirely utopian. The Enlightenment, which was the birthplace of the idea of a
society based on reason, played a great and unintended trick on all of us. It mocked the
way in which people clung to their religions or other beliefs as pitiful without realizing that
even the Enlightenment philosophers were far from being ice-cold calculating automatons.
They just switched their source of recognition from religion to reason but maintained the
same need for community and belonging. The “Republic of Letters,” the emergence of
philosophic salons, and the widespread exchange of letters and ideas were not driven by
rationality, but by a religious fervor in the name of the Enlightenment (Gay 1966, 1969;
McMahon 2002; Gay 1966, 1969; McMahon 2002). To be clear: The Enlightenment values
are by far preferable to those of the Middle Ages, but the Enlightenment did not overcome
culture; it created a new one. It is no coincidence that the Enlightenment also brought forth
the world’s first ideologies and secular religions. Worshipping was shifted from the
religious to the secular, but it remained central to the human experience of community.
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CHAPTER III: SCIENCE, RATIONALITY, AND THE TURN AGAINST CULTURE
The main goal of the previous chapters to firmly establish the psychological,
evolutionary, and anthropological roots of culture in order to demonstrate that we are not
dealing with an exogenous phenomenon but with something that is deeply embedded in
human nature. I hope that the first part has established a way to understand culture as an
emotional phenomenon that influences human behavior. It is an essentialist approach
towards the idea of human nature, resting on the claim that as a species it is the ability to
create ideas of how the world works and invest them with emotional value. These
emotional commitments are fundamental to the creation of stable social organizations that
coordinate collective action and social interaction. Despite the possible variation in the
nature of these ideas, human social life is most likely not feasible without them. There is
growing scientific evidence that without the ability to experience emotions, a human
being’s capacity for social interaction diminishes considerably. Studies involving
individuals with damage to the prefrontal cortex have shown that while the ability to
utilitarian behavior increases, social and moral behavior necessary for sustained social and
cooperative behavior diminishes (S. W. Anderson et al. 1999; Bechara et al. 1994; Koenigs
et al. 2007).
What these studies do not reveal, however, is how the relationship between triggers
and emotional reaction is supposed to be designed – they only tell us that if human beings
are incapable of feeling emotions, social life becomes increasingly difficult. What these
neurological studies have shown is that emotional connections are necessary even if actions
can be comprehended rationally. Individuals with a damaged prefrontal cortex could not
function properly in society because what comes to many of us naturally and instinctively
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needs a cognitive effort by those who have a limited ability to feel emotions. It is based on
these assumptions that I will develop my further discussion of culture and explain where I
take issue with the contemporary role of culture in political science. In a nutshell, I hope
to demonstrate that the Enlightenment was not the switch from emotion to reason and
rationality, but that the Enlightenment filled the concepts of reason and rationality with
emotional value, turning them into the sacred cores of a unique (although not historically
isolated) culture in its own right. I am not the first one to remark that a dominant tradition
within Western philosophy has always been distrustful of emotions and attempted to
replace it with a social order based on reason and rationality (Solomon 1993), but so far no
one has connected this question to the larger issue of culture. It often eludes us how
interwoven culture is into our daily lives and how strong our ability to ignore or deny our
intuitive emotional biases has become. The West has developed a culture of rationality, but
completely forgotten that it is just that: a culture of rationality that still has all the emotional
qualities we can also find in cultures that are built on religious or other foundations.
Most people in the Western world believe in atoms, evolution, and the laws of
physics even though only a minority of the population has the training and intellect to
understand the complex theoretical and mathematical underpinnings of these and other
fields. Yet an explanation of an observed phenomena that involves something like natural
laws will be inherently more credible than the invocation of a supernatural force. The
Enlightenment created a culture that was putting a premium on science and scientific
methods, leading to the emergence of new mental maps to interact with the world at large
(Golinski 1999; P. Jones 2008), a map that gradually trickled down to all layers of society
(see, for example: J. Rose 2010).
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Discussions about how such political dominance came about tend to focus on the
Western part of the term Western Culture (Ferguson 2006, 2011a; Morris 2011), when the
decisive part should be Culture. As I will try to demonstrate in the following chapter,
culture is accessible to every human being, which is why we had civilizations and highcultures as well as declining civilizations and cultures in many different geographical areas.
Roman and Chinese culture did not create civilizations because of their geographical
location or the phenotypes of the local populations, but because of the ideas and subsequent
cultures that emerged in these areas. 24 History is full of examples where cultural ideas
originate in one place and spread across tribes and ethnicities: Christianity, Islam,
Communism, and other visions of human society attached themselves to the most diverse
people regardless of their biological or geographical background. In fact, in cases like
Turkey or Japan we have interesting examples of how states deliberately tried to adapt new
cultures to replace existing ones (Esenbel 1994; Irokawa 1988; Jansen 2002).
I am not disputing that some cultural beliefs can be more grounded in objective
reality than others, and there can be no doubt that the idea of gravity is more convincing
than the assumption that some conscious entity is juggling the planets like a set of balls.
That being said, however, the foundation of every scientific endeavor is the belief that the
world is accessible to rational inquiry and that there is an underlying systemic that governs
the universe. Whether or not this is ultimately true remains to be seen, and the more we
learn of the physical universe the more complicated it seems to be (Ballentine and Jarrett

24

Some authors like Jared Diamond argue that geography is the “ultimate cause” of civilization
(Diamond 2011, 2017), but I do not think that these arguments are fully convincing. As the historian Victor
Davis Hanson points out in his writing about the Spanish conquest of Mexico, geography and resource-wise
the Aztecs had everything necessary to build a sophisticated arms industry – what they lacked were the
necessary ideas (Hanson 2001, 196).
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1987). Contrary to some contemporary champions of the Enlightenment (Harari 2014;
Pinker 2018), the Enlightenment was neither the end of the passions nor the end of
emotionally-held belief systems, but a transformation of said things. Authors like Pinker
describe the story of the Enlightenment as a conflict between rational reason and its
enemies, completely ignoring that the Enlightenment itself produced and was part of the
backlash against it. The so-called counter Enlightenment realized “the irrationalist core of
all knowledge - that reason itself presupposes a faith or belief in reason” (S. B. Smith 2016,
KL 5545). All the atrocities of the 20th century like fascism and communism in their various
forms were not simply a revolt against the Enlightenment but perceived themselves to be
an alternative and an improvement (Furet 1999; Griffin 2010). I will elaborate on this point
later in the chapter, but let it suffice for now that the phenomenon of culture as an essential
part of human nature has not yet disappeared.
As will hopefully become clear in the following pages, I am not taking issue with
the concept of reason or some of the assumptions of rationality, but instead the idea that a
“society of pure reason” can exist without any emotional commitment. This has important
political implications, because even the most reasonable political system will have trouble
surviving if the people it is supposed to organize have no emotional attachment to it. The
Weimar Republic looms large as an historical example how an otherwise well intended and
modern political system was brought down by a lack of emotional commitment and
identification with it: “Important segments of the German army, civil service, and
aristocratic classes rejected the Weimar Republic not because it was ineffective, but
because its symbolism and basic values negated their own” (Lipset 1959, 87). In this sense,
the Weimar Republic did not fail politically, but culturally.

146

The goal of my argument is to revive the importance of culture as a form of
collectively and individually held passion that influences human interaction and institution
building. The Enlightenment plays a key role here, because philosophers like Hobbes and
Rousseau were fully aware of the role of the passions in human life, but viewed them as a
profound danger and the cause of much human suffering. I take no issue with this view,
but I claim that they overlook that the passions were also necessary for functioning societal
life and that individuals cannot interact solely on the basis of reason. Before I will begin
my genealogy of how culture fell out of fashion in Western political philosophy, I will
provide a cohesive definition of culture that, I hope, will help to avoid confusion in the
following chapters.

3.1

What Culture Is – And What It Is Not
The often-arbitrary distinction as to what constitutes a culture and what does not

has at times made discussions about matters of culture impossible. In order to allow us to
continue with a concise discussion about culture, I need to introduce a modified definition
of the concept of ethnicity. The term ethnicity can cover cultural phenomena like national
identity or affiliation with a particular religious group as well as genetic and biological
factors like appearance and skin color in the form of an ethno-racial interpretation of
ethnicity. For the argument I am making I will distinguish between culture and ethnicity,
the former being a collectively held social construct with intrinsic value, the latter being
defined as biological, genetic, or geographic factors that are beyond an individual’s control.
Culture in my definition is inherently linked to the possibility of choice. As I laid out in
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Part one, culture is grounded in human biology, but the shape and form of cultural activity
is subject to human choice and creativity.
For example, I distinguish between an ethnic Austrian and a cultural Austrian in
the sense that one can be born in Austria but not need to have any kind of emotional
attachment to one’s Austrian identity and the sentiment of a common bond between all
Austrians stemming from history, tradition, and custom. This distinction is crucial,
because the evolutionary purpose of culture is to tie individuals together into groups so that
they can act collectively, create a common identity, and generate social capital. Ethnicity
– although it can of course overlap with culture – does no such thing. Sharing eye shape or
skin color does not inherently enable better cooperation. It is a classification of groups of
people by characteristics that can, but do not need to have any emotional meaning to those
who are being classified.
In fact, it is absolutely possible that an ethnic Austrian – somebody who was born
in the country and holds an Austrian passport – is less a cultural Austrian than a recent
immigrant who for whatever reason fully internalizes an Austrian identity and even
replaces his ethnical history (the history of his original country) with his newly-chosen
history (the history of Austria). Culture in its proper meaning always includes the element
of choice and one can join and leave cultures to an extent that one cannot join and leave
ethnicities. 25 This process of course is very close to the concept of assimilation, where
people switch one primary identity for another. This happens continuously, and I
distinguish between one’s cultural and ethnic history purposefully. One can be born in
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I will address cases of cultures that are centered on ethnic characteristics a little later in this
chapter. In these cases, individuals cannot join or leave as easily.
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Sweden, emigrate to the United States and develop more pride and identification with the
Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution than the Swedish Crown. One might
forever remain ethnically Swedish, but it is absolutely possible to become culturally
American.
The misattribution and conflation of culture and ethnicity has been the cause for
much grief in human history, because people became boxed into cultures connected to their
ethnicity and are deprived of the opportunity to choose. This does not mean that there are
not often strong correlations between ethnicities and cultures, but they are not causal in
their relationship. My gender or skin color does not determine my political orientation – it
can have an influence on it, but this is most likely again more a cultural phenomenon than
anything else. The contemporary assumption, for example, that certain ethnic groups like
African-Americans or Hispanic Americans will always and forever be politically left
leaning (see, for example: Judis and Teixeira 2004) is a profound conflation of culture and
ethnicity, for it presumes that there is only one set of values and ideas that can appeal to
people of a specific ethnicity and skin color. In other areas we already see trends that
reinforce the idea of culture as being subject to choice: a growing number of members of
the gay community lean conservative (Huneke 2019), and some scholars have coined the
term “homonationalism” to discuss, among other things, the idea of a culturally nationalist
yet by sexual orientation gay community (Puar 2013; Schotten 2016).
The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci is best known for his development of the
concept of cultural hegemony, describing how a ruling class frames its values as normal
and universal values in order to benefit their own social status (Gramsci 1971, pt. I). The
kind of agency that Gramsci gives to the ruling class is most likely exaggerated and there
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is no great cabal of capitalists that organizes the dominant culture (for a somewhat different
critique along similar lines see: Yanarella 1993). 26 Nonetheless Gramsci is correct that
there are hegemonic structures in the realm of culture, and if there is, for example, a
dominant cultural interpretation of what it means to be “a man” or “a woman” or a “person
of color” it is difficult for an individual to be completely indifferent to concepts that merge
the question of culture and ethnicity. That being said, it does not change the fact that a one
can change one’s cultural identity even if it should come at great emotional cost. The
arguments I will make in the following pages nowhere claim that cultural change is easy,
but that it is possible.
One’s cultural identity depends on the intensity of feeling towards the defining
characteristics of a culture. There is a distinction between my individual cultural identity
and whether other members of that culture accept me into their cultural group. One of
history’s most tragic examples of one-sided cultural adaption is the story of Germany’s
Jews, who despite the many ways they adopted German culture-- including language,
conversions to Christianity, and fighting in the armed forces--never became fully accepted
as German. (Enzo Traverso has a detailed account how German Jews could never be
German enough--see: Traverso 1995.) And this became worse with the racialization of
politics in general and Jewishness, in particular, in the 19th century. This was summarized
sadly in a rhyme that was popular in early 20th century Austria and Germany: “Ob Jud, ob
Christ ist einerlei – in der Rasse liegt die Schweinerei” (“Jewish or Christian it’s all one /
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In fact, culture has been the biggest weakness of the capitalist system and instead of emotionally
connecting with people, capitalist systems have created profoundly anti-capitalist cultures. This has been
explored in great detail by Joseph Schumpeter in his Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Schumpeter
1994).
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It’s their race that makes them scum”). This of course is a profoundly anti-cultural position,
because if your supposed race is the sole determinant of who you are, culture is entirely
irrelevant or at best just another symptom of your underlying ethnicity. At the same time,
however, this anti-cultural position is of course itself a cultural phenomenon, because
people believed fervently and emotionally in the supposed inferiority and superiority of
different races.
In Europe and other nation states we often encounter a very strong overlap between
ethnicity and culture that such that the two become almost indistinguishable. In other areas
of the world, however, this overlap can be much weaker. In sub-Saharan Africa, for
example, there is wide variation between people who identify primarily with their state
(e.g. Uganda) or their ethnic group (e.g. the Baganda, the largest ethnic group in Uganda),
which has a huge impact upon social cohesion and institutional performance in these
countries (E. Green 2018).
Writing about contemporary Britain, Brain Barry points out that for many people
“’British’ seems to be largely a legal conception tied up with formal British citizenship
rather than one with significant affective, cognitive, or behavioral connotations” (Barry
2002, 83). At the same time, newcomers to Britain tend not to feel “comfortable with the
idea of being British being more than a legal title” (Modood 1998, 384–785). If being
British is nothing more than a legal title without any affective, cognitive, or behavioral
connotations, it would seize to qualify as a culture according to the terms we laid out in
part one. Holding British citizenship would confer certain advantages, but emotionally it
would not be much different from joining Amazon’s Prime Membership. It has advantages,
but it doesn’t come with moral obligations or strong emotional attachments, and the only
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thing that keeps me a member are the member benefits. With loosening emotional ties it
should become more comprehensible that as of 2015 more British Muslims have joined
Islamist militant groups than serve in the UK’s armed forces (Weaver 2015)--especially if
religion provides more of an emotional home than the country one lives in. Before its defeat
in 2019, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (commonly known as ISIS) recruited over
30,000 fighters from at least 85 countries (Benmelech and Klor 2018) with an appeal that
rested almost exclusively on issues of emotional, religious, and political identity.
Culture depends on people emotionally identifying with its symbols and principle
ideas, since it is this process that creates the instinctive triggers we discussed in Part One.
Let me add one more point here that has been obfuscating the debate about culture: the
emotional attachment to something like Great Britain does not mean that the symbols and
ideas what what constitutes “Britishness” have to remain the same. The underlying
symbolic structure can change, but as long as there is an agreement among and an
emotional attachment of the people who identify as British, it is appropriate to speak of
British culture. This also holds true for countries like the United States, where the idea of
what it means to be a US citizen has changed fundamentally over the course of the
country’s history. But as long as people feel attached to the struggle of the United States
and its evolution and this emotion is shared by others, we have an American culture in the
broadest sense. The US flag, for example, changed over 30 times in its history, but not
every flag brought forth a new culture. As we have discussed in the first part of this
dissertation, cultures evolve and their values can change, while the people still identify
with what they perceive as a historical continuum that goes beyond their own individual
existence.
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To use another example: The Catholic and Protestant churches of today have
undergone significant changes in the last four centuries, including the abandonment of
burning supposed witches and heretics. But these changes did not create a new culture;
instead, they changed the underlying values and symbols of a pre-existing one. As we will
see in our discussion about institutions, such changes can strengthen or weaken the bonds
between the individuals who make up a cultural community. This is an important
contemporary question, because the sustainability of many states in Europe, North
America, and elsewhere will depend on whether the evolution of what it means to be a
member of these states will be an identity based on ethnicity or culture.
Principles and ideas can differ from culture to culture, but there are some general
similarities. Since culture is an expansion of the bonds of loyalty that exist between family
members, cultures often imitate and build on family relations. Similarly, people that share
certain physiological traits like skin-color have historically been more likely to form
cultural groups together. This does not mean, however, that physiological or genetic
resemblance is the sole or even a necessary determination of culture. Ethnicity can play an
important role in culture, but it does not have to. The more recent history of Southeast Asia
shows how culture and cultural identities can overcome ethnic markers in a variety of ways,
unfortunately often also creating new political tensions. The ethnic difference between
Muslims from Pakistan and Hindus from India is minimal, but the cultural (in this case
mostly, but not exclusively, of a religious nature) differences have been a constant source
of conflict.
More positive examples that emerged from the uneasy relationship between culture
and ethnicity would be South Korea and contemporary China, where the spread of
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Christianity has been a central force for the promotion of human rights, democracy, and
more accountable governments (Aikman 2006; Huntington 1993). Any attempt to predict
the long-term development of China that does not take into account the profound cultural
changes that are currently underway will lead to unreliable results. Given current
demographic trends, China is on track to become home of the world’s largest Christian
community, which is already leading to a fundamental overhaul of the communist party’s
attitude towards religion (Yang 2007), a development that could lead to unforeseen changes
in Chinese foreign policy regarding the Middle East, for example. It remains puzzling why
this development in the realm of culture is barely recognized as an important factor in
contemporary scholarship (Yang 2014).
The Christian awakening in China is a good example of how ethnicity and culture
can diverge. Christianity (just like Communism before) is the adaption of a worldview and
the norms and values that come with it; this adaption however is a process of socialization
and choice and independent from biological markers that define individual ethnicity. In the
same way that Indonesia became the world’s largest Muslim nation, there is some
likelihood that China will become the world’s largest Christian nation. Should this happen,
it remains to be seen what these new dynamics will produce in the regional politics of Asia.
The emergence of culture can be seen as a reaction to ethnicity and the limits it puts
on the organization of large human groups and the ability to act collectively. The depth and
breadth of human cooperation has been subject to cultural evolution as much as to
biological evolution. Altruistic and cooperative behavior was increasing proportionally
with the commonality of genes among the participating individuals, limiting cooperation
first to the family, then to the tribe. The emergence of culture and cultural institutions
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(churches, political movements, interest groups) was a way to overcome these biological
limitations on cooperation and altruistic behavior. Yet while there is a regularity when it
comes to cooperation and shared genes, there is no such “natural rule” when it comes to
culture. Some cultural constructs were an expansion of the principle of kinship to more
extended relatives, something that can be seen strongly for example in ancestor worship in
Chinese or Asian culture. Others deliberately broke and tried to overcome the limitations
of kinship.
This can be observed continuously at different points of human history from the
early days of Islam 27, the American Revolution (which proclaimed that US identity is based
on an American Creed and not ethnicity), the French Revolution (that wanted to expand its
vision of human rights to all mankind ) up to the international ideologies like Communism
in the 20th century (that aimed to unify mankind under an ideological banner).
In fact, culture and ethnicity can be seen as being in constant tension with each
other, for all the anti-ethnic cultural constructions just mentioned that had to face an ethnic
backlash: Islam is still confronted with internal tensions between Arabs, Persians, and
Asians (especially in Indonesia) 28; the United States were unable to extend its ideals to all
and especially the black population was explicitly excluded for the majority of modern US
history; the French Revolution gave way to the racially charged views that dominated

27

One of the first Caliphs, Umar, supposedly said to the Arabs “learn your genealogies, and do not
be like the local peasants who, when they are asked who they are, reply: ‘I am from such-and-such a place’”
(quoted in: B. Lewis 2004, xx)
28
Although anecdotal, a well-known attitude in Indonesia is that the greatness of God is exemplified
by the fact that he revealed his holy text to the most backwards of all people, the Arabs.
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European colonialism; and Communism could never rid itself of its ethnic and nationalist
undertones in the Soviet Union.
Social capital and the ability for collective action as consequence of culture can
come in many shapes and forms: Mohammed and his unification of Arab tribes under Islam
is as valid an example as is the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership in 1871.
Religion and nationalism are probably the most successful cultural artefacts if measured
by the number of people they are capable of unifying for concerted action. Yet culture can
also appear on lower levels – basically every community that creates ties of mutual trust
beyond immediate kinship is based on a form of culture in its own right. What we must
distinguish is the risk of mutual exclusiveness of the values (i.e. the cultural glue that keeps
groups together) of different groups within a society. Ideally, people could join different
communities simultaneously, and contribute to the accumulation of social capital for
society as a whole. But what if the social capital of a particular group is in an antagonistic
relationship with the social capital of the larger community?
This is a phenomenon we can increasingly observe in the United States, where the
confrontational stance between the so-called elites and – for lack of a better word – the
working class is feeding of each other, creating an ever deeper rift and loss of overall social
capital (Murray 2012; Putnam 2016).
Similarly, in Europe the autochthone population and the growing minority of
Muslims make their differences the key element for group cohesion, thereby dividing and
diminishing overall social capital. Francis Fukuyama makes a similar point when he writes
that
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the Ku Klux Klan, Nation of Islam, and Michigan Militia possess
social capital, but a society made up of such groups would not be
particularly appealing and might even cease to be a democracy (Fukuyama
2000, 22).

The cases Fukuyama mentions are particularly interesting, because they highlight
the different effects that the cultural basis for the formation of social capital can have:
Religion, for example, in most cases allows the option of conversion, thereby integrating
previous outsiders into the group and enhancing social capital and the potential for
collective action. An organization like the Ku Klux Klan is based on ethnic markers like
skin color and heritage, thereby not really overcoming a tribal structure only expanding it.
Instead of the family as the main unit we end up with moral tribes (Greene 2014) – which
is only a gradual change from communities based on immediate kinship. This is not a minor
factor in contemporary politics, where it becomes increasingly common for politicians to
speak what I call a tribal language – that is, appealing to voters’ gender, skin color, sexual
orientation or ethnical heritage is an attempt to activate our tribal and more narrowgroupish senses, creating a real threat to the social capital available for society as a whole
and the cohesion of multiethnic states.
At this point it is helpful to once again emphasize what culture is not: it is not
ethnically-, geographically-, or genetically-determined. Contemporary political rhetoric
tends too often to lump all kinds of identities together – religious, ethnic, sexual or other.
Not all of them necessarily constitute a cultural phenomenon. In the United States there is
without a doubt a black and African-American culture that expresses itself regarding
certain attitudes towards the arts, politics and other aspects of life. But this does not mean
that every black person is by default a member of this culture. By the same token, there is
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a vibrant queer culture, but being gay or transgender does not automatically make you part
of this culture. This also applies to religion – being born into a Catholic or Muslim family
increases the likelihood that such an individual will adhere to some of the values of these
faiths, but it is by no means a given. An individual becomes part of a culture once he or
she internalizes and emotionally bonds with the ideas and values that are central to the
culture in question. Regardless of what these values are, however, what matters is the
emotional connection to them. The idea that a person who has certain physiological traits
or sexual preferences must be part of a certain culture is not apriori true, even though there
might be a higher probability in some cases compared to others.
Ultimately ethnicity can be used to describe gene-related markers (e.g. skin color,
body type, gender, etc.) and geographical markers, but culture always includes the
possibility of choice. 29 The key distinction being that to a large degree ethnicity is beyond
human choice, but culture is not. Cultural identity is a social construct and subject to human
choice, while genetically- determined characteristics are a given in the life of the
individual. 30 There can be significant overlaps between ethnicity and culture, like Islam
and Arab ethnicity, but this relationship is neither determined for all eternity nor is one a
condition for the other. It is a matter of correlation, but not causation.
The same holds true for other societies as well. In the United States, a white
conservative and a white liberal share less in common culturally than two conservatives of
29

This does not mean that these choices can be made easily and without incurring significant
emotional stress and interpersonal conflict: Something we see very often in migrant communities where the
younger generation wants to join the culture of their new country, leading to conflicts with the older
generation that wants to maintain certain traditions. That being said, however, it does not change the
fundamental fact that an individual can change his or her culture, but not ethnicity.
30
Due to the progress in the medical sciences this view might be contested, for one’s gender or skin
color are now changeable to a degree that was impossible for most of human history. In general, however, I
believe the distinction between ethnicity and culture remains a valid one.
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different ethnic backgrounds. As we have discussed, culture is about emotional attachments
and while attachment to ethnicity is possible, it is neither necessary nor inherent. A culture
can attach intrinsic value to the skin-color of its members, but this does not mean that
everybody who happens to be of that color needs to be part of that culture. The element of
choice is not just important for a better definition of culture, but it also helps us to better
understand that cultures compete for members. Even in our times the discussion of what it
means to be part of an ethnic or religious group is essentially a cultural competition about
finding the mental model that shows the strongest ability to connect emotionally with the
largest possible number of people – or the maximum number of people a culture’s content
is supposed to appeal to.
The confusion between culture and ethnicity arises because many cultural ideas
deliberately put ethnicity front and center, claiming that they know how to genuinely live
one’s ethnicity and that only by adhering to a specific culture can one be his or her “true
self”. But claims about what it means to be authentically Indian or authentically Russian
are cultural claims not ethnic claims. The claim towards authenticity comes from the
adherence to a certain behavior that helps to self-identify and be identifiable by others as a
member of a certain group. But what this behavior is can be disputed, because our
biological characteristics have us hardwired for culture, but not for a specific culture.
This is highly relevant for politics, because it creates limits to what states can
theoretically demand from their citizens: It is impossible for an individual to change their
ethnicity, so a state that bases its politics on ethnicity automatically creates a class of people
that are forever excluded from participating in the body politic. Apartheid South Africa
and Nazi Germany assumed cultural characteristics of Blacks and Jews based on their
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ethnicity, making it absolutely impossible for the latter to ever become (or remain) equal
citizens of the state.
On the other hand, in the realm of culture states theoretically can make demands on
its citizens and actually do so on a regular basis. We will be investigating this further in the
third part of this dissertation, because it also has a huge impact on the construction of
institutions. For now, it is important to highlight once more the distinction between
ethnicity and culture. To connect a person’s beliefs to a person’s genetics is a dangerous
game, because it would give rise to the claim that such a person is forever bound to one
identity that can never be changed. This is of course also the essence of racism – the claim
that a person is genetically bound to an identity without any choice in the matter. Racism,
as I have pointed out, is also an absolutely anti-cultural ideology, because the whole point
of culture is to socially construct a common identity that is able to overcome ethnic
limitations to community. As we have discussed at greater length in Part One, the strength
of culture is to expand bonds of loyalty beyond one’s kin and replace blood-relations with
shared beliefs and values. A return to define community exclusively in racial terms is not
much more than a slightly more expansive form of tribalism. Nazi-Germany deliberately
shrank the circle of people it allowed access to being German, excluding people that had
felt German all their lives and, in many cases, risked their lives for the German nation in
World War One. But the act of redefining Germany as a racial and not a cultural nation
excluded those who according to ethnic and other criteria (like sexual orientation) were not
“authentic” Germans.
This does not mean, however, that communities can make no demands on its
members and those who aspire to join. The point is that these demands should be fulfillable
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by the individual and not be tied to something they have no control over, like their skin
color or other genetic markers. 31 For example, when we expect people to respect individual
rights and to refrain from throwing virgins into volcanoes to please a deity for a better
harvest, we do so because we know that a person that holds such beliefs is absolutely
capable of changing it. Whether it would be by persuasion and explanation why sacrificing
virgins is wrong and does not work or via laws that ban such actions, we would assume
that this particular cultural value can be overcome independently of the ethnicity of those
who hold it.
The reader might recoil from such an example as being unimaginable, but practices
that make the modern mind cringe have been quite commonplace among human societies
for a long time. There is ample archeological evidence that human and even child sacrifice
was practiced in the Near East and the Mediterranean during the Bronze Age (B. S. Strauss
2007, 38), in China, South America and Northern Europe. Homer’s epic about the battle
of Troy, The Iliad, starts with Agamemnon sacrificing his daughter Iphigenia. Also, the
biblical story of Abraham includes him being willing to sacrifice his son Isaac until God
reverses his initial demand to test Abraham’s loyalty. And there is, in fact, also the biblical
story of Jephthah who offered his daughter as a burnt offering, this time with no divine
last-minute intervention. 32 None of these societies is still use these practices, demonstrating

31

Does this have to apply to all communities within a state? No, of course certain exceptions are
possible for example the existence of different sport leagues for women and men is also based on a distinction
where individual choice is (for the moment) almost impossible – but we accept it out of considerations of
fairness and the enjoyment of non-predetermined competition in sports. The same is not true, however, when
it comes to questions like citizenship.
32
It is worth noting that in both the case of the Iliad as well as the biblical story of Jephthah there
are versions and interpretations that see the daughters saved. It remains an open question, however, whether
these new interpretations have been influenced by the desire to clean the stories of human sacrifices because
the practice appears unfathomable to the modern mind.
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that these were matters of culture and not ethnicity and luckily as human societies
progressed they shed ideas like human sacrifice.
Belief in human sacrifice, belief in a religion, belief in a nation, belief in an ideology
are all powerful forces, but none of them is unchangeable or genetically fixed, so a
community can make demands in these realms because they are within in an individual’s
ability to change. A communist can become a fascist and then a liberal democrat, just as a
Muslim can become a Christian and then a Jew – based on adopting behavior and values
that characterize these beliefs. What is not possible is for an ethnic Arab to become an
ethnic Scandinavian and then an ethnic Pacific Islander. To conflate and blur the
differences between ethnicity and culture creates something close to a form of benevolent
ethnocentrism, where cultural demands on a group seem inappropriate if they could be
construed as being contradicting their “authentic” self. This is what we encounter in the
discussion about the assimilation of migrants into their new countries, when concerns are
raised that assimilation is forcing people to give up their heritage and their true self. While
this can be the case, very often what supposedly is someone’s true self becomes connected
to their ethnicity, once again putting someone’s genetic characteristics over their ability for
cultural change.
We need to discard the notion that there is something like an “authentic” or
“inauthentic” human being based on behavior that is “typical” for others who belong to the
same ethnic group. 33 An atheist Arab is no less and no more an authentic Arab than a
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My argument does not dispute that there can be a higher probability to encounter certain behavior
within a specific group, or what is generally called “stereotype accuracy” (Jussim, Crawford, and Rubinstein
2015; McCauley, Jussim, and Lee 1995). My issue is that behavior is supposed to determine the “authentic”
belonging to an ethnic group.

162

Christian or a Muslim Arab. Why? Because being of Arab ethnicity is not a choice, but a
given.
The claim that only certain behaviors and beliefs allow one to be an authentic
member of an ethnic group can have severe consequences in real life. For example, in some
African-American communities individuals are discouraged from performing as good as
they could in an academic environment in order to reinforce their group identity because
good grades are stigmatized as “acting white” (Hess et al. 2003; Spencer, Steele, and Quinn
1999; Steele and Aronson 1995). This is what the literature describes as “Stereotype
Threat” – “being at risk of confirming, as self-characteristic, a negative stereotype about
one's group” (Steele and Aronson 1995, 797). To put it differently, the negative stereotype
can become part of the very group it is targeting. In a keynote address at the 2004
Democratic National Convention then senator and later president of the United States
Barack Obama highlighted one of the most telling examples of the conflation of ethnicity
and culture in his remark that “the slander that says a black youth with a book is acting
white” (Obama 2004) has to be eradicated. He was referring to the phenomenon that
expectations of a certain behavior are tied to one’s ethnicity. Carrying a book and striving
for academic excellence – to remain with President Obama’s example – is supposedly
connected to a person’s skin color. Although no such biological connection exists, this has
significant consequences of a cultural nature. As Fordham and Ogbu demonstrate, the
internalization of a supposed connection between academic ambition and belonging to a
group creates what they call “fictive kinship” that in part is based on reinforcing one’s own
identity in ethnical terms by rejecting characteristics that are supposedly part of another
ethnic group: “the fear of being accused of ‘acting white’ causes a social and psychological
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situation which diminishes black students' academic effort and thus leads to
underachievement” (Fordham and Ogbu 1986, 176). 34
In purely cultural settings, stereotypes can be quite accurate – for example, the
assumption that when an individual introduces him- or herself as Jewish or Muslim, that
they would reject an offer of bacon; or the rather low likelihood of a member of an Amish
community to possess most recent high-tech gadgets. But in these cases, the individuals
introduced themselves based on their cultural identity, an identity that is defined by the
values and rules that define their respective faith. It is appropriate to assume that a person
that introduces herself as “I am a Mormon” will live according to the dominant
interpretation of what it means to be a Mormon, just as we can make assumptions about a
person claiming “I am a communist” or “I am a fascist.” The same does not hold true,
however, if a person says, “I am Scandinavian,” “I am black,” or “I am Arab.” There is no
handbook for being an ethnicity, but there (sometimes literally) are handbooks for cultural
identities like religious creeds or ideologies.
In other words, when it comes to one’s cultural identity the term authentic can have
actual meaning, since being part of a cultural group means to have shared emotional
commitments to whatever it is that is this group holds sacred. To return to a previously
offered example, if someone joins a fan club for the Boston Red Sox, but cheers for the
New York Yankees and whose emotions are tied to the victories and defeats of the latter
but not the former, such a person would not be an authentic member of the culture of Red
Sox fans. In the cultural realm there is a connection between group belonging and behavior,

Although Fordham and Ogbu published their paper over 30 years ago, more recent studies come
to similar conclusions (Fryer Jr and Torelli 2010).
34
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because it is the behavior that allows me to be identifiable as a member of the group. I am
expanding on this point because too often cases of culture and ethnicity get mixed up,
despite their fundamental differences. Being white and being Protestant are two completely
different categories, just like being Middle Eastern and being Muslim are two completely
different categories. One is based on unchangeable biological characteristics, the other one
is not just cultural, but also includes the element of choice. Once again, this does not mean
that there cannot be significant overlap between ethnicity and culture, but one does not
condition the other.
White, black, male, female, gay, or straight and similar characteristics can be, but
do not have to be the basis for one’s culture. Stereotyping in its soft form can be the
assumption that if certain behavior is very common among people that share certain
physiological characteristics, that if we encounter a random individual that belongs to such
a group will most probably show this common behavior. The problem begins if we assume
that being part of an ethnic group determines or should determine specific behavior and if
individuals do not display it, they cannot be “authentic” members of this community.
This is very similar to the idea of “false consciousness,” the Marxist idea that some
people don’t identify with the “right” group and therefore are not their own authentic self 35:
“False consciousness is defined as the holding of false beliefs that are contrary to one's
social interest and which thereby contribute to the disadvantaged position of the self or the
group” (Jost 1995). Whether or not someone is truly suffering from false consciousness is
hard to determine, since the definition limits it to the threshold of “contrary to one’s social
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A classic example of this is Thomas Frank’s “What’s the Matter with Kansas” (T. Frank 2005).
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interest.” In other words, an African-American individual who identifies as libertarian and
rejects a policy like affirmative action would suffer from false consciousness, since this
position might harm his or her social interest. Equally, a white individual that supports
affirmative action would also harm his or her social interest and therefore also suffer from
false consciousness. With increased migration into Western countries and a changing
demographic profile there has been a wave of predictions how this will change the political
balance between the political right and the political left on the long run (see, for example:
Judis and Teixeira 2004; Phillips 2018), but these observations only hold true if we
construct an overlap of ethnicity and culture that is possible, but not necessary.
The very concept of false consciousness assumes that an individual belongs to a
specific group, defined by the outside observer who then judges whether the individual acts
in accordance of their social interest or not. But these are not objective, but cultural
assumptions: Marx assumed that the workers’ “authentic self” can only identify with their
socioeconomic class, and that any other form of identity – religious, national, etc. – must
be the consequence of brainwashing by the ruling classes to further their interests at the
expense of the working class.
If the first individual in our example strongly identifies and feels emotionally
attached to a libertarian culture, it would be extraordinarily presumptuous to claim that this
is not the individual’s true consciousness because a black person cannot be an authentic
libertarian. Additionally, we must keep in mind that most people inhabit multiple cultural
spaces and can value multiple things simultaneously, but with different emotional
commitments. The African-American individual in our example might be fully aware of
and value the idea of affirmative action as a means to correct historical injustices, but at
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the same time she can still value the idea of individualism and libertarianism higher,
thereby rejecting this specific policy not out of false consciousness but out of a moral
commitment that is difficult to align with the policy of affirmative action.
Ethnicity can become an integral part of a cultural system, but it doesn’t have to. In
fact, historically the concept of ethnicity was significantly more rigid than it is today, and
it was only through cultural ideas that these differences could be bridged. It is often
forgotten that in the United States as well as Europe until the early 20th century, Germans,
Poles, Italians, French and other nationalities were not just seen as different cultures but as
distinct ethnicities and races that are unchangeable. The mainstream position at the time
was that
there could not be a new American identity because […] different
races responding to the same stimuli are still different, and no
environmental influence […] can ever remold them into an indifferent
sameness (Barry 2002, 85; and for a more detailed historical account, see:
Spinner 1996).

This kind of thinking was due to the emergence of ideological racism that was
pervasive not only in Nazi Germany or the major colonial powers of the 19th and 20th
century, but every western country (Barry 2002, 85). This racism, of course, was in many
respects also a cultural phenomenon that put the idea of race on a pedestal by which to
judge differences between individuals or groups. Although a cultural phenomenon in itself,
the content of ideological (or scientific) racism was profoundly anti-cultural, because it
entirely eliminated the element of choice. Once you were born into an ethnic group, all of
your behavior could be traced back to this one factor. Although scientifically complete
nonsense (Smedley and Smedley 2005), something that has become increasingly obvious
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as early as the end of the 20th century (Barkan 2000), the idea of a world that could be
explained through race-biology was an emotionally attractive shared mental model. It
allowed the strengthening of ties to one’s own group under the exclusion of others – but
had the additional modern feature of being exclusive, not because of superstitious or
religious reasons, but because of scientific reasons. Racism and the justification of slavery
in Europe and the United States was partially rooted in tradition and to some extent religion,
but in the 19th century there was a growing trend to justify slavery and racist policies in
scientific terms (Stanton 1982).
Yet the story of the emergence of this racism is more complex than one would think
after a first glance at modern European history. There are good reasons to claim a certain
affinity between nationalism and racism, but there is equal evidence that nationalism in its
early stage was an integrative force. Although heavy with symbols and cues like flags,
anthems, and myths, national identity was a powerful force in overcoming tribal and
religious antagonisms through the altering of emotional attachments. As Brian Barry points
out in his description of English identity:
National identity was additive, not absorptive. The cultural
threshold of incorporation was lowered – the cultural content of
‘Englishness’ thinned – by dropping the connection with Protestantism
(Barry 2002, 85).

The following emergence of not only an English, but a British identity enabled three
distinct ethnicities to cooperate successfully through the adoption of a common culture that
was not so much characterized by the imposition of a new culture on a conquered people,
but by the creation of a new identity that managed to incorporate previous identities. That
the Scottish, the Welsh, and the English created a common state where some of the most
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consequential prime ministers were of either Welsh (David Lloyd George during World
War One) or Scottish origin, is an astounding example of the power of culture.
Similarly, the differences between Saxons, Prussians, and Bavarians have been real
but were gradually overcome with the idea of a common German identity. The German
states of Bavaria, Baden Württemberg, and Hesse are the contributing the highest amount
of money to the federal budget of Germany to be redistributed among the economically
weaker states of Germany, but no one would claim that the people of Bavaria suffer from
false consciousness because they have a sense of loyalty towards the non-Bavarian people
of Germany. To put it differently, it is not ethnicity that matters, but ideas about ethnicity
that matter. France, Italy, Spain, and other European nations were never just given entities,
but emerged out of a cultural shift that replaced religion and kinship with the idea of the
nation as a cultural and historical being (Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012; E. Weber 1976).
Despite its name, nationalism has more in common with religion than kinship, because
both build on what Benedict Anderson calls “imagined communities” (B. Anderson 2006),
that are constructed around a common identity. This identity is in turn more a social
construct than a biological reality, and although one can trace the idea of the nation back
to medieval times (Cannadine 2011), it was not until the 17th century and the Napoleonic
era that nationalism became a dominant historical force. Although the positive and negative
effects of nationalism remain widely debated (see, for example: Hazony 2018), nationalism
itself serves as a strong reminder of humankind’s cultural side. With the decline of religion,
it was not secularized reason that took its place, but secular nationalism.
The trend of ethnic, religious, gender, and racial identities becoming more and more
prominent in contemporary politics is creating cultural rifts that were either less important
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or non-existent in the past (Jardina 2019). Building on what we discussed in the first part
of the dissertation, the fracturing of societies and retreat into smaller cultural groups is a
sign of a weakening culture, because it loses its ability to hold larger groups of people
together. It is an open question whether this cultural fragmentation will be a good or a bad
thing in the long run, but what should become increasingly clear is that we are confronted
with a deeply cultural phenomenon. I argue that one cause of this growing rift is rooted in
the neglect of culture as we have described it so far. Modern social sciences often seem to
lack the vocabulary to address this issue or tend to resort to root causes grounded in
economic considerations. Yet the neglect of culture will become more clearly understood
if we take a look at the one social science that comes closest to revealing a form of
predictable human nature and simultaneously also comes closest to the Enlightenment ideal
to investigate social and natural phenomena by the same means. Therefore, it is to
economics that we will turn next before we return to our investigation into the
Enlightenment roots of the neglect of culture.

3.2

The Rise of Economics and Rational Choice
While trying to improve political science through the exclusion of culture, it was

the methods of economics that seemed to have the greatest success in the quest for
emulating the methods of the natural sciences. And members of that discipline were quite
confident about the superiority of their field compared to others:
political scientists have less powerful analytical tools and know less
[than economists]. By scores on the Graduate Record Examination and
other criteria, [economics] attracts students stronger than theirs, and our
courses are more mathematically demanding” (Freeman 1999, 141).
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Economists themselves celebrated their “superiority” (Lazear 2000) to other fields,
and the imperial character of economics is well documented (Fine and Milonakis 2009;
Hirshleifer 1985; Mäki 2009; Stigler 1984). Not surprisingly, economists have eschewed
more than any other field the idea of interdisciplinarity. According to a recent survey
among US university professors, fewer than half believed that something could be learned
from other fields, compared to members of other disciplines where a majority viewed
interdisciplinary approaches as important (Fourcade, Ollion, and Algan 2015). 36
Economics tends to view human beings and human behavior as mostly uniform, with other
disciplines working on the periphery of comprehending human nature while economists
have found its core understanding of basic human nature (Rosenberg 1979).
This belief in the uniformity of human behavior only gradually became a dominant
force in economics and the broader social sciences and it was not uncontested. It first was
brought to the forefront in the “Methodenstreit” of the 1880s between the Austrian School
of Economics and The German Historical School. In this great debate, the Austrian school
attempted to formulate general laws regarding human economic behavior while the latter
defended an institutionalist-historicist position. Many of the methods of modern social
sciences have been formulated and discussed in this scholarly quarrel (Bostaph 1978) and
150 years later it is hard to dispute that the Austrian School came out victorious. There are
numerous schools in the United States like George Mason University or the University of
Chicago that place themselves in the tradition of the Austrian School, but one will look in

36

Economists would be surprised that no other than David Hume was writing about the “arrogance
of the economists” as soon as 1769: “I hope that in your work you will thunder them [the economistes], and
crush them, and pound them, and reduce them to dust and ashes! They are, indeed, the set of men the most
chimerical and most arrogant that now exist, since the annihilation of the Sorbonne.” (Hume 2007, 216).

171

vain for a university displaying a commitment to the German Historical School. The study
of history fell out of fashion since the past became irrelevant once we allegedly
comprehended the mechanics that drove human behavior (advanced by, among others,
Oakeshott 1991; Ziliak and McCloskey 2008). This development gradually moved from
economics to other fields, something that is reflected in modern terminology as well. In
international relations, we talk about Realism and Neo-Realism (or structural realism),
which is the political science equivalent of Classical and Neo-Classical economics (a point
is made explicitly by Krasner 1978, 37).
Overall, the concept of rationalism or Neo-Utilitarianism as defined by Ruggie
(1998) involves a narrowing of the concept of human nature to an individualisticrationalistic framing that emphasizes structure more than its constitutive elements. One
effect of this is the reduction of individual agency as a relevant factor, since it is the
structure that determines the behavior of the individual unit. Regardless of what they want
to do, the system compels them to behave in the way they have to. The ahistorical nature
of these neo-approaches and the anti-cultural turn they signify was well captured by
Richard K. Ashley and his critique of structuralism in general (Ashley 1984). This
emerging structuralism also restricted human agency and the role of human beliefs and
desires, something that was taken most seriously by an older generation of political
scientists--including Morgenthau, Kissinger, Ruggie and others – who also called for an
emancipation of political science from the discipline of economics and other fields (e.g.,
Morgenthau 1967, 12–14).
Even Karl Popper, who was fiercely critical of historicism and the idea that human
behavior can be rationally organized or predicted like the laws of physics, carved out a
172

special, elevated place for economics as the only social science that allowed for the
development of empirically testable theories (Popper 2002, 2). Popper relativized that
argument later, but it should not be surprising that once all this approval has been heaped
upon economics that it became the “gold standard” or other disciplines. That economics
would become such a powerful influence is not a surprise if we look at the connection
established by Jeremy Bentham between money and utility. Monetary and material wealth
according to Bentham are the sole accurate ways to measure utility and therefore the moral
content of policies (Shapiro 2012, 25). Bentham’s utilitarianism is not just the forerunner
of modern rational choice theory with the assumption that it is rational to choose what gives
us pleasure and to avoid what is causing us pain, but he also claimed that it can be
effectively measured in monetary terms. All of a sudden it seemed possible to measure and
analyze human behavior in a way resembling the natural sciences, since just as the
thermometer is “for measuring the heat of the weather” and the barometer is “for measuring
the pressure of the air,” so money “is the instrument for measuring the quantity of pain and
pleasure” (Shapiro 2012, 25).
The discipline of economics pushed the rational choice approach to the center of
the social sciences, making it one of its most powerful theories. Originally more a method
than a paradigm, the rational choice approach has moved from being applied as a tool for
problem-solving to becoming one of the gatekeepers determing which problems should be
dealt with in the first place, or at all. Indeed, according to Kuhn (2012), this is one of the
chief characteristics of a paradigm operating in normal science (Brogan 1996). (For another
argument viewing Rational Choice Theory as a paradigm, see: G. W. Cox 2004). The forms
of behaviorism and positivism that often go hand-in-hand with rational choice
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utilitarianism carry with them the narrowing our perception of the driving forces of human
behavior. I hasten to point out that this also means that it is only capturing some aspects of
behavior. Like rational choice theory, culture cannot be the sole answer for all forms of
human behavior. Instead, we have to determine carefully those areas of life where the
assumptions and conditions of rational choice are most closely met (e.g., situations where
people tend to weigh information objectively, have clearly stated and observable
preferences, and only a limited emotional attachment to the situation in question is evident).
As we will see, there are plenty of situations where these conditions exist and allow social
science researchers to build insightful models reflecting this feature of human behavior.
At the same time, however, there are also situations where individual utility
maximization under these conditions does not apply. A particularly problematic aspect of
rational-choice theory is the strong application of methodological individualism where the
individual only decides via reflection upon him- or herself. Culture tends to fall by the
wayside in this approach, because ultimately individual utility maximization always wins,
and culture might influence my preferences, but I would never act out of any other
motivation than individual self-interest.
This is a crucial point, because culture cannot be analyzed as a phenomenon that
operates on the individual level; the concept is intersubjective and rests on emotions that
need others to be triggered. What makes culture such a difficult phenomenon is that it
emerges out of moral imaginations and abstractions of reality that gain authority by way of
tradition, habit, and the creation of symbols, and establishes the priority of community over
the individual. This stands in direct contradiction to one of rationalism’s main concepts:
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the practical application of reason that can emancipate itself from the past and stand on its
own.
Michael Oakeshott highlights the difference between a purely rational and a cultural
approach when he writes that
“to the Rationalist, nothing is of value merely because it exists (and
certainly not because it has existed for many generations), familiarity has
no worth, and nothing is to be left standing for want of scrutiny … The
conduct of affairs is a matter of solving problems, and in this no man can
hope to be successful whose reason has become inflexible by surrender to
habit or is clouded by the fumes of tradition” (Oakeshott 1991, 4).

The assumptions made for the modeling of human behavior in the realm of
economics are persuasive, because in many cases they reflect actual human behavior to a
significant degree. In economic theory, the rational choice approach remains the most
important way to analyze problems, and “explanations are regarded as 'economic' to the
extent that they explain the relevant phenomena in terms of the rational choices of
individual economic agents” (Sugden 1991, 751). Rational choice itself was defined as
consistent human behavior where decisions are being made in order to satisfy one’s
preferences at the lowest cost possible. Defenders of rational choice theory claim that
nowhere does this approach limit itself to materialism (Geddes 2003, chap. 5; Keohane
2002, S309), although they seem to have a difficult time fully defending this position.
Robert O. Keohane, for example, argues that:
there is no necessary connection [between materialism and rational
choice] at all. A rational altruist allocates her charitable donations so that
the marginal value of the additional dollar, given to each of a variety of
charities, is equalized. The rational environmentalist chooses strategies with
the highest expected value of improving environmental outcomes. The
rational anti-globalization demonstrator picks situations where the world’s
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media will be hungry for pictures of demonstrators, engulfed in waves of
tear gas, confronting troops in ugly gas masks (Keohane 2002, 309).
It remains questionable, however, whether the most prominent rational choice
theorists would agree with Keohane. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith,
probably the most famous representatives of rational choice theory in political science,
reduce almost all significant political behavior to material incentives – most famously their
claim that the Russian Revolution occurred because of the Vodka tax and the low payment
of common soldiers (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012, 37).
Barbara Geddes, a more critical defender of rational choice approaches attributes
the possible limits of reducing human behavior residing in isolated motivations:
There is, to my knowledge, no rational choice argument to explain
why a few educated, comfortably middle-class individuals ignore family
responsibilities and more secure and lucrative career opportunities in order
to join nascent revolutionary movements in which the likelihood of
achieving power is far lower than the likelihood of ending up dead or in jail
(Geddes 2003, 182).

Robert Keohane, in his desire to defend rational choice from the claim of
materialism, succumbs to the temptation of inferring motive from observed behavior. He
simply assumes he knows why the altruist, the environmentalist, and the anti-globalization
demonstrator act the way they do--in order to satisfy some individual preference aimed at
utility maximization. Geddes, in her example, pulls the rug out from under his argument,
saying, “When goals are directly inferred from observed behavior, rational choice
arguments slide from ‘creative tautology,’ to use Brian Barry's phrase, into mere tautology”
(Geddes 2003, 181).
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This is not a small problem, since it pertains directly to the ability of researchers
using rational choice as a framework for reliable predictions. Referring to middle-class
individuals and their role in political change, Geddes continues writing: “We know that
such individuals play an important role in the early stages of revolutionary movements,
regardless of objective chances for the movement's success.” Similarly, Francis Fukuyama
has pointed out that the Arab Spring of 2011 was triggered by a Tunisian vegetable seller
named Mohamed Bouazizi who set himself on fire after his fruit cart was seized (Fukuyama
2012a). Tunisia, one of the economically and politically more progressive countries in the
region became the first hotspot of the 2011 revolutions. It is hard to believe that either
Bouazizi or the people who took to the streets against authoritarian regimes were driven by
the kind of utility maximization that Keohane finds too easily discernible. In like manner,
and echoing Geddes’ argument, are studies about terrorism that show that higher income
and education can be positively correlated with participation in terrorist organizations (e.g.
Krueger and Malečková 2003).
Once again, it is Geddes who more honestly acknowledges that
rational choice arguments are not usually useful for explaining acts
of extraordinary heroism, stupidity, or cruelty, which are often motivated
either by highly idiosyncratic goals or by lapses of means-ends rationality”
(Geddes 2003, 181).

Likewise, rational choice completely missed the fragility of the Soviet Union and
its dissolution in the early 1990s (M. Cox 2008; Hopf and Gaddis 1993). Of course, the
same can be said of other theories and disciplines as well; but few others in the social
sciences have for so long and so strongly advocated for the predictive power of their
approach, despite such potentially unrealistic assumptions (see, for example: Downs 1957,
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chap. 2; Friedman 2001, 15). But this is an odd defense for a supposedly scientific
approach. Let us think about it this way: In medieval times, the higher emphasis on hygiene
by Jews and Muslims caused fewer incidents of disease and a longer life-expectancy for
members of these communities. Their interpretation was that bodily cleanliness pleases
God, and therefore he grants a longer life. We can assume that the theologians of that period
had no proof of divine intervention, but they could also claim that since they can predict
the longer life expectancy of Jews and Muslims with high accuracy, their theories should
be treated as valid. The power of predictions should call for attention, but it is not
affirmative of the underlying theory if it cannot be augmented by a chain of causality.
Rational Choice in politics has been substantially criticized (Pressman 2004),
because it fails to answer fundamental questions like why people vote in democracies – the
question that according to the political scientist Morris P. Fiorina poses the “the paradox
that ate rational choice theory” (Fiorina 1990, 10). Even worse, individual utility
maximization as the main motivation for political behavior has been empirically refuted,
and economic interests turned out to be a very weak predictor of political behavior (Kinder
1998). What has been demonstrated empirically is that “in matters of public opinion,
citizens seem to be asking themselves not ‘What’s in it for me?’ but rather ‘What’s in it for
my group?’” (Kinder 1998, 808). Politics and political opinions are not vehicles for selfish
economic interests but “badges of social membership” (Haidt 2013, 85).
Even in their own field, economists have a difficult time providing the predictions
that matter. The aforementioned Lazear was in May 2008 still convinced that there was no
recession on the horizon (see: Pulizzi and McKinnon 2008), and weeks later the world was
on the brink of another depression matched only by the 1930s Great Depression (Drezner
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2014). Similarly Ben Bernanke, the then chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank announced
in 2004 the beginning of “The Great Moderation” that will be characterized by decreased
economic volatility due to improved predictability of market behavior (see: Bernanke
2012). None of this means that the attempts to build economic models and aspire to precise
forecasting are futile endeavors, but it is equally important to recognize prevailing limits.
One of the biggest throwbacks in these discussions is the desire to elevate one
model over

others. Behaviorism and the model of the utility maximizing homo-

oeconomicus revealed valuable insights into human behavior and played a key role in the
development of the modern social sciences. At the same time, however, there are limits to
the predictive power of these models: The tendency of actual human behavior to resemble
the homo-oeconomicus takes place in stable market conditions when confidence in certain
outcomes is high. As the economic crisis of 2008 has shown, sometimes a distortion in one
market can have such psychological repercussions that human behavior becomes
unpredictable. This is when “animal spirits” replace rationality and confidence is flees
market (see: Akerlof and Shiller 2010).
In order for rational choice to be applicable and fulfill its claim of being “a form of
positive science” (Zuckert 1995, 179), certain conditions must be met. Without them it runs
the risk of turning from a positive into a normative “science” that qualifies not only
behavior, but also affects the objects of its analysis (human beings) as being either rational
or irrational, which is more than a purely observational statement. The critique aimed at
rational choice theory so far is not particularly new, but what I am trying to offer in addition
is the claim that rational choice and the way of thinking that describes it has roots that go
much further back than we usually realize. Catherine Zuckert correctly points out that
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there is no place for that third part or aspect of the human soul, the
part Plato called ‘spiritedness,’ the part of the soul which serves to channel,
control, or suppress desires, according to the commands of reason (Zuckert
1995, 180).

The difficult but necessary distinction that needs to be made is that people behave
differently in different situations – and that culture shapes such variations in such differing
contexts. Plato describes the human soul as consisting of three parts: A desiring part, a
reasoning and calculating part and, finally, the part that makes up man’s spiritedness and
heartiness. Plato describes this as the man who is thirsty and yet refuses to drink –
metaphorically pointing at the human capability to restrain from the rationally sound choice
if it would violate moral codes. “The soul of the man who is thirsty,” Plato writes, “wishes
nothing other than to drink.” And yet we sometimes see men that “are thirsty but not willing
to drink.” Based on this observation, Plato concludes that there is more to man than reason
and desire: “Isn’t there something in their soul bidding them to drink and something
forbidding them to do so, something different that which bids?” (Plato 1991, 118). We
touched on this in our discussion about the moral matrices created by culture. A hungry
person might eat bacon, but a hungry person who is Jewish or Muslim might not. One could
now make the counterclaim that taking their religious commitments into account, both Jews
and Muslims act rationally in order to satisfy their revealed preference of religious fealty
over quenching their hunger. In other words, rational behavior can be defended within a
cultural approach, but this approach needs to be taken seriously. Very often any action that
results in a materialistic deterioration is considered irrational, when in fact there may be
situations where the material is less important to people than the emotional.
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Any attempt to revive the concept of culture in the social sciences (and especially
political science) must start with a critique of the utilitarian-rationalist view of human
behavior, but not its complete banishment. As Plato points out, depending on the situation,
different parts of the soul might get the upper hand. As in his example about the thirsty
man who refuses to drink, Plato does not say that he never drinks under any circumstances,
but that there can be situations where one part of the soul overrules the other. A critique is
not a rejection, and it is reasonable to point out that the rationalist approach can provide
useful tools in social scientific inquiry, but it cannot provide the one unified scientific
method that can be used to investigate all societal phenomena. 37 Gary Becker, however,
has been making exactly that claim:
The heart of my argument is that human behavior is not
compartmentalized […] the economic approach provides a unified
framework for understanding behavior that has long been sought by and
eluded Bentham, Comte, Marx, and others […] a valuable unified
framework for understanding all human behavior” (Becker 2008, 14,
emphasis in the original ). 38

The economic approach resting on rational choice then was supposed to be the
unified field theory of the social sciences, making other approaches obsolete. Political
scientists even started to sound more and more like economists, and the claim that culture
is “the rabbit out of the hat” to explain political behavior was made by Becker and others
before political science picked it up. Becker shuns “sociology, psychology, or
anthropology” when, “with an ingenuity worthy of admiration if put to better use,” they
37

I cannot emphasize this enough – rational choice is profoundly useful in situations where the
preferences of agents are now with a degree of certainty: i.e. profit maximization in the stock market or the
desire of a politician to be re-elected.
38
The reason why Gary Becker is so prominently featured on this chapter is to avoid the claim that
I am building a rational choice strawman. He has been one of the most prominent proponents of the economic
approach in all areas of life, and his influence in the social sciences remains considerably high.
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account for “almost any conceivable behavior” by resorting to “ignorance and irrationality,
values and their frequent unexplained shifts, custom and tradition, the compliance
somehow induced by social norms, or the ego and the id” (Becker 2008, 13). Once the
economic approach is consequently applied, all political questions will be answered
through its analytical powers and “culture (custom and tradition), specifically sociological
factors (social norms), and individual psychology (“the ego and the id”) are no longer
needed” (Morson and Schapiro 2018, 123). In other words, according to Becker and his
followers, the entire first part of this dissertation could be replaced with the sentence
“human beings maximize their utility.” Becker and his followers further argue that the most
efficient way to maximize utility is through the market mechanism, creating circumstances
that force people to analyze expected costs and benefits and then act accordingly. From
marriage (Becker 1973, 1974) to crime (Becker 1968) to organ donations (Becker and Elias
2007) everything can be solved through the process of rational utility maximization. As
he puts it:
The approach taken here follows the economists’ usual analysis of
choice and assumes that a person commits an offense if the expected utility
to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other resources
at other activities. Some persons become ‘criminals,’ therefore, not because
their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their
benefits and costs differ” (Becker 1968, 14).

The argument against Becker’s approach is not of a technical nature, because his
analysis that market forces can work on every conceivable product is not wrong. Just as
economists are not wrong in the general assumption that as long as there is demand and
supply for a good or a service, a market for it exists. But even these market forces are not
operating completely independent form emotional and cultural underpinnings, which is
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why companies try to create brand loyalty and other ways to bind customers beyond the
benefit they get from the utility value of the products they buy from them.
The problem is whether there are additional effects to be considered that do not
enter the purely economic analysis. Does, for example, the view that the decision for or
against a crime is based solely on a cost-utility calculation change the likelihood of a person
committing a crime in the first place. Michael Sandel has argued that “economists often
assume that markets are inert, that they do not affect the goods they exchange. But this is
untrue. Markets leave their mark” (Sandel 2013, 9). Sandel’s approach has recently
received significant support from psychology and the relatively young discipline of
behavioral economics. (For a good introduction to behavioral economics see: Mullainathan
and Thaler 2000; Thaler 2015.) In this literature, recent studies have shown that behavior
can change dramatically depending on the setting of a transaction. Dan Ariely and others
have done groundbreaking work on this (Ariely 2009; Heyman and Ariely 2004; Mazar,
Amir, and Ariely 2008). They have described how human beings distinguish between a
social and a monetary market: For example, even if you know that professional movers
charge $15/hour for moving a couch, you might still agree to help a friend move for free.
If he offers you 15 cents for your help, however, you might refuse. In the first instance,
you decide to help because the cultural environment has created a certain code of conduct
regarding friendship, and, in the second case, you decide against it, because your friend
switched to a market setting and you are not willing to sell your labor below the regular
market price. Contrary to Becker and other economists, our preferences are not fixed, and
the social setting can have a huge impact on our decision making: 15 cents is better than
nothing, yet some people would be compelled to regard this offer as an insult and refuse to
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provide the same kind of help they would have provided if asked by a friend. Which of
these decisions would be rational? From a purely individualistic viewpoint the latter, the
hidden weakness of the economic or neoclassical approach is that it cannot account for
intersubjectivity without becoming tautological.
Of course, 50 cents are more than zero, but it is the perceived insult from a friend
that causes the rejection of the offer, even if we could make good use of the money. In the
words of Plato, we might be thirsty, but we refuse to drink. The importance of this should
not be underestimated. If the only reason we do not commit crimes is because of a fear of
being caught and punished, you move criminal behavior from the social to the monetary
market. Should I steal gum from the supermarket? Should I take the old lady’s purse? After
all, if I can do it without being caught, obviously the supermarket and the old lady made a
mistaken calculation regarding security and the risk of being robbed – it is basically their
own fault. And economists have told us it would be irrational not to follow my preference
for gum and money out of some (according to them) weird moral commitment.
Becker also cannot assure us that the state, which is supposed to play significantly
into our cost-benefit analysis due to its power to punish, will not descend into complete
corruption. In the end, the state and its institutions are made up of bureaucrats, so which
incentives will prevent them from taking bribes if they are certain they will not be caught?
James Q. Wilson, who was somewhat of a “soft rationalist,” described in his work about
bureaucracy how complete rationality would almost never suffice to fulfill the tasks a
complex organization is supposed to fulfill (J. Q. Wilson 1989). In fact, the more complex
organizations become, the more important culture becomes as well, since it plays an
important role if you want to keep enforcement (or transaction) costs low and maintain
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high levels of trust in your organization. (A similar argument is made by the proponents of
the concept of social capital like Fukuyama 1996; Ostrom and Ahn 2003.) Francis
Fukuyama even goes so far to claim that “a nation’s well-being, as well as its ability to
compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust
inherent in the society” (Fukuyama 1996, 7).
Before a community can aspire to cooperate in the execution of complex tasks, the
community as such must exist, and the level of “existence” or cohesiveness of a community
is largely defined by the trust between its members and the mechanics that exist in order to
sustain that trust. As we have discussed previously, this is where the culture-emotions
connection comes in that defines the way individuals feel about others and the group as
such. It is no coincidence that the modern corporation emerged out of family businesses –
i.e., individuals that were connected by high levels of trust (Fukuyama 1996; Greif 2006a)
within the original emotional community, the family. In some instances, culture managed
to expand that trust beyond the family and allow the economic expansion to go beyond the
limits of kinship. Capitalism, just like other forms of exchange, is not the natural order of
things but was itself the result of a culture that enabled the mindset necessary to trust others,
allow interest and the accumulation of capital, as well as encourage a positive attitude
towards being wealthy. The argument that culture played a key role is not particularly new
and has been made by numerous scholars (Casson 2006; McCloskey 2007, 2010, 2017;
Mokyr 2018; Sapienza, Zingales, and Guiso 2006). What seems to elude them, however,
is that culture did not just appear before the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution
and then disappeared once economic growth took off around 1800. Recalling our earlier
chapter dealing with the first permanently settled societies, the arguments made by Max
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Weber and others about the influence of culture on economic behavior most likely have
also been true, when some societies decided to settle down while others remained hunter
gatherers and nomadic.
We are once again faced with what one could call the “fallacy of cultural
foundations.” We take the cultural fundament that created a community out of shared
morals for granted, assuming that one can replace morality with rationality. Yet this seems
highly unlikely, because the claim that cost-benefit analysis is the most rational way to
approach a problem has significant moral content. It is only a small step from arguing that
moving from behavior is rational to seeing such behavior is good thus creating a completely
new moral matrix (and thereby culture) that structures social relations. Although
unintentionally, my point is that Becker and others are not making a descriptive argument;
instead, they are making a deeply prescriptive and cultural one, telling us how the rational
society is supposed to work.
The reason why I spent a significant part of the first chapters on historical and
anthropological anecdotes was to demonstrate the pluralism of behavior that can be
perceived as good or rational in the eyes of those who act. If we elevate the individual costbenefit analysis to be the most important threshold when considering an action, we will act
differently compared with, for example, thresholds of a religious nature. The rational
choice theorist wants to have her cake and eat it too, getting rid of culture, but keeping its
effects on sociability. The problem is that some economists realized that the market
depends on non-market forces and that the attempt make them marketable effectively
changes their nature: As Kenneth Arrow has argued:
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Trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely
efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other
people’s word. Unfortunately this is not a commodity which can be bought
very easily. If you have to buy it, you already have some doubts about what
you’ve bought. Trust and similar values, loyalty or truth-telling, are
examples of what the economist would call ‘externalities.’ They are goods,
they are commodities; they have real, practical, economic value; they
increase the efficiency of the system, enable you to produce more goods or
more of whatever values you hold in high esteem. But they are not
commodities for which trade on the open market is technically possible or
even meaningful (Arrow 1974, 23).

Arrow does not deny the value of rational choice, but he is aware of its limits and
the dangers of turning a tool of analysis into a normative concept (Arrow 1982). If we
imagine a society where every behavior has to be judged by economic criteria, trust would
only emerge if both sides can be sure of their mutual benefit from trusting. Taking this
approach to the extreme would mean that those who trust without clearly benefiting from
it would be acting irrationally, potentially socially stigmatizing those who do not follow
the rules of the market. But if trust can be solely based on expected benefit, the need for a
powerful third party emergeies that ensures that both sides live up to the agreed upon
bargain.
At the end of Becker’s vision is a police state that ensures that any cost-benefit
calculation will make crime and cheating too expensive, but no longer will moral
considerations play any role. Not culture or morals define your behavior, but the fear of
punishment and lost utility. Welcome to Hobbes’ world.! There we would be all alone and
only the mighty Leviathan state would exist to prevents us from taking advantage of each
other. As I will demonstrate in the following pages, the true father of modern economics is
not Adam Smith, but Thomas Hobbes. And it is not political science that has been
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emulating economics, but economics that has been emulating the Hobbesian version of
political science.
Contrary to his modern interpreters, Smith distinguished carefully between the
different areas of life and their demands on human behavior, as well as the difference
between laissez faire economics and laissez faire politics. The distortion of Smith’s work
is astounding, if not necessarily intentional. Students around the globe are taught his Wealth
of Nations, while his more profound and constantly updated and revised The Theory of
Moral Sentiments is largely ignored. This is concerning, because Smith’s thinking about
society and the market is in many areas more complex than that of many of his successors.
Before turning to the question of economics, Smith concerned himself with matters of
morality, concluding that human behavior is mainly driven with our concern for others:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it
except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the
emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or
are made to conceive it in a very lively manner” (A. Smith 1982, 9).

Smith talks about our interest in others as an “original passion” (A. Smith 1982,
chap. 1), something we are born with and not something that is acquired via socialization.
The notion that human relationships can or should only be the result of self-interest is
nowhere to be found in his writings. At the same time, however, Smith was well aware that
just as sociability is a human trait, so is the ability for self-interest and that there are plenty
of situations where self-interest is the appropriate approach. It is here where is Wealth of
Nations comes in, an analysis of a very specific aspect of human behavior, namely the one
necessary for the functioning of markets. So Smith provided two major works, one dealing
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with a general analysis of human behavior and a case study of the market. The Theory of
Moral Sentiments then is the foundation for the Wealth of Nations (Macfie 1959), and the
latter is not to be understood as a generalized theory of human behavior.
First of all, the marketplace is an exceptional situation in which the assumptions of
rational choice can apply wholesale, including knowledge about the motivation of an
individual or a group that participate in the market. If I go to a store to buy a hammer and
there are two almost identical models, I most likely will pick the one with the better (i.e.
cheaper) price. Similarly, if a large number of individuals is engaging in the buying and
selling of stocks, we can somewhat safely assume that their goal is profit maximization.
Whether it is the shop owner selling me the hammer or the company issuing the shares,
both sides of the exchange know the goals of the other side as well as their own, so the
economic transaction can take place with a limited amount of social transaction. This is
what Adam Smith means when he writes that the main driver of market forces is individual
self-interest, not social mindedness: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher the
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest”
(A. Smith 2005, 26).
What these described actions of trade have in common is that they almost entirely
lack any intersubjective quality, meaning that I am making my decision in isolation from
others, thereby fulfilling a key assumption of rational choice theory. Another important
point is that the so-called economic imperialism of economics into political science is
actually the consequence of a reverse imperialism occurring a few centuries earlier. The
idea of human nature in the marketplace and its application on other realms did not start
with Gary Becker (Becker 1993) or the popular book series “Freakonomics” (Levitt and
189

Dubner 2009, 2011). Its origins reside in the self-declared father of political science,
Thomas Hobbes. The market place in its purest form is the ultimate social contract –
rational individuals get together and agree on rules of how to engage in order to ensure the
highest possible mutual benefit, and once the market transaction is concluded they return
to their individualistic self. Homo oeconomicus owes more to Thomas Hobbes than to
Adam Smith, and could with some justification be renamed Homo-Hobbes.
In a world where human relations could be reduced to the transaction of goods and
services, culture would indeed become obsolete. Voltaire as well as Smith saw that in the
marketplace we do not trade as Jews, Mohammedans, and Christians but as self-interested
individuals who are seeking to maximize their utility. Relationships in the market are
entered for mutual benefit and can be relinquished or renewed based on a cost-benefit
analysis. The problem that Smith saw and that many of his later followers have been
overlooking, however, is that we cannot organize all human relationships in a market
fashion. There is a life beyond the market, and most people find their identity not in buying
and selling alone, but in establishing relationships with others that are of emotional and
psychological value. The idea that there are economic solutions to all societal problems –
whether in a free market or socialist variety – is fundamentally anti-cultural and rests on
the idea that human emotions are reactions caused only by material needs. Yet despite
growing global prosperity, culture stubbornly refuses to disappear. This is because the
nature of economic transactions is itself culturally influenced. The entire advertising
industry appeals to our cultural side, trying to influence our economic decision making to
go beyond mere cost-benefit analysis and self-interested utility maximization. In other
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words, even the markets are often part of a cultural sphere that influences our supposedly
rational decision-making.
The elegance and persuasiveness of formal mathematical models in economics tend
to come at the cost of reliability, because in real life the predictive power of economic
models has been rather poor. Barely any of the recessions and economic downturns has
been predicted correctly by such models (An, Jalles, and Loungani 2018; Morson and
Schapiro 2018, x). This justifies casting doubt on the disciplines self-declared superiority.
Nonetheless, at least since the 1960s mathematical abstractions increased in importance
compared to the realm of culture with its identities, norms, aspirations, ideologies and
ideas. (For a related history of political science see: Dryzek 2006; Gunnell 2005). The
social sciences started to embrace a naturalistic monism that saw value only in applying
the methods of the natural sciences, and one way to do so was through the reduction of
social order and social action to material interests and utility maximization (Ruggie 1998,
859).
There have been some changes in this trend, and political science as well as
economics are starting to pay renewed attention to matters of culture, even though full
systemic integration is still missing. Katzenstein and others have been leading such efforts
to bring renewed attention to matters of identity formation (Abdelal 2009; Barnett and
Finnemore 1999; Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996). And even economists have begun
to concede the importance of culture in human decision making (Akerlof and Kranton
2011; Akerlof and Shiller 2010; Sapienza, Zingales, and Guiso 2006). Recognizing the
limitations of economic forecasting, the noble laureate Robert Shiller created the the
subfield of “Narrative Economics,” with the goal to explain how the way we perceive the
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world influences our emotions and decision making (Shiller 2017). Recalling a
conversation he had with the historian Ramsey MacMullen, author of Feelings in History:
Ancient and Modern (MacMullen 2003), he states that what we lack is a word conveying
“stimulus to some emotional response, and there is no such word” (Shiller 2017, 973). I
hope that based on the first part of this dissertation we can say that such a word actually
exists, and that word is culture. Shiller and others are still tip-toeing around the term, and
even his paper manages to talk about cultural phenomena while only using the word culture
once. 39 Nonetheless, this is a movement in the right direction and a welcome change from
the claim that narratives are no more than “mere storytelling” (Ruggie 1998, 884). It also
helps us to understand that the inclusion of cultural factors is not primarily opposed to the
idea of rationality, but actually lends precision and nuance to it. Once we understand what
motivates groups and individuals, we can adapt the parameters of rationalist models to
include culture. Studying different economic behavior across countries, research has shown
that “variables reflecting culture have as much power as variables derived from the
lifecycle hypothesis in explaining cross-country savings ratios” (Akerlof 2007, 16).
While these developments demonstrate a newfound interest in culture, we need to
investigate in more detail why it fell out of fashion in the first place. The question of culture
has been a contested issue in Western science for several centuries, but we are still missing
a comprehensive account of what was at the root of these quarrels. The following chapters
will try to address this question in more detail.

39

It does appear four additional times in the references.
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CHAPTER IV: CULTURE AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT
The matter of culture takes an important turn with the beginning of the
Enlightenment and the growing influence of the idea that nature as well as social life can
be entirely subjugated to human will and the human capacity for planning. If culture
enabled community through intuitive and emotional commitments to a group, the same
should be possible on the basis of reason. The Enlightenment, in other words, did not view
culture as unimportant, it just viewed it as obsolete. The world became disenchanted
(Gauchet 1999), and nothing could withstand the forces of science and reason, liberating
the individual and making community a means to serve this liberation. Emotions
particularly came under suspicion and were supposed to take a backseat to the rational and
cognitive (Haidt 2013).
Yet despite its novelty in many areas, the Enlightenment was also wrestling with
questions that can be found at the earliest stages of political philosophy: The issue of
emotions has been identified by ancient Greek philosophy in many variations, particularly
the dilemma whether loyalty should be with one’s state or one’s family (Hill 2010, pt. 1;
S. B. Smith 2012, chap. 2). Whether the inherent tension “between a politics of pure
reason—the sophistic claim that man is the measure of all things—and the attitude of
sacred awe and piety before those things that reason cannot control” (S. B. Smith 2012, 18)
can be resolved loomed large in Western philosophy more than a millennium before the
Enlightenment emerged. The philosophical dualism between emotion and cognition is
mirrored in political thought, and the difficulty and perhaps impossibility of a satisfactory
resolution lay at the heart of the debate between Enlightenment and the CounterEnlightenment thinkers.
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It was with Thomas Hobbes that we first encounter the popularization of the idea
that the emotions that bind us together also make us use violence against each other, and
that therefore any political construct should aim primarily at the limitation of emotions. As
we will see, Hobbes accepted the emotion of fear in the hope that if we accept that our
undisturbed physical existence is the best we can hope for, our fear of losing our security
should also make us more peaceful or at least less violent.
In the following chapters I will attempt to create a genealogy of political thought
that ultimately led to the marginalization of culture in the social sciences. Culture rests on
perceptions of the world that in turn built upon ideas about the world (discussed as
discussed shared mental models), highlighting the importance of ideas in societal
development. This does not mean, however, that the influence of ideas is straightforward,
and the way they affect the thinking of generations of intellectuals can of course stray
significantly from the original inception of an idea. (For an overview how ideas can change
see: Berlin 2013a, 2019.) The history of the Enlightenment is often emptied of its cultural
content (C. Taylor 1995), basing itself solely on the idealistic Kantian view that the
Enlightenment is the end to our (intellectual) immaturity and inability to think for
ourselves, opening up the world to the irresistible force of reason (Kant 1784a).
Yet this very idea depended on a very specific set of cultural factors, where religion
and tradition were replaced with the idea of explaining the world through rational
reasoning. What this ignores, however, is that reason itself wasn’t born ex nihilo (out of
nothing and/nowhere), but in many respects concluded an intellectual tradition that started
in ancient Greece, was lost for a time in medieval times only to be rediscovered and merged
with Christianity (Herman 2010). Even medieval Christianity was not characterized by
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blind faith and with Thomas Aquinas and his Summa Theologica in the late 13th century,
even the existence of God increasingly needed to be proved logically. (See in particular
Aquinas’ writings on “Proof of God’s Existence” in: Aquinas 1998, chap. 11.) Similarly,
in the Islamic world science developed as a means to certify the existence of a deity and
not to refute it (D. A. King 2016). The relationship between science and religion has overall
been more complex than is often assumed, and just like there is no major civilization
without religion, all major civilizations also had scientific aspirations (Selin 2016).
The key difference in Western culture was that gradually science became
disconnected from religion and turned into a sacred core in its own right. This is not a
minor observation, since there has been a growing trend in popular literature arguing that
the Enlightenment is antithetic to human nature, that it replaced irrationality with
rationality, superstition with science, and made us more peaceful, more understanding and,
in short, better people (this line of argument is popular with conservative and liberal leaning
authors. See, for example: Goldberg 2019; Pinker 2018). But this is an absurd contention,
since it is built on the assumption that the entirety of Western civilization was built on a
mass revolt against human nature – the sheer possibility of which would render the very
concept of human nature meaningless. If the Enlightenment is truly the antithesis to human
nature, it should never have occurred in the first place, much less as a phenomenon of such
influence and durability.
The Enlightenment in my argument is a cultural phenomenon that created its own
system of emotional commitments that were susceptible to technological progress and
fostered by ideas like universal human rights and democratic government. But none of
these notions was a rejection of human nature, but rather the consequence of what we
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discussed in previous chapter—namely, the human ability to experiment with different
forms of societal organization. I have already hinted in the previous chapters at certain
forces that also sprang from the Enlightenment and to which we will return again—
specifically, the existence of a dark side of the Enlightenment and the modernity it
produced (Jeffrey C. Alexander 2013) precisely because it could never fully replace the
emotional longings of human beings and the complexities of human interaction. Instead of
replacing emotions with rationality, it connected them, allowing the emergence of
ideologies that claimed to justify a wide and often horrific variety of policies on scientific
grounds.
While I dedicated an entire chapter to the rise of economics to demonstrate that
there are areas of human interaction where instrumental rationality serves us well, I doubt
that these areas can be expanded to all aspects of human life. Class, race, nation, ideologythe Enlightenment brought forth a plethora of new ideas regarding the creation of
community, replacing the once dominant position of religion as the cultural center of
society. Authors like Steven Pinker tend to cherry-pick from the historical record what they
count as part of the Enlightenment and what to the anti-Enlightenment reaction. Such a
reading of history allow a thinker such as Pinker to group everything he regards as bad the
17th century as part of the counter-Enlightenment and everything good as part of the
Enlightenment. But this is a profound misreading of the actual history of the
Enlightenment. Indeed, many of the central elements of Enlightenment thought were alive
and thrived in the destructive ideologies of the 20th century. Fascist and communist
ideologies prided themselves on the “scientific” content of their theories (Peukert 1994;
Weikart 2006) and constantly threatened and ridiculed religious worldviews. In the words
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of Martin Bormann, Hitler’s secretary and de-facto deputy “Führer” of Nazi Germany:
“National Socialism on the other hand must always, if it is to fulfill its job in the future, be
organized according to the latest knowledge of scientific research” (quoted in: Conway
1997, 383). Yet despite the ridicule they had reserved for religion, their own theories
attempted to bring back what the Enlightenment in its idealized form was unable to provide
– a sense of belonging and transcendental purpose (Habermas 2010). The argument that
twentieth century forms of totalitarianism are partially rooted in the lost emotional
connections to others and a pervasive feeling of loneliness was explicitly advanced by
Hannah Arendt:
What prepares men for totalitarian domination in the non-totalitarian
world, is the fact that loneliness, once a borderline experience, usually
suffered in certain marginal social conditions like old age, has become an
everyday experience of the ever growing masses of our century (Arendt
1973, 478).

The desire to fill this void in some instances morphed into a toxic combination of
religious-like fervor draped in the language of the Enlightenment, something that Fritz
Stern (1974) justifiably labelled, “The politics of cultural despair.” The return of the human
ability for mass slaughter and human sacrifice came back with a vengeance in the first half
of the 20th century, and while Hitler and Stalin would have scoffed at the idea of human
sacrifice for some deity, they nonetheless oversaw the killing of millions at the altars of
race and class (For a deeper contextualization of the religious nature of 20th century
ideologies see: Payne et al. 2008.) While it would go beyond the main scope of this
dissertation, we should ask whether the conditions Arendt and Stern diagnosed did in fact
disappear with the end of World War Two or if the experience of war and deprivation, as
well as the exposure of unspeakably human cruelty, has only caused them to lie dormant.
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New nationalisms, the resurgence of fundamentalist religion, and environmental
eschatologies are not simply rational reactions to a challenging world, but manifest
powerful emotional and passionate commitments continuous with the war years of the
early-to-mid twentieth century. I make no claim to the validity of the ideas that motivated
these movements, but it does seem obvious that their actions should also be understood as
emotional phenomena that satisfy a sense of belonging.
More to the point, the question we need to engage here is whether the loss of a sense
of belonging was a deliberate or an accidental part of the Enlightenment. As I will argue
in the following pages, this was not just an accident but built into a set of core ideas. The
reason for this was not that the Enlightenment did not take the matter of emotions seriously,
but that on the contrary many of the Enlightenment philosophers saw this desire for
emotional fulfillment as the main political problem to be solved. Moreover, these thinkers
had strong arguments to support their case – specifically the fact, that the most devastating
wars before the emergence of the Enlightenment were fought in the name of religion and
driven by the fervor with which human beings held their beliefs. Without these emotional
commitments, violence could become less frequent or maybe be banished as a way to
conduct human affairs altogether.
If this fervor could be lessened, the likelihood of violent conflict – its was believed
– should also diminish. But if culture is the embodiment of collectively- and emotionallyheld systems of belief, a weakening of these emotional commitments perforce leads to a
weakening of culture itself. I argue that this well-intended idea stands at the beginning of
the anti-cultural turn and does so to this day. As we have discussed before, in light of this
argument, it should not be surprising that the field of economics has assumed such a role
198

model, since it is the field in which the matter of culture has been most successfully
obscured. The moral case the Enlightenment is making for the importance of the individual
is less driven by the idea of individualism as an end in itself (see: Siedentop 2015, for a
history of individualism), but by the idea that individualism and valuing of the self will be
a counterweight to any tendency towards self-sacrifice or murder in the name of a religion
or ideology. This makes clear that postmodernity with its abandonment of so-called metanarratives (Lyotard 1984) is much closer to original Enlightenment thought than is often
conceded. Critical theory too tends to overlook this part when two of its main
representatives write that “for the Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the rule of
computation and utility is suspect. Enlightenment is totalitarian” (Horkheimer and Adorno
2007, 6). While I would agree with the general assessment, I think the conclusion is
misguided. The very reason for the Enlightenment’s emphasis on computation and utility
rests on the hope that rationality itself is the best way to prevent and reduce human beings’
totalitarian tendencies. If I no longer care about the religious and ideological world of my
neighbor and I can rest content with the knowledge that while emotionally less fulfilled,
my life will be safe and economically prosperous, why should there be any reason for
violence or a totalitarian state.
Intellectuals in philosophical circles often-shunned bourgeois thinking that
exemplifies precisely this type of society—i.e., autonomous individuals connected by
economic interests but nothing more. (For an overview of the anti-bourgeois reaction to
the Enlightenment see: S. B. Smith 2016.) But this type of bourgeois principle is almost
entirely fictional. As we have pointed out before, many revolutions are triggered and
depend on the middle class, and even World War One was more of a middle-class
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phenomenon (Eksteins 2000; Fussell 2000) than one driven by the monarchs who ruled the
European powers. (Some authors even argue that European royalty was one of the least
war inclined classes in the Europe of 1914. See: Clark 2013.)
But even defenders of the bourgeois Enlightenment tend to get it partially wrong.
In her multi-volume vindication of the Enlightenment and the society it produced, Deirdre
McCloskey praises the
broader, not narrower, choices of identity than the one imposed on
them by the country, custom, language, and religion of their birth. They
have deeper, not shallower, contacts with the transcendent of art or science
or God, and sometimes even of nature, than the superstitious peasants and
haunted hunters-gatherers from whom we all descend (McCloskey 2007,
KL 512-514).

But this is precisely the problem identified by the critics of the Enlightenment. If
there are so many choices of identities, can there ever be something like an authentic
identity be left? Horkheimer and Adorno lament the “mechanical” and totalitarian nature
of modernity that McCloskey seeks to refute, pointing towards the wide array of choices
made possible by modernity. In the end, however, their differences are only superficial
ones because they do agree on the underlying issue: The main reality is an economic reality
that depends on utility and calculation, and everything else is relegated to private and
individual pleasures that should have no or only limited impact on the public sphere. In
other words, the public sphere should be an economic sphere because the existence of
mutually beneficial exchanges of goods and services should make violence increasingly
unlikely, since it would go against one’s major interest: the economic one. This society is
therefore neither totalitarian since it allows for a large private sphere with significant
autonomy, something that would be unthinkable in a truly totalitarian society. Nor is it full
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of deeper contacts, because the sheer fact of choice makes it harder to have strong
commitments and the promotion of an economic mindset increasingly contradicts these
strong commitments, because by a mere utility calculation there might be no point to stay
with a community that asks more of me in sacrifice than it brings to me in benefits. 40
At this point it is important to clarify something in order to avoid confusion later
on—that is, the claim that Enlightenment thinking created some of the ideological
preconditions for Fascism and Communism must not be confused with the claim that
Enlightenment thinkers themselves were inclined towards totalitarianism. On the contrary,
my claim is that the Enlightenment was deliberately seeking out a way to avoid forms of
authoritarianism and totalitarianism by elevating reason above emotion. They could not
have anticipated that the need for emotional fulfillment and their ideas would create
modernity’s primordial intellectual soup out of which every modern ideology from
liberalism to totalitarianism would emerge. The initially optimistic idea was that the natural
sciences would lead the way and the epistemology so that in the same way human beings
gained control over nature, the natural and social sciences would gain control over the
social world, replacing conflict with harmony and prosperity based on scientific processes
that would be so obvious that force would be unnecessary to convince the people of its
validity and everybody would join out of their own volition.
The Enlightenment’s abandonment of a specific type of belief system that was
based on revelation and the supernatural led to the optimistic worldview that without god
and religion, the way would be free for the full emancipation of reason and rationality. The
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A similar point is made by Fukuyama (2006, pt. V) in his engagement with Nietzsche’s concept
of “The Last Man.”
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problem, however, never was god or religion per se, but the human ability to turn
everything they believe in into a sacred and inviolable issue, a consequence of the
emotional attachments that we discussed in the previous chapters. Religion certainly
deserves a special status as one of the oldest belief systems we know about, but this does
not mean that the psychology that enables us to experience religion simply disappears once
we disavow the Torah, the Bible, the Quran, or any other faith system.
Mass slaughter in the name of ideologies in the first half of the 20th century should
serve as a stark reminder that just because a society abandons belief in the supernatural
does not mean it abandons belief as such. Moreover, it will not suffice to simply ascribe
these events to anti-Enlightenment movements. The communist and fascist regimes that
rose from the ashes of the First World War did perceive themselves as alternative
modernities but not as reactionary movements (Griffin 2008, 2010). They claimed to have
found the answer to the anxieties of the modern era, and this claim was so seductive that
even a mind as brilliant as Martin Heidegger fell for its appeal. Both major ideologies did
not appeal to the people because of their conservative or reactionary content, but because
of their self-perception as revolutionary movements that found the answer to the pressing
question of the 19th century: how to maintain a sense of belonging and meaning in a world
that has become thoroughly secularized and devoid of all transcendental meaning (I claim
the centrality of this question because it was a main theme for every social commentator
from Durkheim to Taylor. See: Carlyle 1869; Durkheim 2006, 2008; James 2011; C. Taylor
2007a; Thiele 1994).
To make this observation is not to endorse these movements, and the story of course
is much more complex. Just because these ideas existed did not guarantee that they would
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or will ever come to power; and I would discourage any historicist approach that claims
that the Gulag and the Holocaust have been written into the DNA of the Russian and
German people, simply waiting to break free. My analyses and arguments do not claim to
have all the answers, but I suspect that one of the reasons why totalitarian movements came
to power is because the pre-existing systems lost all legitimacy and support as a
consequence of the lost World War. These systems were already under pressure before
1914, but tradition and economic progress maintained and sustained emotional ties that
kept them in power. Being utterly defeated in a war that they promised to win opened up
an ideological and cultural gap, because the emotions once invested in the ancient regime
needed “rewiring,” and totalitarian ideologies arose to fill that gap.
One should, however, not only focus on radical and negative examples. The idea of
society as a community with shared values is not limited to religion and totalitarian
ideologies but also played a role in the ideological evolution of Great Britain, as can be
seen in the conservative political theories and writings of Edmund Burke (see: Levin 2014)
or the United States’ concept of American exceptionalism (Bellah 1967; Bellah et al. 2008;
Lipset 1997). The United States in particular is less a product of the Enlightenment in its
purest form than in the application of Enlightenment ideas built on an emotional
underpinning that the founders where well aware of and exemplified by John Adams:
We have no government armed with power capable of contending
with human passions unbridled by morality and religion. Avarice, ambition,
revenge or gallantry would break the strongest cords of our Constitution as
a whale goes through a net. Our Constitution is designed only for a moral
and religious people. It is wholly inadequate for any other (Adams 1798).
Contrary to the French Revolution of 1789 the American Revolution was much
more careful in its handling of matters like religion. Whether or not the Founding Fathers
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were religious or not is a lively debate for another place, but there can be little doubt that
they were astutely aware of the social implications of religion, and that a wholesale
abandonment in a revolutionary fashion could be troubling for the social cohesion of a
young nation (for the role of religion in the founding of the US, see: Meacham 2007).
Sometimes what seems to be superstitious and irrational is not necessarily without
advantages regarding social organization. We know of no complex civilizations that
existed wholly without religion – whether in the form of believing in a supernatural being,
worshipping dead ancestors or obeying the rules of some sacred text. These sacred items
are guidelines for our naturally occurring emotions. For example, we are all capable of
feeling pride and shame or affection and anger. But what triggers these feelings is strongly
influenced by culture. Some of the biggest successes in the liberation of the individual and
the emergence of modernity have been achieved by precisely such a re-direction of
emotions (for an overview of the literature describing the redirection of emotional triggers
see: Keltner and Haidt 2001).
Most people reject slavery not because of some rational cost-benefit analysis, but
because the idea of slavery itself strikes us as repulsive. The rejection of slavery becomes
a cultural phenomenon, something we retain due to an emotional tie to values, not
something that we have to renegotiate with every new generation. We might like to tell
ourselves that the moral advances of the last few centuries like the abolition of slavery, rise
of women’s rights, and legitimation of the LGBTQ movement are all the consequence of
reason’s final victory, but this could be a dangerous misinterpretation as to how that
progress was achieved. All these social changes were driven by a change in the emotional
reaction people held towards each one od them, so just as being gay was once seen as a
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mental illness at best and a moral abomination at worst, now we tend to see it the other
way round. It is no coincidence that we use the term homophobic, indicating that a rejection
of homosexuality is a phobia, something grounded in an irrational fear.
To be very clear, I am not creating a moral equivalency here; on the contrary the
goal is to demonstrate that the path towards a liberal and tolerant society has to lead
through culture and not around it. This in my argument was the grand miscalculation of
modernity and the Enlightenment: the idea that the passions themselves can be wholly
redirected into self-fulfillment and economic interests and that this new form of
individualism will finally resolve the problem of violent anarchy.
The reduction in violence that has been documented by Steven Pinker (Pinker 2011)
is not simply the result of us getting more rational, but of filling the idea of resolving
conflicts without violence and respecting the dignity of others with emotional content. It
could be very dangerous to assume that this progress is irreversible; such a view reveals a
profound misreading of history. The argument has been made before, but it is worth
repeating: totalitarian ideas did not take hold of the world’s most irrational societies
isolated from the ideas of science and progress, but emerged in societies that in many
respects were among the most advanced of their time. And totalitarianism did not only
appeal to the masses, but was equally widespread among the intellectual classes.
In his study about the Russian Revolution Orlando Figes writes that “most of the
revolutionary leaders were first and foremost intellectuals. Their heads were full of
European literature and history” (Figes 1998, 125). The same is true of National Socialism
(Höhne 2000; Ingrao 2015) and contemporary ideological movements like political Islam
(Byman 2015). These movements were able to inspire and incite a crucial mass of their
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followers to believe in the rationality of their actions, and to pursue them at all cost. Often
these ideologies were able to build on what was left of the legitimacy of the previous regime
and thereby bolster their own. The loyalty of the population and especially the state
apparatus to the Nazi government remained very high until the approach of the end, and
there can be no doubt that the war would have ended sooner if the regime would have
collapsed through growing internal resistance, just like Wilhelmine Germany did in 1918.
But the ability of National Socialism to describe and assert itself successfully as a
legitimate form of government in the eyes of most of the German people and project all the
existing German passions of loyalty, patriotism, and nationalism onto itself played a key
role in preventing an uprising against the regime. (Ian Kershaw describes in great detail
how little public support there was for resistance against Hitler, and how many members
of the military felt that they could not break the oath they swore, despite their realization
of what was going on. See: Kershaw 2001, 656)
As always, however, one can point to positive examples of such a process as well.
The cultural change running through US history from being a slave-holding society to one
of the freest countries in the world is a story of cultural change that happened gradually
and with the constant building of new ideas on existing ones. The efforts of Frederick
Douglass, Martin Luther King, the abolitionists, as well as the Civil Rights Movement,
stand witness as examples to the energy and perseverance such a process requires. Both
Frederick Douglass and Martin Luther King appealed to the promise of America and its
Constitution, thereby directly addressing the emotional core of American identity and an
existing shared mental map defining what it means to be American. Whether intuitively or
strategically, individuals like Douglass or King realized what constituted the “sacred” on
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the other side and used it to convince others of their position. In other words, individuals
like Douglass and King connected emotionally with society, creating an atmosphere where
negative emotions were increasingly connected with opposing their ideas, while positive
emotions derived from supporting them.
Despite claims to rationality as the basis of government, the concept of the sacred
exists also in secular societies and these sacred institutions often play a fundamental role
in maintaining a society’s social cohesion. Take, for example, the US Supreme Court as
the final arbiter in constitutional disputes. With the constitution being one of the most
sacred artifacts in American political life, the role of the court equals that of a class of high
priests. (This observation is neither original nor new; see, for example: Segall 2018, 12.)
The influence wielded by nine robed individuals over deeply cultural questions like the
definition of marriage, freedom of speech, or the termination of pregnancies is not so much
justified by a democratic process that underpins the decisions in such cases, but by the
legitimacy the Supreme Court enjoys among the people. The religious-like reception of the
US Constitution was intended and expressed by its architect, Chief Justice John Marshall
in Cohens v. Virgina in 1821, when he ruled for the court, writing: “A constitution is framed
for ages to come, and is designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions
can approach it” (Marshall 1821). The US constitution is perceived as the highest
expression of the will of the people in an almost Rousseauean approach of the general will,
that has authority over all other laws.
Although made by human beings, the constitution derives much of its power from
its metaphysical quality of laying out what values are central to the American identity.
Therefore, even laws that have the support of the people can be overturned if they are
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deemed unconstitutional and thereby in violation of the US’ founding values. Religious
conflicts in the United States are not fought on theological grounds, but constitutional ones,
since the court enjoys such legitimacy throughout the country that its verdicts are generally
accepted even by the parts of the country that oppose the final outcome. 41 This was
captured quite nicely by the Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who remarked
that:
The court has no troops at its command, doesn’t have the power of
the purse, and yet time and again, when the courts say something, people
accept it. […] [After] the court rendered its decision, there were no riots in
the streets. 42
These sacred values are double-edged swords, for they are an effective glue to
create communities, but they are also an efficient tool to organize them against each other.
In the end, however, I believe there is significant supporting evidence to make the claim
that without collectively-shared belief systems that are invested with intrinsic value, “it is
hard to see how human beings could have evolved beyond small band-level societies”
(Fukuyama 2012, 37). The question for modernity is whether we can build social cohesion
without the negative side effects of sacred values. A first step into that direction, however,
would be to acknowledge that all communities that expand beyond kinship have an array
of sacred values, symbols, and rituals that tie their members together. It is no coincidence
that even atheists start forming their own congregations that mimic a religious service

41

The former Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi made exactly such an argument when she
commented on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London: “So this is almost as if God has
spoken.”
42
These remarks were made during an interview on NPR. Available at
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/24/744633713/justice-ginsburg-i-am-very-muchalive?utm_term=nprnews&utm_campaign=politics&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_medium=social&mod=
article_inline (last accessed July 31, 2019)
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where people seek to form a community around the sacredness of not believing (Wheeler
2013).
The sidelining of culture in the social sciences is not simply grounded in a
methodological quarrel but is based on prescriptive arguments by early political
philosophers like Thomas Hobbes. Far from being ignorant of culture, Hobbes saw the
willingness and fear of individuals to kill and be killed for some higher ideal as the main
threat to what was to him most precious: human life and its survival. The writings of
Hobbes can be read (in part at least) as a defense of individual life against the vicissitudes
brought against us by nature and society alike. Contrary to those who interpret Hobbes as
a materialist realist, he was seriously concerned with ideological and moral disagreements
among people that could lead to conflict and create conditions where human existence was
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Abizadeh 2011). Hobbes did not emphasize
individualism because he viewed it as the most natural state, but because he identified pure
individualism and concentration on the self as a way to prevent conflict. We will also return
to Hobbes in due time in this part of the dissertation, but for now it suffices to say that the
stripping of culture as an important factor has only recently become a matter of
methodology, when in the beginning of modern political thought was a matter of policy.
The emphasis on reason and the belief in a rational social order are two sides of the same
coin: rationality describes the best way to achieve it (hence often the term instrumental
rationality) and reason helps us define individually and collectively beneficial goals. It is
through this tandem that Enlightenment optimists like William Godwin could argue in the
1790s that human society was progressing towards a state where everybody “was capable
of listening with sobriety to the dictates of reason” (Godwin 2013, 77) and that a society
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with barely any institutions can be sustained through a benevolent anarchy. Bernard
Mandeville in his famous “Fable of the Bees” (Mandeville 1989) in the 18th century put
forward the argument how selfishness - which he viewed as human beings’ main emotion
- could lead to overall positive outcomes for society, echoing the idea that reason and
rationality can be enough to sustain a society. For Mandeville and Godwin there is nothing
truly sacred that should command our emotional commitment; and Godwin especially is
straightforward about it, arguing that loyalty to one’s country, laws, or religion can only be
justified by reason, which he defines as centered around “utility […] the only basis of moral
and political truth” (Godwin 2013, 112). For thinkers like Godwin there was no longer a
real place for culture in the field of politics, a mode of thought that has become dominant
in many areas of political science.
Some authors like Patrick Deneen have claimed that the disregard of culture is a
consequence of political liberalism and individualism (Deneen 2018), but I conisider that
assessment not entirely correct. A liberal political order and the emphasis on individualism
are a consequence of an ideological anti-cultural term, not the other way round.
4.1

Avoiding Theoretical Strawmen
I need to avoid from the outset the impression that my genealogy rests on the

erection of theoretical strawmen. The history of ideas is a complex one, but there are more
and less dominant schools of thought, and for the purpose of this dissertation we need to
focus on those. As Peter Gay points out, the history of rationality in political thought and
the tensions between the Enlightenment and Romanticism/Idealism involve not a clear-cut
competition between different schools of thought (Gay 1954). The Romantics used
rationality just as many members of the Enlightenment philosophers were, in the end,
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romantic rationalists and rational romantics (McMahon 2002). The thought of Hobbes,
Hume, Bentham, Smith and others has a level of complexity that often forced us to
distinguish between their early and later writings as if they were written by completely
different people. The same applies to writers like Aristotle, Rousseau, Habermas, Rawls
and others. (On the often considerable evolution of thought, particularly regarding Hobbes
and Rousseau, see: S. B. Smith 2016.)
Yet not every idea of these thinkers has developed the same historical weight, and
the fact that, for example, Adam Smith and David Hume were much closer to
sentimentalism than tp rational utilitarianism did not prevent them from often being
grouped with other rationalists. Some authors have named Smith in the same sentence with
the extreme libertarian Bernard Mandeville, someone whose approach Smith
wholeheartedly rejected (e.g. Rothschild 2003, 40; A. Smith 1982, 308). So we must
distinguish between the actual ideas and the effective ideas of the thinkers and historical
periods we are addressing. Someone like Montesquieu was fully aware that culture is a
crucial factor when he wrote to the astonishment of his contemporaries that “when
Montezuma with so much obstinacy insisted that the religion of the Spaniards was good
for their country, and his for Mexico, he did not assert an absurdity” (Montesquieu 2011,
KL 13678). Yet Montesquieu’s overall legacy is not that of a cultural pluralist but as one
solidly in the camp of the Enlightenment and its emphasis on reason as the crucial bar every
idea has to meet. Similarly, the position of Rousseau remains unclear since he can be read
both as a defender as well as a critic of the Enlightenment (Berlin 2013b, 8; S. B. Smith
2016). What remains particularly important for us is his claim that reason unites people,
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while emotions divide them--the precise sentiment that lies at the heart of the anti-cultural
turn.
The principles laid out by the Enlightenment centered around the idea that the world
around us is not only entirely intelligible, but that everything is governed by immutable
laws that are waiting to be discovered. Emotions are mainly a reaction caused by the despair
of us not knowing these laws, because once one knows the inevitability of causal reactions
there is no point in reacting any more emotionally than we would to the fact that two plus
two equals for (an argument also made by Berlin 2013b, 40). Isaiah Berlin offers us three
basic assumptions that characterize the Enlightenment despite the existing disagreements
between the philosophers of its time (Berlin 2013b, xiii):
•
•
•

All genuine questions can be answered
These answers can be known by methods that can be learnt and taught to others
The answers must be compatible with one another
Based on these three principles, the Enlightenment ascribes to the idea that the order

that was created through Newton’s methods regarding the physical universe could be
repeated in the realm of the social or human sciences as well. Culture from the outset
became problematic with respect to these three assumptions, because it would be difficult
to fit the idea that the objectively same things could mean something different based on a
person’s culture into the concept of universal applicability. As we have discussed in
previously, it is also not something that can be learnt, but instead that needs to be felt. The
application of naturalist methods in the social sciences also pushed forward the concept of
materialism, making the standing of emotions as a crucial factor increasingly difficult. As
“The Oxford Companion to Philosophy” explains, materialism became a precondition to
apply the methods of natural science (Honderich 1995, 530), so in order to make social
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phenomena subject to the natural sciences, it was advantageous if they could somehow be
put into materialist shape first. The reduction of human motivation to material needs as the
ultimate end might be true in some cases, but most definitely not in all instances; and as
we saw in prior chapters, political scientists who remain befuddled as to why people do not
always vote according to their economic interests tend to overlook that sometimes other
considerations outweigh the purely materialistic ones. But there is another problem in that
observation—namely, that people who do not act solely according to their economic
interests are somehow irrational, and it is only a matter of time until the materialist mindset
will replace supposedly higher values of a non-material nature.
This second problem is a dangerous misperception. For it assumes that culture is
somehow a leftover anomaly from pre-rational times and it is only a matter of time and
education before all humans can turn into fully reasonably beings driven by nothing but
instrumental rationality. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, culture did not end with
modernity and the Enlightenment. On the contrary, the story of modernity is one of a
continuing struggle over culture and its proper place in life. Some hoped that the
Enlightenment would bring an end to this search altogether and that with culture’s
banishment as the embodiment of emotional ties to custom and tradition societies would
become even more cooperative and peaceful (see Condorcet for a good example for this
way of thinking in Condorcet’s 1795 writing on the progress of the human mind-Condorcet 2009). In his essay about secular religions, Raymond Aron makes a similar point
(although without endorsing it), writing that “humankind, without God or master and ruling
itself by reason, is bound to become peaceable and fulfilled” (Aron 2011, 103). Even more
concise is Steven B. Smith’s argument about “the broader philosophical project of the
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Enlightenment, with its goal of the liberation of men from the sway of prejudice and
tradition” (S. B. Smith 1991, 12).
The Enlightenment caused a real existential struggle in the intellectual circles of
Europe that is still with us today. It is impossible to read Gustave Flaubert’s Madame
Bovary, Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace, his Anna Karenina, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crime
and Punishment or The Brothers Karamazov as anything but novels wrestling with the idea
of human life between tradition and modernity and the tensions between reason and
morality. For the purpose of this dissertation the ultimate conclusions of Dostoevsky,
Flaubert, and Tolstoy are not of concern. Raher, what is important is the extent to which
the question of whether or not human life can be grasped rationally was a core topic for
novelists as much as philosophers. While we should be careful not to draw simplified
causal chains of history, the overall assumption that the Enlightenment did change the
relationship between society and the individual and the role assigned to culture as a central
element in the creation and sustainability of communities.

4.2

From the Enlightenment to Rationalistic Utilitarianism
There are reasons to believe that the rationalist-utilitarian worldview is a direct

consequence of the triumph of the (idea of) reason put forward by the Enlightenment. The
scientific method that emerged during that time opened the world to a form of inquiry that
did not exist before. Although the scientific revolution did not develop independently of
religion as is sometimes believed (Stark 2004, chap. 2), religion became increasingly
identified as a source of conflict and violence. To rely on faith and by extension emotion
was not seen as a way to generate and maintain communities, but to set them against each
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other. It is no coincidence that Thomas Hobbes called voluntary associations “worms in
the intestines of Leviathan” that must be “purged” (Hobbes 1988, chap. XXIX). Society
supposedly consisted of independent individuals who should be arranged according to
scientific knowledge, and not faith or tradition. Just as there are laws that govern physics,
so there should be laws that govern society and politics. It is again no coincidence that
August Comte originally wanted to call sociology social physics (Morson and Schapiro
2018, 120), and that early anthropology was driven by similar ambitions. The early
anthropologists were hoping for the ability to make a “prediction of our future”
(Malinowski 2013, 8) or to arrange possibilities of human developments into “a table of
elements” (Lévi-Strauss 1963, 55). Isaiah Berlin was among the first to point out that
political science was from the very beginning influenced by the idea that the law of physics
should have their equivalent in the social sciences. According to Berlin, this ambition was
the notion, either concealed or open, of both Hobbes and Spinoza,
each in his own fashion—and of their followers—a notion that grew more
powerful in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the natural
sciences acquired enormous prestige, and attempts were made to maintain
that anything not capable of being reduced to a natural science could not
properly be called knowledge at all (Berlin 2019, 51).
Jeremy Bentham believed that human morals can be studied like Newtonian physics
(Bentham 2018, 169); Although the idea that the realm of the material and the realm of the
social can be inquired by the same methods became the subject of strong criticism even in
the writings of rationalists like Rawls (Rawls 1999) or Habermas (Habermas 1984), it did
create a standard by which the social sciences became relegated to a supposedly second
tier kind of science (Morson and Schapiro 2018). That this supported a new form of
“philosophical radicalism” based on “moral Newtonianism” was pointed out as soon as
1928 by philosophers like Elie Halevy (Morson and Schapiro 2018, 62), who were critical
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of the idea of turning politics into a subfield of the natural sciences. In his study on the
evolution of Newtonian influences on the social sciences Charles Camic writes that “the
new scientific challenge led, above all else, to a search in history for the inevitable
principles of its development” (Camic 1979, 537).
The assumption of law-like behavior remains so pervasive that even a critic of
rational choice theory like Ian Shapiro claims that without laws, the study of politics would
become impossible:
We are not saying that political behavior is not law governed; to
make this claim would be effectively to give up on scientific study of
politics. It is one thing, however, to suppose political behavior to be law
governed, quite another to suppose that it is all governed by the same laws.
Some kinds of political behavior may be irreducible instrumental, others
irreducible expressive, routinized, or other-directed” (D. P. Green and
Shapiro 1994, 184).

Criticism of the natural scientific approach towards politics should not be confused
with the resignation of the study of politics. What it should do, however, is alert us to look
more closely for patterns of human behavior and the inherent difficulty of making it
predictable soon or even in the long run.
The question of universal laws that govern the behavior of humankind is not really
new, and we can find it at least as early as Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where he argues
that “the degree of precision and certainty that can be sought in the study of any subject [in
this case, politics and ethics] is dependent on the nature of the particular subject” (Aristotle
2009, Book 1, Chapter 3) and that “about some things it is not possible to make a universal
statement which shall be correct” (Aristotle 2009b, 99). We are on much safer ground if

216

we perceive human behavior in terms of principles and not laws, allowing for a more
central roles of the particularities that characterize individuals and societies. 43
The problem, however, was that the promise of “inexorable laws of social and
cultural development” was too seductive and gradually replaced the more cautious
approaches of Adam Smith and others (Camic 1979, 537), who still believed in the
fundamental variability in human morality and its consequences on behavior. As we have
already mentioned, it is no coincidence that the Wealth of Nations remains widely read,
while the Theory of Moral Sentiments has been relegated almost exclusively to the
philosophy departments or less often to history of modern economics courses. The reason
for this development was the complex interplay of intellectual, social, and political forces
that unfolded in the era of the Enlightenment. It is important to realize that there has been
a tense relationship between culture and the Enlightenment’s emphasis on science from the
very beginning, especially since the former was supposedly based primarily on
superstition. By the same token, however, the idea was to create morality – which is at the
core of culture – but free it from the surrounding ballast of belief and ritual. God or tradition
were no longer an acceptable justification for morality, but that was not supposed to elevate
an immoral world, but to create a moral society on surer footing. Consequently scripture
and other sources were increasingly discarded as sources of moral authority (Hazony
2012).

43

The emergence of so-called “narrative economics” is precisely that: A return of casuistry and a
gradual turn away from universalisms. It remains to be seen whether or not this new school of thinking will
have a lasting impact on the social sciences, but it marks a first significant break with the core principles of
the utilitarian viewpoint.
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The utilitarian viewpoint does not deny the historical importance of culture; instead,
it claims that with the emergence of reason humankind can free itself from the yoke of
theological ignorance or mere philosophical abstraction. It is during the Enlightenment that
human history is bestowed with a purpose—i.e., the culmination of historical experience
in a secular and positivist stage, where
the human mind, recognizing the impossibility of obtaining absolute
truth, gives up the search after the origin and hidden causes of the universe
and a knowledge of the final causes of phenomena. It endeavors now only
to discover, by a well-combined use of reasoning and observation, the actual
laws of phenomena – that is to say, their invariable relations of succession
and likeness. The explanation of facts, thus reduced to its real terms,
consists henceforth only in the connection established between different
particular phenomena and some general facts, the number of which the
progress of science tends more and more to diminish” (Comte 1988, 2).

Culture came under pressure from the search for natural laws that govern society
and the fear of culture as the main source of conflict. As we will see, the idea of society
consisting of independent autonomous individuals is not just a descriptive concept, but a
prescriptive one. It is no coincidence that Thomas Hobbes was a severe critic of Aristotle
(Laird 1942) and the ancient Greek’s idea of natural sociability and the limits of absolute
laws.
Condorcet and other thinkers of the Enlightenment proposed a shift from
transcendentalism and metaphysics to society as it objectively exists and questions about
maximizing utility and happiness, thereby creating a completely new ontological frame
for human existence (Baker 2004, 58). The advancements in technology and stateorganization allowed an individualism that was historically unprecedented, since
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community slowly but inevitably moved from being a necessity to being an option. Steven
Smith points out what these changes meant:
The Enlightenment had bequeathed a set of dichotomies between
public and private, reason and passion, and the noumenal and phenomenal
parts of the self that would have to be resolved if our moral and intellectual
lives were to be satisfactory (S. B. Smith 1991, 7).

This, in a nutshell, is the dilemma created by the Enlightenment and one of the core
questions of modernity itself--how to resolve this dichotomy? To this day, I would argue,
no satisfactory answer to this question has been presented, and that is at least partly due to
the fact that one of the elements for bridging the dichotomy has been pushed to the side:
namely, culture.
The way we have discussed culture so far stems from a psychological-functionalist
viewpoint – the role of culture in the creation of shared mental models and their role in the
formation of communities. Here we will take a more political-philosophical look on
culture, demonstrating, one hopes, that it can help us resolve this dichotomy. The
Enlightenment’s critique of the old regimes being incompatible with human freedom was
not a mistaken one; and Hobbes’, Locke’s, and other early modern theorists’ contention
that the individual has a right to individualism and autonomy from arbitrary authority was
crucial in the establishment of ideas like human rights and modern liberalism, two concepts
that, I believe it fair to say have overall benefited the condition of humanity, since without
them innovation and economic progress would have been hardly possible. What these
concepts underestimated, however, is the human willingness to voluntarily, and even at the
risk of personal disadvantages. join communities and submit to authority. This antiauthoritarian turn rested on the idea that the individual is supposed to govern him- or
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herself, based on what Hegel called “the atomistic principle, that which insists upon the
sway of individual wills” (Hegel 2011, 405).
One of the most durable influences of the Enlightenment on the social sciences was the
idea that we can look at human nature in an individualized methodological fashion, stripped of
all the diluting effects of society, upbringing, and tradition. While there is much to be said about
the scientification of the study of humans, we cannot ignore the fact that it was very special
historical and cultural circumstances that coincided in a way to allow for the emergence of
Enlightenment thought itself. Contrary to the idea that rational thought is some kind of natural
evolution of thought in general, I would argue that rationalism is in itself a product of culture.
This has of course huge implications for the political application of Enlightenment ideas; the best
ideas are hard to implement without the cultural setting in which they can flourish. The
Enlightenment’s approach to history was addressed by the first significant figure of the counterEnlightenment, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in a similar but more nuanced way. Joining the
Enlightenment philosophes in their rejection of Christianity, Rousseau remained convinced of
the importance of religiosity as a core human sentiment. Therefore, he proposed the concept of a
civil religion that would garb the underlying governance of human affairs by reason. Rousseau
was not alone in this. Spinoza in his Theologico-Political Treatise, Locke’s The Reasonableness
of Christianity, or Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason ( Spinoza 2001; Locke 1958;
Kant 2018) all attempted a fusion between the morality of religion and the requirements of
reason. The original Enlightenment philosophers were not unaware of the crucial role of emotions
(or faith, to use the term that was more common at the time) in the construction of human
morality; but there was an equal awareness that belief without proof but only feeling is a
dangerous thing. This is one of the key differences between the original Enlightenment and the
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modes of thinking that characterize modernity: Hobbes, Smith, Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau,
Hume, Kant, and others viewed culture as an issue to be dealt with in one way or another. The
rationalists of modernity, on the other hand, jettisoned the matter of culture altogether.
It must be pointed out that the rationalist approach is a young phenomenon, and marks a
significant break with other historical schools of thought. Having its roots in the moral philosophy
of the Enlightenment, the rationalist approach attempted to imitate the evolution of natural science.
Once known as natural philosophy, natural science has left behind most of earlier more metaphysical
philosophy and focused on the discovery of mechanical “laws of nature” that could be revealed
through the application of empirical and experimental methods. Unintentionally or not, this
evolution also created a qualitative split in the way science was perceived. As John Blackmoore
points out, “… it becomes natural to call ‘empiricism’ realism and all philosophy or ‘metaphysics’
idealism” (J. Blackmore 1979, 129). This immediately had an effect on the study of culture which
is, by its nature, part of the metaphysical experience (Verene 2009). The now dominant rationalist
approach reduced culture to a functionalist minimum, describing it as the result of economic and
structural pressures but with barely having an influence as a primary mover on human agency. 44
Seeing culture as a consequence rather than a cause of rational behavior, however, obscures the
significant cultural and institutional ontology that is the basis for so-called rational behavior. 45

44

It must be mentioned that this view is probably one of the lasting legacies of the Marxist school
of thought. For Marx as well as the rationalists culture is a “superstructure” that flows from but has no
influence upon the underlying materialist realities.
45
The close relationship between culture and institutions will be elaborated further in the course of
this dissertation, but for now it should suffice to say that “institutions are, of course, in some sense the
products of culture” (Ferguson 2011, 10). Institutions and culture, therefore, are corresponding and not
competing concepts. Culture shapes institutions, but at the same time institutions reinforce and shape culture
(Greif 2006).
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Once again, this way of thinking does not apply to the same degree to every figure of the
Enlightenment. Instead, it was most certainly pervasive enough that those philosophers who turned
against it and mounted their counter-attack in the name of Romanticism and Idealism saw the biggest
threat precisely in social Newtonianism. For William Blake, Friedrich Nietzsche, Fyodor
Dostoyevsky, Martin Heidegger, as well as other modernists and post-modernists, the idea that
human life could be mechanized without the agency of the individual was absolutely horrifying. It is
no coincidence that the Scottish philosopher Thomas Carlyle delivered his critique of the
Enlightenment in a tract on heroes and hero worshipping (Carlyle 1869). At this point, however, let
me discourage any attempt to take sides in the conflict between the Enlightenment and its
Romantic/Idealistic counterpart. Just as psychologically we are equipped with cognitive as well as
instinctive/emotional abilities that only together allow for a full account of a human being, we need
to view these supposedly opposing schools of thought as the intellectual expression of the continuing
struggle between cognitive and emotional.
The Enlightenment had good reason to discard many parts of past traditions as the cause for
conflict and human suffering, just as the Romantics were not wrong in their fear that a life based on
nothing but natural laws would not only threaten the idea of free will but also dissolve any attempt to
find a meaning in life. It was precisely this question that Kant among others was wrestling with when
he tried to find eternal and objectively valid social laws, but simultaneously strived to maintain the
concept of free will, without which true morality would be impossible (Kant 1998, 27). Yet even for
Kant culture in the sense we have defined it so far would be problematic, because it does not allow
for one universal conceptualization of morality, but accepts the possibility of moral pluralism. And
even for as complex a thinker as Kant, free will is a necessary condition for his theory of morality,
because only moral behavior that happens out of free will is true moral behavior. If we only obey the
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laws because we are afraid of punishment, we might be called law-abiding, but we are not moral in a
Kantian sense. If we would obey the laws because it is the right thing to do independent of possible
reward or punishment, then we are acting truly morally. The problem with Kant and other
Enlightenment thinkers, however, is that they believed that we could arrive at ideal laws and
consequent moral behavior solely by reason. Moral behavior according to them is something to be
followed instinctively not because it feels right, but because we know it is right. Emotions are entirely
unnecessary in this theory. The point here is not that such ideal laws do not exist – if we could free
people entirely from their emotional faculties it might be possible to arrive at such laws but the point
is that even if these laws would exist, I doubt that appeals to reason alone would be enough to make
people adhere to them. In fact, an assumption that reason alone would suffice puts and extraordinary
burden on our ability to reason without the support system of emotions. 46
It is important to end the misperception that emotions can only be attached to
unreasonable or irrational goals. On the contrary, emotions can be a way to reinforce the powers
of reason because they add an instinctive certainty to modes of behavior. To provide but one
example, slavery in the modern era was not ended because it was identified as unreasonable, but
because it was seen as emotionally untenable. From a power politics perspective it would have
been absolutely reasonable for Great Britain and other European powers to support the
Confederacy during the Civil War, because two mutually hostile states in North America would
have increased the relative power of Europe compared to the prospect of one United States. Yet
the issue of slavery made it impossible for Europeans in general and the British in particular to
support the South, despite widespread sympathy for the right of secession (Hamand 1988).

Kant was of course aware of this: “Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was
ever made” (Kant 1784b, l. 22).
46
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Psychologically, culture is a pluralistic phenomenon with numerous possible ties between
emotions and their triggers. The emergence of these ties is often lost to us and based on habit and
tradition that is rationally hardly graspable but still has strong emotional effects. An
Enlightenment perspective would argue that this might well be the case, but only because we
haven’t been exposed to the singular underlying truth that – in theory – would allow the “right”
application of emotions. Culture is like a thick layer of barnacles that has grown around the core
laws that govern human relations and that were necessary due to a lack of scientific understanding
and methodology. In other words, a supernatural being, for example, was necessary to create
moral behavior because we were not fully aware that moral behavior mutually benefits all who
act according to it. Even worse, sometimes the belief in supernatural forces took over and became
more important than its original function, the ordering of human relations. None of this would be
needed anymore once the scientific method has uncovered the causal relations of human
interaction, allowing a harmonious society to emerge based on sound principles that owe nothing
to faith or tradition. Intended or unintended, this was a decisive turn against culture as a primary
mover (meaning something that stands on its own and is not just a symptom of something else)
of human behavior. As we will see, the break with culture as a relevant factor in the political
sphere did not happen at once but gradually, starting with the desire to protect politics from
cultural influences to the gradual perception of culture as a negligible factor.
The Enlightenment with its emphasis on reason and the aspiration to apply the methods
of the natural sciences to the study of politics was searching for a formalized and ultimately (even
if unintended) emotionless way to investigate political phenomena. The growing rationalization
of society would ultimately replace tradition and religion, allowing politics to become the
execution and manipulation of natural laws, independent of the realm of culture. These attempts
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set the stage for the growing rejection of culture as an explanatory variable, causing some leading
contemporary political scientists to discard it altogether and to declare it basically a waste of time
(Tilly, McAdam, and Tarrow 2004, 9).
One reason is the assumed non-linearity of cultural factors that makes them difficult to
be used as variables in empirical and statistical research. This inherent nature of culture makes it
prone to “be employed as a ‘missing link’ to fill in anything that cannot be explained in political
analysis” (Sills and Merton 1968, 204). Political scientists Jackman and Miller make a similar
argument, focusing their critique on the alleged tautological quality of a concept of culture and
its empirical invalidity. “To draw rabbits from the cultural hat” as they call the habit of
introducing cultural values as ex-post variables (Jackman and Miller 1996, 712). They claim that
this kind of inquiry does not further our understanding of collective decision making, while
Przeworski argues that the idea to introduce a concept of culture to explain group behavior was
irrelevant in political science (Przeworski et al. 1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). What is
surprising about many of these arguments is that their articulators seem to be completely
oblivious to their own cultural groundings. The idea that collectively-held beliefs are an
unimportant factor in politics and that behavior can always be reduced to the utility maximization
of an individual is a prime example of Enlightenment thinking.
The following rise of structuralist theories in political science and other social sciences
was another factor working against the inclusion of cultural factors in political research. Culture
became seen as the expression of underlying power structures that served the vested interests of
particular groups, classes, or individuals but did not play any role independently of these
interests. Just as planets are moved by forces they cannot control, so human beings also behave
according to external pressures that emerge from the structure of a surrounding system. Although
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I am simplifying here, the rise of secular utopian ideas beginning in the 18th century and
culminating, among other things, in the French Revolution of 1789 was driven by the growing
perception that a perfect society is indeed possible. What these events also show, however, is that
the distinction between Romanticism and the Enlightenment is not clear-cut. The idea of a society
based on reason is in itself inherently romantic and idealistic, something that does not change
just because the intellectual and actual revolutionaries at the time laid claim to having found an
objective and universal formula for human society. The problem is that human beings have a lot
in common, but probably not as much as would be necessary to develop a theory of human
relations that would be akin to the theory of gravity. Both Romantics and the proponents of the
Enlightenment bring something to the table that has validity: Without a doubt, structure matters
and human beings are susceptible to incentive structures and decision making based solely on
self-interest. It is also true, however, that sometimes individuals and events can play the role of
so-called black swans: Unpredictable events that cause systemic changes (Taleb 2007).
Since we cannot re-run history, it is impossible to conclusively test whether every
historical event was predetermined by the structure of an evolving system or specific
individuals and events. Yet any thick historical description of the unfolding of events of hugeimpact demonstrates the many contingencies and even coincidences that led to specific
outcomes. Regardless of whether one looks at the American, French or Russian Revolution,
or the world wars, these events might in hindsight seem inevitable and predetermined, but it
most certainly did not appear as such for those who participated at the time. Was Lenin a
decisive factor in the Russian Revolution? Would World War Two have taken a different
course or happened at all if the Wehrmacht had gone through with its plans for a coup in
September of 1938 or if any of the numerous assassination attempts on Hitler would have
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been successful? These answers cannot be answered with absolute certainty and it is also true
that every politician has to operate within certain structures, but it is a far shot from arguing
that individuals have no more say in course of events than Jupiter has about its orbit around
the sun. Contrary to Jupiter, human beings care about their “orbit” and cherish the idea of free
will and finding meaning in whatever they do, making it very difficult to fit human behavior
into immutable laws that can be perfectly captured by theory. I think Hans Morgenthau got
comes closest to reality when he writes that there is
a rational element in political action that makes politics susceptible
to theoretical analysis, but there is also a contingent element in politics that
obviates the possibility of theoretical understanding (Morgenthau 1970,
254).

What this means is not the abandonment of the scientific approach to politics, but an
embrace of a more nuanced one that takes historical and cultural surroundings into account.
Such analysis can lead to much richer explanations of political developments and thereby help
in the formulation of new, generally applicable research strategies that recognize the possible
differences of the object under investigation. (A good example is Parson’s theory of European
Community formation, although the factors he investigates might be unique to Europe, their
absence in other cases could be an explanation why similar processes have yet to be seen
outside Europe: Parsons 2002.)
Ironically, even the laws of nature are only immutable under certain conditions,
exemplified by the differences between Newtonian physics and Einstein’s theories of
relativity, or Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle that tells us that we cannot precisely
determine a particle’s position and momentum simultaneously.
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For the most part, however, what the social sciences wanted to emulate was the claim
to precision and law-like causal relations that would allow for predictable outcomes. In order
to get there, the emotional and supposedly irrational side of human behavior needed to be
eliminated from the equation so that only the “true” factors determining human behavior
would remain. From Thomas Hobbes to Karl Marx to modern structuralists one of the most
pervasive ideas has been that the structure of the system is the main factor driving human
behavior with little to no influence of their own. For Hobbes, the system was created by human
beings’ constant state of fear; for Marx it is the ownership of the means of production; and
even neoclassical economists are ultimately structurally influenced with the assumption that
the incentives that maximize utility determine human behavior in every area of human life
(we will discuss this in more detail in the next chapter). 47 I am of course not the first one to
point this out, and similar arguments have been made by Leo Strauss and Michael Oakeshott,
among others (Tregenza 1997, 531). What they have overlooked, however, is the profound
impact this new way of thinking had beyond the field of political philosophy. The idea that
human agency is a mere illusion and it is systemic forces that control our behavior without us
knowing it had huge ramifications for not only the question of morality, but also the value of
human life.
To be clear once more, my criticism of rationalist-structuralist approaches does not
deny the important role of exogenous factors and I am nowhere claiming the complete agency
of the individual. My criticism is aimed at the idea that all societies and individuals react in
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Without a doubt, members of these schools of thought would protest being thrown together like
this. But they all share in common the idea that culture is only the symptom of a “true” underlying cause –
whether it be the desire for material possessions or fear of violence. With Hobbes being somewhat of an
exception, since he took emotions so serious that his theoretical work can be read as a blueprint how to get
them out of social life, most other modern schools don’t see culture as an independent phenomenon.
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equal fashion to exogenous factors. The reason the role of culture in my approach is so
important is because culture plays a crucial role in the way a society and individuals react to
events.

4.3

Idealism and The Enlightenment

In order to discern the problem with the concept of culture it was helpful to look at
the development of the social sciences and how they differ from the natural sciences. This
was important, because culture is a unique social phenomenon, and therefore eludes the
toolkit of the natural scientist. This elusiveness is frustrating and can lead to a plethora of
attacks on the concept of culture itself. The difficulties in investigating culture should not
be confused with the impossibility of doing so. A first step is to acknowledge the possibility
that we are in fact facing two kinds of reality. One is the material and physical reality
guided by the laws of nature, the other one the social reality guided by human perception.
What has been driving the tensions between the natural and the social sciences is the
question: which one of these realities is more “real” than the other? As we will see, both
are real and they build upon and influence each other (Morson and Schapiro 2018; Searle
1995).
The distinction we wish to make is between the “brute” reality that is independent
of human perception like the law of gravity and the social reality that is created through
ideas and collective agreements like “money, property, governments, and marriages”
(Searle 1995, 1). In many instances the construction of social reality is a reaction to the
force of “brute reality” – for example, the human individual is ill-equipped to survive as a
solitary being, therefore she creates social mechanisms that enable collective action and
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survival. The influential ideologies of the past did not spring from nowhere but were in
many ways attempts to resolve brute changes in the environment. The Enlightenment was
a reaction to the felt need to explain a world that seemed to have become explainable
wholesale via scientific means; idealism was the attempt to save the dignity and meaning
of human life at a time when it seemed that human society was being atomized and
fractured; mass democracy was a reply to spreading literacy and rising incomes. Then,
too, Marxism could be seen as a consequence of the social defects of industrialization,
while Fascism and Communism attempted to control the consequences of science with
metaphysical and transcendental ideas.
As we have discussed previously, culture is a way to adopt the social structure of a
society to a changing environment. And while these attempts often ended in disaster, there
are success stories that we have almost entirely forgotten. In their insightful history of
European and particularly the British states, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge
paint an astounding picture of how cultural changes allowed European states to cope with
the consequences of industrialization and explosive population growth (Micklethwait and
Wooldridge 2014). It might be common to think of Victorian England or Prussia of
Frederick the Great as stuffy, narrow-minded, and quasi authoritarian systems – and that
view might be justified from a 21st century perspective.
But in fact, from the newly-founded United States, through the British Isles and on
to continental Europe liberty was breathing probably stronger and became accessible to a
larger number of people than ever before in human history. On June 22nd 1772, the British
judge Lord Mansfield set the precedent for the abolition of slavery with the first legally
sanctioned emancipation of a slave in the British Empire. Part of his ruling deserves to be
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given at length, because it highlights in a single case the dilemma of the Enlightenment
and Idealism:
The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being
introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law,
which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasions, and time itself
from whence it was created, is erased from memory. It is so odious, that
nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law. Whatever
inconveniences, therefore, may follow from the decision, I cannot say this
case is allowed or approved by the law of England; and therefore the black
must be discharged (Usherwood 1981).

Mansfield, whose Scottish heritage is probably no coincidence, since it makes him
a close contemporary of Adam Smith and David Hume, applied one of the key features of
Enlightenment thinking here – that tradition and reverence of the past can never be the
justification for something as odious as slavery, and that it only remains because humanmade laws allow it to continue. This is a clear indication of the idea that some laws, no
matter how old, are made by human beings and therefore can be changed. I assume that
Lord Mansfield thought himself to act in accordance with the laws of reason and rationality,
but it was not the laws of said things, but the embedded culture.
Great Britain than moved on to ban the slave trade throughout the British Empire
in 1807 and to abolish the institution of slavery itself in 1833. Continental Europe followed
gradually as well, with Frederick the Great of Prussia, Joseph II of Austria and Russia’s
Alexander II beginning a process of abolishing serfdom throughout their respective
empires. The United States struggled longer and was caught in the duality of a system that
had the highest ambitions for liberty, but also maintained the institution of slavery. This
was only resolved through a bloody Civil War that killed three percent of the population,
and its consequences still linger on in contemporary US politics. None of this should be
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read as a hagiographic account of 18th and 19th century Western society and politics, and
mentioning the advances of liberty does not mean denying that industrialization and
urbanization brought with it horrible working conditions, child labor, and other forms of
exploitation. The marginalized role of women and other minorities and their mobilization
are also worth mentioning (for women and Victorian society see: Walkowitz 1991).
Nonetheless, the 18th century and the Enlightenment did fundamentally change
many of the moral standards that had often prevailed for centuries, and I believe it would
be a mistake simply to discard so-called Victorian morality as something merely
hypocritical because the standards of this morality were often and regularly broken. From
prostitution to drug consumption, these vaunted values seemed to be the thin veneer of a
society that broke them idly and often. Or were they? The beginning of cultural change
typically contains a shift of sacred values, and such a shift does not necessarily occur within
the entire population at the same time, but gradually grows in power and influence until
the new culture has fully established itself. The Victorian Virtues described by the historian
Gertrud Himmelfarb (Himmelfarb 1996, 2007), were remarkable because they started to
reshape the ideas and values around which an ideal society should be constructed.
Historians and philosophers alike agree that most Western nations in the 19th
century experienced a “golden age of associational life” (Ferguson 2013, 118). The fact
that in 1911 the gross annual receipts of registered charities in Great Britain exceeded
national public expenditure on the Poor Law is as remarkable as the fact that the absolute
number of cases of hardship reviewed by charities between 1871 and 1945 remained almost
constant. Similarly, Tocqueville (Tocqueville 2012a, 2012b) described with great
enthusiasm the “art of association” as a main virtue of the young American Republic.
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Associations in Germany were formed that actively tried to bridge differences (Ferguson
2011b), accompanied by a culturally awakening working class that, despite the remaining
class antagonisms, tried to live up to a Victorian standard (Himmelfarb 1985, 1991; J. Rose
2010) as a basis of collective identity. To be sure, not everybody was included in the
construction of this new society and, as Michel Foucault (Foucault 1988) has pointed out,
this unity came at the cost of excluding others and destroying more local ways of life. But
overall many of the moral standards, especially those attached to the importance of the
individual are still with us today; and although they are being applied more widely and in
new areas (e.g. sexual and gender identity), the underlying morality is rooted in ideas that
started to spread during this historical period.
Intellectual life too came to flourish as a consequence of these freedoms as well –
an intellectual life that already carried the notion that not all these freedoms came without
consequences, resulting in a new anxiety that grew in the shadows of liberty. William
Blake, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Hegel, and others formulated their replies
to a world that was in complete upheaval and characterized by the vision of finally
elevating reason above the passions. The elevation of reason by the Enlightenment was
liberating in many respects, but it also replaced the certainties of a life based on the
transcendental values of religion. While there were optimists of modernity that viewed the
triumph of reason as a first step towards true human liberation, others saw something
deeply concerning and started longing for supposedly easier and more “natural” times:
Natural man is entirely for himself. He is numerical unity, the
absolute whole which is relative only to itself or its kind. Civil man is only
a fractional unity dependent on the denominator; his value is determined by
his relation to the whole, which is the social body […] He who in the civil
order wants to preserve the primacy of the sentiments of nature does not
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know what he wants. Always in contradiction with himself, always floating
between his inclinations and his duties, he will never be either man or
citizen. He will be good neither for himself nor for others. He will be one
of these men of our days: a Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois. He
will be nothing (Rousseau 1979, 4).

Rousseau, of course, overstates here the solitary qualities of human beings,
something he shares with John Locke, who also believed that “man is by nature a solitary
being, concerned only with his preservation and his comfort” (A. D. Bloom 1987, 168).
The similarity between Rousseau and Lockean thinking is not a minor issue, because very
often Rousseau is credited as the intellectual forefather of the brutality that occurred during
the French Revolution, while Locke is viewed as the creator of a tolerant liberalism (see,
for example: Ferguson 2011a). But this view overlooks some major parallels in their
thinking, especially regarding their attitude toward what I consider to be relevant for the
concept of culture. Rousseau and Locke came to different conclusions, the former
becoming increasingly concerned with a collectivist approach and the concept of the
“General Will” that must come before and above the will of the individual, while the latter
developed a theory resting on the sovereignty of the individual. Rousseau differs in one
aspect, however, and that is his realization that there is a collectivist and an individualistic
side to human nature (S. B. Smith 2012, chap. 10). While Hobbes and Locke focused on
individualism, Rousseau tried to square individualism with collectivism, something that is
reflected in his writings about small republics where the participation of the individual in
the formation of laws for the community presents his way of transcending individualism
into community.
Nonetheless, their starting points are remarkably similar, with both Locke and
Rousseau asserting that human beings are born free and equal, and that it is the institutional
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framework built by positive law that creates differences and contradicts the state of natural
freedom. Even more important, both believed that human affairs can be fully organized by
reason, once again underestimating the crucial role of emotions. Locke shows no or only
limited support to communities established by culture or tradition, arguing that consent is
the only acceptable reason for an individual to join a community: “Every man being…
naturally free,… nothing [can] put him into subjugation to any earthly power but only his
own consent” (Locke 1980, 63). Similarly, Rousseau laments that while we are born free,
society has put us everywhere “in chains” (Rousseau 2011, 156).
Rousseau’s political theory is a tricky read and, as Steven B. Smith points out, it is
hard to fit him entirely into either the Enlightenment or the Counter-Enlightenment since
his writings strike both an Idealist, as well as an Enlightenment, chord. He was, in other
words, “at once both and neither” (S. B. Smith 2016, 176). But despite the opaqueness of
Rousseau there is an undercurrent that justifies putting him into the Enlightenment
category, despite his criticism aimed at Enlightenment optimism. I believe it fair to say that
for Rousseau culture becomes a technical issue, meaning that he viewed it as a tool to be
controlled and yielded as a way to create political order, but I am doubtful to what extent
he would have supported the idea of a genuine emotional connection that emerges
naturally. In the end, Rousseau argues for the power of a rational state that creates a civil
religion and the people that adhere to it (Rousseau 2011, 156–69; 224–52). He does not
deny the importance of emotions, but, as Yoram Hazony writes, they “are ersatz creations
of the Lockean rationalist universe, in which Rousseau’s thought remains imprisoned”
(Hazony 2018, 247–48).
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John Locke differs from Rousseau because he sees another purpose in human life,
and that is the owning of property and by extension the amassing of economic wealth. As
we have already mentioned, for Locke a true association must be entered into voluntarily
as a first step, but he also gives us an insight into the actual purpose of an association of
individuals. On this matter, he says: “The great and chief end of men’s uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their
property” (Locke 1980, 65). The materialist interpretation of history starts with Locke, for
he was one of the first philosophers to tie political action almost exclusively to its
relationship with property. His property-centered approach is combined with more than a
little disdain for other kinds of loyalty, becoming clear in his treatment of nations which
would not exist
[were] it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men,
there would be no need… that men should separate from this great and
natural community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and
divided associations” (Locke 1980, 67).

There are of course glimpses within Locke’s writing that seem to emphasize an
emotions-based form of community, particularly in his writings regarding toleration, where
some of his most interesting paragraphs deal with what Locke would not be willing to
tolerate: neither atheists nor Catholics can be trusted since “promises, covenants, and oaths,
which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist” while Catholics
serve a prince outside the established commonwealth (Locke 2010). I believe that the term
tolerance in its contemporary use has evolved to mean something much closer to the idea
of endorsement, but this is of course not what Locke meant. Like the US Founders, he
tolerated certain ideas and religious creeds on the basis that they are part of one’s private
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sphere and barely influence public policy making and its core concern of protecting private
property. Ultimately, Locke is a believer in the primacy of individualism and the
individual’s right to property coupled with an unobstructed life, expressed in voluntary and
mutually beneficial contractual obligations. Locke thus is suspicious of any form of
community that exists or claims to justify its existence outside a voluntarily entered
contract. It makes sense, because in addition to a state of nature Locke also describes a law
of nature:
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges
every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but
consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm
another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions (Locke 1980, 8–9).

Despite their different policy-prescriptions, Locke and Rousseau share a great deal
of common ground in their definition of human nature, and to some extent even Locke
belongs to both the Idealism and the Enlightenment movements. For if the law of nature is
reason, and this law should induce us to respect each other’s life, health, liberty and
possessions, how else can we explain war and violence except for attributing them to the
flawed institutions created by humankind.
Once again, Locke is absolutely open about this when he writes that
mankind are one community, make up one society, distinct from all
other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and viciousness of
degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no necessity that men
should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive
agreements combine into smaller and divided associations(Locke 1980, 67).

So it is the “corruption and viciousness of degenerate men” that creates
communities concerned with anything but the mutual respect for the individual. I argue
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that Locke’s writing has been at least in part been misread as a purely liberal document;
but in fact his writing concerns toleration only as a resignation to the fact that probably we
cannot completely rid society of “corruption and viciousness.” Therefore we might as well
allow some associations besides the ones created by voluntary social contracts. Society, for
Locke, can and should only be held together by mutual obligations enforced by the state,
and the people are defined as members of this contract: “wherever any number of men, in
the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic under one
supreme government” (Locke 1980, 47). Society is formed by reason, not by discrete
traditional bonds or emotional commitments to sacred values.
This engagement with Locke and Rousseau is important, because I concur with Leo
Strauss to the effect that given the many similarities of their theorizing Rousseau’s writing
is “the first crisis of modernity” (L. Strauss 1965, 252). The great break in Western political
thought starts with Thomas Hobbes who laid the groundwork for many of the ideas of
Locke and Rousseau, because it was he who first proposed the concept of thoroughly
rationalist politics (Hazony 2018, 247). There are, of course, differences. And in many
respects these differences are most relevant to the realm of culture as discussed so far.
Hobbes, contrary to Locke is fully aware of the fact that even if we presume a natural law
of reason, in order to enforce such a law, it needs a powerful state, something that Rousseau
also views as necessary. This, of course, makes individualism not only less natural, but
connected to a very strong institutional framework. While Locke viewed individualism as
natural, Hobbes argued that it has to be enforced by an institution. Yet all of them agreed
that the measure of things is the individual, and that society serves this individualism and
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not the other way around (for a more detailed account of the individualism on Hobbes and
Locke see: C. B. Macpherson 2011).
One of the more convincing points of Patrick Deneen’s critique of individual
liberalism is his notion that the natural state of human beings is not as solitary beings, but
that the advances of modernity have made it a possible option (Deneen 2018) – but one
that needs substantial government support. Individualism can only be accomplished
through independence from every community that was not entered voluntarily and for
mutual benefit, so the state must by necessity play a larger role in liberal societies –
according to Deneen’s argument. A different way to look at it would be to say that the state
has to create what Rousseau and Locke perceived as natural but muddied by modernity,
namely our natural individualism. As I have attempted to demonstrate in the previous
chapters, such a natural individualism has never existed, and the idea that it did is grounded
in culture, not science. 48
Francis Fukuyama makes a similar argument, writing that human beings are by
nature social and political, siding with Aristotle over the individualism of the
Enlightenment:
It is in fact individualism and not sociability that developed over the
course of human history. That individualism seems today like a solid core
of our economic and political behavior is only because we have developed
institutions that override our more naturally communal instincts”
(Fukuyama 2012c, 29).

48

I would like to highlight here once again that this is not supposed to be a criticism of liberalism,
but rather its establishment as a cultural phenomenon.
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What is interesting about Rousseau’s statement regarding modern society is the
underlying assumption that modern (or civil) life has created the bourgeoisie, and that one
of its characteristics is to be “nothing.” The issue Rousseau is pointing towards is that with
the progress of scientific approaches, the certainty of older values was gradually
disappearing. So despite his emphasis on the power of reason, Rousseau complains that
modern life has deprived us of something and that the state should artificially create ways
to fill these emotional gaps. I remain uncertain, however, if the anxiety Rousseau has
diagnosed has not always been there, and that modernity has only exacerbated an already
existing condition.
I maintain the argument that the diagnosed anxiety created by the demands of the
individual upon himself (i.e. what do I desire from a purely selfish perspective) and the
demands created by the values of the community (i.e. the limitations on behavior based on
religious and social rules) always existed, but that the Enlightenment made the latter much
harder to justify. In his treatment of Nietzsche’s philosophy, Alan Bloom sets out to
describe exactly this argument. Without the sincere belief in absolute and non-negotiable
values, we can have no culture and, in the end, no society (A. D. Bloom 1987, 194–217).
One does not have to fully endorse the cultural pessimism and relativism of Nietzsche or
its conservative reading by Bloom, but the key observation that absolute values and their
emotional certitude did crumble under the Enlightenment does contain some truth – and it
fits the contemporary movement to perceive one’s individuality and the recognition thereof
as the highest moral value. The demands of the individual upon oneself are outweighing
the demands of the community, but at the same time we still have the urge to be part of
communities and submit ourselves to their rules. This is the anxiety caused by the
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Enlightenment, and this caused the Idealistic reaction and triggered the following crisis of
modernity.

4.4

The Ancient Greeks, Hobbes and the Birth of Modern Utilitarianism

There is a good argument to be made that the question of how to balance
individualism and community in an ideal political regime has been a defining element from
the beginning of Western philosophy, starting with Plato and Aristotle. Despite their
differences, as Deneen noted, both dealt with this question, in which the virtuous individual
would be fostered to help create a virtuous regime which in turn would create a virtuous
individual – resulting in a “virtuous cycle” (Deneen 2018, 99). Without using the term, the
implication is that the political system should infuse its citizenry with virtuous values that
they hold so dearly that the only system they can create would also be inherently virtuous.
What they were talking about, in other words, was an emotional tie to behaving in the
interest of the common good without betraying oneself or experiencing negative emotions,
describing something very similar to what we have defined as culture.
This becomes even clearer when we look at the value the ancient Greeks put into
the arts and education as tools to form the moral qualities of citizens. The question of who
should be tasked with the education of the next generation is a recurring theme for Plato
(S. B. Smith 2012, chap. 3). None of them relied on an inherent automatism that would
lead to the virtuous citizen who would know how to arrange individual and collective needs
for the common good, independently of experience, culture, and history. At the same time,
however, this solution poses a problem: If people have to be educated (or indoctrinated) to
be virtuous, would that not be tantamount to a justification for totalitarianism? Also, if
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virtue becomes an unreflective habit or the product of indoctrination, does it even remain
something praiseworthy (S. B. Smith 2016, KL 5334)? Not surprisingly, Plato has on
occasion been associated with totalitarianism (S. B. Smith 2016, KL 516). Although this
association is often facile, it points toward an important fact of social life: Human societies
tend to build around forms of hierarchy that constitute a main component of social reality.
Yet since these hierarchies are socially constructed there is a potentially limitless variety
of possible hierarchical structures, including totalitarian ones. Plato and Aristotle were
concerned with what form of education would give rise to what hierarchy and which
political system. In fact, their concern is with different political outcomes and the
possibility for the degradation of political systems due to the inherent emotional tensions
of human beings.
For Greek philosophy, political life took place between the tensions created by
emotional commitments and choices based on reason, something that Leo Strauss so aptly
calls the “theologico-political dilemma” (L. Strauss 1995, 224). What should weigh
stronger on the mind of a person: the claims the state makes to her as a person, or the claims
of tradition as part of a tight knit community? In Greek thought. the state tends to represent
the forces of reason and rationality, while the family is the seat of the emotions; and these
two institutions tend to be in unending conflict with each other, because both can make a
valid moral claim on the individual. To use a simple example: if the father commits a crime,
should the son report him to the authorities? It most likely depends on the seriousness of
the crime. But this is an example where two sources of morality collide: The rational
authority of the state, that prosecutes and punishes crime to maintain order, on the one side,
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and on the other, the traditional and highly emotional authority of the family, that demands
loyalty above all else.
This dilemma is a key theme for classical Greek literature and philosophy, and also
crucial for us here: Social theory in both its modern and post-modern varieties--from
Durkheim to Freud, Weber, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno, Horkheimer, Foucault, Taylor,
Habermas and others—offered diagnoses of the modern world characterized by internallyinduced societal and individual anxieties, and all of them proposed their own remedies and
solutions to this problem. But I would argue that very often they missed the key point, since
this anxiety is hard-wired into us as a species that uniquely understands the emotional value
of both group membership and being free and autonomous as an individual. I see no
circumstances where an ultimate solution to this dilemma will be found, because to be
either fully individualistic or pathologically altruistic is not a realistic option for most
people.
On the other hand, one means by which these two extremes can be reconciled is to
create a certain type of culture, because cultural creation means the creation of common
values where the giving up of individualism and being part of a group creates a positive
emotional sensation, even if it comes at the cost of personal sacrifice or endured hardship.
Military service, giving to charity, or even something as simple as the voluntary payment
of taxes are all infringements on individualism and individual property, but they are (or can
be) perceived as justified and a necessary contribution to the community. In fact, very often
the dedication of time or economic means to a common cause can increase a feeling of
belonging and reinforce one’s identity, because the act of sacrificing makes the valuing of
the group over oneself even more visible and accessible. This kind of tension is also a key
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theme of Enlightenment and Idealism thinking, as Hegel himself demonstrated when he
wrote that:
The collision between the two highest moral powers is enacted in
that absolute exemplar of tragedy Antigone. Here, familial love, the holy,
the inward, belonging to inner feeling, and therefore known also as the law
of the gods, collides with the right of the state” (Hegel 2006, 353)

For Hegel, of course, in the end the authority of the state is tantamount, but he does
realize that what is described is a conflict between two moral positions and that both have
a strong claim to validity. But it is not just Sophocles’ Antigone who deals with this
question, the same story looms large in the Oresteia by Aeschylus (see: Hill 2010, 6–16).
The resolution of this problem, or at least the taking of a side, is a key element of
the Enlightenment, which must be understood as the attempt to ultimately replace the
dictates of faith (or culture) with those of reason. I believe that keeping that position and
the philosophical quarrels it created in mind helps us to understand why the Enlightenment
is such a double-edged sword. Defining the state as the ultimate authority is one of the
more contentious interpretations of Hegel, and one that caused many thinkers to view him
as an intellectual precursor to totalitarian forms of government. Francis Fukuyama, in his
benevolent treatment of Hegel accuses one of Hegel’s critics (e.g., Karl Popper) of exerting
“his usual lack of insight” (Fukuyama 1989, KL 6600) when writing about Hegel. But it is
more complicated than that and this becomes clear when we remind ourselves of the crucial
role of emotions: Even if the state is entirely rational and based on reason, its dictates can
still violate the emotional inclinations of people towards their traditions and identities. Any
state that attempts to replace them would have to at least gradually act in a totalitarian way,
interfering with the deepest beliefs of its citizens. For Hegel, this was not really a problem,
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because as a believer in the forward-directedness of History (deliberately written with a
capital “H”) the bourgeoisie state would merge with the bourgeoisie values of the citizens,
and when there is no contradiction between state authority and the authority of culture,
there is also no potential for conflict. Hegel was engaged in a dilemma similar to Plato in
his dialogue, the Republic, that also wrestled with the problem of how to square individual
reason with the demands of a harmonious political community (see, for example: Browning
1987). In fact, the writings of Plato and Aristotle could and should be read less as a political
blueprint and more as a description of the endless conflict between individualism and
communitarianism as an emotional phenomenon. 49 Plato’s concern with spiritedness or
Thymos is a key theme in his Republic, where he wrestles in Socratic Dialogue with the
question of how the needs of the good citizen can be brought into accordance with the
needs of the good human (Plato 1991; and for a similar interpretation see: Smith 2012,
chap. 4). The role of the Thymos has been treated extensively by Francis Fukuyama and
Catherine Zuckert, both making the convincing case that politics depends on more than
rationality (Fukuyama 2006b; Zuckert 1988).
Notwithstanding the profound differences between Plato and his student Aristotle
(Herman 2010), there can be no doubt that both of them and Greek philosophy in general
were constantly concerned with the questions to which culture supposedly gives answers:
How do we create loyalty to our communities, how do ensure adherence to the law without
resorting to tyrannical government, and how can education help us align the interests of
the individual and the common good? The idea put forward by Aristotle that true liberty
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Not surprisingly, Popper is also a fierce critic of Plato whom he accuses of being yet another
forerunner of totalitarianism (Popper 2013).
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is not unhindered self-interest and individualism under self-imposed constraints is one
answer, but the question remains: from where do these constraints come? Aristotle does
not believe in the unlimited power of positive law, and carves out significant space for a
culture of obedience that might be more important than the laws itself:
The law has no other source of strength through which to secure
obedience apart from habit. But habit can be created only by the passage of
time; and a readiness to change from existing to new and different laws will
accordingly tend to weaken the general power of law (Aristotle 2009a, 66).

In other words, Aristotle does not believe that simply because a law might be
objectively good, it can be easily implemented. And this is important because he sees that
there needs to be room for cultural change before legal change can happen, which also
means that the deep-seated biases of a community will always be reflected in a
community’s willingness to abide by certain rules, and these rules are firmly lodged in
what we would describe as culture. His concerns ring particularly modern, because his case
is one that emphasizes that a government cannot simply be neutral towards the values of
its citizens, and that a strict separation of the private and the public is probably impossible.
That being said, we now have to turn to where I would locate a true break between Greek
and modern political thought. This story starts with the political philosophy of Thomas
Hobbes. As we will see, Hobbes is a more nuanced thinker regarding the matter of culture
than are many of his successors, because not only does he take it seriously, but he gives a
full-fledged theory of how to limit its influence on politics.
For Aristotle the community is more natural than individualism, a view that was
challenged by modern philosophers, first among them--Thomas Hobbes. For Hobbes,
community was the consequence of a deliberate social contract concluded between
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individuals who agree to invest a higher power (i.e. the state) with the authority to prevent
violence among the members of society. Aristotle, on the other hand, identifies a natural
human urge towards forming communities and denies the idea that society emerges purely
out of intention and instead locates its source in human nature itself. Aristotle is very
explicit about this, writing that a human being who can live without community must be
either “beast or god”. We are neither of those, according to Aristotle, since “the impulse
for such a community is in everyone by nature” (quoted in Keyt 1987, 74). 50 This is the
essence of what Aristotle means when he describes human beings as “political animals.”
This idea has led to a wide discussion on whether Aristotle is actually contradicting
himself in his Politics, since he is highlighting the artificial nature of the state and at the
same time making the case for its naturalness (Keyt 1987). I argue that this debate is
misleading because it does not take into account the difference between community
formation and the form of the community. Aristotle’s argument is a description and a
recommendation: A description of the naturalness of community formation and a
recommendation for the Polis as the ideal form of the community. Yet at the same time
Aristotle does not argue that the Polis is the natural form of community: Community is
natural, the Polis as a form of community is artificial. Community falls into a grey area
between nature and artificial creation by intent:
In saying that the state is natural he [Aristotle] does not mean that it
'grows' naturally, without human volition and action. There is art as well as
nature, and art co-operates with nature: the volition and action of human
agents 'construct' the state in co-operation with a natural immanent impulse
(Keyt 1987, 56).

50

Depending on the translation there are slightly different versions of that part. Fred Barker, for
example, translates it as “a natural impulse in all men towards an association of this sort” (Aristotle 2009,
11). The basic meaning, however, remains the same: Community is natural to human beings.
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For Aristotle the polis is the ideal form of government, since it is most beneficial
to the development and sustaining of virtuous citizens, which should be the desirable end
of any political community. Aristotle is not dissimilar to Fukuyama, who argues that the
reason for the final triumph of liberal democracy is its ability to satisfy our most basic
psychological need, the desire for recognition by others. The only problem is that human
beings seem to be incapable of reaching this final or ideal stage straightforwardly by
rational means but have to evolve towards it. It is a journey where the destination is known,
but not the path. Aristotle is less concerned with recognition, but he also sees as a problem
that there is no automatic mechanism to reach the best possible (meaning the most virtuous)
polis. As Keyt points out, Aristotle does not believe that “men belong to the best polis by
nature” but that “neither by nature nor contrary to nature do the [moral] virtues arise in us;
but we are fitted by nature to receive them, and brought to completion through habit”
(quoted in Keyt 1987, 62). Aristotle describes acting in accordance with acquired virtues
as “arational.” This means that it is not by rational calculation that the virtuous citizen come
to live a virtuous life, but achieve this by an emotional urge to do so.
One should not be entirely focused on Aristotle’s emphasis on virtue, since he
himself is not blind to the possibility that a society might emerge without any regard to the
virtues he is promoting. Aristotle argues that the natural drive towards community creates
the potential for the polis made up of virtuous citizens, but nowhere does he claim that it
must come into existence. Human beings have the capacity for virtue, but it is the prevailing
culture that plays a crucial role in creating the virtuous citizen. “Habituation, guided by
practical wisdom and law” is the key to reaching full virtue, according to Aristotle (Keyt
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1987, 62). Aristotle assumes the existence of a potential for virtue, but there is no natural
law that ensures its emergence. As he says,“Man is furnished from birth with weapons
which are intended to serve the purposes of wisdom and goodness, but which may be used
in preference for opposite ends” (Aristotle 2009, 11).
In other words, the potential for virtue is innate in all of us, but it is its development
through a community that decides whether it emerges or not. It is no coincidence that
Aristotle puts such emphasis on the role of the lawgiver in a community (see: Aristotle
2009, 78, 80, 117, 134). The lawgiver’s task is to create the right institutions to allow the
emergence of a virtuous society, taking actual circumstances into account as an important
limitation for even the most ambitious lawmaker “For this reason,” he says, “ most of the
writers who treat of politics, even if they deal well with other matters, fail when they come
to matters of practical utility” (Aristotle 2009, 134). Although not explicitly, Aristotle
makes a subtle argument for taking culture into account:
All producers— weavers, for instance, or shipwrights—must have
the materials proper to their particular work; and the better prepared these
materials are, the better will be the products of their skill. In the same way,
the statesman and the lawmaker must have their proper materials, and they
must have them in a condition which is suited to their needs. The primary
factor necessary, in the equipment of a city, is the human material; and this
involves us in considering the quality, as well as the quantity, of the
population naturally required (Aristotle 2009, 260–61).

Without the proper “materials” even the most ambitious plan to create a virtuous
polis might fail. So it would be better to settle for the best possible option: “We have to
study not only the best constitution, but also the one which is practicable, and likewise the
one which is easiest to work and most suitable to cities generally” (Aristotle 2009, 134).
Aristotle’s view is not without consequences, as we will see in the following chapters. We
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can already provide a historical analogy for his argument. The democratization of Japan
and Germany after World War II followed Aristotle’s principle of practicality over the
ambition to create the best possible outcome, whereas one could argue that similar attempts
in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 were dominated more by ambition
than by practicality. Yet even with these examples it is important to keep in mind that
Aristotle is not proposing a relativistic view here. The normative goal of virtue must still
be achieved. A virtuous society, however, emerges not out of the rational calculation by
communities to be virtuous, but through historical and cultural processes.
Although Aristotle was more popular with Enlightenment thinkers than Plato, these
aforementioned elements of his thought got at least partially lost with the appearance of
philosophical realism. The first and most remarkable divergence from Aristotle came in
the philosophical approach of Thomas Hobbes, who tried to refute the idea of human being
as political animal. To say that Hobbes was critical of Aristotle amounts to a gross
understatement, considering that he called his works absurd, repugnant, and ignorant
(Hobbes 2019, KL 16119). The emphasis by Aristotle on the importance of the community
and its demands on the individual were not shared by Hobbes. Individualism and its
protection as a political idea finds its first proponent in the figure of Thomas Hobbes (S.
B. Smith 2012, KL 2907), and although it seems so natural to us today, even a 19th century
writer like Alexis de Tocqueville had to admit that “individualism is a recent expression
arising from a new idea” (Tocqueville 2002, 482).
Regarding culture, the rise of individualism with Hobbes is of crucial importance.
As we have already discussed, the functionalist purpose of culture is intended to fill
communities with emotional content and intrinsic value that goes beyond any cost-benefit
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analysis. We have also argued that this ability is natural in the sense that being with others
can cause emotional reactions, and these emotions are not just optional, but potentially
crucial to our health and well-being. Society in the cultural approach, I have suggested so
far, is therefore more than just the solution of an organizational problem (since we need
others to survive in a hostile environment), but the consequence of an actual emotional
need.
For Hobbes, however, neither society nor the social instinct of human beings are
entirely natural. Hobbes argues that it is fear of violence and the need for protection that
leads to emergence of a social contract in which the participants agree to endow the state
with the necessary power to protect and punish. Yet this agreement for Hobbes is an act
against, not in line with, human nature (Keyt 1987, 62). The creation of society is an
artificial act conducted by naturally selfish beings who are in constant fear of violent death.
They form a society around a social contract to protect the one existing natural right, the
right to self-preservation. The formation of society is an artificial act carried out to protect
a natural right, but society as such does not come to us naturally, according to Hobbes.
This is partially because most people are not equipped for social life:
Manifest therefore it is, that all men, because they are born in
Infancy, are born unapt for Society. Many also (perhaps most men) either
through defect of minde, or want of education remain unfit during the whole
course of their lives; yet have Infants, as well as those of riper years, an
humane nature; wherefore Man is made fit for Society not by Nature, but
by Education: furthermore, although Man were born in such a condition as
to desire it, it followes not, that he therefore were Born fit to enter into it;
for it is one thing to desire, another to be in capacity fit for what we desire
(Hobbes 2019, KL 3815).
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Hobbes does not fully discard Aristotle’s view of human beings as social animals,
but he does not see it as a natural inclination, but more as a desire like there are many
desires we encounter during a lifetime. He emphasizes that this desire is based on the
conditions into which we are born, which is more than a subtle hint that once these
conditions could be changed, the desire itself might also disappear. Here we once again
encounter a very modern idea in Hobbes’ thinking that distinguishes him from later liberal
thinkers in his tradition. For Hobbes, a society of self-interested individuals does not
emerge by nature, but by the creation of institutions that support such a society. It is worth
noting that it is the modern liberal state and its welfare provisions as well as technological
progress that would enable a life disconnected from a larger community including family
is very Hobbesian. To make a somewhat provocative argument, Hobbes proposes
something akin to upside-down totalitarianism. The known totalitarianisms tried to take
control over the life of individuals in the name of an ideological community, while
Hobbes’s totalitarianism aims at breaking the ties of community and replacing them with
individualism. In his view, your life should be yours alone and you should extent the same
right to everyone else. Using the word absolutism instead of totalitarianism, Steven B.
Smith comes to a similar conclusion: “Hobbes is […] absolutist not despite his
individualism but because of it” (S. B. Smith 2012, KL 3154). It is only through the
powerful and impersonal state that individualism can be guaranteed.
Despite their differences regarding the state of nature, we see a strong parallel here
with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who equally argued that individual freedom must be enforced
by the laws and that even those who might refuse have to be “forced to be free” (Rousseau
2011, x). It is debatable to what extent the use of force would have found Rousseau’s
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approval, but it does highlight that even he argued for the necessity of a strong institutional
framework to guarantee individual freedom.
These similarities are quite important, because they highlight another
misunderstanding when it comes to the liberalism of Hobbes and Rousseau. Their
philosophies aim at breaking free the individual from any form of community that puts
obligations on a person that cannot pass muster with reason.
Hobbes does not force a specific way of life on the citizen like a totalitarian would,
but he denies certain lifestyle choices. There is only one authority in the world of Hobbes,
and that is the state which not only rules supreme as the representative of the people but is
also the only source of law. In his view, laws made by the state can be good or bad laws,
but they can never be unjust (Hobbes 2019, KL 19150), because justice is solely defined
the state itself and no other authority. Rousseau will later ascribe a similar role to his
concept of the “General Will” that would serve as the sole authority and casting aside other
sources of law like nature, custom, or revelation (S. B. Smith 2012, KL 3977).
The good laws that Hobbes envisions do not force people to do something, but
rather encourage them not to do something:
For the use of laws, which are but rules authorized, is not to bind the
people from all voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a
motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness
or indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travelers, but to keep them on
their way (Hobbes 2019, KL 20847)

Now, what would be the source of such “desires, rashness, or indiscretions”? Most
likely misguided teachings that emphasize the wrong values and are unconducive to public
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tranquility. This problem will be solved by censorship and a rather tight conceptualization
of free speech:
Sixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what
opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and
consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted
withal, in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the
doctrines of all books before they be published (Hobbes 2019, KL 18765)

Hobbes confronts us with the paradox that an omnipotent state that has control over
all the laws, religion, and education will nonetheless act as a representative of the people
and be its protector, but not its suppressor. This is a tall order, but Hobbes does resolve it
through his abandonment of culture. If people no longer see the need or have the desire to
harm each other in the name of the metaphysical, who else could prevent them from
realizing that the most precious thing to preserve is life itself. Pride and the habit of
moralizing is for him one of the biggest reasons for violence, when fear and respect for life
would be much more appropriate. Hobbes, and this cannot be stressed enough, did not
create a cold emotionless political theory, but a political theory that aimed at redirecting
and reevaluating the emotional capabilities of human beings. When I argue that Hobbes
started the movement against culture in political theory, what he in fact did was create a
cultural revolution that attempted to replace communitarianism with individualism and
instrumental communitarianism. 51 All of this was well-intended and it was impossible for
Hobbes to foresee how strong our groupish instincts and desire for community actually are.

51

By “instrumental communitarianism” I mean the idea that community is not an end in itself but
only a means to achieve the goals of individuals.
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There are passages in which Hobbes sounds surprisingly modern, but also shows
an acute awareness of the actual ramifications of his theory. For example, he writes both
that the poor should be taken care of by the state in order not to depend on the charity of
others, but equally proposes public works programs by the state to combat idleness
(Hobbes 2019, KL 11917-11921). Hobbes is fully aware of the idea that his Leviathan
needs to provide more than just the upholding of the law. The individualization of society
will need an active, not an absentee, Leviathan that will have to focus his resources on the
creation and sustaining of a society of individuals. The modern state with its welfare and
support systems owes much more to Hobbes than is commonly realized. It would go
beyond the purpose of this dissertation, but it is worth remarking that Hobbes probably also
had a possible answer for the dilemma of multicultural societies. For him, government
provisions of any kind serve the emancipation of the individual, so the question of how to
handle diversity would not even arise: Participation in the modern Hobbesian welfare state
would require individuals to forswear any allegiance with the exception of allegiance to
individualism, respect for human life, and the laws of the Leviathan.
It is important to point out that despite the powerful role Hobbes has reserved for
his Leviathan, the role of the state is arguably more limited than Aristotle’s or Plato’s. The
Greek philosophers viewed the creation of government as a main tool in the emergence of
virtuous citizens, therefore an active interplay between individual, state, and society was
built into the theoretical DNA of the polis. Hobbes abandoned these ideas as overly
idealistic and empties the political theory of any teleological content that concerns itself
with virtue or morality. Hobbes becomes the first philosophical “Realist” who wants to
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describe human behavior in its true and timeless form, undiluted by culture, traditions, and
institutions (Strauss 1965, 170–75).
The Hobbesian state allows society to exist through the prevention of violence and
the protection of the natural right of human beings: The right to self-preservation. In
Hobbes’ theory there is no real room for community but only for an artificial society of
human beings who are to one degree or another frightened of each other:
I set down for a principle by experience known to all men, and
denied by none, to wit, that the dispositions of men are naturally such, that
except they be restrained through feare of some coercive power, every man
will distrust and dread each other… . . . (Hobbes 2019, KL 3666),
And also:
I hope nobody will doubt but that men would much more greedily
be carryed by Nature, if all fear were removed, to obtain Dominion, then to
gaine Society" (Hobbes 2019, KL 3804).

The state according to Hobbes emerges out of fear and forces individuals into
civilized society (meaning a society in which the right for self-preservation is respected)
through the replacement of fear from each other with fear from the state. The location and
application of fear is the linchpin in Hobbes theory, because without it we would not create
society but instead seek dominion over each other. So even if the creation of society can
be accomplished, the people “never acquire any genuine regard for one another; they
remain always potential enemies, held in harness by the power of the sovereign” (Gauthier
1979, 211). Hobbes’ theory hinges on a very specific conceptualization of human nature,
one that simultaneously pitches us against each other but simultaneously endows us with
the rational faculties to create a system to restrain ourselves. And that system culminates
in the creation of the state that has the ultimate say in spiritual as well as secular matters.
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This ultimate say, however, does not mean that the state forcefully imposes a belief system
on its citizens, only that the state is supposed “to control ideas that genuinely are dangerous
to peace and order, but still leave ample room for what people are allowed to think and do
in their private lives” (S. B. Smith 2016, KL 1704).
Although enormously powerful in theory, the Leviathan is quite limited in its actual
competencies. Its powers may be absolute – “for the Sovereign [must be] absolute … or
else there is no Sovereignty at all” (Hobbes 1988, 257) – but its use highly conditional.
Hobbes’ state is neutral in spiritual areas or questions of what supposedly makes a good
life – as long as the individual answers to these questions do not question the key value of
the state: individualism. In other words, you can worship within your heart whatever you
want, but keep it to yourself. This is also how we must understand Hobbes’ call for
censorship. His concern is more with what kind of information gets disseminated and not
necessarily what people truly believe.
The fact that Hobbes allows the individual in the private sphere such a high degree
of autonomy caused some to call him one of the first major characters in the liberal tradition
(S. B. Smith 2016, 71, where Smith refers here especially to Michael Oakeshott). Hobbes
is a liberal in the sense thathe rejects any kind of moral zeal – people are what they are,
and there is no way to change that. He allows the highest level of individual freedom
conditional such freedom not interfering with or compromising public safety. The state is
neutral and does not impinge upon the private sphere of its subjects, while the private
sphere of its subjects does not interfere with the public sphere that is the realm of the state.
Moral convictions like religion are to be held in private and should not be the source of
public conflict. In his awareness of the influential power of religious sentiments, Hobbes
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even provides an escape hatch for the true believer to be able to observe both the state and
his religion:
Laws can compel actions but not faith. For this reason, even if a
person is forced to forswear belief in Christ, Hobbes argues that he commits
no sin. ‘Profession with the tongue,’ he remarks, ‘is but an external thing’
and can signify obedience, but not belief (S. B. Smith 2016, KL 1649).

So even if the state bans one’s religion, the believer should not despair since the
government can only forbid the public profession of faith: the soul remains untouched.
Through this way of thinking Hobbes hoped to carve out a path that allows the existence
of an absolute secular state and religious sentiment in tandem and in service of social peace.
This way of thinking remains valid today, as Mark Lilla points out: “The way modern
liberal democracies approach religion and politics today is unimaginable without Hobbes”
(Lilla 2007, 88).
Hobbes believed in the possibility that a person can be a citizen in support of a
protective state and relegate all things spiritual to one’s private sphere. Public and political
life for him are to be cleansed of religious influence and the state should serve the purpose
of allowing each person to be happy according to “his own fashion.” Supposedly Hobbes
theory found its partial realization in the enlightened absolutism of Frederick II’s Prussia
in 1740, whose regent declared that “religions must all be tolerated; only the Attorney
General should see to it that none of them injures any other, for here everyone must be
saved in his own fashion” (quoted in: Gay 1966, 349). 52 If we take another close look at
Frederick II, we will see why he was so comfortable promoting religious toleration. For

Gay also writes about Prussia that “Hobbes, had he lived to see it, would have approved” (Gay
1966, 349).
52
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Frederick and the anti-religious philosophers of the Enlightenment, religion was to be
challenged and ridiculed. Frederick himself wrote about Christianity as
an old metaphysical fiction, stuffed with miracles, contradictions
and absurdities, which was spawned in the fevered imaginations of the
Orientals and then spread to our Europe, where some fanatics espoused it,
some intriguers pretended to be convinced by it and some imbeciles actually
believed it (quoted in: Clark 2009, KL 3655)

To view the abandonment of religion as Hobbes’ triumph would miss the mark
regarding what he means when he talks about religion. For Hobbes, religion is born out of
the human fear of death; one way or another, Hobbes sees fear as the main driving impulse
of human behavior. Once religion has emerged, however, it becomes the cause of pride and
other emotions that tend to trigger violent behavior. Hobbes is best known for his idea that
the state of nature is synonymous with the the state of war. But as Only when men seek to
impose their beliefs on others does the war of all against all break out (Fukuyama 2006,
KL 4642). Hobbes does not believe that religion as such can be abandoned, but if its
source—fear--can be tamed by the state, it could cease to be the cause of violence. This is
a crucial part of Hobbes’ writing that often tends to be misunderstood. He wrote about
religion since it was the main inspiration for ideological and cultural conflicts at his time.
When the Puritans banned theatres throughout England in 1642 shortly before the outbreak
of the English Civil War, Hobbes was not entirely mistaken in identifying the conflict
between religious and secular authority as an important contributing factor. As Stephen
Holmes points out, Hobbes viewed “laymen in the grip of enthusiasm” and those who
inspired them as the main culprits of rebellion and civil war (quoted in the preface to
Hobbes 1990, x).
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I believe it is safe to say that Hobbes would maintain the same position even if this
inspiration would be of a non-secular nature. A communist society would not gain Hobbes’
approval simply because it is secular and anti-religious. On the contrary, Hobbes would
reject any political system that tries to impose a vision of salvation on its citizens,
regardless of whether this vision would be secular or religious. It is those who can incite
the imagination and enthusiasm of the population that for Hobbes tend to cause war and
violence. Hobbes identifies religion as a source of pride for the individual, leading to a
situation where “most men would rather lose their lives … than suffer slander” (Hobbes
1990, x).
Yet, if fear is the source of religion, and religion the source of pride that inspires
violence, then the containment of fear should ultimately also lead to the containment of
religion, pride, and ultimately violence. This is possible for Hobbes, since he views religion
as purely functional in its relation to fear. If this issue can be resolved, religion itself might
one day become obsolete. 53 The fear that gives rise to religion should be redirected into a
fear of the state which resembles a godlike entity.
Therefore the age of enlightened absolutism should have been the beginning of an
era of peace, since religion was increasingly put at the margins and the state was close to
being as absolute as at the times possible. If indeed religion was the main culprit for causing
violence, its marginalization should have limited the causes of violence within and among
states. The weakness, however, of Hobbes theory is that he misinterprets the source of
religion. While fear might very well play a crucial role in the emergence of religion, a more
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It was this view on religion that made him a heretic in the eyes of many of his contemporaries.
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important element is the natural sociability of human beings that incentivizes us to build
communities around sacred objects. These communities form moral norms and values that
enable and facilitate collective action.
For Hobbes, there is no community but only individuals that are put into relation
via society – and these relations are by nature characterized by latent violence. This does
not mean that there is constant war, but that the conditions always point into its direction:
For warre, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but
in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battell is sufficiently
known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature
of warre; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foule weather,
lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many
dayes together: So the nature of war, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but
in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to
the contrary (Hobbes 1988, 186).

In other words, everybody is in constant fear of violence without any assurance of
safety unless this fear drives people to enter into a social contract that leads to the
emergence of the state. This leads to the larger question whether a society without culture
can exist at all. According to Hobbes and his followers, the answer is not only yes, but
emphatically yes. If society could be held together simply by the rational agreement of the
individuals constituting it, culture – regardless if secular or religious – would become
irrelevant as a defining element of society.
The central figure in Hobbes theory remains the individual that is subject to being
misguided by superstition, deceived by clergy, and riled up by intellectuals. It creates the
conditions under which people become willing to harm each other in the name of honor or
other “trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue,
either directed in their persons, or by reflexion in their kindred, their friends, their nation,
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their profession, or their name” (Hobbes 1988, 185). In addition to honor (or glory) Hobbes
identifies competition and diffidence as the “three principal causes of quarrel,” all of which
emerge because of us “keeping company.”
Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of
griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them
all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same
rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or
undervaluing, naturally endeavours, […]to extort a greater value from his
contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example (Hobbes 1988,
185).

Community and society are related to unhappiness since they are the field upon
which competition, diffidence, and the strive for glory can take root. Only a “power able
to over-awe them all” can reign in our violent instincts, and according to Hobbes we are
rational enough to leave our state of nature and form such a power. This power will ensure
the relegation of our religious instincts to the private sphere and minimize violence since
its driving forces will be restrained by the state.
Although rarely credited for it, Hobbes initiates consideration of a key problem of
modernity: The question whether a civilized society is actually in contradiction of our
“natural” instincts. After all, if society is only possible through the rational overcoming or
replacing of humanity’s state of nature, would we not enter a constant state of anxiety
driven by living in denial of our true nature? From Durkheim’s anomie to Freud’s
civilizational discontents, multiple variations on this theme exist. To locate human
existence on the plane between individualism and sociability has puzzled the social
sciences at least since the abandonment of what Hobbes called “Aristotelity,” the
combination of Christian and Aristotelian thought. Hobbes’ theory liberates the individual,
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but simultaneously limits the entire emotional life of the individual to the private sphere.
Society becomes functional as a place to conduct economic exchanges, but it is separated
from any true form of community:
Even in times of peace, Hobbesian or Lockean liberalism provided
no reason why society’s best men should choose public service and
statesmanship over a private life of money-making (Fukuyama 2006, KL
3037).

A peaceful community in Hobbes’ world can exist only because of a social contract
that establishes the “Leviathan,” but that social contract springs from rationality and is
sustained by fear and not some natural sociability or desire for community. Francis
Fukuyama labels this the “Hobbesean fallacy” – the assumption that human beings are by
nature individualistic and enter society at a later stage out of rational calculation
(Fukuyama 2012, 29). The minimalist yet powerful state Hobbes envisions takes the
concept of rationality to an extreme, since everybody who partakes in this social contract
is apparently rational enough to also forswear any temptation to free-ride or otherwise take
advantage of this newly created system. This is especially surprising, given that Hobbes on
the one hand identifies the emotional side of being human (that we rather risk our life than
endure slander) but at the same time places such high trust in our ability to rationally
overcome these emotions. In an argument based on Weber, Durkheim, and Talcott-Parsons,
Richard K. Ashley writes that
in the absence of a framework of norms consensually accepted by
its members, it might be possible momentarily to establish an orderly social
aggregate (a "social contract," for example) among instrumentally rational
individuals. Except under conditions of absolute stasis, however, it cannot
be maintained (Ashley 1984, 246).
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If everything is instrumental, the individuals will constantly reevaluate the utility
of the existing framework and give it up as soon as such an action would lead to higher
benefits. Not at all, Hobbes would reply, since the powerful state would prevent any
deviation from the social contract. But even so, what at the outset seems like a very limited
state only designed to prevent violence between the people becomes much more complex
once we realize that such a state would not only have to prevent violence as such, but also
guard against the emergence of conditions that could lead to violence. Hobbes elegantly
circumvents this problem by arguing that through the redirection of fear from a godimposed punishment in the afterlife to the possibility of a state-imposed punishment in the
here and now, the fewer incentives for violence there will be. The only thing to be feared
is a state that can punish in this life and not the afterlife, giving it the power to rationally
compel people into obedience. All are still free to believe whatever they want in their
private life, but public life is to be cleansed of discussions about higher things that can lead
to violence. Hobbes, in other words, replaces the irrational fear of god with the rational
fear of the state. Similarly, as Fukuyama points out, he wants to channel the readiness to
act violently in the name of trifles into commercial energy, where honor is not defined by
prowess in battle or piousness in religious questions, but by material success in the market
place.
Whatever positive content life may have has to be filled by the
individual himself. That positive content can be a high one of public service
and private generosity, or it can be a low one of selfish pleasure and personal
meanness. The state as such is indifferent. Indeed, government is committed
to the tolerance of different “lifestyles,” except when the exercise of one
right impinges on another. In the absence of positive, “higher” goals, what
usually fills the vacuum at the heart […] liberalism is the open-ended
pursuit of wealth (Fukuyama 2006, KL 3028).
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Hobbes cannot reverse the emergence of society, but his model at least partially
recommends a reduction of human interaction. If rational utility alone would be the
overriding reason for people to interact, communal activities like religious services and the
fervor they might cause would be diminished or even disappear. In Hobbes world, you can
have an altar in your home, but you worship alone. We might view these arguments as
fervently anti-religious, but they are in fact profoundly anti-cultural in character. Why?
Because a world in which we define the scope and purpose of our social life by the security
and personal benefit that is in it for us would have no need for communities in order to
praise god or recite the pledge of allegiance. We would remain alone unless we have a
material need to interact with others. This might suffice to make a society possible, but
most likely not a community. The entire body of literature dealing with the matter of social
capital argues convincingly that if people trust each other, material conditions tend to
improve along with other factors necessary for a satisfied life – also on the individual level
(Fukuyama 1996, 2001; Elinor Ostrom and Ahn 2003; Putnam 2001, 2007). Even the
Leviathan and Hobbes impersonal government would most likely function better if people
identified with it (Rothstein 2011). Yet the terms “social capital” or “social trust” are just
a very fancy way of saying people sharing a common culture and identity – something
Robert Putnam openly admits (Putnam 2007).
Hobbes lays the groundwork for what later would become the definition of the socalled bourgeois or bourgeoisie: Interested only in physical security and material wealth,
this new class of people is supposedly disinterested in questions of religion and ideology.
“Hobbes gave decisive expression to a new morality that has its home with the modern
bourgeois desire to achieve peace, safety, and comfort” (S. B. Smith 2016, KL 1398).
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Historically, however, it turned out that the very comfort the bourgeoisie enjoyed, was also
a cause of great anxiety. Far from adhering to Hobbes’ strict separation of private and
public, the bourgeoisie became the driving force behind ideologies and secular religious
movements. We must understand that for Hobbes the problem was not so much the content
of religion, but the fact that it can enflame our passions. And where there is passion, there
is also the risk of violence. As Leo Strauss points out, the main virtue for Hobbes is
peaceableness, which creates the conditions under which self-preservation becomes
possible (L. Strauss 1965, 187). Any idea that would incite the passions is therefore a
potential threat to a peaceful society, and it does not matter whether such an idea has
religious roots or not.
Hobbes and later writers of the Enlightenment wrote at a time when religion was a
major cause of conflict, and understandably their approach towards religion was
fundamentally critical. The question whether Hobbes himself was a Christian or not has
been debated extensively (for example S. B. Smith 2016, chap. 4) and without clear
conclusion, but his criticism of religion was substantial enough that even the Enlightenment
philosophers thought it wise to use Hobbes’ ideas without giving him credit, since his
reputation for impiety would have made him a political liability (Gay 1966, 43). Regardless
of how Hobbes felt personally about religion, it was not for him a source of absolute truth
or revelation, but an artificial creation to combat mankind’s fear of violent death. 54
There is no higher meaning in religion, only a functional approach that reduces it
to a mechanism that allows us to cope with our fear of death. The problem, however, is that
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Hobbes might not have been an atheist, but he was definitely a sceptic. It was not so much the
underlying question of whether God exists that troubled Hobbes, but the wide variety of interpretations and
claims to ultimate authority of religious writing.
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religion teaches us to fear the punishment we might receive in the afterlife – allowing
religion to incite passions that run contrary to peaceableness in the here-and-now under the
promise of a peaceable life after death. It is here where we find Hobbes’ secularism: The
fear of punishment must be in the here-and-now, since otherwise there could be incentive
to act violently out of fear of punishment in the afterlife. For the social contract to function
properly, the people must fear punishment by the state more than anything else, including
punishment by some invisible forces. It does not matter for Hobbes if we are willing to die
and kill in the name of religion, nation, or ideology. What matters for Hobbes is that we do
it in the hope that our sacrifice will benefit future generations and our own chance for
eternal salvation. It is exactly this kind of thinking that Hobbes seeks to combat, for it
misdirects our fear and encourages us to act contrary to peaceableness.
Hobbes’ position of rejecting any belief that would make people get passionate for
no other reason than the belief itself, makes him the first anti-culturalist in Western thought.
If we take the claim seriously that he was the founder of modern political philosophy with
his publication of De Cive in 1642 (for this claim see: S. B. Smith 2016, KL 1318), then
modern Western political thought had a problem with culture as soon as 1642. One pillar
of the definition of culture, we have argued, is the creation of community via emotional
and passionate bonds between its members. Yet it is exactly these bonds that Hobbes sees
as problematic: We should form a community out of fear of each other and not out of love
for each other.
Hobbes deems knowledge of the passions as the most important, since it is the
passions that are the most common cause of conflict. His theory is thus of high
contemporary relevance:
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I say the similitude of Passions, which are the same in all men,
Desire, Feare, Hope. Not the similitude or The Objects of the Passions,
which are the things Desired, Feared, Hoped, for these the constitution
individuall, and particular education do so vary (Hobbes 1988, 83).

Hobbes argues that while the nature of the passions is the same among all human
beings, the objects of the passions can vary. We are all able to feel certain emotions (Desire,
Feare, Hope), but what triggers them depends on the upbringing and the education of the
individual. The Hobbesian argument is making here is almost entirely in line with current
research into the psychological role of emotions that we have addressed in previous
chapters (Haidt and Joseph 2004; Keltner and Haidt 2001).
When Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph write that
People have created moralities as divergent as those of Nazis and
Quakers, headhunters and Jains. And yet, when we look closely at the daily
lives of people in divergent cultures, we can find elements that arise in
nearly all of them – for example, reciprocity, loyalty, respect for (some)
authority, limits on physical harm, and regulation of eating and sexuality
(Haidt and Joseph 2004, 55),

Is it (the above) really that different from Hobbes when he writes that
for though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the
diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body,
and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different
passions […] For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth Feare;
and one Cruelty, what another Justice; one Prodigality, what another
Magnanimity; one Gravity, what another Stupidity. And therefore such
names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination”(Hobbes 1988, 109–
10)?

Social psychology tells us that the occurrence of passions and emotions are a
combination of nature and nurture, the former defined by biological and genetic factors
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(i.e., the actual physiological processes that take place when we feel an emotion) and the
latter by culture and upbringing (i.e., what triggers these physiological processes). (For a
good overview of the relation between nature and nurture see: Carruthers, Laurence, and
Stich 2005.) What has been confirmed by these modern approaches, I argue, was
anticipated by Hobbes. The major difference is that but Hobbes drew different conclusions
from these social psychologists. Hobbes does not deny the existence of the passions, but
he argues that reason should allow us to control those triggers. For example, the fact that
insults to our family, religion, or nation make us angry is an arbitrary thing. Someone who
feels no emotional connection to any of these cannot be upset by any insult to it or even
have an incentive to insult them in the first place. To sever this connection and subdue or
sublimate it to the more important priority of ensuring an individual’s physical safety is
Hobbes’ main imperative.
Doing so comes, however, at a price. Reason must be able to suppress the passions
in order to allow the coexistence between human beings, with one exception: the passion
of fear. For Hobbes, the unique quality of this emotion is that is forces us to act rationally.
That is, I am afraid of my neighbor just as much as he is afraid of me; therefore I will
construct a system that evokes a third party my neighbor and I fear even more than each
other--the State. And the only thing the State asks from us is to respect each other’s right
to self-preservation.
Hobbes made the first step towards a sociology that viewed a functioning society
as tantamount to being in a constant stage of anxiety. If we are only entering communities
to ensure our survival but in reality would be rather on our own, community is reduced to
the lesser of two evils. You can either be an individual in permanent fear of being killed or
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be part of society that will ensure survival but will make you unhappy, since community is
against our nature. The idea that civilization (and particularly modern civilization) makes
us unhappy is an idea that gets increased traction in the years following Thomas Hobbes.
According to Rousseau, it was the early tribal societies that were “the best for man”
and also “the happiest and the most lasting epoch” (Rousseau 2011, 74) until the rise of
modern civilization started to make us unhappy. Modern life makes us constantly
discontent since it suppresses our natural urges (Freud 1961) or we escape the body‘s yoke,
but end up being subject to that of society (Durkheim 2006, 276) and we become animals
suspended in webs of significance we ourselves have spun (Geertz 1993, 5).
Supposedly, reason forces us to escape our state of nature by denying part of our
nature, and, for Hobbes, this reason gives rise to the emergence of the modern state that is
liberal in that it does not impose a moral value on its citizens, but it is also authoritarian
since it does not allow its citizens to compete about which moral values should dominate. 55
This is why the separation of the public and private sphere is so important for Hobbes: He
is liberal regarding the exercise of one’s passions in private, but his state will prevent one
from exercising them in public. On the other hand, Axel Honneth may be right in claiming
that Hobbes “ultimately sacrificed the liberal content of the social contract for the sake of
the authoritarian form of its realization” (Honneth 1996, 10), since his liberalism only
applies to the individual, but not really to the public sphere.
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Needless to say, I disagree with the assumption that civilization puts us into conflict with our true
human nature. As we have extensively discussed in previous chapters, the anthropological record does not
support the idea of an ideal society before modern civilization arises.
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Hobbes proposes a neutral state--one that must not pursue some moral or spiritual
goal in order to provide social peace. If this peace is not threatened, the individual is free
to do as she pleases. Since we are by nature solitary animals, we do not really care for what
others do around us as long as they do not pose a threat to us. Even modern thinkers like
John Rawls who have been influenced by Hobbes argue that the state must “remain neutral
to comprehensive moral doctrines— doctrines about the good life, what makes life worth
living, and so on” (S. B. Smith 2016, KL 180). In a sense, the modern concept of a
multicultural society owns more to Hobbes than any other modern philosopher: If our
cultural identities and individual passions are limited to our private lives without ever
competing in the public sphere, there really is no reason why society should not be made
up of a multitude of cultures.
From Hobbes to Rawls and later to Habermas, there is a thread of thought that aims
at the creation of a political community out of reason and free of passion. Competing ideas
about the good life are a problem, because they might be so different among people that
they cannot form a community or state. If, however, ideas of what a good life is form the
essence of what we call culture, then culture itself becomes the problem. If the only passion
we accept is fear, there is no room for public spiritedness or the positive emotions that
spring from communal life. Norms, values, and traditions become a nuisance that dilute
our ability to realize that communities exist primarily to protect the rights of the individual,
but only to a very limited extent place obligations on said individual. John Locke builds
upon Hobbes just a little further, adding that it is not just life that that state has to protect,
but property as well. For Hobbes, the main moral question is the preservation of life; for
Locke it is life and property. For none of them, however, is it some form of higher moral,
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intersubjective matter. That this was a break with ancient Greek philosophy and tradition
was pithily summarized by Rousseau: “The ancient politicians forever spoke of morals and
virtue; ours speak only of commerce and money” (Rousseau 2011, 16).
While Plato and Aristotle viewed reason as a pathway to virtue, its interpretation
since Hobbes was one that saw reason as the main tool to advance individual interests –
first in the name of protecting life, then later including property. 56
The intentions of both Hobbes and Locke as well as Rousseau later on were
definitely noble, so the goal here is not to undermine the values and insightfulness of their
thinking. The problem, however, is that both Hobbes and Locke believed that society could
be maintained almost exclusively by self-interest. 57 For them, culture simply has no room
in this theory.
Leo Strauss formulated the problem with putting this kind of reason before culture
thusly: “The more we cultivate reason, the more we cultivate nihilism: the less we are able
to be loyal members of society. The inescapable consequence of nihilism is fanatical
obscurantism” (L. Strauss 1965, 6).
Strauss goes on to make two important points here that directly relate these
problems with the societal vision of Thomas Hobbes – two points that were also picked up
by Fukuyama and Smith. First, Hobbes wants to push the passions out of public life, but
this would potentially not only limit the occurrence of violence, but also “the noble
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That the idea of virtues as a basis for community has fallen out of fashion in modernity was
already observed by Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre 2007)
57

Rousseau takes a slightly different take on self-interest: Although his idea of the general will is
resting on the possibility to merge collective with individual desires, he still views emotional bonds between
individuals as important. But even he believes that they can be created solely out of reason.
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passions of patriotism, courage, generosity, and public-spiritedness” (Fukuyama 2006, KL
3047). The public life in Hobbes’ world is devoid of passions, regardless of whether their
content is noble or otherwise. It is not worldviews that the Leviathan bans, because people
will always believe in different things, but it is their potential effect in the public sphere
that concerns Hobbes. He is fully aware of the plurality of possible beliefs, but he sees
them only as a problem if they enter the public sphere where people begin to try convincing
each other of their views. And if persuasion fails, Hobbes is afraid, some will attempt to
use violence to make their values the dominant ones. Discussions about moral issues are a
potential risk, not the source of potential social and moral progress. Therefore it would be
best to keep them to the privacy of one’s home, while in the public sphere the state
determines what is to be discussed and what is not. Hobbes does not view an ideal society
as a moral community but as a conglomerate of individuals who want to advance their selfinterest. Human beings, for him, are “egoistic calculators, who remain more or less the
same after [entering] the [social] contract as they were before” (S. B. Smith 1991, 90). The
state is supposed to use its power in order to influence that egoistic calculation to it inclines
every individual towards peace.
Second, Strauss sees another consequence of Hobbes, which is that if the only
criteria for the judgment of one’s behavior is its effect on public safety, the range of what
is permissible is quite broad. This observation of Strauss also shows a weakness in Hobbes’
thinking, namely, that human beings can be fully content with their choices on an
individual level. What I mean by this is that in Hobbes’ thinking an individual should be
satisfied if he or she can live out their identity without the recognition of said identity by
others. The problem with this, however, is that identity very often depends on being

273

recognized by others and can hardly exist for and by an individual alone (Honneth 1996;
the deconstruction of recognition as an intersubjective phenomenon is the most important
and insightful argument of Charles Taylor: C. Taylor 1992, 1994). In a world where
everything is permissible, the struggle for recognition becomes actually more acute than
before, and Strauss points towards the combination of nihilism and obscurantism – that the
more that is permissible, the harder one has try to gain recognition. It is an open question
whether a society that demands conformity in certain areas causes more anxiety than a
society where nobody is supposed to care about the identity of others, but by the same
token should take identity very seriously. We will return to this topic again a little later,
but for now let me summarize how Hobbes matters for the concept of culture:
Hobbes’ theory hinges on the assumption that communities are purely artificial and
instrumental, meaning that they emerge out of a contract between individuals for
controlling the most basic of all passions: fear. Religion, as well as the urge to form a state,
are not driven by some natural sociability, as Aristotle would argue, but by fear of violent
death. For Hobbes, human beings are anxious, frightened beings whose survival instinct
makes them create society even though, as we have seen before, is contrary to their
individualistic nature. Hobbes is the first in a line of philosophers to argue that the
potentially civilizing effect of community is not a fulfillment of a deep-seated desire but
the deliberate suppression of our actual human nature for the sole purpose of minimizing
the risk of violent death. Since it is fear of death that reinforces life as the most important
natural right. Allan Bloom summarizes this argument as follows:
In particular you should imagine how you feel when another man
holds a gun to your temple and threatens to shoot you. That concentrates all
of the self in a single point, tells us what counts. At that moment one is a
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real self, not a false consciousness, not alienated by opinions of the church,
the state, or the public. This experience helps much more to ‘set priorities’
than does any knowledge of the soul or any of its alleged emanations such
as conscience (A. D. Bloom 1987, 174).

The social contract allows the “natural” condition of human individualism through
guaranteeing the most basic natural right of human beings: The right to life, which we are
constantly in fear of losing. The society created by the social contract has no intrinsic
purpose but a purely functional one—i.e., society exists to serve the security needs of the
individual, nothing more. Hobbes philosophy is inherently atomistic and materialistic, and
thus always falls back on the individual and her material interests. The extent to which
Hobbes has emptied the concept of society from a true sense of community has received
surprisingly little attention, given the importance it has for his overall theory of politics (Z.
A. Pelczynski in Hegel 1964, 136)
Hobbes breaks intentionally with what he considers the core mistake of the
idealistic tradition in political philosophy, which is the assumption that man is by nature a
political or social animal. A community for Hobbes is the agreement between individuals
to give up the right to do as they please and create a third party, the state, which will ensure
everybody’s right to self-preservation. But, ultimately, the only two “natural” feelings are
pride and fear, both of which act on the individual level and are determined by our selfinterest.
More than any other philosopher, Hobbes laid the groundwork for the utilitarian,
rational-choice based view of human nature. Or, put differently, the rational-utilitarian side
of human nature has to be elevated above any other aspect. In order for the social contract
to work and to avoid the negative influence of cultural passions,
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it requires such a radical change of orientation as can be brought
about only by the disenchantment of the world […]. Hobbes’s is the first
doctrine that necessarily and unmistakably points to a thoroughly
‘enlightened,’ i.e., a-religious or atheistic society as the solution of the
social or political problem (Strauss 1965, 198).

What would be left in a disenchanted world? Strauss, in his interpretation of
Hobbes, has an answer for us: Political hedonism and material enjoyment. Although
Hobbes himself was no hedonist, he was fully aware that if political and religious passions
are to be banned from public life, fulfillment must come in the form of a complete lifting
of all restrictions on the sensual pleasures (as long as they do not interfere with societal
peace).
The “sacred duty of the rulers is no longer ‘to make the citizens good
and doers of noble things’ but to ‘study as much as by laws can be effected,
to furnish the citizens abundantly with all good things […] which are
conducive to delectation’” (Strauss 1965, 198).

Hobbes is arguing that all the passions below the desire for self-preservation should
be redirected into the desire for a materialistically good life, where sensual pleasures would
replace emotional ones that come from following moral imperatives that have no grounding
in true human nature. Turning against the idealism of the classics and their
conceptualization of the best possible political regime as the one that creates the virtuous
citizen, Hobbes strives for the creation of a political system that creates the hedonistic
citizen. Not least because the hedonist is expected to be more concerned with his selfpreservation than the morally inspired ascetic, who must always be suspected of giving up
his desire of self-preservation and the respect of others’ self-preservation in order to
achieve some higher, more idealistic goal. This is the core of Hobbes’ so-called realism,
the reduction of human beings to materialistic utility maximizers. It is not regard for each
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other or any form of sympathy that keeps a Hobbesian modern society together, but the
desire to improve our material well-being as well as the guarantee of state-protected selfpreservation.

4.5

Culture and the Utilitarian Worldview
Utilitarianism is a central concept of my overall argument, not only because of its

crucial role in the development of economics but also because of its role in the
advancement of an individualistic worldview. A good definition of the term “utilitarian”
comes from one of its defenders, Charles Camic:
The distinguishing feature of utilitarian moral philosophers was an
ethical principle which viewed the morally good as those acts whose
consequences tend to promote the greatest good for the greatest number of
individuals. This is the ‘principle of utility’" (Camic 1979, 520).

Morality in this conceptualization is the best possible life for the highest number of
people, and whether unintentionally or not, this view merged quickly with a materialist
idea of human flourishing. This is not unreasonable either, because “the greatest good” is
a broad term, and what constitutes the “good” is a question yet to be conclusively decided.
Hobbes and Locke were straightforward in their answer: good equals security and property.
So a society able to provide protection for life and possessions is, in a utilitarian sense, a
good society.

277

Since the key figure of utilitarianism is Jeremy Bentham (Bentham 1970; Mitchell
1918), we have to ask whether there is any connection between his thought to that of
Thomas Hobbes. Some claim that Hobbes is no utilitarian at all (Camic 1979) or that it is
at least uncertain (Crimmins 2002), whereas I believe that there are some clear parallels of
thought that are more than coincidental. I agree with the assessment that Bentham’s “chief
ideas and methods are to be found in Hobbes” (W. Graham 2016, xx) and that both
Bentham and James Mill come close to “an uncritical acceptance” (Plamenatz 1949, 2) of
Hobbesian principles. In one of the most influential books on Hobbes, John Bowle argues
that Thomas Hobbes is “a forerunner of the Benthamite school of political thought” (Bowle
2015, 43–44).
There is a rich and interesting debate surrounding utility, and it has been interpreted
and reinterpreted in different ways (see, for example: Camic 1979; Mill 2015). One of its
main characteristics remains a form of naturalistic monism, that reduces
problems of social action and social order to material interests, and
both embraced a naturalistic monism--that is, the belief that the natural
sciences embody the only valid model of science to which the social
sciences should, therefore, aspire (Ruggie 1982, 859).

This observation was not lost on many 19th century philosophers and social
thinkers, and German Idealism especially directly attacked the concept of utilitarianism
and its foundation of naturalistic monism. German Idealism particularly was worried about
the idea of a world devoid of transcendence or it being “disenchanted.” Charles Taylor
among others has written insightful about modernity and utilitarianism making the world
more accessible in terms of understanding, but potentially making it less “experienceable”
(C. Taylor 2007a). Of the early idealists, Heinrich Heine, for example, lamented that
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French philosophers chose John Locke as their master […] He was
the savior they needed. His Essay Concerning Human Understanding
became their gospel, and they swore by it. […] He turned the human mind
into a kind of calculating machine; the whole human being became an
English machine (H. Heine 1985, 168)

Karl Marx was equally critical of this idea, remarking that it is only in the world of
the markets and utility that “Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham” rule (quoted in:
S. B. Smith 2016, KL 441). Max Weber built his theory of modernity’s disenchantment
with the world at least partially on a severe critique of utilitarian principles (Koshul 2005;
S. B. Smith 2016, chap. 6). Friedrich Nietzsche, probably the most important philosophical
defender of culture in the idealist tradition (see: A. D. Bloom 1987), wrote about the
struggle against the “English-mechanistic doltification of the world” and that
They are no philosophical race, these Englishmen; Bacon signifies
an attack on the philosophical spirit; Hobbes, Hume and Locke a
debasement of the value of the concept of philosophy for more than a
century […]. it was Locke of whom Schelling said understandably, “je
meprise Locke” (Nietzsche 1989, 189).

That Benthamite utilitarianism was not much interested in intersubjective relations
is not an unfounded claim, and it should give us pause that the founder of utilitarianism,
Jeremy Bentham, was a decidedly unemotional person that drew the irritation of many of
his contemporaries like John Stewart Mill for being unsympathetic to “the most natural and
strongest feelings of human nature”—namely, the desire for company (quoted in: Haidt
2013, 118). There is a lot of credible speculation that by modern standards Bentham would
have been diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome (Lucas and Sheeran 2006). This is no
indictment of Bentham, since his ideas remain intriguing and inspiring, but in the end for
his societal model to work most individuals would have to score extremely high on the
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autism spectrum, meaning that they would be strong systemic thinkers and weak empathic
thinkers (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004).
Bentham serves as an important reminder in our treatment of culture that there are
differences in the level to which people desire the company and emotional bonding with
others. This means that on the individual level culture will be perceived and experienced
differently. Special cases like people with autism, or socio- and psychopaths are just a few
examples of conditions under which my theory of culture would break down, since
emotional empathizing is such a crucial element for cultural activity and a significant lack
thereof would render culture itself less important.
So while acknowledging these exceptions are important, it is equally important to
emphasize that a majority of human beings does not meet the conditions for these special
cases, but the model we tend to use in the social sciences potentially does. Homo
economicus is one expression of a model that describes human beings as self-interested
utility maximizers, which has become the main description of human nature in many of the
social sciences. This model, however, neglects most of the intersubjective qualities of
human beings, including our desire for recognition and other emotional needs, something
that makes such models of human nature resemble something closer to a high score on the
autism scale than a social animal. (I am not the first one to make such an argument. See,
for example: Devine 2003)
Most people are hardwired for grouping and emotional bonding around ideas and
activities, which is why we find competitive games, music, dance, and collective praying
across all societies. Within society, other individuals are more than means to satisfy selfish
desires via cooperation and competition. From war to sports external challenges and the
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prospect of working together for something that has higher meaning have reinforced the
bonds among the members of communities since the appearance of the first form of
organized religion. This observation does not deny that this can lead to negative
consequences, because the improvement in collective action for common goals extends to
organized violence as well.
But this is why we should take culture so seriously: The creation of individual
identities that are emotionally tied up with the community can become so intense that it
overrides our more individualistic instincts. It is impossible to talk about violent conflicts
between groups and completely ignore the question of what makes the individuals that
comprise these groups hang together. It is here where the argument regarding rationality
becomes most problematic. The reason is because, while cooperation in the economic
sphere can be explained without giving up the concept of the individual utility maximizer,
it is much less easy in times of war.
This is not necessarily so, argue the utilitarians: violent conflict also serves some
purpose, and therefore has a utilitarian quality after all. It just might happen that the utility
is received in non-material form like honor or a lasting legacy for one’s sacrifice. Such an
argument, however, is equally relativistic and tautological since it boils down to “that
people will pursue whatever it is they pursue” (Fukuyama 2018, KL 280), and cannot be
falsified.
To reduce the concept of Benthamian utility maximization to material utility
maximization is not an attempt to build a strawman and then tear it down. But in order to
have a viable concept and engage critically with this idea, one must break it out of its
tautological cycle. The materialist conceptualization of utilitarianism is not to be
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understood as just an observation of human behavior, but must be seen as a moral and
ethical idea. A world that is primarily guided by the avoidance of pain and the seeking of
pleasure in materialist terms should be less prone to violent conflicts over metaphysical
matters, especially if these goals are pursued rationally. Maybe unintentionally, Bentham
laid the groundwork for a materialist interpretation of utility when he declared money to
be the most suitable measure for pain and pleasure (Shapiro 2012, 25), and since Bentham
argues that preferring pleasure to pain is the foundational premise of rationality, it was only
a matter of time that this morphed into the idea that any action that increases an individual’s
monetary endowment should be considered rational.
There are, however, some differences between Bentham and Hobbes I do not want
to gloss over and that help us to understand the ways in which Hobbes was ultimately a
moral thinker, despite the seeming coldness of his political proposals. Hobbes grounded
his philosophy in an unwavering belief in natural rights, he just saw that there can be
occasions on which some natural rights might be in conflict. Particularly the right to
freedom and the right to life, in Hobbes view, could create tensions if the exercise of
freedom by one individual should infringe on the right to life of another individual. This is
why he hesitates to outright ban certain religions or ideas and just wants to relegate them
to the private sphere, because there I can fully exercise my right to believe what I want
with a minimal risk of interfering with the life of others. Hobbes might have been too
optimistic in his conviction that human beings can be thoroughly individualized, but the
motivation of his thought was coming from a deep belief in the value of human life.
Jeremy Bentham is different from Hobbes primarily because he does not believe in
natural rights at all. According to him they are ““simple nonsense […] rhetorical nonsense,
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nonsense upon stilts” (Bentham 2011, KL 625). All law for Bentham is positive law, but
this does not mean that Bentham does not also adhere to some moral criteria. But his criteria
is not one based on the natural right of the individual, but the principle that every action
that increases the maximum happiness for the maximum of people should be judged as
morally good. So in a certain way Hobbes is an individualist and Bentham a collectivist,
with the later defending a strictly consequentialist doctrine that theoretically could justify
policies even if they should involve
grave harm, perhaps death, for some, that is no reason to object to it
if the net effect is to maximize total utility. This is why links can be drawn
between utilitarianism and eugenics, and why it confronts severe difficulties
in dealing with the disabled. If the costs of keeping someone alive exceed
the benefits to her and to the rest of society, then there is no utilitarian reason
not to let her die. And if supremacist members of the Aryan race experience
an increase in utility as a result of exterminating the Jews in their midst that
exceeds the suffering experienced by those Jews, utilitarianism supplies no
grounds for objecting. On the contrary, it would actually support such a
policy, as even those who are sympathetic to consequentialist theories have
been forced to concede. (Shapiro 2012, 26)

Hobbes and Bentham, however, do show strong similarities in their treatment of
culture, because neither one of them grants the concept of community significant
importance. We have discussed this in great detail regarding Hobbes, but Bentham also has
no interest in the idea of community as a human need. According to his theory, as Robert
Nozick points out, the best possible life would be one in which we are plugged into
“experience machines” that consist solely of an endless stream of pleasure (Nozick 2013,
42–45). 58

58

One could imagine that Bentham as a movie critic would have perceived “The Matrix” as an
intriguing utopian model.
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Theoretically, utilitarian morality should not lead to the breakdown of order and
people robbing and betraying each other for material gain, since such an order would not
be sustainable and in the end would most likely make it harder to enjoy one’s material
gains. In the utilitarian society we are driven by our materialist instincts to create social
institutions that support an environment that allows for the peaceful accumulation of as
many material goods as possible. Kant himself points out that “hard as it may sound, the
problem of establishing the state [i.e., the just social order] is soluble even for a nation of
devils, provided they have sense” (quoted in: Strauss 1965, 193). Kant, in true utilitarian
form, argued that enlightened self-interest should make a beneficial social environment
possible. The problem for utilitarian ethics is not so much its practical feasibility but the
resistance of people to use reason. It is no coincidence that the Enlightenment is not only
seeking the liberation of the individual, but also its goal of emancipation from the comfort
of relying on somebody else’s interpretation of the world (Kant 1784a). 59 Seeing the world
through a collective lens is not the consequence of some innate desire for community, but
a laziness of mind. We need religion-like institutions because they allow us to work
together despite us being too lethargic to realize through reason that working together is
the right thing. Once reason is realized, collectively-held belief systems should and could
gradually wither away. 60

59

Kant is quite explicit about this: “Thus it is very difficult for the individual to work himself out
of the nonage which has become almost second nature to him. He has even grown to like it, and is at first
really incapable of using his own understanding because he has never been permitted to try it. Dogmas and
formulas, these mechanical tools designed for reasonable use--or rather abuse--of his natural gifts, are the
fetters of an everlasting nonage. The man who casts them off would make an uncertain leap over the
narrowest ditch, because he is not used to such free movement. That is why there are only a few men who
walk firmly, and who have emerged from nonage by cultivating their own minds” (Kant 1784).
60

The convergence of Kant’s and Bentham’s thinking might (again) be connected to an exceptional
medical condition. There is the possibility that Kant developed a brain tumor at the age of forty-seven. He
began complaining of headaches, and soon after that he lost vision in his left eye. His writing style and his
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The belief in one’s god, nation, or ideology is an obstacle to “having sense,” which
would be the ideal of homo oeconomicus – a calculating automaton who behaves rationally
and seemingly in a moral manner not for some higher cause, but because he or she realizes
that in the end it is to their own benefit. 61 History in this reading is just the long way of
realizing the futility of culture and then finally throwing off its shackles. Violent conflicts
should become solely possible over economic issues, but religious or ideological wars
should disappear since reason leaves no justification for them. The Enlightenment project,
in other words, was the attempt to replace the cohesive effect of culture with the supposedly
cohesive effect of reason. The strength of a belief is not to be measured by the passion with
which it is adhered to, but whether or not it is reasonable.
The proponents of the importance of culture argue that passions are necessary to
achieve such ends as group cohesion and enable collective action, something that the critics
of culture concede, but with an important limitation: Group cohesion and collective action
need the support of culture in pre-enlightenment times when something like religion was
necessary to make people work together, since they lacked the rational thinking to realize
that cooperation is beneficial as such. In using Kant’s dictum that “Enlightenment is man's
emergence from his self-incurred immaturity,” they argue that the age of modernity since
the Enlightenment has made culture obsolete – we now know through reason and
experience all the positive effects of culture and can therefore afford to discard all its

philosophy changed after that too, and some have speculated that he developed a tumor that interfered with
emotional processing in the left prefrontal cortex, leaving his high systemizing unchecked by normal
empathizing (Haidt 2013, 314).
61

Kant for his part lived up to the ideal and was a utilitarian social being that enjoyed laughter and
good company – because it was good for his health (Haidt 2013, 120).
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superstitious side effects. If we know the benefits of cohesion then there is no need for a
culturally triggered emotional support system.
Religions and ideologies become obsolete since the enlightened mind does not have
to share an emotional bond with his or her fellow human beings – reason has revealed how
to work together, so even the most selfish individual will work towards the common good
since she knows that in the long run it is in her own best interest. The idea of receiving all
the positive effects of culture, like enabling cooperation and peaceful coexistence, but none
of its negative effects, like conflicts over cultural values, is a tempting on. I am afraid
however that it is an idealism that is not grounded in the reality of human psychology.
4.5.1

Alternative Utilitarianism: Adam Smith and David Hume
Despite the criticism by the Counter-Enlightenment, English and particularly

Scottish political philosophy was not entirely uncritical of utilitarianism. Adam Smith
especially had strong doubts regarding the thin psychological grounding of utilitarianism,
but he also realized that there can be conditions in which the utilitarian model applies. A
good political system would cultivate the passions in such a way that they would support
the virtues necessary for an ordered and prosperous society. While Hobbes believed that a
good political system would relegate the passions to the private sphere and that concepts
of vices and virtues have no room in the public sphere, the utilitarians were hopeful that a
philosophy of material prosperity should also help solve the problem of order and living
together in a society. Adam Smith is an important figure in our genealogy, because he is
often named in one breath with utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham (Camic 1979). The
utilitarian argument about self-interest as the main driving force of human action became
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so pervasive, that in the course of time even its critics became interpreted as hidden
supporters.
It is astounding that a supposedly well-known philosopher like Adam Smith is often
seen as a promoter of a Hobbesian system based on self-interest (Lamb 1974, 672). Smith
identifies two sources of the philosophy of individualistic self-interest, and then disagrees
sharply with both of them. One of them is Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of The Bees in
which the author claims that individual selfishness leads to public benefits, an idea Smith
calls “in almost every respect erroneous” (A. Smith 1982, 308). The second one is none
other than Thomas Hobbes himself. While granting the possibility that laws emerge from
human reason, the formation of community and cooperation cannot spring solely from the
reason of self-interested individuals but instead comes first from immediate “sense and
feeling.” Relying on individual reason as the sole source of functioning social systems is
for Smith “altogether absurd and unintelligible” (A. Smith 1982, 320).
This has far-reaching implications: Contrary to the common belief that modern
neoclassical economics is a descendant of Adam Smith, it in fact owes more of its
intellectual inheritance to Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham. It is Hobbes who claims
that the state is not supposed to care about the promotion or production of a virtuous life
but should limit itself to the protecting the sole natural right of human beings: the prospect
of violent death (Strauss 1965, 181). Smith, on the contrary, is constantly concerned with
the question of virtue and how to promote it. For Hobbes, there is only one virtue:
peaceableness. Peaceableness is the condition for self-preservation, leading to the cessation
of other forms of virtue like courage, temperance, magnanimity, liberality, or wisdom that
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have no or in the worst case a negative effect on the virtue of peaceableness (Strauss 1965,
187).
Smith, on the other hand, dedicated a huge part of his moral philosophy to the
question of virtue and its varieties. Like Hume, Smith takes the idealistic viewpoint that
virtuous behavior can be maintained if people start to take pride in it and if their vanity is
flattered by demonstrating their virtuous behavior. Consequently, Smith argues that “the
great secret of education is to direct vanity to proper objects” (A. Smith 1982, 259).
Throughout his works Smith shows his concern with the maintenance of a virtuous society
and the different challenges to it. Even the division of labor, something he so admires for
its positive impact on the productivity of society, does not escape this scrutiny: “Division
of labor operates to impair the intelligence, enterprise, martial courage, and moral character
of the laborers” (Viner 1927, 215).
The more the division of labor progresses, the bigger the role Smith sees for the
state in the provision of education, to maintain the moral integrity that he views as equally
crucial to the maintenance of society as the pursuit of self-interest. (For the equal
importance of self-interest and morality see: Lamb 1974; regarding the importance of
public education see: Viner 1927, 227.) Despite putting questions of human relations at the
core of his writings, Adam Smith remains most famous for his metaphor of the invisible
hand – a concept that is hardly as central to Smith’s political thought that one would think,
based on the frequency of its referencing; indeed, it might be that he meant it in a purely
sardonic sense (E. Rothschild 1994).
The “Nachtwächterstaat” or “Night-Watchman State” whose obligations are
limited to maintain the peaceableness of society correlates more with the Hobbesian vision
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of the state than it does with Smith’s. As we have already discussed, the spreading of
economic methodology to the other social sciences has led to the dominance of Hobbes’
view of human nature in many disciplines, although he barely gets much acknowledgment
or credit for it.
Elaborating on why human beings strive for material well-being, Smith argues that
it is not the materialist aspect alone that motivates us: Material wealth (or the lack thereof)
influences how we are perceived by others, which is the ultimate motivation of human
action (A. Smith 1982, KL 797). By a similar token, Smith is critical of utility and the way
Hume describes it (Macfie 1959, 209). For Smith, Hume applies the concept of utility too
broadly, muddying crucial distinctions when it comes to human motivation:
It seems improbable that the approbation of virtue should be a
sentiment of the same kind as that by which we approve a convenient or
well-contrived building; or that we should have no other reason for praising
a man than that for which we commend a chest of drawers. […] The
sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense of propriety quite
distinct from the sense of utility (A. Smith 1982, pt. iv, chap. ii).

Smith sees more clearly than Hobbes and others that even pleasure or
“delectability” of material goods depends on social interaction. When writing about the
differences between rich and poor, Smith defines it as more a problem of emotional distress
than lack or abundance of property (highlights by me):
The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they
naturally draw upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind are
disposed to go along with him in all those agreeable emotions with which
the advantages of his situation so readily inspire him. At the thought of this,
his heart seems to swell and dilate itself within him, and he is fonder of his
wealth, upon this account, than for all the other advantages it procures him.
The poor man, on the contrary, is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it
either places him out of the sight of mankind, or, that if they take any notice
of him, they have, however, scarce any fellow-feeling with the misery and
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distress which he suffers. He is mortified upon both accounts. For though
to be overlooked, and to be disapproved of, are things entirely different, yet
as obscurity covers us from the daylight of honour and approbation, to feel
that we are taken no notice of, necessarily damps the most agreeable hope,
and disappoints the most ardent desire, of human nature (A. Smith 1982,
56, my italics).

Matters of right and wrong, according to Smith, can be explored by reason, but the
first reaction by which we judge something comes from our emotions, not our reason:
It is altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first
perceptions of right and wrong can be derived from reason, even in those
particular cases upon the experience of which the general rules are formed.
These first perceptions, as well as all other experiments upon which any
general rules are founded, cannot be the object of reason, but of immediate
sense and feeling (A. Smith 1982, 320)

Adam Smith is making a point similar to that of the theory of moral intuition, where
we first feel and then try to rationalize and ground the feeling in reason.
Adam Smith and his close friend and contemporary David Hume can be viewed as
the last skeptics regarding the Hobbesian worldview. The division of Smith’s work into the
realm of economics and the realm of passions is well documented (Macfie 1959), while
David Hume proves trickier. Hume was more of a utilitarian than Smith, but not to the
same extent of Bentham, who tried to fully absorb Hume’s approach into the utilitarian
framework common in modern economics (Darwall 1994).
Hume himself was somewhat torn between the scientism of the Enlightenment and
the centrality of emotions as part of the human experience. He has been praised as a
paragon of the Enlightenment as well as an example of emotivism, moral subjectivism or
cultural relativism (Capaldi 1992; Manzer 1996). Anti-rationalist and Counter-
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Enlightenment figures of the German Romantic period even went so far to interpret Hume’s
writings on religion and reason to support their claim that reason itself is a cultural- and
faith-based phenomenon, and thereby the Enlightenment was wrong to put reason before
faith, since the former cannot exist without the later (Berlin 1977, 162–87).
Hume’s main contribution is the realization that any theory of human behavior is
useless without scientific knowledge about human nature. He was one of the first
philosophers to realize that natural as well as social sciences “depend on the sciences of
man” (Gay 1969, 166). Hume’s Treatise on human nature was the starting shot for the first
serious discussion about human nature and its implications for politics. While the topic
itself has been covered by figures like Rousseau, it was Hume who argued that human
nature needs to be looked at through the rigorous lens of science, and to focus on the is
instead of the ought.
I think the main reason why Hume could be interpreted to defend two completely
different views is because Hume was foremost a skeptic. Hume supported the
Enlightenment’s emphasis on reason, but at the same time remained skeptical whether it
could replace every other authority that guides human behavior. Hume allowed room for
the role of customs and tradition, without throwing the possibility of an evolving society
that is increasingly guided by reason overboard. For Hume, justice cannot exist solely as a
consequence of reason, but must be “corroborated […] by allegiance,” and he sees a strong
role for education and acquired habits to cultivate a sense of condemning injustice. Without
deference to these habits
you break all the bonds of civil society, and leave every man at
liberty to consult his private interest, by those expedients, which his
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appetite, disguised under the appearance of reason, shall dictate to him
(quoted in: Manzer 1996, 491)

Simultaneously, however, Hume does not promote obedience to everything that
comes from authority. Hume defines obedience as a rational duty that recognizes obedience
to an established authority as central to an ordered society. But this is not a slavish
obedience but one that obliges me to accept authority even if it should act against my
personal appetites. One could think about it as the way in which defeated parties and their
supporters accept election results in a functioning democracy. Although the outcome is not
what they have hoped for, deference to the system and the allegiance to its ideals leads
them to accept it. Just like Adam Smith, there is a particular emphasis on education. For
him, it is education that fosters the emergence of a rationality to help us keep our passions
in check and value the common good as something worth striving for.
Hume’s and Smith’s Utilitarianism was therefore as much concerned with rational
behavior as it was with creating the cultural fundament on which rational, utility
maximizing behavior could lead to society’s well-being. David Hume is quite explicit in
his rejection of the human ability to reason towards the most rational path of action since
“reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any
other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume 2011, 174).
Contrary to Hobbes, Hume perceived human beings as social beings arguing “that
his very first state and situation may justly be esteemed social” (Hume 2011, 208), and that
this initial sociability renders the idea of a so-called state of nature in which “man can be
man” obsolete: “This state of nature, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere fiction, not
unlike that of the golden age, which poets have invented” (Hume 2011, 208). If human
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beings are by nature social, are there iron laws that govern that sociability? Hume’s answer
to this question is rather ambiguous:
Hume had indeed argued that ‘in its principles and operations’ (its
functions and mechanisms) human nature is essentially the same ‘in all
nations and ages’ This affirmation of the existence of discoverable scientific
regularities did not, however, deny – it actually emphasized – that the
content of human nature ‘is various and supplied by social and historical
circumstances’ (Camic 1979, 536).

In other words, Hume believed that there are patterns of human behavior we see at
all states and ages, which is the formation of societies because of our innate sociability.
Yet what such a society would look like in detail springs from an interplay of factors and
not some iron law of human behavior. There is, however, a permanence in the fundamental
structure of human behavior:
In all periods actors are social, motivated by a constellation of
passions (which varies and is not just combinations of egoism and altruism),
and regulated (in varying degrees) by external (artificial and natural) and
internal (conscience) controls. This is what Hume meant when writing that
‘human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations’
(Camic 1979, 538).
In his The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, Peter Gay provides us with an
anecdote that highlights Hume’s way of thinking:
He (Hume) describes a nation that rewards ingratitude, brutality,
incest, homosexuality, suicide, and murder – and it turns out to be the
classical Greeks, and he then plays the same cunning game with Frenchmen,
who welcome cruelty to children as long as it is the Bastille for a disobedient
son, and murder as long as it is an honorable duel. An Athenian of merit,
though civilized and intelligent, would be execrated by modern Frenchmen;
a modern Frenchmen, though equally civilized and intelligent, would have
been execrated by the ancient Greeks. It is true that fundamental moral
principles have changed little, but their expression and application differ
enormously (Gay 1969, 381, my italics).
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David Hume, therefore, is not so much the forerunner of a model of rational choice,
but of moral pluralism. Far from arguing that egoistic behavior will lead to optimal social
outcomes, Hume maintains that human beings create moral concepts like justice through
“education and human convention” (Hume 2011, 204) after realizing the “disorders that
result from following their natural and variable principles” (ibid. 228). Once established,
it is not just a rational cost-benefit analysis that upholds morality, but the investing of these
societal interests with intrinsic values so that a
sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally,
and of itself; […] and that the public instructions of politicians, and the
private education of parents, contribute to the giving us a sense of honour
and duty in the strict regulation of our actions (ibid. 228).

Hume realized three crucial conditions of human existence: First, we are by birth
social beings and the idea of human beings growing up in isolation and learning sociability
later is flawed. Secondly, we are passion-driven creatures who can use reason to obtain the
object of our desires, but our ability to control our passions is limited. Finally, and most
importantly regarding the concept of culture, we are rule-making animals as well, since we
know that living only according to our individual natural desires would make a functioning
society all but impossible. One could construct a contradiction between the second and the
third point, since how can it be possible that we are at the same time driven by passion and
yet compelled to follow rules?
The key to this puzzle is to understand that passion can be expressed towards a
variety of things, spanning from the material to the immaterial. 62 Immaterial passions can

This is particularly important for Hume, since a significant part of his reasoning deals (in a
nutshell) with the question of why people respect the material possessions of others.
62
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be the love for another person, but it can also be the passionate belief in an idea and the
community that forms around this idea. One of the reasons why political systems are slow
to change is the passion with which its constituents believe in it, despite the possibility that
the system in question no longer represents the best possible option. A beneficial societal
order is one where people invest the “right” ideas with passion. This is why investing
certain rules with intrinsic and emotional value is not just a side note, but is absolutely
crucial in the maintenance of order within societies. Hume describes this as a “general
sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one
another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules” (Hume 2011,
206). Hume resolves the potential puzzle of human beings driven by passions yet also being
able to restrain themselves by realizing that
it is impossible to live in society without restraining themselves by
certain rules; and that of morality, when this interest is once observed and
men receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace
of society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it (Hume 2011,
228).

In other words, society for Hume works if we get more pleasure out of playing by
the rules than violating them for our own benefit. Hume and Smith presented somewhat of
a third way regarding the relationship between reason and passion, but ultimately the more
mechanistic approach to human behavior remained. The reason for this can be found in the
second promise of the Enlightenment, which was not just arguing for the better
understanding of human behavior but also the potential for its manipulation that could
ultimately lead to a utopian state.
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4.5.2

The Enlightenment and the Natural Laws of Society
Despite the skepticism of people like Smith and Hume, the Hobbesian view

continued to attract greater attention. I think this can be partially explained by the strong
emphasis Hobbes gave to the scientific nature of his theory, and its potential for
generalization. The dream of fully understanding the world in clear and simple causal
relationships would also enable a new dimension of social engineering; and after
understanding how societies work, they can ultimately be rebuilt in a new and better way.
It was once again David Hume, however, who cautioned against such a simplistic approach
towards human matters:
There is no subject, in which we must proceed with more caution,
than in tracing the history of the arts and sciences; lest we assign causes
which never existed, and reduce what is merely contingent to stable and
universal principles. Those who cultivate the sciences in any state, are
always few in number: The passion, which governs them, limited: Their
taste and judgment delicate and easily perverted: And their application
disturbed with the smallest accident. Chance, therefore, or secret and
unknown causes, must have a great influence on the rise and progress of all
the refined arts (quoted in: Morson and Schapiro 2018, 268).

Hume wanted to put the social sciences on as much of a scientific fundament as
possible, but he was not oblivious to the extraordinary difficulties in doing so, as well as
the risk that what starts as scientific inquiry might end up as an ideology. There is an
ongoing debate to what extent Hobbes was an influence upon Hume, but there is such
overlap in the themes and structures of their work to make coincidence highly unlikely
(Moss 1991). Both authors promote a scientific approach towards politics, but Hume is
more measured in his assessment of what can actually be achieved in practice. The
Hobbesian approach to politics has at its center the idea of a fully scientific analysis that
would include the option for the optimal planning of political structures.
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We find echoes of Hobbes even in the writings of philosophers who would reject a
Hobbesian label. Yet does Hobbes sound so much different from Marx in his assessment
that “armed with the proper method or art, we might ultimately become the masters and
possessors of nature” (S. B. Smith 2012, 146), when the late German philosopher was
equally contemplating that human beings can alter and control nature through their
intellectual capacities (Marx 1992, 329). The Hobbesian revolution was twofold: First, it
established the idea of human beings as potentially autonomous individuals; and, second,
Hobbes fully believed that human society can be constructed on a thoroughly rational and
artificial basis.
The latter point is important, because despite the occasional claim that Hobbes was
a forerunner of totalitarianism (Nisbet 1943), it was not so much his idea of government
that is central as his idea that politics is completely cognitively accessible and plannable
that proved to be tempting for many of the ideologues that followed in Hobbes’ footsteps.
Hobbes also lays the groundwork for the anxiety of modernity, but less so by intention than
by his definition of reason:
Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by
Experience onely; as Prudence is; but attayned by Industry; first in apt
imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in
proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by
Connexion of one of them to another; and so to syllogismes, which are the
Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all
the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is
it, men call science (Hobbes 2019, KL 7877-7881)

Reason and science go hand in hand, and the more we understand the consequences
of our actions, the better we will be able to make responsible decisions. This paragraph,
however, also reflects the Hobbesian dilemma: What if the commands of reason go against
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our intuitions? For Hobbes, the answer is clear, which is that our intuitions have to be
brought in line with reason. And as we have mentioned before, “the passions that incline
men to peace, are fear of death,” (Hobbes 2019, KL 18156), therefore there should be a
“general rule of reason that every man ought to endeavor peace” (Hobbes 2019, KL 18178).
Hobbes does not write extensively about the passion of fear because he simply takes it for
granted (he does), but because he wants us to fear the right things, thereby convincing us
of his social contract as the logical and most beneficial solution to the problem of order in
society (S. B. Smith 2012, 152).
For Hobbes, the application of reason should enable us to create an individualistic
society that is held together by a mutual interest grounded in fear. I might not like the
Leviathan, but the assurance of protection and – most importantly – significant autonomy
in my private sphere make this creature the best possible alternative to the anxiety of an
anarchic world. Ultimately, however, Hobbes is not a friend of society but someone who
views it as a threat to the individual that has to be dealt with.
This brings us to back to Rousseau, who equally disdained society, or at least
modern society. He differs from Hobbes in his assessment of reason, which he sees at the
heart of selfishness and egoism:
Reason is what engenders egocentrism [amour propre], and
reflection strengthens it. Reason is what turns man in upon himself. Reason
is what separates him from all that troubles him and afflicts him. Philosophy
is what isolates him and moves him to say in secret, at the sight of a
suffering man, ‘Perish if you will; I am safe and sound’” (Rousseau 2011,
63).

Ironically, there are passages in Rousseau that would qualify him as a fierce critic
of the rational choice approach, but the problem is that even his criticism of reason as
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making us selfish can hardly be read as a ringing endorsement of society. Rousseau, just
like Hobbes, views the state as the necessary tool to break societal relationships between
individuals, but he differs from Hobbes because Rousseau then goes on to replace these
initial bonds with bonds to the state:
The second relation is that of the members to each other or to the
entire body. And this relationship should be as small as possible in regard
to the former and as large as possible in regard to the latter, so that each
citizen would be perfectly independent of all the others and excessively
dependent upon the city. This always takes place by the same means, for
only the force of the state brings about the liberty of its members. It is from
this second relationship that civil laws arise (Rousseau 2011, 190–91).

Despite the importance Rousseau places on the importance of the passions and his
criticism of reason, he remains anchored to the idea that the passions can be fully made
subservient to a rational design of politics. There are many ways to read Rousseau. Some
argue that he was a Counter-Enlightenment figure who defended local cultures and
emotional bonds to one’s community (see, for example: S. B. Smith 2012, 2016). But there
is another way to read him as well, which is that his admiration for community is that of a
political community, one which is indistinguishable from the state
and which shares all the uniformitarian qualities of the state. It is, in his
mind, a moral unity, but it is a unity conferred by the sovereign will of the
state, and directed by the political government. Thus the familiar organic
analogy is used to indicate the unitary structure of his political community
(Nisbet 1943, 100).

Rousseau and Hobbes both believed that society can be managed in order to lead
to individual human flourishing, and that the central role in this attempt will be played by
the state. They differed only in their ambitions: Hobbes was content with managing our
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inclination toward violence with a perfectly designed “security-system,” while Rousseau
saw the state as a shaper of human perfectibility (S. B. Smith 2012, 194).
And they were not the only ones with high hopes for the future. William Godwin,
the Marquis de Condorcet, and the philosophes of the French Enlightenment agreed all
upon the potential perfectibility of humanity that was impossible to achieve in preEnlightenment times when superstitions reigned supreme. Change would become possible
only once we replaced our passions with reason, ideally under the guidance of philosophers
who “have no particular interest to defend, [and] can only speak up in favor or reason and
the public interest” (Coser 1997, 232). The disinterested intellectuals are “enlightened
philosophers, strangers to ambition,” capable of reaching the indefinite “perfectibility of
man” (Condorcet 2009, 109, 200).
One of the promises of the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment was to
anchor the human condition in reason, meaning that a clear cost-benefit analysis of every
possible action should be possible and build the foundation for decision making. Patterns
of individual behavior and societal structures were no longer to be justified on the grounds
of religion or tradition but had to meet the bar of reason. In the beginning, this was not an
open revolt against the past, but an effort to build upon the even positive effects of certain
traditions that were to be reshaped and potentially improved under the guidance of reason.
For example, even if one would accept the positive role of religion in the creation of
communities, reason should enable us to reach the same effect without a theological
superstructure. Communities under such a scenario would be founded on the realization of
the mutual benefits of collective action, and the glue holding it together would be
rationality, not some shared belief in nation, god, or ideology. This scenario made the idea
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of reason simultaneously a universal as well as an anti-sentimentalist and anti-cultural
doctrine.
While culture is always influenced by a path dependence based on the actions and
beliefs of prior generations, reason supposedly can stand alone without any reference to
the past. William Goodwin and Condorcet among others believed that experience is
unimportant compared to reason, while Francis Bacon argued that the present is always
superior to the past for it can draw on more experience (S. B. Smith 2016, 6). In both cases,
the Enlightenment began to turn its back on tradition, looking for eternal truths independent
of experience and tradition. It is important to mention once that not everyone was fully
convinced of the perfectibility of humanity, as such figures as Adam Smith, David Hume,
Edmund Burke and the American Revolutionaries engaged in lively debates about this
matter (Levin 2014). The Enlightenment itself was facing a constant barrage from the
Counter-Enlightenment, particularly in its German form, from both the political right in
the persons of Schmitt and Heidegger as well as from the left by way of the Frankfurt
School figures such as Horkheimer and Adorno (Horkheimer and Adorno 2007; Meier
2006; Schmitt 1976; Thiele 1994).
The problem for these Enlightenment critics was that many of the arguments they
directed against the Enlightenment rested on idealized forms of the past, so while they were
correctly anticipating the potentially corrosive effects of a materialist-rationalist society,
they staunchly refused to accept what might have been the answer to the dilemma: The
Bourgeoisie. That is, one thing the Enlightenment’s modern critics from the left and the
right had in common was their thorough going rejection of bourgeois society (McCloskey
2007, 2010, 2017; S. B. Smith 2016). The often quoted line by Barrington Moore, “no
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bourgeoisie, no democracy” (Moore 1993, 167) contains more than a grain of truth. There
was more at work than a lucky arrangement of economic interests that then lead to the
emergence of modern democracy. The American Revolution, the French Revolution, and
even the enlightened despotism of Austrian, Russian, and Prussian rulers (among others)
cannot be explained without taking into account the fundamental cultural shifts that were
occurring at the time. These changes were often painful and full of unintended
consequences (Eckstein 1988), but they nonetheless rested on a remarkable cultural
fundament that extended to more than just changing economics. The economic success
itself was increasingly reassuring to those who believed that a thoroughly plannable society
was possible, and that morality – while, of course, important – should be based on science
and not intuition. The idea of achieving societal peace via setting aside deeply cherished
moral conceptions for the sake of reaching a political modus vivendi as John Rawls
envisioned it (S. B. Smith 2016, 5), would only be possible under the condition that moral
conceptions can be set aside in the first place, and their role be taken over by a form of
instrumental reason.
For the Whig optimists it did not even matter that the movement that focused so
much energy on reason, the Enlightenment, was a European phenomenon. Just like the
invention of the wheel or the printing press, once it invented it is accessible to everyone.
This argument was put forward by the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment. The
problem, according to philosophers like Kant, was that in the past we made insufficient use
of our capacity to reason due to group pressure and the comfort of traditions that absolved
us from thinking independently (Kant 1784a). Once we put reason above tradition and the
desire to please others, most if not all of us should have a convergent view of the world--
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one that in its conclusion should allow global cooperation to the benefit of the individual
as well as humankind. There would still be differences based on local geography and
nature, but even those differences could be explained and grounded in reason until it leads
to the emergence of an international state (Hazony 2018, 264).
What I claim, however, is that the success of modernity involved not the
replacement of culture with rationality, but the creation of a culture of rationality. The
ideological battle that raged between the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment
was a deeply cultural conflict with its own symbols, shibboleths, group identities, and
passionately held beliefs (Gay 1966, 1969; McMahon 2002). As Peter Gay shows in his
two-volume study of the Enlightenment, Voltaire and others used every tool in their
cultural toolbox to push their ideology forward. The new reverence for ancient Rome and
Latin, as well as the thinly veiled attacks against Christianity by the likes of Edward Gibbon
and his The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Gibbon 1996), were not
simply scientific exegesis of the past but deployed directly to undermine the dominant
culture of the day. Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment produced great history,
despite it being used “as propaganda (and) generalized too freely” (Gay 1988, 11). Leopold
von Ranke, Diderot, Lessing, Rousseau, and Kant aimed philosophical salvos straight at
“changing the general way of thinking” (Gay 1973, 285) and overturning not the existing
political, but its cultural order. In the words of Diderot, the Enlightenment philosophes
must “ride roughshod over all these ancient puerilities, (and) overturn the barriers that
reason never erected” (quoted in: Gay 1973, 286). The Enlightenment and later the project
of modernity were a gigantic process of delegitimizing traditions that were full of intrinsic
value. The Enlightenment, however, was less of a liberation from, than a replacement of,
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culture with something new. Instead of god, it put the individual into its center as faith was
replaced with knowledge and passions with reason. More important for its success was in
the end the ability to make Enlightenment thinking “fashionable,” meaning that a growing
number of people decided that they wanted their identity and recognition to be connected
to the ideas of the Enlightenment. Many of the key figures of the Enlightenment were the
celebrities of their day, having pipes carved in Voltaire’s likeness or playing with cards
that had the images of the philosophes stamped on them (McMahon 2002, 7). Smoking a
Voltaire-pipe while playing with Diderot cards is not just an act of agreeing with their
views, but one of identifying with them and wanting others to recognize that new part of
one’s identity.
Without acknowledging it, the Enlightenment produced its own form of religious
fervor, without which their triumph probably would not have occurred. The triumph of the
Enlightenment is often accorded to the triumph of reason over superstition and the
disappearance of the blinders of religion and tradition. Yet this story leaves out an
important part of the narrative – the Enlightenment garnered a lot of its power and influence
not solely from the superiority of its reasoning, but from an overly receptive audience that
started to invest the Enlightenment with intrinsic value, thereby increasingly turning it into
a cultural phenomenon. When the French Revolutionaries banned Christianity and turned
churches into temples in the name of the “Cult of Reason,” they executed a cultural
program, not a rationalistic one (Gliozzo 1971). It is absolutely remarkable that this aspect
of the French Revolution is barely mentioned, and that the importance of the “Cult of
Reason” as the attempt to establish an actual Enlightenment religion is featured so sparsely
in published histories of the Enlightenment.
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The general weakening of traditional bonds allowed serious questioning of
traditions to occur in the first place, and it was one of the major achievements of the
scientific revolution and the Enlightenment to open up previously perceived truths to rigid
questioning. Replacing the will of god and the whims of nature with the search for universal
laws opened up the possibility of questioning everything and tearing down every dogma
that could not withstand the skepticism and scientism of the Enlightenment.
Much has been revealed through this relentless search, but in their quest for
objective truth and their battles with superstitions and traditions the philosophes of the
Enlightenment and their contemporary successors have often remained ignorant of their
own cultural basis. For the most ardent philosophers of the Enlightenment, the more we
understood nature and the laws that govern it, the easier it would be to overcome the
shackles of custom, tradition, and ultimately culture if they should conflict with these laws.
In the words of Isaiah Berlin,
from this it followed that all other types of authority were to be
rejected, and in particular such foundations of faith as sacred texts, divine
revelation and the dogmatic pronouncements of its authorized interpreters,
tradition, prescription, immemorial wisdom, private intuition and all other
forms of non-rational or transcendent sources of putative knowledge”
(Berlin 1977, 163).

The scientism of the Enlightenment was not problematic for its establishment of
objective principles of inquiry and the aspiration to find ultimate answers, but for the claim
that there is but one form of inquiry and that other forms of knowledge and experience are
by definition inferior. Max Weber, one of the key critics of Enlightenment scientism,
argued that
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Finally, although a naive optimism may have celebrated science –
that is, the technique of the mastery of life founded on science – as the path
which would lead to happiness, I believe I can leave this entire question
aside in light of the annihilating critique which Nietzsche has made of “the
last man” who “have discovered happiness.” Who, then, still believes in
this, with the exception of a few big babies in university chairs or in editorial
offices? (quoted in: A. D. Bloom 1987, 194)

The position of Max Weber is highlighting the dilemma of modernity, because
Weber was not opposed to the scientific method – on the contrary. His opposition was
against the idea that we can explain the human condition by the same means that allow us
to analyze the forces of gravity. The Enlightenment was not simply the end of humanity’s
self-imposed immaturity but a rearrangement of values including the so-called
disenchantment of the world, which was defined by Weber as
The knowledge or belief that if one but wished one could learn it
(rationality) at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no
mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can,
in principle, master all things by calculation. This means the world is
disenchanted (quoted in: Gordon 2008, 652)

The growing problem with the disenchanted world was that it increasingly also
meant that all that was incalculable also seemed of lesser worth. And this is what Weber
and other critics of Enlightenment scientism feared (e.g. Morson and Schapiro 2018): that
all the parts of the human condition that are difficult or impossible to measure would
become additions to the true human condition that could be explained by cold hearted
individual utility maximization:
When a man attempts to combat the principle of utility, it is with
reasons drawn, without his being aware of it, from that very principle itself
(Bentham 2013, KL 3597)
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The warrior and the deserter, the cheater and the faithful partner – they all maximize
their utility, and the only way to make a moral judgement about their behavior is by
considering whether their actions increase or decrease the overall utility of society. If the
cheated upon partner, for example, should have a smaller experience of pain compared to
a greater experience of pleasure by the one who cheats, net utility in society would increase
and the behavior could therefore be justified. The critics of the Enlightenment did not
discard its emphasis on science, but they feared its potentially eroding effect on the very
values that are necessary for the maintenance of society itself.
None of this should be seen as a full rejection of the Enlightenment and modernity.
On the contrary, my argument is that culture is the common belief system that holds a
society together, and that different belief systems result in different political systems. Yet
while I prefer an enlightened system to a theocracy, I claim that both need to be rooted in
a common culture that invests its belief systems with intrinsic value. The Enlightenment
produced a culture that allowed the flourishing of human freedom, creativity, and
prosperity not as a consequence of a sudden realization of reason and individualism, but
because it changed the dynamics of desirable recognition. Once the successes of
economists and scientists started to yield more approving public recognition than being a
warrior or a priest, more and more people flocked to these fields, increasing the
opportunities for economic development and scientific breakthroughs. The Enlightenment
did not just convince, but it converted, people to a new creed they desired to embrace and
make part of their identity.
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CHAPTER V: CULTURE AND MODERNITY
One of the questions we have to ask is whether the Enlightenment and modernity
are synonymous terms and distinctions without a difference, or if there is actually a break
in the way the world was perceived. I would argue that the later is the case, because
modernity as I define it already has elements of a cultural pessimism that we do not find to
that extent in the Enlightenment. Jürgen Habermas wrote insightful of the cultural selfunderstanding of modernity (Habermas 2007), but the philosophers he identified as his
main protagonists, including Weber, Nietzsche, and Marx, are among those moderns who
no longer share the optimism of a Condorcet, Smith, or Benjamin Franklin. This trend is
then continued by the movement known as postmodernity that continued the tradition of
cultural pessimism that took its beginning in the 19th century.
This pessimism is in itself a fascinating phenomenon, because overall the human
condition experienced significant improvements exactly in those areas of the world where
a majority of these pessimists were working--Marx in England; Weber and Nietzsche in
Germany; Durkheim in France – all countries that underwent profound social and political
upheaval, but all nations with indicators one would use to show that human well-being was
arguably improving. From life-expectancy to literacy, a world that once was available only
for a tiny elite only became increasingly accessible to a larger part of the population.
Democracy itself became a mass phenomenon for the first time in history (Ortega y Gasset
1993). Similarly, the borders between different social classes became more porous and
contacts more frequent. (A good example for this is the case study of Reinhard Höhn and
how the army served as an integrative force: Höhn 1963.) It is not until the 18th and 19th
century and the policies of the modernizing nation-state that we actually encounter the
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emergence of a genuine “Staatsvolk” (E. Weber 1976), with governments being
increasingly held accountable by their populations.
The discomfort expressed by rise of modernity was ultimately a cultural one,
probably best captured in Emile Durkheim’s concept of anomie. According to Durkheim,
the era in which he was living was characterized by a loss of norms, and that this normabsence generated psychological distress often manifesting itself in individuals committing
suicide. Durkheim wrote in 1897 that
man cannot become attached to higher aims and submit to a rule if
he sees nothing above him to which he belongs. To free himself from all
social pressure is to abandon himself and demoralize him (quoted in: Haidt
2013, 165–66)

For Durkheim the social pressures created by society were not just an element of
discontent as Freud would have argued, but an essential feature of human life and daily
experience. The liberation caused by the social change that occurred during his lifetime
was not only a benefit, because it was neglecting the psychological desire for social and
moral rules. The “normlessness” that Durkheim diagnosed was also part of growing
individualism, that simultaneously liberated people and took the certainties of the moral
order of the past away from them. The glue that maintained social order and cohesion was
weakening, and this became a key cause of the anxiety of modernity (Jeffrey C. Alexander
2013).
Although Durkheim’s arguments differ in many respects from Marx and other
contemporaries, he nonetheless is another important example how especially the
intellectual class was growing uneasy with the emergence of many aspects of the modern
world.
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This leads us to another key question: Has modernity or subsequently
postmodernity been able to sufficiently address this unease? This is the question towards
which we have to turn now.
Before doing so, I have to add a few words before starting the following chapter.
My argument in this dissertation rests on the assumption that social life depends on culture,
because culture creates the emotional bonds necessary to establish group identities and the
ability for improved collective action. I also tried to establish that not every cultural
invention leads to such an improvement, and that cultural change can also cause the
breakup of communities and a reduction in the ability for collective action. My goal so far,
however, has been to refrain from making any claims to what an ideal culture would look
like. The purpose of my arguments was to show that there has been a trend to oust culture
as an important factor and replace it with reason and instrumental rationality. I have also
claimed that this is impossible, because biological factors exist that make us long for
communities based on a common culture.
The process that started with Hobbes is still pervasive today in political science and
political philosophy, and even those who are perceived as defenders of culture resort often
to anti-cultural arguments in their reasoning. The critique by figures like Nietzsche and
Weber that we can no longer imagine things to be of value if they have no immediate utility,
something Weber called the disenchantment of the world, was not entirely wrong (Bell
1962; A. D. Bloom 1987; Lasch 1991). They did realize that despite all claims to the
contrary, the Enlightenment did create a cultural atmosphere in which belief in higher
things that transcend individuality became more and more problematic. The Enlightenment
ultimately did not just throw out religion; it was increasingly hostile towards any kind of
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metanarrative necessary for culture and collective identities. The breaking up of ossified
social structures and the opening up of new opportunities for individuals is and was a great
achievement of the Enlightenment movement, but even this individualism needs to be
cushioned in some form of collectively shared culture. Individualism never fully replaces
our more collectivist inclinations, which is why even the most individualistic societies
constantly struggle over group-recognition. Discussions about gay marriage or transgender
bathrooms are conflicts over recognition of group identities, which is why their emotional
impact is much stronger than their political salience. I will discuss this in more detail in the
final chapter, but for now it is important to see that from the Enlightenment to modernity
to postmodernity there was a gradual decline in the role culture was granted within human
existence.
In the last thirty years, postmodern thinking has gained a strong foothold in various
social science disciplines. One of the major elements of postmodern thought is its real or
supposed emancipation from dominant belief systems, stemming from its argument that
these systems are social constructs generated in order to maintain oppressive structures
(Lilla 2003). 63” To a certain degree, postmodernism is no less hostile towards cultural
artifacts like religion and nationalism than rational choice theorists, albeit the latters’
arguments derive from a number of different bases. These theoretical approaches are,
however, politically relevant because the idea of multiculturalism that pervades many
contemporary debates in Western countries would be unthinkable without its postmodern
underpinnings.

63

Habermas is a special case in this respect – he also rejects traditional belief systems, but is at the
same time a fundamental critic of postmodernism, mainly due to the latter’s disbelief in the creation of a
completely rational society.
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At some point, however, postmodernity may run the risk of attempting to
emancipate society from culture altogether, meaning that it would promote a political and
social system that no longer has internal cohesion based on a collective identity springing
from shared beliefs about the world. Indeed, at least one major theoretical perspective on
collective ideologies by a postmodernist suggests such a risk. In a short overview of the
“postmodern condition,” Jean-Francois Lyotard argues that this condition is defined by its
“incredulity towards metanarratives” (Lyotard 1984, xxiv). In his view, metanarratives are
the grand stories that are used to justify behavior in the name of religion, nation, or
ideology–the products of cultural activity.
The late Samuel Huntington, as well as contemporary philosophers like Mark Lilla,
increasingly voiced discomfort about a possible risk of societal breakdown occurring
without any form of collective metanarratives (Huntington 2005; Lilla 2003). Even
defenders of the multicultural project like Charles Taylor (C. Taylor 2002, 2007b) and
Michael Ignatieff (Ignatieff 2003) are not blind to these risks, wrestling as they do with the
question of how to create solidarity among individuals without an overarching grand
narrative accepted by all members of society. But all of them tend to give a rationalistic
answer to an emotional problem: If I maintain my cultural identity only because I
consciously expect some utility from doing so, I will most likely also give it up as soon as
that utility falls below a certain threshold. When Martha Nussbaum or Charles Taylor write
about the necessity of patriotism, but equally scold those who are patriotic, it becomes clear
that they want to safeguard the emotion of patriotism by the rails of reason and rationality
(M. C. Nussbaum 1994, 2008; C. Taylor 1996). Equally, they have a hard time grasping
the emotional content of culture, which is why they tend to fall back upon a quasi-Marxist
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explanation that religious fundamentalism is a reaction to external forces, but not
something to be held out of faith – a faith that is nearly absolute and does not define itself
by self-skepticism (C. Taylor 2007b).
That being said, the following is not an overall critique of Jürgen Habermas,
Charles Taylor and others, but a specific engagement with their views on culture. As I hope
to demonstrate, their theories suffer from the same weakness as Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s—
namely, that they build on assumptions that are hard to square with reality and more than
once forget to distinguish an is from and ought, to use David Hume’s famous phrase. I am
also not doubting the noble intentions of their theories, and share the moral implications of
their argument. But this is where the problem begins, because moral arguments are by
definition cultural arguments and one cannot replace their cultural grounding and simply
take an entire moral matrix as given. Aware of this problem, it seems that many fall back
on the Enlightenment position that there is such a matrix, and that matrix springs from
reason and is therefore less cultural and more objective. While this is an interesting
philosophical argument, it is also a clever escape – if I can claim that natural morality is
enlightened morality and enlightened morality is WEIRD (Western, Educated,
Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) morality, I can build an entire social theory without ever
having to take genuine cultural diversity and moral pluralism seriously. What I mean by
this is that if a community shares and cherishes these modern liberal values, they have
created a genuine culture, one that supersedes other cultural ideas. For example, a group of
individuals can have a wide diversity of religious beliefs, but if their primary belief system
is individualistic, tolerant, and liberal their religions will neither be a source of conflict,
nor will it be their primary identity. This group is not a multicultural group, but a
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monocultural group that is built around a very specific set of shared sacred values. Contrary
to some critics of these values (Burnham 2014; Deneen 2018), they are not relativistic,
because they do elicit emotional commitments from those who believe in them, but the
proponents have the problem that they often cannot fully accept: their views are ultimately
also cultural and not objectively enlightened and universal.
This, I believe, is actually the true weakness of modern Western culture, because
its inability to self-perceive itself as a culture also makes the necessary emotional
commitments in order to sustain it more difficult. Additionally, it has narrowed the
realization that there are genuinely different cultures that value entirely different things,
and that those cultures will not simply disappear if exposed to Western ideas. Western ideas
created a culture of its own, with its own sacred values, symbols, and rituals. What I
propose in this chapter is a deeper understanding of the cultural underpinnings of so-called
cultural pluralism and its deficiencies. The philosophers I am discussing in the following
chapters have been among the most influential in the postmodern era, although most of
them would refute being labeled as postmodern themselves. This makes them the most
interesting ones to engage, because even those contemporary theorists that do engage with
culture are still strongly anchored in the Hobbesian idea of the rational, individualistic life.

5.1

Culture and Habermas
That modernity has a cultural deficiency was diagnosed by Jürgen Habermas when

he wrote about modernity’s need for self-assurance and its longing for an equivalent of the
unifying power of religion (Habermas 2007, 17, 26, 105, 123, 166). This is the long
struggle of Habermas, and I think it is fair to use it as the angle from which to analyze his
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writings that are relevant for us. Habermas rejects postmodernity as outlined by Lyotard,
because while skeptical of metanarratives himself, he s maintains the idea of a
universalistic philosophy (Rorty 1991).
But what would that universalistic philosophy look like? On the one hand,
Habermas sees elements of a universalizable kind of reason in bourgeois society
(Habermas 1989), particularly the emergence of a vibrant public sphere. This public sphere
provides Habermas with the potential building block for his key to a universalistic
philosophy applicable to all of humankind: ideal speech situations. Situations where
individuals come together in uncoerced and open debate and the desire to inquire the best
possible rational answer to open questions. Habermas tries to save culture by replacing it
with communication. His concern with the question of culture becomes clear in Habermas’
work on the question of legitimacy (Habermas 1975), which he sees as a major issue in the
crisis of modern capitalist societies. Unfortunately, Habermas remains strongly anchored
in his focus on capitalism and while not necessarily Marxist in orientation, his theory gives
such a prominent place to the economics system, that culture appears to be relegated to a
secondary issue.
Although an interesting approach, Habermas does not really move beyond the idea
of Hobbes and the solutions he outlined. At certain moments, Habermas sounds precisely
like Hobbes:
The level of the shared political culture must be strictly separated
from the level of subcultures and pre-political identities (including that of
the majority), which deserve equal protection provided only that they
conform to constitutional principles (as interpreted in this particular
political culture) (Habermas 1996, 133)
Or
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As long as the welfare-state program, in conjunction with a
widespread, technocratic common consciousness […] can maintaintain a
sufficient degree of civil privatism, legitimation needs do not have to
culminate in a crisis (Habermas 1975, KL 1048-1049)

These paragraphs without a doubt would have pleased Hobbes, for they describe
the idea of a culturally neutral state and a political culture that consists almost exclusively
of that neutrality. Society for Habermas agrees on a set of principles that offers equal
protection to everyone and does not interfere or promote any kind of specific culture. In
other words, Habermas just like Hobbes relegates matters of culture to the private sphere
and – at best – allows culture to “inform” debates in the public sphere (Habermas 2005).
Hobbes could make such an argument because for him life in society is a necessary means
to an end, but barely an end in itself. Emotions could be had and experienced largely
independent of others, so the isolated private sphere of the autonomous individual is no
problem for him. On the contrary, in his writings Hobbes admittedly treats human beings
“as if [they] even now sprung out of the earth … like mushrooms” (quoted in: Barry 2002,
200), demonstrating that intersubjectivity and socialization are not something he engages
with in much detail, because he views it as acquired art that can be discarded and replaced
with a different art, the one he outlines in his ideas of the social contract.
Despite being more open towards interaction between individuals, Habermas still
views his theory ultimately grounded in rationality and a universal acceptance of his
definition of rationality that could emerge through the practice of communication. Needless
to say, this approach builds on assumptions that are difficult to square with the concept of
culture.
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Hobbes would not quarrel with Habermas’ ideas, because for the latter as well as
the former the motivation for interaction is not driven by a purely emotional need, but is
instead a means to an end. Hobbes distinguished the private and the public sphere, while
Habermas sees three distinct “cultural spheres” created by the Enlightenment, namely
science, morality, and art. All three of these spheres are under constant threat of a complete
takeover by instrumental rationality that is made the dominant force by capitalism
(Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998, 1975). Yet it seems that Habermas has less of an
issue with the Enlightenment emphasis on rationality than on the way this rationality is
applied. It is the instrumental part of instrumental rationality that bothers him, not the
concept of rationality itself. Even Richard Rorty was skeptical of the Habermasian claim
to a universal philosophy and morality derived from communicative action and the ideal
speech situation (as defined by Habermas) (Norris 2010, 150). Human nature is culture
bound, and these universal ideas completely discard the idea of culture as an influencing
factor independent of rationality. In the “ideal speech situation” put forward by Habermas
“communication will no longer be distorted by the effects of power, self-interest or
ignorance” (Norris 2010, 149). This form of rational communication rests on an extreme
demand of cognitive awareness by those who participate in it, plus it assumes – in true
Enlightenment fashion – that there is a single answer to every problem addressed through
communication. The idea of competing and contradictory moral claims does not really
appear in Habermas’ discussions, which is why some of his critics call his theoretical
approach fundamentally “nonpolitical” (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998, 1979) or
“curiously antipolitical” (S. B. Smith 2007, KL 2552). But, for me, they are more than
nonpolitical; they are ultimately anticultural. Habermas would most likely reject such a
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label, but not only does he not provide us with a coherent theory of culture, but his own
theorizing is built on
certain norms of public rationality that are said to constrain what can
and cannot be used in justifying public policy. Such approaches are
curiously antipolitical, as they assume the primacy of certain normative or
ethical standards from which politics are then deduced (S. B. Smith 2007,
KL 2552)

It is peculiar that Habermas makes his anticultural argument on a cultural basis,
drawing on the emergent public sphere of the seventeenth and eighteenth century where
communication in salons and coffee houses paved the way for a new liberal and
cosmopolitan order (Gopnik 2019, 65; Habermas 1989). Unfortunately, however,
Habermas overlooks the immense cultural underpinnings that enabled this public sphere.
The idealized form that begins to emerge but ultimately fails in his retelling of the story of
the emergence of the public sphere ignores the emotional infusions of a redefined
relationship between society and the individual. The historical period Habermas discusses
was characterized by a far ranging idea of moral values individuals were expected to adhere
to (Himmelfarb 1991, 1996, 2007) and that motivated people to found all kinds of clubs
and charitable societies and begin the golden age of association (Ferguson 2013; Skocpol
2004; Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000). Contrary to previous times, governments and
private organizations made much broader efforts to include all of society in making this
moral ideas mandatory (J. Rose 2010). Despite the “utopian sincerity” with which
Habermas idealizes the concept of the public sphere, he fails to “conceptualize how one is
actually constructed” (Jeffrey C. Alexander 1995, 192).
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The complex historical processes that took place sometimes seem to take the
backseat in order to preserve his overall theoretical approach, making the historical record
playing a supporting role in his theory whenever needed, but always “in danger of
neglecting the real learning processes in history in a Hegelian jump to a level of abstraction
which explains less rather than more” (Outhwaite 1994, 63). Habermas sometimes appears
as a philosopher who tries to maintain two competing and contradictory principles at the
same time: Critical of Marxist determinism and capitalist utilitarianism, he nonetheless
does not want to give up completely on the idea of a rationally graspable world. The
problem is that the same claim was made by the theories that his own Critical Theory set
out to criticize. He successfully creates a standard against which criticism is possible, but
he remains opaque on the creation of that standard and the potential of its practical and
theoretical sustainability. Underlying Habermas’ ideas is still the vision of a world that can
be perfected through reason. As Jeffrey Alexander points out, Habermas maintains
“rationalism in a continental, anti-utilitarian romantic idiom” (Jeffrey C. Alexander 1995,
71).
When he remains in his Hegelian-Kantian framework, there is a constant undertone
promoting the idea that world is evolving into a more rational direction (see, for example:
Habermas 2006). So, despite his criticisms, Habermas also believes that there is a purpose
or an underlying direction of human history. This also means that as the world becomes
more rational, it becomes less emotional and, ultimately, less cultural. I believe this also
explains why Habermas seems to have significantly more patience and admiration for nonWestern cultures compared to his often scathing criticism of the United States and Eastern
European nations (Auer 2010; Kumar 2008).
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The problem Habermas encounters is that he wants to preserve a metanarrative that
provides common meaning and a common horizon around which community can emerge,
but he never tells us where this metanarrative comes from. If rationality alone already
enables the public sphere and “peace through communication” as proposed by Habermas,
why is there any need for a metanarrative? I think Jeffrey Alexander is correct when he
points out that
the whole tradition from Kant to Habermas suggests [that] norms
create order only when they bind action via internal commitments, in
relation to which an exclusively rational calculation is impossible” (Jeffrey
C. Alexander 1995, 155).

To put it differently, even the most objectively rational societal order must be
internalized emotionally on the subjective level – even if this would include supposedly
irrational elements.
As I have pointed out before, we can make a solid argument that slavery is
objectively and universally a terrible thing, and this argument would not have lost its
validity during all the periods when slavery was practiced. But it was only once it has been
subjectively and emotionally internalized that people started to have the required moral
intuition that makes slavery unthinkable in most societies of the modern world. Habermas
and others are readily accepting the existence of objective moral facts and the rational
arguments that could justify their support, but they do not provide convincing answers
about the internalization of these arguments. To be clear, rationality and emotions are not
mutually exclusive, but as I have argued in this dissertation on multiple occasions, even
the most rational idea of societal order will remain powerless if it is not filled with
emotional content. To put it differently, it will not be enough for me to be persuaded by
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the better rhetorical argument that slavery is wrong, I also have to feel an intuitive rejection
- because otherwise we might be forced to re-discuss the issue with every new generation.
The emotional internalization and the passing on of these emotions makes the rejection of
slavery a cultural phenomenon that new generations pick up an defend without having to
be convinced in a long series of arguments.
For a modernist like Habermas and his postmodern critics alike, the idea of loving
something without a rational cause is hard to accept. They both cannot fully grasp that there
are still billions of people that passionately identify with their nation or religion without
expecting something in return or a clearly individualistic reason to do so (Jeffrey C.
Alexander 1995, 192). The idea that people invest religion or nation with a purpose and
therefore teleological content that goes beyond the pursuit of some individual need has
suffered significant neglect in modern as well as postmodern writings.
Let me emphasize again, Habermas is not blind towards question of culture, but he
never leaves the plane of the abstract, which is why concrete cultural problems are also
hard to find in his writings. It is only his high level of abstraction that allows him to expect
people to view their cultural identity as just that: their own worldview that does not lay
claim to be better or worse than anybody else’s worldview. Such a conceptualization of
culture is fundamentally flawed, because the very purpose of culture is to impose moral
rules on others and to create a hierarchy regarding acceptable and unacceptable moral
behavior. The only condition under which Habermas’ conceptualization of culture could
be maintained would be if ultimately a worldview or culture can be an entirely
individualistic phenomenon that bears little importance for the possibility of sustainable
societal life. Once again, Hobbes would agree.
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Habermas is not unaware of this problem, and as a way out he proposes the concept
of Verfassungspatriotismus a constitutional patriotism that would put patriotic feelings on
a solidly rational ground--or, to use the words of a critic, to make affect safe for democracy
(Markell 2000). Unfortunately, we once again encounter a theory of societal structure that
is based on such far reaching assumptions that we soon enter the realm of “pious illusion
or […] highly inaccessible ideal” (J. C. Alexander, Giesen, and Mast 2006, 354). In defense
of Habermas, he refers frequently to the idealistic content of his theorizing (Habermas
1985b), but he remains nonetheless committed to the framework that he constructs around
the concept of communication.
The underlying ideal he presents is in line with liberal traditions—ones, not just
embodied by John Locke, but also by John Stuart Mill and others who value the idea of
liberty, especially the liberty to exchange ideas (Mill 2015). According to Habermas, a
discourse between individuals that is free of blatant egoism, power structures, and openness
to consensus and the search for truth should be at the core of modern democratic systems
and what he calls the public sphere (Habermas 1984, 1985b, 1989). It is within this public
sphere where through communicative politics takes place and intersubjective relations as
well as collective identities are negotiated.
a public sphere as porous as possible in which collective identities
are renegotiated and revised. Open-ended communication is thus a crucial
precondition for what Habermas has termed the ‘rationalization of
collective identities’. A sense of attachment, one might say, is formed then
both to the general character of the society that emerges from collective
learning processes — and to the very procedures and situated practices that
make collective reflection and contestation possible as an ongoing project
(Müller 2006, 287)
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And it is right here where we encounter the first problem of Habermas and the
concept of culture: Right from the beginning, identity becomes not just something
negotiable, but all the individuals enter communication with the awareness that their
identities are subject to negotiation. Although an interesting ideal, it is a safe assumption
that making one’s identity negotiable from the outset could be also interpreted as a form of
self-negation. This goes much further than Hobbes, who only wanted the citizens of his
state to keep their identities to themselves and leave them out of the public sphere because
he knew of their violent potential due to the connection of identity with the whole plethora
of emotions. Habermas circumvents this problem, because for him the emotional
attachment is not to identity itself, but the process of communication about identity and
other matters. This is a crucial matter, because Habermas’ constitutional patriotism is not
the same as, for example, the identity US citizens derive from their pride in the US
constitution. In the American case, the constitution builds the fundament for a unique
American identity that extends then to other symbols like the flag and broader US history.
For Habermas it is processes defined in a constitutional framework that would work
independently of a particular identity. He makes this quite explicit in his discussion about
the idea of a European identity (Habermas 2006, chap. 6).
To put it in somewhat simpler terms: US (and other national) citizenships can be
held intuitively, while Habermas’ constitutional citizenship is much more a cognitive and
rational act.
Habermas is absolutely clear about this and argues forcefully that modern identity
can no longer be based on traditions but most rest on “formal conditions” that allow the
constant reformulation of identity. This form of fluid identity is rational because it is based
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solely on the structure of this process of negotiation about identity, which flexibly” allows
the reciprocity of recognition among all members of such a society – creating a rational
identity for complex societies (Habermas 1974). While vague about the precise conditions
under which this society can emerge, Habermas does not conceal the potential endpoint of
it: The global public sphere (“Weltöffentlichkeit”) in which these discourses about identity
will continuously take place.
Cultural conflicts disappear in the Habermasian universe because cultural identities
are the building blocks used for the negotiation of new identities that ensure pluralistic,
reciprocal, and universal recognition. The universalism proclaimed by Habermas does
surprise, because he is by no means an uncritical supporter of the Enlightenment. On the
contrary, he is also highly critical of the aspirations of perfectibility expressed by so many
philosophers of the early Enlightenment. He is fully aware of their
extravagant expectation that the arts and sciences would promote
not only the control of natural forces but also understanding of the world
and of the self, moral progress, the justice of institutions and even the
happiness of human beings (Habermas 1985a, 9)

The problem with Habermas is not that he does not see the far-fetched expectations
of Enlightenment philosophers, but that he is not in fundamental disagreement about the
achievability of their aims, only their means. This is where his theory of communicative
action comes in, because instead of the all-knowing and planning philosopher it is through
communication that we reach an ideal state of society. David Harvey summarizes this
nicely when he writes that according to Habermas out of communicative action,
“consensual and normative statements do arise, thus grounding the role of universalizing
reason in daily life. It is this that allows ‘communicative reason’ to operate ‘in history as
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an avenging force’” (Harvey 1991, 52). Habermas is not an Enlightenment revolutionary,
but he shares their ultimate goals and proposes to reach it via the grinding process of
communicative action in a public sphere that as much as possible resembles his ideal
speech situation. On first glance, this emphasis on communication and the public sphere,
as well as the view of society as being capable of changing through evolution, might seem
as a significant departure from Hobbes’ depiction of human nature. But this does not hold
up to closer scrutiny. The Hobbesian model is aware of the shortcomings of human nature,
but ultimately rests on the assumption that we ourselves can realize these shortcomings
through reason and then build an institutional framework to counter them. Habermas makes
the same argument, he only replaces the Leviathan with the ideal speech situation, but
ultimately it is reason that solves humanity’s problems. When Habermas writes about the
necessity of the state to provide “social and material conditions” so that people can
effectively be “privately autonomous,” his policy prescriptions are almost equal to those
of Hobbes (Habermas 1998b, xxvii). Granted, Hobbes wants to separate individuals while
Habermas wants to bring them together in the public sphere, but both of them posit human
beings as reasonable and individualistic and, ultimately, being capable of creating a society
without the emotional bonds outside of our rationality.
The idea of a “universalistic morality” (Habermas 1974) must be hostile to the
concept of culture, at least the way we have treated it in this dissertation so far. The cultural
pluralism promoted by Habermas rests on the very assumption that culture is not a decisive
factor in matters of morality. It becomes clear, however, that he himself is not fully
comfortable with the loss of culture. In his ideal vision, he sees the “need for unification”
in order to “regenerate the devastated power of religion in the medium of reason” (quoted
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in: Hoesterey 1991, 89). In practical terms, that is a very ambitious program because it is
tantamount to the idea to genuinely feel religion-like sentiments but to completely control
them through reason. Which, of course, is working against the feeling-component.
Accepting the existence of genuine feelings outside of reason is one of the biggest
challenges in Habermas philosophy of society. In equal fashion, Habermas proposes a state
that is simultaneously religious and secular:
The guarantee of equal ethical liberties requires the secularization
of state power, but it forbids the political overgeneralization of the
secularized worldview. Insofar as they act in their role as citizens,
secularized citizens may neither fundamentally deny truth-potential to
religious worldviews nor deny the right of believing citizens to make
contributions to public discussion in religious language. A liberal political
culture can even expect that secularized citizens take part in efforts to
translate relevant contributions from the religious language into a publicly
accessible language (Habermas 2005, 27–28).

Haberman almost literally wants to have his philosophical cake and eat it too – and
the way he proposes that this is possible is through the unifying force of communicative
action. But, as his critics correctly point out, the idea that all opinions can be equalized
through reasonable discourse ignores or downplays the fact that opposing viewpoints
cannot simply be resolved via appealing to the ideal of reason (Zerilli 1998, 14). This form
of communication would transcend all the cultural and moral particularisms and dissolve
antagonisms from politics.
Despite the complexity of his writing, in many respects Habermas has added, but
not fundamentally departed, from the social theories of Hobbes, Locke and others we
engaged with the early course of this dissertation. True antagonisms in the theoretical world
of Habermas are the consequence of a lack of reason promoted through communicative
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action, but with a resolution of that problem emotional loyalties should be replaced by
rational ones, and there is no reason why these loyalties should not gradually encompass
all of humanity.
The problem for Habermas is that he himself is not fully at ease with his theory.
Hobbes and Locke supposedly took a very straightforward approach in their theoretical
blueprint, and while Habermas wants to preserve their faith in reason, he is deeply aware
of the (particularly German) criticism in the tradition of Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Horkheimer, and Adorno. Partially accepting their criticisms of the emotional emptiness
of modern life (Baxter 1987), he is of course also aware of the fact that this criticism played
a significant role in the intellectual underpinnings of totalitarian systems (Reid and
Yanarella 1977, 528). Habermas’ hope is that communicative action can preserve both the
rational and the emotional worlds, harnessing the best of both of them into one
universalistic morality.
Yet even such an approach runs against internal contradictions: Habermas assumes
that there is only one morality, even though there might be different paths leading to it. His
morality is built on the sacred value of open discourse by honest individuals – and while
this is certainly a possibility, it is most likely not as universal as Habermas hopes it might
be. The complexity of moral ideas and their connection to emotions that we examined in
the first chapters simply does not point towards a convergence towards one unique moral
matrix shared by all. Habermas, in other words, did not resolve the problem of culture, he
just created one of his own, complete with its sacred core and accompanying symbols and
rituals. This does not come as a particular surprise, because insofar as Habermas engages
with the psychological underpinnings of moral development at all, he remains firmly within
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a Kohlbergian universe and its concept of moral universalism (Habermas 1990). As
Richard Shweder points out, this includes the belief that
liberal enlightenment thinking had come closest to discovering the
terms of the one true moral charter […] tribalism (in-group favoritism) and
hierarchy (which they viewed as incompatible with autonomy) [are viewed]
as lower forms of social organization […] the moral consciousness of
human beings had not only evolved over the course of cultural history but
should be encouraged to continue to develop in […] the progressive
liberated and liberal direction (Shweder 2015, 90)

It is no coincidence that it is exactly in-group favoritism and hierarchy that are
missing from his ideal speech situation. This is complemented by his attempts “to
rehabilitate the concept of the autonomous Ego or, perhaps better, a ‘model of
unconstrained ego identity’ as the developmental keystone of his communication theory of
society” (Reid and Yanarella 1977, 529). That evolution towards the rational society is a
core idea of Habermas’s thought is made once again explicit in his own words. Reacting
to his critics who argue that historically even constitutional patriotism needs a shared and
common identity, he writes that “the symbiotic relation between nationalism and
republicanism reveals itself as merely a transitional, historical constellation” and that in the
future societies might rest on “a new level of abstract, legally mediated social integration”
(Habermas 2000, 132).
The quarrel Habermas is having with his critics resembles the conflict between the
Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment, with the former claiming that reason will
enable us to “understand the true nature of our circumstances and ourselves” (Shapiro
2012, 7) and the later claiming that attachments based on tradition and historical affiliations
are a social reality that cannot simply be replaced by a form of practical reason and
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detachment from the past (C. Taylor 1992). Habermas, working in a Kantian tradition, does
not fully discard the past, but it is not much more than the path necessary to the Enlightened
self, which would enable social life to exist without any emotional attachments to or
intrinsic value of a specific identity. In his theory we emerge to a state of almost complete
self-awareness; but, he assures us, this does not mean that society no longer matters,
because this self-awareness does not just spring from the reasonable individual, but from a
society that itself is socially constructed around the value of self-awareness (Habermas
1992, 182–85). This self-awareness is in itself based on constant rational evaluations of the
social world around us in which the individual “relates autonomously and critically to the
social expectations he encounters” (Markell 2000, 41). His attempt to anchor a possible
societal structure in reason and rationality simply prevents him from accepting the full
implications culture has on public and private life. He wants to separate things that cannot
be separated without taking over the entire Hobbesian idea of the completely autonomous
individual.
Habermas hopes for the emergence of postconventional collective identities that no
longer depends on kinship, religion, territory or other “fixed contents” but a shared
“consciousness of universal and equal opportunity to participate in value and norm-forming
learning processes” (Habermas 1974, 100). And this new collective identity would be
based on the identification of the idealized “unlimited communication community”
(Habermas 1992, 185). Habermas dissolves all traditional attachments and loyalties and
argues for their replacement with an attachment to procedures that are enshrined in
universal rules of justice (S. B. Smith 2012, 248). The question Habermas is avoiding is
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how people could develop these attachments. Bertrand Russell, who was wrestling with
similar questions like Habermas nicely frames the problem the latter encounters:
Social cohesion is a necessity, and mankind has never yet
succeeded in enforcing cohesion by merely rational arguments. Every
community is exposed to two opposite dangers: ossification through too
much discipline and reverence for tradition, on the one hand; on the other
hand, dissolution, or subjection to foreign conquest, through the growth of
an individualism and personal independence that makes cooperation
impossible (Russell 2015, 9 emphasis by me).

Despite all their downsides and failures, traditional and conventional identities did
succeed in creating social cohesion, and part of that cohesion came from the kind of moral
intuitions created by culture that we described in previous chapters. Russell correctly points
out that there can be an “overdosing” of the elements necessary for social cohesion, but he
is equally correct that simply appealing to our rational faculties will be an insufficient
replacement for emotional attachments. Bertrand Russell is worthwhile mentioning,
because his philosophical work is laced with similar questions, and can be read as a journey
away from conventional identities and ultimately his return to them (Greenspan 1996).
Without these “conventional” identities based on fixed contents everything
becomes debatable, and we need to ask whether the cure Habermas proposes as a remedy
for the anomie of modern society might be worse than the original ailment. If the loss of
fixed norms and values caused the anxiety of modernity, it is unclear how the Habermasian
idea of making everything a subject of debate is going to replace these norms and values.
The idea to have debate and communication replace those conventional identities is
intriguing, but we have to ask what the conditions would be to accomplish it.
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The use of rituals and symbols in the past has not only been a means to reinforce
identities, but also set the bar of what is necessary to become a member of a community.
Initiation rituals and pledges of allegiance tend to seem outdated in the post-conventional
world, but at least they provide possible steps towards community formation. The world of
post-conventional identities is one that most likely has much more difficult conditions of
membership. One does not have to resort to as scathing a review of Habermas’ work as
Roger Scruton does, but he does have a point in mentioning that a much of “ordinary
humanity” would be excluded from Habermas’ public sphere, and that despite the
impressive amount of theorizing the ideal speech situation, Habermas fails to tell us what
he would like to see debated in particular (Scruton 2016, KL 3422). The goal of
communication is consensus to be achieved in “unrestrained and universal discourse” but
in so far as we master the means of the construction of [this] ideal
speech situation, we can conceive the ideas of truth, freedom and justice,
which interpenetrate each other – although of course only as ideas
(Habermas 1970, 370)

Religion, nationalism, and ideologies increasingly demanded some basic literacy in
order to effectively join the communities they attempted to create, but the discourse
community of a Habermasian nature would probably demand some significant form of
higher education to enable membership. This is not supposed to be a cynical criticism, but
is intended to expose a much deeper problem. Even if we assume the aspirational quality
of Habermas’ idea, it cannot be erected on thin or non-existing cultural grounds. From the
agreement on the rules of discourse to what can be included and what not to the acceptance
of other viewpoints over my own, there is a thick web of necessary emotional and moral
commitments to build what Habermas proposes. The dismissiveness with which he treats
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the cultural environment of 18th and 19th century Europe is not just intellectually
problematic, but it also reveals a deeper problem of post-World WarTwo political thought
to which I will turn shortly.
To first address the intellectual problem, it is more than a mere theoretical sleightof-hand to simultaneously view 19th century Europe as a forerunner to a possibly ideal
public sphere but at the same time dismiss the historical circumstances that led to its
emergence. I suspect that Habermas himself is here a victim of his own cultural
socialization. Due to the role played by modern European culture in laying the intellectual
groundwork not only for liberal democracy but also for fascism and communism, a critical
theorist like Habermas has to downplay the role of culture to avoid an (in his eyes)
unnecessary elevation of a culture that is responsible for history’s worst atrocities.
Habermas is not alone in this dilemma, and the events of World War Two have created a
lens through which much of the 19th century is interpreted, often in a very negative light
(Bruckner 2010; Ferguson 2004, 2011a).

5.1.1

Habermas and the German Question

Evidence for my suspicion can be found in Habermas assessment of National
Socialism and particularly the experience of the Holocaust and its effects on German and
European politics. This is an essential point, because Habermas builds his theory on a claim
to universalism, but at the same time uses the profoundly unique historical experience of
Germany as the starting point. Habermas, for example, admits on several occasions the
crucial role played by conventional identities like nationalism in the construction of the
liberal democratic state (Habermas 1998b, 492–500), but that Auschwitz made any
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recourse to traditional identities of that kind impossible – everywhere and not just in
Germany (Habermas 1988, 4). It would go beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore
the entirety of Habermas’ historical interpretation of the National Socialist period, but there
are a few points that need mentioning, since they are crucial to his larger theoretical work.
While nationalism played a significant role in the emergence of National Socialism
and fascism, it is worth asking whether nationalism was a sufficient or only a necessary
ingredient for the rise of this ideology. We need to ask this, because if “conventional
identities” are to be history’s main culprits, a solid case has to be made in order to justify
Habermas’s proposal to turn away from them. Needless to say, this is another very
Hobbesian argument: The idea to prevent violence through the shedding of a certain
identity.
I would also like to caution the reader that the following is not supposed to be read
as a defense of nationalism in general or German nationalism in particular. The purpose of
this chapter is to demonstrate two things: The underestimation of cultural factors in
Habermas interpretation of history; and the identification of the very specific cultural
framework that would be needed for Habermas’ proposed society to emerge.
According to Habermas, nationalism and patriotism divides people into groups that
draw their own identity from viewing each other in an irrationally hostile light (Habermas
1996), 64 making their abandonment a pre-condition for a peaceful society. This is an
interesting proposal, but it is most likely also a very poor reading of the actual history,
psychology, and anthropology of nationalism and patriotism (and religion, which is
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A similar point was made by John Locke that we discussed in an earlier chapter.
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mentioned in other writings). There is at least some evidence that the very idea of
cosmopolitanism and world citizenship that Habermas supports, would hardly have
emerged without the idea of the nation as a historical community (Kleingeld 2012).
Equally, whether the emergence of nations and religions has divided or united diverse
people remains a heated debate (Hazony 2018). It is not at all clear whether love of one’s
own country necessarily needs hatred of somebody else’s (Haidt 2016; Kleingeld 2012).
As we have discussed earlier, the emergence of complex cultures was one of the main
causes for homo sapiens to be able to evolve beyond the social structure of the tribe; and
as we showed, intertribal relations were often characterized by excessive violence is well
documented in the anthropological record.
That being said, it is also the case that these complex cultures and their ability to
enable more effective collective action are responsible for previously unseen levels of
organized violence. Nonetheless, if National Socialism has made nationalism an
unbearable idea, we have to ask why other important elements of this ideology escape
Habermas’ scrutiny. For example, the welfare state is a crucial element in Habermas
historical vision (Habermas 1986), but his historical account of its inception ignores the
crucial role of national identity formation that was often a justification for welfare-state
policies (for example in Prussia: Beck 1995). Equally with democracy, Habermas does not
accept that national identity could have been, not just a transitional, but a necessary element
for the expansion of political rights and political participation (Habermas 1974). He neatly
separates from the historical record what he needs for his theory and discards as merely
transitional what he does not. It is barely mentioned, for example, that the modern German
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welfare state that still exists today was in many respects built during the Nazi period (Aly
2008).
The answer to this somewhat selective historical memory, I believe, can be found
in moral intuition developed as a consequence of culture. That the cultural trauma caused
by the National Socialist experience and the horrors of the Holocaust have fundamentally
changed social and political life has been well documented as well as its effects on German
national identity (Jeffrey C. Alexander et al. 2004; Fulbrook 2002). As Peter Katzenstein
has pointed out, anti-nationalism was a cornerstone of postwar German culture
(Katzenstein 1997, 2003), and the writings of Habermas on this matter point in a similar
direction. The uniqueness of the Holocaust and the German experience created the very
cultural environment in which Habermas’ writing takes place. Being part of the moral
matrix of an anti-nationalist culture, Habermas has demonstrated all the expected behavior
of an individual who sees his or her cultural sacred core under attack. During the so called
“Historikerstreit” (Historians Debate) in the late 1980s several German historians were
arguing for a new approach towards the history of Nazi Germany, particularly towards a
more contextualized way of looking at how events could have unfolded the way they did
in Germany between 1933 and 1945.
The reaction by Habermas and his contributions to the debate was one of absolute
rejection of any such contextualization, since this would risk a “laundering” of the German
past and could be used as a justification for a rehabilitation of German nationalism. The
entire debate very soon left the framework of an experts debate on a specific period of
history, and changed into deeply cultural issue where the potential consequences of
arguments became more important than any claim to truth. (All the contributions can be
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found in English in: Knowlton 1993.) This shouldn’t have come as a surprise, because the
Fascist period is so central to contemporary German identity that it is hard, if not
impossible, to have an unemotional debate about it in public. What was surprising,
however, was that the one participant in the debate whose lifework was the development
of discourse ethics, ideal speech situations, and promoting the “force of the better
argument” (Habermas 1984, 24, 25, 28, 36, 42) became one of its most fierce polemicists.
Whether or not the polemics were justified is another matter, but the argument to shut down
the debate itself revealed its cultural context: We intuitively dislike attacks on what we
hold sacred, and this dislike makes it very hard for our rational side to function uninhibited
– and not even a thinker like Jürgen Habermas is exempt from his emotions. For the
duration of the Historikerstreit there was not much left of the
Intuitively underlying [the] concept of communication rationality is
the experience of the noncoercively unifying, consensus-promoting force of
argumentative speech […] actors […] change their perspective: they […]
shift perspective from the objectivating attitude of an actor oriented toward
success who wants to realize some purpose in the world, to the performative
attitude of a speaker who wants to reach understanding with a second person
with regard to something in the world. Without this switch to the conditions
for the use of language oriented toward understanding, the actors would be
denied access to the potential inherent in the binding and bonding energies
of language (Habermas 1998a, 220)

Regardless of which side in the Historikerstreit had the better argument, the
participants in the debate on both sides at least initially wanted to reach understanding
“with regard to something in the world.” The problem was that this something also
happened to be a sacred element of Germany’s post-war culture, making the debate
extremely difficult, even for Jürgen Habermas. And not even a thinker of his complexity
could fully escape from his emotional and cultural side. This does not, of course, render
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the Habermasian discourse ethics and his ideas regarding communicative action mere
hypocrisy, but it does show that culture sets limits to their universality. It also reveals the
implicit limits of who would be allowed to participate in the discourse – and, from
Habermas’ perspective, those who disagree with his historical interpretation of the German
past would not have a place at the table. In order to be part of the community Habermas
envisions, there must be agreement regarding certain values, ideas, and norms – in other
words, it is a cultural community, not a universal one.
The often abstract and complex principles that he proposes would serve as a glue
among the “diversity in cultural forms of life, ethnic groups, religions, and world views”
(Habermas 1996, 133). But as Habermas himself has demonstrated, he does not accept all
world views as being able to participate in the discourse, and it seems more than likely that
there might also be some other forms of cultural or religious life that would not find his
approval. So, on the one hand, his communicative community will,
unlike earlier forms of patriotism and nationalism, valorize a set of
universal norms rather than a concrete historical community. Consequently,
it does not generate irrational, antidemocratic hostility toward an unending
series of people or groups whom it positions as its "others" (Markell 2000,
44)

but, on the other hand. he never fully reveals how these universal norms will
become more important to people than membership in “concrete historical communities,”
which is peculiar because he proposes that individuals should be able to keep their ethnic
identities, religions, and world views, but at the same time all subscribe to the unique set
of norms that Habermas proposes.
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This, of course, could only function under the condition that the Habermasian
norms are the sacred core of this new society, and that all other forms of identity are mere
lifestyle choices that enrich the life of the individual and maybe are topics for public
discussion, but do not reach the same level of salience and identity-forming power that the
norms of Habermas do . His theory puts the cart before the horse, because unlike his claim
that communicative action will in itself create legitimacy as a basis for society, there needs
to be a legitimate society before one could ever implement Habermas ideas.
Habermas’s idea of a rational constitutional patriotism might be implementable in
Germany, which comes closest to have the historical experience and culture to accept a
non-conventional identity that he proposes. But to derive universalist principles from a
philosophical program that is so deeply influenced by particular historic events is much
more difficult. Without a doubt, the long shadow that is being cast by National Socialism
has long gone beyond German borders, something demonstrated almost daily by references
of US political and media figures to Hitler and Fascism. Using Nazi and Hitler as
derogatory terms has become common throughout the Western World, and most audiences
immediately know what is meant by invoking them.
There is no comparable phenomenon, and while every US citizen understands what
it means when someone is called a Nazi or Hitler, nobody in Germany would understand
what it would mean to be called a Bull Connor or a Neo-Segregationist. The French
philosopher Pascal Bruckner is not entirely incorrect when he diagnoses a tendency of
“Hitlerizing History” (Bruckner 2010, chap. 5) in the West, where the entire history of
Western culture is viewed as a road to the NS genocide. National Socialism has become
part of the cultural inheritance of the entire West, and in this respect Habermas is correct
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when he claims that the German experience had an impact far beyond Germany itself. This
is also why Habermas is of such high relevance for us here. Because despite the close ties
of his philosophy to the German experience, the philosophy itself and its rejection of
specific identities has become more common in the West.
The declaration of post-nationalism and post-religion could be premature, a view
that is only compounded by Jürgen Habermas’ concept of the post-secular age (Habermas
2010) that announced the end of the sacred in politics. In reference to Habermas, JanWerner Müller writes that “the exercise of coercion over citizens can no longer be justified
with reference to sacred or quasi-sacred sources” (Müller 2006, 287). This, however, seems
to be a contestable proposition. The term “sacred” seems to automatically imply a
metaphysical or religious source. Yet, to attach sacred value can extend to non-religious
phenomena as well. And many aspects of the German experience have been become a
sacred core of contemporary Western culture. It would go beyond the scope of this
dissertation to deconstruct and dissect this phenomenon in detail, but it demonstrates that
even the most universalist aspirations of some of the most important thinkers rest on a
cultural foundation. Habermas’ arguments for the abandonment of religion and nationalism
are well founded in the specific historical and cultural context that underlies his writing,
but it is entirely unclear why a Buddhist, Muslim, Japanese or Indian nationalist should
give up their collective identity and trade it for the universal rules of Habermas. Despite
their claim to universalism and pluralism, the visions of Habermas and similar thinkers like
Rawls rest on a very narrow set of assumptions. The idea of public reason through
deliberation cannot exist without a cultural context, an issue that neither Habermas nor
Rawls ever sufficiently address (Rawls 1999). This leads to a theorizing with “a rationalist
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bias, [that] homogenizes, and takes a one-dimensional view of public reason” (Parekh
2000, 312).
The Habermasian-Rawlsian claim that certain identities have outlived their
legitimacy is constructed around the historical experiences of particular communities,
whether it be the United States (in the case of Rawls) or Germany (in the case of
Habermas). The universalization of these experiences to arrive at better forms of identity
is treated as some form of logical consequence, but it is never explained how this
universalization can and will take place.
Despite his criticisms of modern life and the flaws of rationalism, Habermas is
entirely silent on the matter of culture as an emotional experience. He assumes that cultural
attachments and loyalties can be dissolved and weakened by communicative action, but it
never occurs to him that in order to enter such a communication one would have to be
willing to give these attachments up in the first place. But why should people do that? If
the life-world has already been emptied by the workings of modern capitalism, why should
they now also give up the emotional comfort of a cultural community? In fact, the rise of
religion (Kepel 1994) and new nationalisms (Gries 2005; Lind 1996) in the early 20th
century point more towards a revival than and end of conventional identities.
The idea that the atrocities of the 20th century have finally opened up the path to a
rational society that will finally control its urges and exert their passions under the strict
reins of reason is without a doubt noble and well-intended, but its realization is more
difficult. Ultimately, it argues that an emotional experience would make the rational rule
based society possible, but this also means that those who do not participate in this
emotional experience (whether by choice or circumstance) can also not become part of this
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new society. Despite its appeals to reason, this is as much an emotional as it is a rational
project. The pluralistic society that Habermas and others envision depends on people
feeling a higher degree of loyalty to that particular vision than to any other vision of life
they might inherent from religion, tradition, or a competing ideology:
He sets up a single model of political discourse and fails to
appreciate the depth of national diversity. Like Rawls, he too takes a
narrowly rationalist view of it, stresses arguments and largely ignores other
forms of reasons, takes a homogenous view of political arguments,
postulates a culturally unmediated or “pure intersubjectivity” and a
language “purified” of history (Parekh 2000, 312)

In the end Habermas views culture as something that might enrich the individual
life and inform the public sphere, but he does not give it a particularly important role as an
independent force. This is why he believes that it can be replaced with a formal and legal
structure. Culture might have been important in the past, but that is no longer so. Just as
Hobbes had the English Civil War as the backdrop for his theory of society, Habermas
draws on the events of World War Two. But ultimately both of them want to replace the
passions that they see as responsible with a rationalist approach that hems in the emotional
attachments that culture demands.
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5.2

Culture and Recognition: Charles Taylor and Multiculture

That the aftermath of the Enlightenment as well as the beginnings of modernity
created new ways to look at culture is not an observation that is limited to this dissertation.
Choosing a similar approach to mine but coming to different conclusions, Charles Taylor
has proposed that there are two theories of modernity, one cultural and one acultural:
A ‘cultural’ theory of modernity is one that characterizes the
transformations which have issued in the modern West mainly in terms of
the rise of a new culture. The contemporary Atlantic world is seen as a
culture (or group of closely related cultures) among others, with its own
specific understandings (e.g., of person, nature, the good), to be contrasted
to all others, including its own predecessor civilization (with which it
obviously also has a lot in common). By contrast, an “acultural” theory is
one that describes these transformations in terms of some culture-neutral
operation. By this I mean an operation which is not defined in terms of the
specific cultures it carries us from and to, but is rather seen as of a type
which any traditional culture could undergo (C. Taylor 1993b, 205, and
1995).

I would concur with Taylor that “the overwhelming weight of interpretation in our
culture, positive and negative, tends to the acultural” (C. Taylor 1993b, 208), yet in one
important aspect he remains unclear: Taylor provides us with two intriguing narratives
about modernity, one that sees it as a natural evolutionary force and another one that
interprets it as a cultural phenomenon, but despite the importance he grants to the matter
of culture and his attempts at formulating a defense, his actual definition of culture remains
unclear. This fundamentally weakens his case against the acultural approach, because
without clear definitions, it’s difficult to fully comprehend his defense. This is particularly
important, because it is one thing to know that culture is a necessity of human life, but quite
another to define which kind of culture should address that necessity. As we will see,
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Taylor is challenged by the same problem that Habermas has encountered, namely that
there are such strong anti-totalitarian undertones to their philosophy that they cannot bring
themselves to openly endorse one kind of cultural (and therefore moral) values over
another, despite the fact that their philosophy itself is based on very specific cultural
grounds. This, unfortunately, often leads Taylor as much as Habermas to be very selective
in what he counts as being part of a genuine culture and what is not. And, just like
Habermas, Taylor assumes an almost unlimited possibility for cultures to learn and
compromise from each other. This is why I claim that despite his more detailed and
nuanced view of culture, even Taylor has problems with accepting the often irrational
emotional reactions cultural values can elicit, and that these reactions make it hard if not
impossible to compromise with cultures that happen to hold cultural values that contradict
our own.
This chapter will begin with Taylor’s insightful critique of the Enlightenment
before turning to his views on the matter of culture in contemporary society that I view
with greater skepticism. By doing so, I hope to highlight that very much like Habermas,
Taylor is critical of overemphasizing of reason and rationality as a consequence of
Enlightenment thinking and that individualism alone is not a substitute for our natural
sociability.

5.2.1

Taylor, Modernity, and Rationality

Charles Taylor plays a prominent role in the question of culture and modernity
because just like Habermas, he comes from a very critical perspective regarding the
Enlightenment. Although himself not part of the counter-Enlightenment, he takes seriously
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their concerns with the overly formalistic and culturally-impoverished approaches of many
strands of Enlightenment thought. Not coincidentally, Taylor grounded a significant part
of his philosophical writings on the ideas of Hegel, playing a decisive role in re-establishing
the German philosopher’s intellectual status in a more nuanced and positive light after
decades of anti-Hegelian trends especially in the English speaking world (Gordon 2008,
649). It is also no coincidence that Taylor was taking a close look at the ideas of an even
more controversial figure than Hegel—namely, Martin Heidegger. While working through
the more destructive ideas of Hegel and Heidegger, he takes seriously their arguments
about the shortcomings of a world that explained solely in rationalist and behavioralist
terms (C. Taylor 1993a). Taylor also shares with me some of the criticisms I have
formulated regarding the Lockean approach and the idea that human beings can be
understood in isolation from their cultural and historical environment (C. Taylor 1992).
But it is also here where we will see some divergence, because while Taylor
criticizes the individuality that is so central to Enlightenment thought, he struggles with the
level to which we are bound by our cultural and historical surroundings. Contrary to the
claim that the Enlightenment has made us hyper-individualistic, I believe that the story is
a more complex one, consisting not of an end of community but one of the individual being
faced with an unprecedented range of options from which to choose their identity. As we
will see, this is a serious problem for Taylor’s philosophy, because if individuals can
choose their culture and identity, it will become increasingly more difficult to identify an
“authentic” identity. Taylor is fully aware of this conundrum when he writes that
The change I want to define and trace is one which takes us from a
society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in
which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility
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among others. I may find it inconceivable that I would abandon my faith,
but there are others, including possibly some very close to me, whose way
of living I cannot in all honesty just dismiss as depraved, or blind, or
unworthy, who have no faith (at least not in God, or the transcendent).
Belief in God is no longer axiomatic. There are alternatives. And this will
also likely mean that at least in certain milieux, it may be hard to sustain
one's faith. There will be people who feel bound to give it up, even though
they mourn its loss (C. Taylor 2007a, 3)

In his genealogy of the secular age, Taylor provides us with a detailed story of how
the commitment to any form of faith becomes optional, and that modernity no longer offers
us the previously existing certainty of religious beliefs that undergirded the normative and
moral content of culture. In his description of belief systems, Taylor comes very close to
some of the assumptions we also made in previous chapters, for example that beliefs
are held within a context or framework of the taken-for-granted,
which usually remains tacit, and may even be as yet unacknowledged by the
agent, because never formulated” (C. Taylor 2007a, 13).

This is just another way of describing our intuitive reaction to moral questions and
whether we consider an act to be appropriate or not. Taylor also realizes that
we are in fact all acting, thinking, and feeling out of backgrounds
and frameworks which we do not fully understand. To ascribe total personal
responsibility to us for these is to want to leap out of the human condition
(C. Taylor 2007a, 387).

It is here where Taylor most strongly presents the human condition as one of being
fundamentally intersubjective (C. Taylor 1971), meaning that we cannot understand the
way we interact with the world outside of the social imaginary (C. Taylor 2004) of people
based on shared practices, stories, and traditions. On this theoretical framework Taylor
builds an intriguing model of multiple modernities and how there is not simply a modern
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and a post-modern world but worlds where we have to take into account the nuances by
which social change has historically unfolded. Taylor, of course, shares with Habermas a
strong emphasis on the role of economic exchange and how economic considerations have
become central to everybody’s life.
Taylor views this change as lamentable, arguing that another effect of this change
is the atomization of society into individuals claiming autarky over themselves and their
experiences,
A race of humans has arisen which has managed to experience its
world entirely as immanent. In some respects we may judge this
achievement a victory for darkness, but it is a remarkable achievement
nonetheless (C. Taylor 2007a, 376).
But it is not the atomistic self that worries Taylor the most, but the loss of certainty
in a single cultural framework and the very choice brought forth by modernity. If there are
so many possibilities, how can a true transcendental experience of culture be possible, and
how can we expect a serious commitment to any set of cultural values? Not without reason
have some of Taylor’s interpreters suggested that he in part sounds similar to Nietzsche,
and his lamentations of the hollow and uncommitted species humans have become as a
consequence of modernity (for example: Gordon 2008, 663).
Taylor defends religion on the grounds that it is the only source of a true
transcendental experience, and that all that came afterwards are “lesser modes” offering an
ersatz-transcendence, and that nationalism and other modern ideologies are only substitutes
that cannot reach the force of the original (Gordon 2008, 664). But without this
transcendence society might be
bound to lead to a crumbling and eventual breakdown of all moral
standards. First, secular humanism, and then eventually its pieties and
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values come under challenge. And in the end nihilism (C. Taylor 2007a,
638)

More than once Taylor sounds very much like critics of modernity and the
Enlightenment, resembling a fear of Nihilism that is usually more common in the writings
of Leo Strauss (L. Strauss 1965, 2011). The problem we encounter with Taylor is not his
insightful approach to investigating the evolution of secular societies, but the exclusive role
he gives to religion. As we will see in the next chapter, Taylor does not support the idea of
measuring and valuing cultures differently. But I believe that this is in part due to his own
perception of what culture is supposed to be. For him, it is the true transcendental
experience that can only come from the collective bonds created around religious belief.
He is not comfortable with the idea that the transcendental force of religion can be found
somewhere else, which is why he discards alternatives as lesser substitutes.
The secular-rational self of modernity might forever be separated from the
possibility of a true transcending experience (Gordon 2008), and all that is left to do is to
work towards compromise between the competing lesser modes of supposed
transcendence. Taylor, in other words, takes culture seriously but that culture is gone. It is
in this light that we have to engage with his approaches towards the condition of culture in
the contemporary world.

5.2.2

Taylor and the Wrong Allure of Pluralism

Despite Taylor’s unease with the disenchantment of the world, his philosophy does
have significant problems with the reality of culture as an authoritative source in people’s
moral thinking and the real possibility that cultural values contradict each other.
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Brain Barry highlights this problem with a summary of Taylor’s position during the
Rushdie affair, where an author – Salman Rushdie – living in Britain was sentenced to
death by the Iranian government for the crime of blasphemy:
Taylor exhibits what appears to be genuine regret that the case of
Rushdie does not lend itself to compromise: “in the nature of things,
compromise is close to impossible here – one either forbids murder or
allows it.” This seems to me to show a sad lack of imagination. There would
have been nothing to prevent the British government from proposing to the
Iranian authorities some compromise solution. For example, it might have
been possible to reach a deal according to which the British government
would undertake to transport Rushdie to some neutral venue and an expert
Iranian limb-severer would be flown in to remove some agreed portion of
his anatomy – say the right arm. The problem is not that it is hard to think
of compromises, as Taylor suggests. The problem is, rather, that it would
be utterly revolting, from a liberal point of view, to compromise on the
proposition that Rushdie should not suffer a legal penalty for writing The
Satanic Verses. Compromise over liberal principles is not, and cannot be, a
liberal value (Barry 2002, 283)

Just as with Habermas’ approach we run into the issue of which values we would
accept in a pluralist society and which we would not. But that, of course, is in itself a deeply
cultural question. Pluralism will be possible as long as either one set of cultural values is
prioritized by a majority of the society and as long as different values do not directly
contradict each other. Liberal societies as envisioned by Taylor and Habermas have solved
this problem partially by the recourse to a Hobbesian approach: Different cultures can best
co-exist, if cultural values are the domain of the life of the individual, meaning that I might
live according to scripture, but I neither care nor demand the same from others. It is,
however, only a partial recourse because both Habermas and Taylor want culture to be part
of the public sphere, something that Hobbes rejected because the risk of different values
clashing in the public sphere could be a source of disorder and violence.

348

The early Enlightenment especially in the form of Thomas Hobbes was fully aware
of this, which is why he promoted a strong form of individualism and a separate private
sphere where individuals could search for meaning without allowing it to become a source
of conflict in the public sphere. If we can find value and meaning in ourselves without the
involvement of others, there might no longer be the need for conflict. Mainly concerned
with religion as the dominant cultural phenomenon of his day, Hobbes strived to make it a
purely individualistic affair where everybody could be happy according to his own beliefs,
but nobody had the right to judge the behavior of others in the name of some higher
authority like god:
This humanization of religion meant that it could eventually be
reduced to a cipher, belonging ultimately to the private precinct of
individual conscience and rendered irrelevant to determining the shape of
the public good (S. B. Smith 2016 KL 1413-1414).

It is also only this condition that we could fully endorse Taylor’s idea of an equal
value of culture. In fact, Taylor himself restates Hobbes when he writes that
we might speak of an individualized identity, one that is particular
to me and that I discover in myself. This notion arises along with an ideal,
that of being true to myself and my own particular way of being (C. Taylor
1997, 227)

Taylor’s main concern is not culture as a means for social cohesion, but as a means
for finding one’s own identity, and this identity is to be recognized by others, something
that he correctly views as important for human flourishing. Nonetheless, this is an
individualized view of culture and a reduction of its collective qualities. The individuals in
society interact as recognition-givers to each other, but the true values of culture is to be
measured by its effect on individual well-being (C. Taylor 1994). From this perspective,
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all cultures are indeed of equal value – if the way to measure a culture’s value is whether
or not it confers psychological benefits for those who hold the culture, it makes no
difference what the particular culture is. But when we look at culture and its consequences
for collective behavior, things could look differently. This is why we engaged with the
topic of maladaptation in previous chapters: Being a Shaker or being a Protestant can have
the same emotional effect on me as an individual, supporting my claim to its recognition
of a culture and granting them equal value. But from a collective perspective, in a hundred
years there will most likely still be Protestants, but no Shakers, given the fact that their
values (celibacy, joining only by voluntary conversion) put them at a disadvantage.
So Taylor’s argument that “we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from
which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident” (C. Taylor 1994, 73) is not
really accurate. The worth of something in most cases is established in comparison or
relation to something else. For example, the worth of eating a piece of chocolate or going
to the gym can be established from various perspectives with different or equal outcomes:
Both of these activities can trigger the release of endorphins in my brain, and if this is my
main goal, it is indeed difficult to establish whether chocolate or the gym are be of higher
value. On the other hand, if I am concerned with my long-term health, and the choice is
between the endorphin-triggering activity of going for a daily run or eating a piece of
chocolate, the daily run might objectively be the better option. It is hard to see why we
should not use a similar approach to culture. Yes, being a Shaker might cause the same
psychological reward than being a Protestant, so it is difficult to establish whether one has
more value than the other. If the concern, however, is the sustainability of my particular
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community, Protestant culture has a clear advantage over Shaker culture and is, therefore,
from that perspective of higher value.
This is not a small problem, because although Taylor denies the existence of any
kind of standard against which to measure the relative value of culture, he still implores us
to “recognize the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but
acknowledge their worth” (emphasis in the original C. Taylor 1994, 64). He grounds that
appeal on the idea that “all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some
considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings” (C.
Taylor 1994, 66). This defense of cultural equality runs into the same problem that
Habermas encountered—namely, that a society that recognizes the value of all cultures
needs itself to be based on a culture that would allow for such a recognition. It is surprising
that an author like Taylor who is on the one hand a staunch defender of culture, believes
that any society could value something as a culture neutral operation. There are parts in
Taylor’s writing where he concedes the issue, such as this: “Just as all must have equal
civil rights, and equal voting rights, regardless of race or culture, so all should enjoy the
presumption that their traditional culture has value” (C. Taylor 1994, 68).
Although most likely unintentionally, in so arguing, Taylor has smuggled Hobbes
back in. In neatly separating between a public sphere (civil rights, equal voting rights) and
the emotions of the private sphere (the presumption that traditional culture has value), he
does exactly what Hobbes would do as well. Nobody denies the value any traditional
culture might have for those who are part of it, but in the public sphere these values cannot
override the principles of civil rights as they are established and protected by the state. So
the state tells the people that they can believe and value whatever they want, unless it
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becomes a threat or contradicts the values established by the state itself. Once again, there
is nothing here that would fbe disagreeable to Hobbes.
Taylor himself qualifies the idea of cultural neutrality in his ideal society:
“liberalism cannot and should not claim complete cultural neutrality. Liberalism is also a
fighting creed” (C. Taylor 1994, 62). If it is a fighting creed and cannot be neutral towards
other cultures, Taylor goes a long way to say something much simpler: Liberalism is in
itself a culture, and can only accept other cultures as long as their sacred values do not
violate the sacred values of Liberalism. So idea of recognizing and valuing all cultures
comes with a pretty significant asterisk, namely that whatever the content of these cultures,
they cannot get equally valued they run contrary to the values of liberalism. This is a
significant problem for the cultural approach of Taylor, because either he accepts that he
prefers a liberal to an illiberal culture, thereby creating a very clear standard against which
to measure cultures (i.e. the degree of individual liberty they permit), or he subscribes to
the idea that all cultures are indeed equal, so complete neutrality would be required (which
he rejects), or he takes the third, an Hobbesian option, which would be to allow culture as
a form of psychological pleasure relegated to the private and individual sphere but with no
role in the public sphere (something he is also not comfortable with).
At the core of Taylor’s Liberalism is the role of the state as the protector of rights
and not the imposer of obligations (C. Taylor 1997, 257–58), something that Leo Strauss
described as follows:
If we may call liberalism that political doctrine which regards as the
fundamental political fact the rights, as distinguished from the duties, of
man and which identifies the function of the state with the protection or the
safeguarding of those rights, we must say that the founder of liberalism
was Hobbes (L. Strauss 1965, 181–82 emphasis by me)
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For Hobbes, human life was to be perceived as a strictly individualistic affair, and
it is the fear that individualistic human beings have of each other that enables us to agree
on the creation of a forceful entity that will protect us from each other: the state. But Hobbes
did not only fear that we kill each other for material gain and the need for defense, but he
fully realized the potential cultural sources of violence:
the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any
other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in
their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name
(Hobbes 2019, KL 8958)

The politics of recognition are alive and well in the writings of Hobbes, and these
are not an invention of the 18th century. Taylor is correct when he writes that “the
importance of recognition has been modified and intensified by the new understanding of
individual identity that emerges at the end of the eighteenth century” (C. Taylor 1994, 28),
but this is a change in degree and not in kind. The very fact that Thomas Hobbes was
already writing about the matter of recognition in 1651 (the publication date of Leviathan)
should give us pause. Taylor qualifies his statement with an emphasis on individualized
identity that is particular to one person, so he defines the importance of culture as an
individualistic experience.
From this individualistic view Taylor derives his idea of human right for
recognition of all cultures, because he has “sanitized” his concept of cultural recognition
from the likelihood of struggle (Parekh 2000, 343). The previously quoted statement that
“one either forbids murder or allows it” highlights this view – in an individualistic society,
harm to the individual is under almost all circumstances a cultural taboo, so there is a much
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broader definition of what constitutes the concept of murder. But this is not so in all
societies, and those who supported the death penalty against Salman Rushdie – we must
assume – were in their eyes not condoning a possible act of murder, but the justified
punishment for an act of blasphemy. Whether or not blasphemy should be punished by
death, or whether the criticism and ridiculing of religion should be part of a free and vibrant
society is once again a deeply cultural question – and although compromise might be
possible, it is doubtful that Taylor would, for example, agree with the idea that instead of
killing a blasphemer we only put him in jail. There is a solid cultural frame that holds
Taylor’s philosophy together, despite his unwillingness to fully commit to it.
One of the reasons for this is that there is one part where both he and Habermas
depart from the Hobbesian perspective. Hobbes was straight-forward in his anti-cultural
position: Culture makes us form group identities, and conflicts between these group
identities can lead to violence; therefore, we should rid ourselves of them altogether and
entirely consign them to the private sphere. Habermas, Taylor and similar philosophers, I
argue, want to bring culture back into the public sphere, but under “sanitized” conditions.
On the one hand, this attempt must be considered, because a public sphere free of
culture and consisting only of rational individualistic human beings is the definition of
Hobbes’ utopia, and most likely not a real option. On the other hand, bringing back culture
under the assumption that we can all control its effects on us individually and collectively
by reason and rationality (in a nutshell the Habermas-Taylor suggestion), is equally hard
to achieve. This is so because even that very specific vision needs to build on a cultural
basis – one that values a certain definition of reason and rationality – and must be hostile
to those cultures that contradict it. As I have pointed out before, Taylor realizes that
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Liberalism is also a “fighting creed,” but he is rather quiet on the specifics. What makes
this even more difficult is that a commitment to liberal values is a precondition for joining
the public sphere, but at the same time these liberal values should include a commitment
to affirm the values of other cultures. Denying recognition to other cultures “can be a form
of oppression” (C. Taylor 1997, 232).
Taylor stops short of the further reaching claims like those by Iris Young that
“groups cannot be socially equal unless their specific experience, culture, and social
contributions are publicly affirmed and recognized” (Young 2011, 174), but only
marginally so. The problem with the general affirmation of cultures is, as Robert K.
Fullinwinder writes, is this:
Why, for example, should I respect the Southern Baptist who
believes I am damned for not practicing his brand of religion? Why should
I respect his belief? And why should he reciprocally respect my contempt
for his benighted superstition? Why should Young respect fellow citizens
in virtue of rather than in spite of their misogyny? In any society of size
there are bound to exist groups loathsome and contemptible from our
particular points of view. An ideal that calls for each of us to respect all
other in virtue of their differences is otherworldly (Fullinwider 1995, 512)

Even if we accept Taylor’s and Young’s assumption that not recognizing one’s
culture is a form of oppression, might there be cases where such an oppression is justified,
maybe even necessary? After World War Two the United States endeavored to implement
a far-reaching strategy to reeducate and reshape German and Japanese culture through
denazification and reeducation (F. Taylor 2012; Tent 1984; Wippich 1996), due to the
realization that there was a strong cultural component that enabled the emergence of these
fascist regimes. The denial of recognition to people whose identity was intertwined with
Nazi ideology and to also deny them social equality certainly was painful for the
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individuals in question, but to grant National Socialism affirmation and recognition
probably would have been an even worse alternative. Similarly, slavery and its supposed
justifications in the antebellum South were deeply intrenched in the local culture (Gross
2000), making the US Civil War in essence a clash of cultures. I think there is a strong
case to be made that slavery and a culture that condones it should be oppressed, regardless
of the degree to which it “animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of
time.”
To be clear, these are not theoretical strawmen that I am building up, but questions
that go to the heart of why culture matters. If human beings were ultimately all to abide by
a form of moral uniformity and equal values that are just waiting to come forward in all
communities, then there would be no problem with bestowing equal recognition and even
affirmation on all cultures. The idea that everybody shares and values equally WEIRD
morality is what I suspect that a lot of modern and postmodern thinkers ultimately believe:
It is hard for many of them to grasp that there are indeed people who view the world and
how to interact with it differently from the way a Western individual in the tradition of the
Enlightenment would (Shweder and Bourne 1984).
But there is only moral universalism, but not moral uniformity, and the same issues
can be handled differently from culture to culture. Sometimes these differences can coexist
without conflict, but sometimes they cannot. As in the examples used above, a liberal
society simply cannot bestow equal recognition on a culture that endorses the idea that
human beings can be owned by other human beings or cultures that view women as being
inherently inferior to men. As Brian Barry points out “we cannot simultaneously affirm
everybody’s culture” (Barry 2002, 271). This is even put more succinctly by Peter Jones:
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People are allowed to believe in the worth of their own culture,
including the beliefs and values that it embodies, yet they are also required
to believe that others’ cultures, embodying different and conflicting beliefs
and values, are of no less worth. How can we expect people to embrace that
absurdity? (P. Jones 1998, 45)

In the end, it is once again Hobbes that provided us with the only workable method
to give equal recognition to all cultures. Ban them entirely to the heart and soul of the
individual and disallow any culture to seep into interpersonal relations or the public sphere,
for the state will immediately step in and stop you. Whatever belief gives you spiritual
fulfillment should be your own, and there is no need to have it shared with, recognized, or
affirmed by any other person.
Unfortunately, there is a tendency in Taylor’s way of argumentation that just
explains conflicting beliefs away or accuses those who point them out as the real problem.
In his contributions regarding the potential for conflict between Islamic and Western
culture, Taylor separates culture and the symbols that represent it in order to cast the
members of all cultures more or less as adherents to Western liberalism. Writing about the
unease some people in non-Muslim cultures have with the practice of veiling, Taylor
explains that
a girl wearing a headscarf might in fact be rebelling against her
parents and their (conservative) kind of Islam, and that others might be
deeply pious while being utterly revolted by gender discrimination or
violence, is lost from view (C. Taylor 2007c)

That most certainly can be the case, but to reinterpret Islamic symbols of piety into
an actual confirmation of Western liberalism and to mock those who have the audacity to
connect Islam to
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the stoning of adulterous women under sharia law in northern
Nigeria, the amputation of thieves' hands in Saudi Arabia, honour killings
of women who refuse arranged marriages in Pakistan (or even northern
English cities like Bradford and Manchester), the willingness to justify
suicide bombings (C. Taylor 2007c)

as if there is no connection at all between Islam and certain practices is at some
point edging right into the territory of deriving an “ought” from an “is.”
Let me highlight this again by referring to the two examples I made previously.
Symbols often have collectively determined meanings, something that is difficult to escape
from even if an individual would prefer symbols to have a different meaning from the one
perceived by the majority. Somebody who finds a swastika to be an aesthetically appealing
symbol would most likely still refrain from displaying it openly, simply by knowing what
kind of meaning most people intuitively and culturally would connect with it. In some
countries this can have stronger repercussions – like fines and even jail time in Germany
for the use of Nazi symbols – or it will be legally tolerated but be the subject to severe
disapprobation by the majority, like in the United States. This in fact does do a great
injustice to the individual in question, especially if he or she is sincerely only displaying
this symbol out of an aesthetic intention.
I would make a similar argument in the US case regarding the display of the
Confederate flag. Most certainly not everyone who has an inclination to display this flag is
a racist, segregationist, separatist, or white supremacist. Nonetheless, there is a perception
of this particular symbol that connects it with these attitudes, and even if someone just likes
it because of the way it looks, or in their mind connects it to different, more noble attitudes,
they will not be able to avoid the perception of the majority. Once again, this can be an
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injustice to the individual in question, but if someone chooses to use symbols that are
intrinsically loaded with positive or negative emotions, people will intuitively reach a value
(pre-)judgment about the person using those symbols.
Let us recall the stories for moral dumbfounding from previous chapters, where
people were unwilling to accept it as morally neutral if someone “is cleaning out her closet,
and she finds her old American flag. She doesn’t want the flag anymore, so she cuts it up
into pieces and uses the rags to clean her bathroom” (Haidt 2013, 19).
Although the fictional story was presented in a way that made clear that this was
done without any political, moral, or anti-American sentiment and only out of practicality,
most of those who heard to story immediately arrived at a moral conclusion, with persons
being interviewed saying things such as “it’s wrong to cut up the flag because a neighbor
might see her do it, and he might be offended” (Haidt 2013, 24). Haidt and his experiment
focused mostly on the question why an individual would make a moral judgement of an
innocent act, but his studies also revealed that people had a key awareness how some
members of society might react to acts that are without moral meaning for the individual
who conducts them. So the person shredding up the US American flag for cleaning the
bathroom, the aesthetically pleased fan of the swastika and the admirer of the Confederate
flag could all have reasons for their actions that are the distinctly contrary from how a
majority of their respective society would interpret them, but under the assumption that
they know the potential consequences of their actions, they might refrain from acting upon
them.
Does this mean that culture infringes on the ability of an individual to fully live out
their inner self? Absolutely, and this is not in contradiction to anything we have so far
359

established about culture in this dissertation. As I have pointed out, culture creates an
emotional-moral web that encourages or restrains behavior that I as a completely
autonomous and independent individual would engage in. But since this inner-self is also
socially constructed, something that Taylor is well aware of (C. Taylor 1997, 230), there
is not simply a tension between me and society, but a dialectic where a society’s majority
culture in some areas emotionally restricts me and in other areas emotionally elevates me.
As we have also discussed at great length, culture is not only operates through negative
emotions like fear, but also through positive emotions like affirmation and recognition.
Culture is not just intersubjective, as Taylor correctly claims (C. Taylor 1971, 27).
And what has meaning for me is not entirely independent from what the same thing means
for others. What is particularly befuddling in the case of Charles Taylor is that in his earlier
writings he seems to make precisely that argument, pointing out that there
are distinctions between different sorts of behavior such that one sort
is considered the appropriate form for one action or context, the other for
another action or context; e.g., doing or saying certain things amounts to
breaking off negotiations, doing or saying other things amounts to making
a new offer (C. Taylor 1971, 25)

If within a society there should happen to be significant disagreement regarding
what is appropriate and what is not,
The intersubjective meanings which are the background to social
action are often treated by political scientists under the heading
"consensus." By this is meant convergence of beliefs on certain basic
matters, or of attitude. But the two are not the same. Whether there is
consensus or not, the condition of there being either one or the other is a
certain set of common terms of reference. A society in which this was
lacking would not be a society in the normal sense of the term, but
several. Perhaps some multiracial or multi-tribal states approach this limit
(C. Taylor 1971, 27 emphasis by me)
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The Charles Taylor of 1971 got it exactly right and in line with what we know from
psychological studies – if there is a significant difference between beliefs on certain basic
matters and attitudes, we are not confronted with one society, but several, each created
around its own beliefs and attitudes. To be clear, people can inhabit several cultural spaces
at the same time, and as long as possible contradictions are small or non-existent smaller
societies can exist and interact under the umbrella of one larger society that in itself exists
as a consequence of certain beliefs and attitudes. Culture can have a bridging effect, for
example when German Protestants and Catholics decided in the 19th century to subordinate
their religious identity to a common German identity. Equally, I believe it is justified to
argue that the United States have overall an impressive history of assimilating different
cultures into a common American culture. There is a somewhat worrisome trend to
describe this assimilation as a process of becoming “white” and to depict it in a rather
negative light (Brodkin 1998; Roediger 2005, 2007). The United States experiences her
own version of a “Hitlerization” of history, where the entirety of the political and cultural
evolution of the United States is viewed through the prism of slavery and race-relations. 65
There is probably no greater challenge for a society than retaining cohesion if its history is
characterized by a grave injustice of one group within that society against another. And
there is an argument to be made that the answer to this injustice cannot simply be
assimilation into a common culture, or, in the American case, the assimilation of an African
American population into an Anglo-Saxon culture that was responsible for the injustice in
65

In 2019 the New York Times Magazine started an article series premised on the idea that the year
1619 and the arrival of the first African slaves is “not country's original sin, but it is more than that: It is the
country's
true
origin”
(https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-americaslavery.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=476B3523C09D57DF61B706E7E94D14F9&gwt=pay&asset
Type=REGIWALL)
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the first place. And we see similar challenges in Canada and Australia with its indigenous
populations who have experienced their own suppression at the hands of a white majority.
These historical experiences permeate Taylor’s writing and provide the backdrop
against which we can better understand his claim that assimilation is the “cardinal sin
against the ideal of authenticity” (C. Taylor 1994, 38). But it is also here where a problem
with Taylor’s philosophy arises. He argues convincingly about the necessity of a society
to allow, recognize and affirm individuals and groups authentic identity. But he fails to
fully define what the sources of an authentic identity can be, which does come as a bit of a
disappointment considering that one of his major works is titled “Sources of the Self” (C.
Taylor 1992). In this elaborate and insightful work, Taylor provides us with an interesting
genealogy of modern identity, but comes very close to the rather pessimistic idea that
modernity no longer allows for fully authentic identities. Whether or not this is true is one
thing, but his skepticism towards modernity paired with his concern of forced assimilation
into a majority identity creates an almost anti-assimilationist cultural philosophy. That in
itself is of course a defendable position, but then Taylor would have to provide us with a
structure of how societies that consist of groups who refuse any form of assimilation can
maintain social cohesion. Also, Taylor, Habermas and others who defend similar positions
show a striking unawareness of the differences between the cultural recognition of groups
and individuals. When Taylor writes that “what we are asked to recognize is the unique
identity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else” (C. Taylor 1994,
38), he glosses over the significant issue that being recognized as a member of a group and
being recognized as an individual is not the same thing, and that in fact these can be based
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on very different forms of recognition. And what makes things even more complex is that
these forms of recognition can be in conflict.
When Taylor demands recognition of a group, he demonstrates considerable
awareness of what this could mean for the potential individual recognition of the members
within that group. It is a very simplistic view to assume that if the majority culture grants
minorities recognition the members of these minorities will be freed from oppression and
can be their authentic selves. It is equally true that group recognition will “cage-in”
members of the minority group, and potentially entirely close off the possibility of
assimilation into the majority culture. In Taylor’s own Canada the government has made
great efforts to recognize the cultural autonomy and authority of its Aboriginal people, with
the consequence of less and less assimilation and people of Aboriginal descent remaining
locked into a culture that wrestles with social problems that surpass the situation in the rest
of Canada (Flanagan 2000; Widdowson and Howard 2008). To point this out is not to
ignore or deny the crimes and sins of Western colonialism in general and the Canadian case
in particular; but to first take someone’s land and then pursue policies that make it
increasingly difficult for members of the Aboriginal people to fully join and enjoy the
benefits of Canadian citizenship seems to be a misguided way of making up for sins of the
past.
Even worse, we encounter again the conflation of culture and ethnicity, and within
Taylor’s argument there is the idea that there can be only one authentic self for people of a
certain heritage or that show certain physiological characteristics. But there is no evidence
for that, and it also reveals a complete misunderstanding of what assimilation actually
means. If a person assimilates into a culture, this means that they emotionally embrace the
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moral matrix of the culture they join. One can think about this like the US-American patriot
of Swedish descent who speaks of “our Constitution” even though his grandparents might
only have arrived in the United States in the 1930s. Would anybody claim that this
individual’s sense of identity is misguided and he suffers from false consciousness because
his “true” allegiance should be with Carl XVI Gustaf, the reigning King of Sweden? Taylor
is correct in emphasizing the importance of an authentic identity, but without a standard
against which we can measure authenticity we are left with random declarations of what is
supposedly authentic and what is not.
I hope that in the previous chapters I have laid out a possible standard that could
help us to define authenticity: I claim that an authentic identity is one to which an individual
feels an intuitive emotional bond that ties him or her to a community and its values as well
as intrinsically invested symbols, and that this identity is also recognized and reciprocated
by other members of the community. These values and symbols can be constructed around
ethnicity or heritage, but there is no iron law of identity that says that they have to. Cultures
therefore can be more open to new members than others, depending on their values. This
also offers us an additional way to measure the relative position of cultures vis-à-vis each
other, even if we use two seemingly very different cases: Islam and being a US Citizen, for
example, are two cultures that are more open than cultures that have skin color or tribal
relations as a sacred core that enables membership. This does not mean that the Quran and
the US Constitution enshrine the same principles, but that both cultures are in theory open
to every individual that commits to them. 66 Historically, people with originally vastly
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I am of course not blind to the fact that within the United States just as within religious
communities very often additional hierarchies emerge that are defined by the ethnic characteristics of
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different backgrounds have joined and been accepted into new cultures, and it is not at all
clear that this process of assimilation was always negative. Without the assimilation of
Arabic tribes into the Umma of Islam the world would have been deprived of one of
history’s greatest civilizations, with most likely devastating consequences for humanity
due to the loss of all the scientific and artistic inventions that were brought forth by the
culture of Islam (Hoyland 2017). Similarly, it has most likely been beneficial for the United
States that former members of so-called Celtic tribal culture in the South have been
absorbed and assimilated in the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture of the North (McWhiney
1990; Sowell 2006).
We probably do not think about these cases as often because they do not include
racial or ethnic differences, so an Irish Catholic becoming an American Protestant or a
Swedish atheist becoming an American Republican, do not seem as odd to us as an
Aboriginal Canadian becoming a Nationalist Canadian. There are multiple factors at work,
including the willingness of the majority culture to accept attempts of assimilation, but
from the perspective of the individual there is no evidence or argument that can
convincingly claim that somebody born as an aboriginal Canadian cannot change their
cultural identity and be as much authentic to themselves as they would be with their
previous identity. The entire point of true assimilation is that the person feels and is
accepted as a member of a new culture. If these two conditions are fulfilled it is hard to
argue why an individual should not hold an authentic identity, even if it differs significantly
from the identity of previous generations or members of the same ethnic group. And if

supposedly equal members of the same culture. But even in that case more open cultures have a better record
than deliberately more closed cultures.
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there are actually multiple paths towards a truly authentic identity, should it not matter to
us and policy makers what that the content of that identity is? The moral claim to the equal
recognition of all cultures would only be fully justified if it would be as unalterable as
certain other characteristics of human beings.
If Taylor would limit his argument to the idea that equal recognition should be
applied regardless of a person’s skin color, heritage, gender, geographical origin, or other
immutable characteristics he would have a much stronger case. But this does not apply in
the case of culture, because although it can involve painful emotional change and
emancipation, in principle changing one’s culture is always a possibility. There can be a
fruitful discussion as to the standards by which we can measure the differences of cultures
and their consequences, but to proclaim that this is near-impossible as Taylor does is a
flawed assumption.
His argument for equal recognition is based on the concern that “the projection of
an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent
that the image is internalized” (C. Taylor 1994, 36). While this observation is correct, it is
not a sufficient argument for equal and universal recognition. As I have pointed out before,
there are powerful examples that can justify the projection of an inferior image. That there
is no public affirmation for members of Neo-Nazi gangs or the Ku Klux Klan and that they
are subject to ostracization by the majority of society serves this very purpose, that once
this demeaning image has been internalized, members will consider changing their culture.
Equally, the reason why many governments offer de-radicalization programs for right wing
or Islamic extremists is because these particular cultures are not viewed as equal.
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Nowhere in Taylor’s or Young’s writing does it occur to them that affirming
minority cultures makes assimilation into the majority culture much more difficult. And
cultural psychology gives us good indicators why that is the case. If we attach significant
moral value to being a member of a group, like being part of one of the Canadian aboriginal
groups, any individual who tries to leave these groups will automatically be stigmatized as
a rule breaker who has violated a sacred idea, creating a strong emotional disincentive to
leave the group. There is significant evidence that keeping people trapped between two
cultures comes at severe psychological cost (Wexler 2006), and that well-intended cultural
affirmation can have unintended consequences. Trying to lock people into cultural
identities because of their heritage or skin color is not just misunderstanding assimilation,
it ultimately is misunderstanding culture.
The same applies to our initial example regarding the matter of veiling: Taylor is
undoubtedly right that there is can be a plethora of individual reasons why a woman of
Muslim faith is wearing a Burka or a Hijab, but to entirely disconnect cultural symbols
from the contextual meaning they have for a majority of insiders and outsiders of the
culture in question is a very ambiguous philosophical proposition. If we would take
Taylor’s argument further, cultural symbols would lose all meaning: If wearing the Burka
is just a different way to affirm the same values like a woman who burned her bra in the
1960s, then we really could do without any discussion about underlying values. But veiling
does have a particular meaning independently of what the individual who engages in it
believes for themselves. If Taylor would have made a case for the unabridged right of an
individual to dress as they please, that would have been one thing, but he equally demands
recognition for what the veil symbolizes and then goes on to provide his own interpretation
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of what it is that it symbolizes. It is worth mentioning that Taylor himself once supported
more restrictive measures regarding public veiling (Authier 2019), and only changed his
views recently, because he views Islamophobia as a bigger threat to societal cohesion than
the practice of veiling.
Ultimately Taylor seems to have such a disenchanted view of a supposedly
disenchanted world that culture no longer is a matter of competing transcendental ideas of
the world, but of possible compromises between individuals who fundamentally all agree
on the rational nature of things. The good news for Taylor’s unease is that the world
probably is not as disenchanted as he thinks, and people still cling to ideas that give their
life meaning beyond mere material existence. The bad news is; compromise in such a world
will be much more difficult to achieve.
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CHAPTER VI: CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONS - THE WAY FORWARD
We cannot finish our discussion of culture without at least taking a short glimpse
at the matter of institutions, for it is institutions that translate ideas and identities into actual
and sustained political realities. Additionally, institutionalism has become the major field
to produce explanations for the economic and political success of some societies and the
failure or decline of others. There is a growing consensus that it is not individuals that
determine the shape of a society, but the institutions they decide to build (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2012; Douglass C. North 1990, 1991; Douglass C. North, Wallis, and Weingast
2009; Douglass C. North and Weingast 1989). Yet these institutions themselves depend on
being seen as legitimate by the people, and regularly this legitimacy comes from the
grounding of institutions in the intrinsic and collective values of a society (Crawford and
Ostrom 1995; E. Ostrom 2000). As numerous studies have shown, institutions are not only
anchored in culture, they also have the ability to change culture (Greif 2006b). Prominent
examples would be: the success of Islamic institutions in altering the tribal structures of
Arab societies; the endorsement of democracy by the Catholic church in the 1970s and its
transformation from being an obstacle to becoming an active promoter of democratization;
the role of the U.S. Supreme Court with its influence based on the role of being the highest
authority on interpreting the constitution, which is at the heart of America’s political and
cultural identity.
Human development beyond clans and tribes has culminated (for now) in the
emergence of the modern state. While there is an ongoing debate about the ideal form of
government, the view of the state as the sole form of legitimate representation and main
bulwark against Hobbesian anarchy remains the dominant argument in political science.
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Although there are discussions about the end of the (nation)state (Mann 1993a, 1997), the
possibility of a world state (Wendt 2003), and the ability of transnationalism to replace
state power in certain areas (Dingwerth 2007), the state continues to be the focus of both
bureaucratic and organizational power as well as being invested with a level of legitimacy
by the people that are governed by it.
The central characteristic of the modern state was defined by Max Weber in his
Politics as a Vocation (M. Weber 1994) as consisting in the legitimate monopoly over
violence within a given territory. The modern state, therefore, is no longer based on kin
and family, but on territory and new forms of social bonds between individuals. These new
bonds were created by distinctively cultural processes, transferring legitimacy away from
the family to institutions based on religion, traditions, and ideas. The strength of these new
bonds was substantial enough to allow taxation and drafting into armies, and obliged
people to live by the laws of the state. The state itself is at least in part a cultural artifact,
and cannot be fully understood without a conceptualization of culture.
Accepting the state as a cultural artifact, however, also entails that it can never be
completely neutral towards cultural developments within the state. If we take the concept
of identity in modernity seriously, the state must ensure that the anxiety of individuals
between inner-self and social conformity does not threaten the conformity necessary to
legitimize state institutions. Culture and its role in the formation of identities that supersede
the loyalty to one's kin are a necessary condition for virtually any kind of state formation.
It is no coincidence that both the birth of the modern state and the birth of modern identities
in the West can be traced to into the 16th and 17th century. As Charles Taylor points out,
modern identity politics starts at the time of the Protestant Reformation, with rapidly
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increasing literacy and social mobility. (For an overview of Taylor and social mobility,
see: Fukuyama 2006).
In the European case, national identity became the driving force in state
development, brought most obviously to the forefront as a consequence of the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648, which historically marks the birth of the Nation State. National identity
for elite groups, however, was a reality much earlier than the 17th century. David Cannadine
gives us an interesting glimpse into its early stages with the following quotation from 1241
by Frederick II, warning his fellow rulers of the threat posed by the Mongols: “Germany
was fervent in arms, France was the mother and nurse of chivalry, Spain was warlike and
bold, and England was fertile and protected by its fleet” (Cannadine 2011 Minute 21).
We have similar historic cases of culture as the trigger of state formation in China,
India, and the Middle East (see: Fukuyama 2012, for an overview). Contrary to the often
England-centric story of institution-building (e.g. see: Douglass C. North and Weingast
1989), different cultural backgrounds led to significantly different states: state formation
in China was strongly secular-theoretical and lead to very centralized forms of institutions,
whereas the sacralization of the division of labor in India’s Brahmanism led to a much less
centralized state. The history of the state in the Arab world can almost exclusively be
explained by the emergence of Islam, which for the first time allowed the unification of
formerly nomadic tribes into a unified empire.
Additionally, the longevity of institutions is connected to their cultural background
as well, and history provides some interesting examples: a major problem of the Ottoman
Empire was the inability to create a loyal bureaucracy, making them dependent on the
Janissaries and the Devshirme. In this system the Ottoman Empire abducted children from
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conquered areas in order to train and educate them to become the empires’ elite bureaucrats
and military leaders. The need for doing so emerged because the Ottoman system was not
as capable of overcoming the strong loyalties individuals who were supposed to work for
the state felt towards their kin and tribe and who often acted for the benefit of tribal groups
but not the state – Christianity, on the other hand, was much more successful in weakening
the family bonds (Fukuyama 2012c, chap. 15).
States and culture, therefore, do not develop in isolation from each other but are
closely entwined from the beginning. It remains a neglected fact in contemporary political
science that the state almost everywhere emerged out of cultural changes that enabled the
emergence of strong and resilient ties of loyalty paralleling or even surpassing kin and
tribal loyalties. Equally, states made significant efforts in ensuring the emotional
connection between the state and the people over which it was supposed to rule. Charles
Tilly argues that “war made the state, and the state made war,” but it is also true that culture
made the state, and the state made culture. While a nascent national consciousness of
European peoples can be traced back to the 12th century, it was an increasingly active and
centralized state that nurtured and directed a collective consciousness that became a
necessary condition for the legitimacy of state institutions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012).
There is significant evidence that states engaged strongly in the creation of national
cultures to justify their rule. Existing cultural artifacts like language and history were taken
up in order to mold them into a national consciousness (Hobsbawm 2012; E. Weber 1976).
The early project of modernity was also a project of creating the nation. The success and
speed of this endeavor is quite astounding: Despite the fact that in 1789 only 12-13% of
the population in France spoke “correct” French or that in 1860 only 2,5% of Italy’s
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population used Italian language for everyday purposes, this tiny minority was “in a real
sense a and therefore the [Italian] people. Nobody else was” (Hobsbawm 2012, 61).
Similarly, Hobsbawm argues the existence of a German identity is in some respects “a
purely cultural concept” (Hobsbawm 2012, 61).

6.1

Formal and Informal Institutions
While institutions represent formalized rules of a society, the legitimacy of these

institutions is part of the informal realm. Aoki (M. Aoki 2001) and Boettke et al. (Boettke,
Coyne, and Leeson 2008, 334) emphasize “the importance of informal complementary
institutions that allow formal institutions to function in the desired manner.”
Francis Fukuyama makes a similar point, arguing for the necessary distinction
between formal institutions like constitutions and legal systems, and “informal norms that
fall into the realm of culture” (Fukuyama 2012c, 531). Niall Ferguson, who champions the
institutional approach as a historian and regularly issues “health warnings” (Ferguson
2013, 27) with regard to cultural interpretations, admits that “institutions are, of course, in
some sense the products of culture” (Ferguson 2011a, 10). Institutions and culture,
therefore, are corresponding and not competing concepts. Culture shapes institutions, but
at the same time institutions reinforce and shape culture (Greif 2006b). An example would
be the democratic turn of the Catholic Church in the 1970s – an institution that originally
had a troubled relationship with democracy, then moved to embracing it, allowing its
followers to do the same (Huntington 1993; Woodberry 2012).
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Efficient institutional arrangements can emerge spontaneously from societies (like
Islam in the Arab world), and often they work more efficiently and with fewer negative
externalities than “artificially” created and implemented institutions (Hay and Shleifer
1998; Leeson 2006; E. Ostrom 1990, 2000; J. C. Scott 1999). Institutions are created in
order to constrain and shape individual behavior via mechanics of reward and punishment,
but also by creating social norms that define actions that are obligatory, permitted, or
forbidden (Crawford and Ostrom 1995). As Ostrom (E. Ostrom 2000, 144) argues, the
content of these norms varies from culture to culture and is not stable, but dynamic. The
interplay of culture and institutions also creates certain path-dependencies, meaning that
cultural evolution will most likely look differently from society to society, depending on
what their “original” culture and traditions looked like (Greif 1994, 2006b; Greif, Tabellini,
and Britain) 2010). A similar point is made by Almond and Verba (Verba 1965), who argue
that compatibility of societies with democracy is not static, but strongly dependent on
historical experiences.
The disciplines of history, sociology and anthropology often focus on very specific
geographical areas and time periods, allowing them to create thick descriptions of cultural
backgrounds to political processes (B. Anderson 2006; Geertz 1993; James C. Scott 2009).
Additionally, culturalists in comparative politics have to compete with the powerful
structural and rational choice approaches in their field (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997, 2–
8). These approaches often provide more elegant answers to questions like state formation
(Tilly 1975) and other major developments.
One of the reasons why culture might yet make a comeback in political science
could be due to empirical research like Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (Putnam
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1993), in which he tries to show that different performances of governance in Italian
regions can be traced back to centuries’ old differences in civic traditions. Introducing the
term “social capital” into the discussion, Putnam succeeded in reinvigorating the
importance of cultural questions in politics and moving it beyond civic and political
culture.
The concept of social capital, often defined as the degree of civic participation in
society emerging as a byproduct of cultural norms, allowed the development of more
quantitative research programs, comparing the state of social capital over time and in
different countries (Ferguson 2013; Fukuyama 1996, 2000; Murray 2012; Skocpol 2004).
The survey studies by Robert Inglehart are a central part of the study of culture in
comparative politics (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart 1977, 1997) – his concept
that mass beliefs exist and matter for democratization made culture a phenomenon that
could be inquired beyond the usual reducibility of political processes to the individual level
in political science.
Putnam’s stunning success in bringing culture back onto the table (Laitin 1995)
also resulted in new avenues of cultural research, especially with regard to the question of
trust. Originally trying to learn from other disciplines, now historians and economists have
now started to employ these ideas in their own research (see, for example: Akerlof and
Kranton 2011; Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995; Elinor Ostrom and Ahn 2003).
Other studies in a similar direction started to formulate historical path dependencies
that showed that the emergence of different cultural value systems can affect political
outcomes over long periods of time (Greif 1994). In a number of his studies on Asia, Pye
showed that authoritarianism has to be understood differently depending on the cultural
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context (Pye 1985). Comparing the political development of China and India, Francis
Fukuyama concludes that it is mainly cultural and historical factors that explain why China
is much more centralized than India, and that this has to be taken into account when
debating the prospect of democratization in the former (Fukuyama 2012c).
Other research compared specific qualities of cultural values and how they affect
political and economic development. One example for this is the comparison of the attitude
towards literacy in different religions and its influence on political outcomes (Ferguson
2011a). Most importantly, these comparative studies have helped to determine whether
cultural factors are exogenous or endogenous, in sharpening the toolset for comparative
politics (G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 191).
Also, the understanding of regional political developments can be better understood
if a culture is a factor of analysis. Pakistani involvement with, and occasional support for,
the Taliban in Afghanistan has been puzzling to many analysts, especially due to the
continuous involvement of the Taliban in terrorist attacks on Pakistani soil. Yet this policy
becomes more logical if one looks at the tensions between culture and ethnicity. Pakistan
is a multiethnic state with religion as the binding glue, making it central to the country’s
existence such that Islamic culture and not ethnic markers is the dominant factor when it
comes to the emotional identity of the population. An ethnical awakening in Afghanistan
that would lead to a fracturing of the country along ethnic lines could spill over into
Pakistan and would potentially be a more existential threat to Islamabad than Taliban
terrorism. This means that despite the uneasy relationship between Pakistan and the
Taliban, it is in the interest of the former that Islam remains the core of Afghan identity
and continues to trump the regional and ethnic aspirations of tribal leaders – something the
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Taliban promise to deliver. Similarly, neighboring multi-ethnic Iran has no interest in
ethnicity becoming a more prominent political force than it already is, preferring religion
as the major source of identity.

6.2

Towards Taking Culture Seriously Again
Ultimately this discussion needs to answer one question: Does culture matter? Does

the turn away from culture have any political and social relevance that makes it a topic
worth engaging with beyond mere academic interest? I think the answer is yes, and the
reason why culture continues to matter is due to its impact on the formation, functioning,
and sustainability of institutions. Certainly, there are institutions that can exist and maintain
themselves without any significant cultural underpinning, and we have addressed them
already in this dissertation. Being a member of Amazon Prime or Sam’s Club comes with
significant mutual benefits for both the creator of the institution and those who join it, even
though there is not much of an emotional commitment to my membership beyond my
economic interest. But can all institutions and the communities they serve be maintained
by solely a mutual exchange of benefits? Are we supposed to accept and endorse human
and civil rights not as a moral good, but as something that confers benefits upon us and
therefore the endorsement is the rational thing to do? Being against slavery and racial
discrimination, not as a moral imperative, but a utilitarian principle would mean: if
egalitarian societies generate more happiness for a greater number of people, we should
prefer it to non-egalitarian societies. This, of course, would also imply that if nonegalitarian societies should be better in generating happiness, we should equally endorse
them as well.
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The problem is that happiness – despite the attempts by Bentham and others
(Shapiro 2012, chaps. 2 and 3) – can be difficult to measure objectively, and, as social
philosophers from Aristotle to Adam Smith have pointed out, it matters a lot what a society
considers as sources of happiness. Culture continues to play a key role in the creation of
emotional triggers, and what we perceive as appropriate sources of happiness, sadness, joy
or shame depends largely on our cultural framework. The cultural framework we live in
can be so internalized, that we no longer recognize it and take it as a given. Yet things like
private property or equality before the law are cultural creations that have not been around
for as long as we might think, and to take them for granted ignores the fact that they and
other values have been the consequence of numerous cultural revolutions. (For a history of
property rights and other economic inventions see: Screpanti and Zamagni 2005.) On the
other hand, this should highlight the power of culture for us: we are so deeply and
emotionally attached to some of these values that we have a difficult time understanding
that they have not been the dominant values for every society at every point in history. As
Charles Taylor has pointed out in his magisterial A Secular Age (C. Taylor 2007a), there
once was a time when not-believing in a deity simply was not an option and created a
different value system compared to the one we have today. Still, people believed in God
just as strongly as we in the West believe in our secular values today. In fact, one of the
worries that Taylor expresses is that maybe the belief in God was actually stronger than
our belief in secular values is nowadays.
Yet, even authors like Taylor and Connolly, who have written insightfully about
the creation of identity and how culture matters for it nonetheless have a rather
inconsequential view of the actual emotional commitments culture generally entails. In a
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nutshell, their argument rests on the idea that if we realize that culture serves an emotional
need and is therefore a means to an end, there should be no conflict or contradiction
between different cultures since they all serve an individual emotional need. The terms
used to describe this emotional need are often either recognition or intersubjective selfrespect, so this theorizing does not preclude the element and necessity of sociability (C.
Taylor 1971), but it attaches a very utilitarian aspect to it. John Rawls, for example, argues
that self-respect can be based on having one’s actions publicly affirmed by others. But
affirmation does not have to come from the entire society but only from those who are
already like-minded (Rawls 1999, 441). This of course would only function if these groups
and their members would not care about what the other groups do, an argument that is
equally Hobbesian and utilitarian. Rawls only escapes Hobbes’ need for the Leviathan,
because all the individuals in his society prefer and share membership in a liberal
constitutional democracy (Fiss et al. 1985, 234). Thus, they have an inclination towards
tolerance that makes the joining and leaving of different groups possible, and individuals
can explore multiple ways to find self-respect and recognition. But, ultimately, he puts
forward a Hobbesian idea: People are individualistic, and once they realize their
individuality, culture just becomes another good to be consumed for one’s personal wellbeing.
In other words, Rawls takes an incredibly thick cultural basis – liberal constitutional
democracy – on which he erects a concept of cultural pluralism. In his ideal society,
everyone can believe whatever they want, as long as their core belief is of a liberal and
individualistic nature. It is a noble vision, but it is not a culturally pluralistic one, because
the diversity Rawls is approving of only follows after everyone has already joined and
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emotionally committed to his virtues of liberalism and individualism. It would be more
consequential to talk about 2nd degree cultural pluralism, because the 1st degree remains
fundamentally anchored in a cultural monism that makes the 2nd degree pluralism possible.
In the end, Rawls simply has a more complex way to restate the (in a previous chapter
already quoted) statement by John Adams regarding the United States: that “our
Constitution is designed only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate for
any other” (Adams 1798). John Rawls could write that his theory is designed for an
individualistic and tolerant people, but wholly inadequate for any other. Robert Putnam,
who has written extensively about cultural diversity and community admits as much in his
own analysis:
In the short to medium run, however, immigration and ethnic
diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital […]. In the
medium to long run, on the other hand, successful immigrant societies
create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative effects of
diversity by constructing new, more encompassing identities. Thus, the
central challenge for modern, diversifying societies is to create a new,
broader sense of ‘we’ (Putnam 2007, 138–39 emphasis by me)

Putnam seems to be so wedded to his idea of diversity that he doesn’t realize that
this last sentence is in fact a contradiction in terms. If a group of people shares a common
“we” that goes beyond economic interests and is based on social trust and emotional
attachments (which is what Putnam means), it is no longer a diversifying but a unifying
society that is becoming culturally more homogeneous instead of heterogeneous. Just like
Rawls, Taylor, Habermas and many others, Putnam defends his argument for pluralism and
diversity with an appeal to unity. Once a group of people share a sincere and intuitive “we”feeling in relation to each other, their diversity and differences have decreased, not
increased. In his analysis Putnam shows empirically how a common identity increases the
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participation of individuals in public life and how it improves the performance of
government, a relation that has also been confirmed in studies outside the US (Rothstein
2011).
Western societies can easily find themselves in a situation where they have to make
trade-offs between strong social cohesion based on a shared culture and the advantages of
a pluralist society. This is the great paradox liberal societies face, and which also
constitutes their greatest weakness: how can a state be purely liberal, if it prefers some
cultural values over others? The answer to this question depends on the definition of
liberalism and its emancipation from relativistic pluralism. Even Charles Taylor accepts
the limits to multiculturalism and the possibility of turning liberalism into a “fighting
creed” (C. Taylor 1994, 62). Jacob Levy gives us a glimpse into what such a creed could
look like:
Non-cruelty, non-humiliation, and genuine tolerance are possible if
not always easy. Public affirmation of respect and recognition, though,
cannot be available to all cultures simultaneously … To recognize what a
group values in its own culture is to accept a standard by which some other
groups fail to be worthy of respect (Levy 2000, 32).

This is a clear rejection of a cultural relativism that tends “to attribute ‘equal value’
to all cultures … [and] destroys the very notion of value. If everything is of value, nothing
is of value: the value loses its content” (Joppke 2004, 242). A functioning marriage
between multiculturalism and liberalism (Kymlicka 1996) within a state can therefore only
be achieved under the dominance of, and tolerance by, a liberal culture and liberalism as
the central common meaning.
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By nature, state involvement in culture oscillates between the extremes of complete
neutrality and totalitarianism, although the later can be prevented if we take Habermas’
idea of the public sphere seriously. Habermas did not simply call for pluralism, but for
pluralism in a public sphere that would serve as a space to allow for cultural evolution via
debate and discourse under the absence of totalitarian structures. It is therefore the public
sphere that the liberal state has to promote, not simply a dedication to pluralism per se: “an
uncritical embrace of diversity may obscure the need to promote citizenship and the
elements of a healthy civic life” (Macedo 2003, 6). There are inherent risks to such an
uncritical embrace as outlined and criticized by Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama 2000) and
Michael Ignatieff (Ignatieff 2003, 90). Both argue that liberal societies have to develop a
liberal consciousness that would trump the right to equal recognition of illiberal groups.
The current institutional setup in Western democracies makes it difficult to promote
the development of a public sphere due to its focus on uncritical pluralism and
individualism, which due to its lack of collective identity could lead to a decay of the
institutions themselves. The neoinstitutional economist Avner Greif argues that Western
institutions “may have undermined themselves in the long run by creating excessive
individualism and materialism” (Greif 2006b, 26). Michael Walzer makes similar
arguments and calls for the active engagement of the state in reviving the public sphere
(Walzer 1994)
Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas, and other writers about modernity and postmodernity are continuing the Weberian legacy of interpreting and describing the
rationalization of the world, but they themselves remain largely caught in an instrumental
interpretation of culture that leaves little room for the importance of psychological
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processes. They lament the loss of authenticity of the modern world, but neither of them
can provide us with a defense of culture that is not directly drawn from the very world they
criticize. Culture becomes an instrument in the rational world they imagine, a world that
supposedly lost its authenticity because of rationality (regarding Habermas see: Baxter
1987; regarding Taylor see: C. Taylor 1992).
By instrumental, I mean that while they accept a plurality of cultures and cultural
interpretation of the world and its importance for human flourishing, they struggle
considerably with the idea that people can have exclusive and ultimate emotional
commitments to certain values. Taylor writes about the demand for universal justice and
beneficence, claims of equality, freedom and self-rule and the avoidance of death and
suffering (C. Taylor 1992, 495). These and other universalities across cultures have been
well established (D. E. Brown 2004), but the particularities of what equality, freedom, and
justice mean can differ widely. There is, in other words, a universalism of moral values,
but no uniformity. Even within the United States there is a significant difference between
liberals and conservatives in their interpretation of equality: For many on the right, ideal
equality means equality of opportunity; for many on the left, it means equality of outcome
(Sowell 2007, chap. 6). The same moral value of equality can be expressed quite
differently, so even if all the values Taylor lists are indeed the most important ones, it will
not change the fact that even these values can be expressed in different, sometimes
seemingly contradictory, ways.
This has been addressed in great detail in the first part of the dissertation, so we
need not to go into too much detail here, but allow me to recapture one of this dissertation’s
core findings: That similar or even the same moral values can have different cultural
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expressions. But these expressions are often invested with strong emotional commitments
on the individual and collective level, creating unease if we see them violated. Taylor and
others believe that this can easily be overcome and we are able to live in a world where
cultural differences are living side-by-side and free of conflict due to our realization that
culture is mostly important for our own individual well-being and this function should not
be limited just because other people have other ways of finding sources of their well-being.
Taylor’s argument is partially Hobbesian with some modern adaptions – Hobbes, just like
Taylor, made the case that individual fulfillment should not be limited just because it differs
from others’ means of a fulfilling live; this is so, as long as these means do not interfere
with the life and liberty of other individuals, and, most importantly, a stable political order
(S. B. Smith 2016, chap. 4).
Modern political philosophy often looks at culture like an emotional gumball
machine, where one can get emotional satisfaction, but without the need to look at the
deeper emotional commitments that cultures demand (see Taylor’s idea of solidarity across
cultures: C. Taylor 2007b). Martha Nussbaum, for example, argued strongly for a
replacement of the culture of patriotism with a culture of cosmopolitanism, since in her
view these are easily interchangeable (M. C. Nussbaum 1994) – until she had to partially
reverse her views later (M. C. Nussbaum 2008) and rephrased it as “globally sensitive
patriotism.” Taylor defends cultural pluralism but once again his prescription would
require a very low level of emotional commitment to any specific culture or identity:
A society’s sense of solidarity can be sustained only if all of its
different spiritual groups recreate their sense of dedication to it: if Christians
see it as central to their Christianity, if Muslims see it as central to their
Islam, and if the various kinds of lay philosophies see it as central to their
philosophies” (C. Taylor 2007b).
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To be clear, Taylor is not talking about solidarity within groups of Christians,
Muslims, and “lay philosophers” but between members of these groups. He goes even a
step further and argues that this should become “central” to their culture, meaning that
solidarity with those outside of your own cultural group should become the sacred core of
your own. Taylor, despite his claims to the contrary, does not take culture seriously as a
social force – he puts forward an approach that is pluralist on the surface, but not in
substance. If all cultural groups in a society are built on the same sacred core – namely
solidarity with each other – these groups have merged into a new culture in its own right,
constituting its own unique cultural identity and not a multicultural mosaic. Taylor’s theory
recognizes the importance of community, but it remains anchored in a powerful
individualism that cannot cope with the idea that people hold identities (regardless of
religious or secular in nature) because they are loyal to some values and critical or outright
hostile to others.
Taylor goes to great lengths to discuss the dialectic between society and one’s inner
self that sets the conditions to discover one’s true authentic identity, but he can never fully
detach himself from ethnic considerations like being black or female, thereby not simply
making a claim to the individual right for an authentic identity, but smuggling in his idea
what that identity might be (C. Taylor 1997, chap. 12“The Politics of Recognition”).
Habermas attempts to resolve this issue by writing that “different values are not
mutually exclusive like different truths. So there is also no difficulty for the secular
consciousness to recognize that an alien ethos has the same authenticity for the other and
enjoys the same priority that one’s own ethos has for oneself” (Habermas 2005, 27).
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Habermas is of course right that members of one culture – in his case a secular one – can
recognize the authenticity of an alien ethos, but recognition is not the same as feeling or
sharing this ethos. As we have already discussed, it is easier to understand alien (to use
Habermas’ diction) values than to feel them. We made this argument before, but let us use
a more provocative example to highlight how problematic a simply focus on recognition
is. 67 A neo-Nazi and an Amnesty International activist might have the same emotional
commitment to their cause, meaning that participating in their meetings, pronouncing their
creeds, and feeling emotional elevation as being part of their group is activating the same
areas in their brains since they share the same human physiology. Maybe they can even
relate to and understand each other’s commitment to a supposedly higher cause. But none
of this means that they would be able to form a community together based on their values,
because we must assume that they hold these values to be truths and see the other side as
violators of their intrinsic values tantamount to attacks on their very group identity.
Taylor and Habermas often avoid the question of competing emotional
commitments by declaring something a cultural phenomenon that really is not cultural at
all. If none of the emotional aspects we discussed in part one applies to a given issue, that
issue most likely is only of limited or no cultural content at all. Their argument resembles
one made by Francis Fukuyama in his treatise on identity when he argues about how the
increasing number of exotic food options in Washington, D.C. is proof for cultural
pluralism and benign coexistence (Fukuyama 2018, KL 1807). Despite their philosophical
and theoretical sophistication in other areas, the actual treatment of culture by these authors

67

I am using following examples on purpose to also elicit an emotional reaction from the reader.
Regardless on which side in the examples he or she comes down on, the very fact that is difficult to remain
emotionally indifferent to either side proves my point.
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is astonishingly superficial and simplistic. To address Fukuyama’s culinary example:
Different cuisines can coexist if food and its preparation are not central to the very values
Habermas is talking about – in other words, if they have no cultural significance. A devout
Christian will not have a profound issue with a Japanese restaurant preparing Sushi. But
this is not because of cultural harmony and understanding, but indifference.
What would happen if food in fact is central to the value system of a culture? In
recent years, German police have had to break up fights and riots in public parks, where
Muslim Germans demanded public barbecue places with grills that have not been used to
prepare pork and German right-wing activists who insisted on preparing pork on these
publicly available grills. In the latter case, food becomes infused with cultural values and
the increased likelihood of clashes between those who hold these values. The potential for
overlap as well as the potential for conflict between cultures differs based on the amount
of contradicting values, but to argue that two sides can always approach each other with
nothing but mutual understanding seems unlikely. Certainly, a pro-choice activist can
understand and maybe even respect the emotional commitment of a pro-life activist and
vice-versa, but can they really just accept each other’s position without conflict? The only
way such a conflict can be resolved is if there is a higher, even stronger, cultural
commitment that binds the two sides more closely together than the disagreement that
separates them.
This is ultimately what Habermas, Taylor, Fukuyama, and others are implying to
varying degrees: The common commitment to rational individualism and individual liberty
should supersede value antagonisms based on religion, ideology, or other forms of identity.
While that assumption is not unreasonable, it is not so much about tolerance between
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cultures as it is about replacing existing cultures with a more strongly unifying one. We
have discussed this previously, but one example would be the case of the atheist and the
religious American who might be feel significantly apart when it comes to certain values,
but where the shared value of being an American and the reassurance that both sides have
the same emotional tie to the US can create a value-bond whose connecting power is
stronger than the antagonism borne of different values in other areas.
History provides numerous examples about the forging of new identities through
the re-wiring and expanding of existing emotional commitments. In its beginning, the two
large monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam, were expert at incorporating existing
structures and transforming them so that people switched their creed but could continue
emotionally-valuable traditions, or, in the words of a contemporary scholar: “Islam
explicitly and discreetly affiliated itself with the traditions already in place in the region”
(Ahmed 1992, 4). The historical importance of this should not be underestimated, because
this was also of high political relevance. Islam managed to unify and create a common
purpose for people who originally had nothing that tied them together, allowing them to
build the necessary organizational structures to become an imperial power. Just like other
empires, the Islamic ones at some point fell victim to different forms of institutional decay
that made them increasingly unsustainable (Fukuyama 2012c, chaps. 13, 14, and 15), but
it is hard to imagine that without Islam there would have been an empire out of Arabia in
the first place. One can only agree with Francis Fukuyama’s observation that there
is no clearer illustration of the importance of ideas to politics than
the emergence of an Arab state under the prophet Muhammad. The Arab
tribes played an utterly marginal role in world history until that point; it was
only Muhammad’s charismatic authority that allowed them to unify and
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project their power throughout the Middle East and North Africa
(Fukuyama 2012, 88).

The 15th century Muslim scholar Abdel Rahman Ibn Khaldun described the role of
Islam in this process as follows:
“When people possess the [right] insight into their affairs, nothing
can withstand them, because their outlook is one and they share a unity of
purpose for which they are willing to die” (quoted in: Karsh 2013, 25).

But this new religion did not just spring from nowhere, and in order to gain
legitimacy among the people it tried to convert, it had to take existing emotional
commitments into account. It is, for example, debatable if the practice of veiling is
originally Islamic or was in fact adopted from Persian ideas of female modesty (Ahmed
1992, 55–56). In pre-modern times the ability of imperial states to monitor its population
was limited, so the stronger and more sincere the commitment of a majority of the
population was to the ideological purpose of the state, the greater was the likelihood that
they would be loyal and obedient subjects – not by the power of fear, but the power of
conviction. And one way of ensuring this loyalty was to adopt existing traditions that
people followed voluntarily and incorporated into the new creed.
Another example would be the spread of Christianity throughout Europe during
Medieval times. As Richard Fletcher explores in great detail, the Christianization of Europe
was a complex process, where missionaries and representatives of the Christian faith
connected and gradually transformed existing pagan cultures, making them part of a larger
Christian culture (Fletcher 1999). It is no secret that Christmas and other modern church
practices have their roots in pagan forms of worship, but this is not a sign of early
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Christianity’s weakness or strength. Rather, it reflects an approach that took the existing
emotional commitments of medieval European tribes seriously. By taking the emotional
bonds that existed between peoples and their pagan rituals and reconnecting them to
Christianity, the likelihood of voluntary conversion was much higher than if it had been
done by force. Christianity’s success was not so much a matter of replacing, but instead of
merging and rebuilding, existing identities.
It needs to be mentioned that this cultural expansion, however, was a two-way
street: Christianity was transformed by its interaction with Rome and central European
tribalism, just as Islam was transformed by the peoples and areas of the Near- and Middle
East and Central Asia. When we tell the stories of these cultural transformations we must
be careful not to see determinism that does not exist. Islam and Christianity are successful
examples of such transformations, but not because there is a simple step-by-step program
that a new religion or ideology can follow in order to establish itself. There have been
multiple additional factors in the realm of economics and politics that created the necessary
conditions for the success of these two religions. Nonetheless, they do demonstrate the
important role of emotional commitments in creating sustainable communities.
The question modernity is asking is whether forms of community can be created
and sustained without these commitments. Modernity is poses itself therefore as a
fundamental break with the past, since it lays claim to the idea that all the benefits of
community can be accessed rationally and cognitively, creating moral bonds between
individuals that are not sustained by emotions, but through a process of cognitive
rationality (DeSouza 1998). The attempt is to maintain morality not out of the instinctive
feeling that something is right or wrong, but out of a rational and cognitive analysis that
390

something objectively is right or wrong. Habermas and other philosophers who deal with
the question of modernity assume that morality is accessible solely be cognitive means,
which is a highly doubtful assumption. Even if it were true, there is no reason to assume
that accessing morality cognitively will lead to universally applicable moral ideas.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This is in a nutshell what moral foundations theory has revealed: Different ideas of
morality can be held with equal commitment by different people and it is not as easy to
declare one side wrong and the other right as it might seems. As Jonathan Haidt has pointed
out in political debates, we sometimes tend to ascribe the most negative motivations to
people who do not share our views; a closer look at the origins of these views however
often reveals that they have the same moral ambitions we do, but attempt to reach them by
different interpretations of the world. (He uses a good example discussing economic
policies: Haidt 2010.)
To put this point in less scientific terms, two people can agree that it is 28 degrees
Celsius outside, but whether this is perceived as hot or cold depends very much on the
individual. Similarly, two people can agree on the need for justice, fairness, equality and
all other kinds of moral ideas, but might widely differ when it comes to the propositional
content of these terms. The question of what is just is quite different from the statement
justice is good, and cultural conflicts usually arose regarding the former and not the latter.
One of the key features that emerged from the Enlightenment was the idea that
these questions can be answered in the same fashion that one can calculate the position of
Mars three days from now. Morality must follow some definable rules, and once these rules
are uncovered and stripped from its cultural superstructure, we can have a moral society
based on reason without the confusing influence of culture with its prejudices, symbols,
and traditions. Yet the disentanglement of reason and culture proved to be much more
difficult than expected, since overthrowing the faith of tradition itself rested on a faith in
reason “that reason itself cannot justify” (S. B. Smith 2007, KL 208). So the struggle
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between reason and rationality, on the one hand, and culture, on the other, seems to run in
circles, since in order to replace traditional cultures based on religion and other beliefs the
Enlightenment – partially intentionally, partially unintentionally – needed to create its own
faith-based system, an Enlightenment Culture on its own. The popularity of the natural
sciences and the application of its methods “has to some degree repressed that kind of
historical philosophy. But what lies behind it has not changed” (Aron 2011, 103). We
therefore must inquire into philosophical roots of the role of rationality and how it became
such an important concept. As I tried to point out in the course of this dissertation, its
purpose is not to discard reason and rationality and embracea thoroughly antiEnlightenment position, but to identify the cultural aspects of Enlightenment rationality
and thereby justify the role of culture as an important aspect of the social sciences. The
tensions between reason and passion and which one should be preferred are among the
most important philosophical questions in modern political thought. My argument is that
this discussion itself produced a unique culture that is still with us today. The
Enlightenment and its opponents created new ways of looking at human existence, and
neither side in the larger philosophical debate could fully escape the influence of the other.
The very struggle of modernity is characterized by the two poles of the human condition:
The desire to give life a metaphysical and transcendental meaning but simultaneously
realizing that human existence might not be different from the existence of any other
material object without a true will of its own.
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